U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Energy and Commerce, Republicans Prepared Witness Testimony: Kilpatrick, Kwame

Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

Full Committee on Energy and Commerce
September 3, 2003
10:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building

Introduction

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Dingell and other members of the Committee. Good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to participate in this critical hearing about the Blackout of 2003.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 14, 2003, a disturbance within the Eastern Interconnection power grid began a rapid chain of events that resulted in a massive power outage affecting a significant portion of the Northeastern United States. This outage disrupted service in eight states (and parts of Canada), forcing 50 million people to lose electrical power.

The outage hit the Detroit area at approximately 4:17 p.m. That is when the nearby Enrico Fermi Nuclear power plant lost power and shut down. The City of Detroit lost all power shortly after that at around 4:21 p.m. The blackout paralyzed transportation, disrupted communications and left many people - particularly senior housing residents - in a potentially life-threatening situation and without basic, necessary services. Four million customers of the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD) lacked drinking water, because the power outage shut down the pumps that delivered that water to homes and businesses throughout the region. Power was restored to the Detroit area on Saturday, August 16. However, even with the power restored, the region was forced to endure the threat of rolling blackouts, and residents were advised to boil-water until the following Wednesday to ensure that the drinking water was safe for consumption.

Despite these difficult circumstances, the people of Detroit remained calm and showed a true sense of community. There was no panic in the streets and neighborhoods remained calm. Much of the credit goes to the hard-working men and women who are employed by the city. These personnel worked tirelessly to confront the endless stream of issues and problems that arose within the city during the outage. These personnel (using updated emergency response plans and other protocols developed as part of the city's homeland security planning efforts) were able to respond to the needs of Detroit's communities.

I have learned a number of lessons from the events of those several days. The most important of which is that this experience serves as an indicator that our efforts to be better organized and prepared to deal with catastrophic emergencies has paid off and that our homeland security planning has pointed the city in the right direction. However, at the same time, this experience tells me that as a nation, we still have a long way to go particularly in addressing core vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and in giving local governments the resources they need to be ready to respond to critical incidents.

What were the specific events leading to the blackout?

As all of you are aware, a comprehensive investigation has begun into the causes of the blackout. But, based on information that has already been publicly disclosed, I am greatly troubled. I am troubled that we still do not know why the outage occurred and why the safeguards built into the system to specifically prevent such a large-scale power outage failed to work. Even more disturbing is that this power outage is but one of a number of events that have occurred this summer that call into question the stability of our nation's critical infrastructure.

On July 30, there was a major pipeline ruptured spilling approximately 10,000 gallons of gasoline and causing a massive disruption in fuel supplies within the State of Arizona. As a result gas prices shot up not just in Arizona, but also across the country.
On August 20, a computer failure caused by two viruses shut down the entire CSX Transportation system and halted train service for hours in 23 states.
Published reports also indicate that computer viruses disrupted New York City's 3-1-1 system, forced the closing of the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration offices, shut down the check-in system at Air Canada and wreaked havoc on an unclassified Navy-Marine Corps intranet.
And, the nation is still dealing with the ramifications of the latest "Sobig" and "Master" computer viruses, which spread to more than a million computers in a matter of days and disrupted critical public and private sector information systems.

When all these events are viewed together, there is only one conclusion - the nation's critical infrastructures remain at risk and highly vulnerable to attack or failure due to system weaknesses. And despite two years of discussion and debate over how best to protect the nation's critical infrastructures, we have yet to take steps to assess the vulnerability of the infrastructures and mitigate the risks caused by those vulnerabilities.

Which systems operated as designed, and which systems failed?

When the outage hit Detroit, approximately 2.1 million people lost power. Additionally, a number of key systems failed to operate effectively. For example:

Four million Detroit Water and Sewage Department customers lost water.
While the city's 9-1-1 telephone system remained operational, the computer aided dispatch system used by the police and fire departments failed to operate at full capacity.
The phone system used by the city government failed to operate.
Cellular phones used by a number of key public safety personnel failed to operate, because a number of cellular carriers experienced partial network outages. This is particularly important because one of these cellular telephone companies advertises that its systems present a feasible back up to public safety radio systems. In this case, one of the phones that failed to operate was the one used by Detroit's homeland security director. The failure of this particular cellular phone actually disrupted communications between the city and the Department of Homeland Security. DHS finally had to resort to going through our homeland security consultants in Maryland in order to get in contact with us.
The blackout shut down transportation systems and critically impacted traffic, especially at the border. The Detroit-Windsor tunnel had to close, stranding some workers. 27,000 people use the tunnel daily to cross the U.S.-Canadian border. Many of the commuters staff our city's hospitals.
Detroit Metropolitan Airport remained open, but with very limited operations. Northwest Airlines, the main carrier out of Detroit, cancelled 216 flights.
The Marathon Ashland refinery, which is about 10 miles south of Detroit, suffered a small explosion because of the outage, and police had to evacuate hundreds of residents who lived within a mile of the complex.
Though most Detroit hospitals remained fully operational, they had to utilize back-up generators and keep hospital employees from using computers to conserve energy. Elective surgeries were canceled. And at Children's Hospital of Michigan, everyone who could be discharged was sent home in order to make room for about 30 children who developed aggravated asthma problems due to the lack of air conditioning in their homes.

Despite all of these issues, I am proud to say that city personnel were able to respond to and manage the consequences of the blackout quickly and efficiently. As I said earlier, much of the credit goes to the hard-working men and women employed by the City of Detroit. Credit also goes to members of the community who were able to come together and weather this crisis. However, much of the city's success in managing this crisis was due to the procedures and protocols developed through Detroit's homeland security planning efforts. In April 2002, the city released its comprehensive homeland security strategy that focused on strengthening the day-to-day preparedness of the city. Since the release of that strategy, Detroit has taken a number of steps that improved the city's ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks and other critical incidents. These efforts directly enhanced the city's ability to confront the myriad of problems that faced the city during the blackout. For example, the city:

appointed a homeland security director who during the blackout served as a hub for the sharing of critical information between the city and various federal, state and other public and private entities;
established a Homeland Security Council comprised of key public safety, public health and other city officials to coordinate strategic planning and operational coordination before and during critical incidents. (During the blackout, this group convened immediately and served as a problem solving team, working together to address the various consequences of the outage);
upgraded our Emergency Operations Center which was activated and served as a command and control center during the entire blackout; and
updated our departmental emergency response plans and utilized those plans as the foundation for operational activity during the blackout. For example, police, fire and emergency personnel were either dispatched to the streets or put on alert to handle any potential emergencies. Additionally, three public schools were converted to "cooling centers" for the elderly and others in need of relief from the heat.

What were the lessons learned from this event?

Despite our level of preparedness, what we learned from the blackout is that we still have a long way to go. The lessons learned include the following:

When a catastrophic event occurs - whether it is a terrorist attack or a power outage - local agencies are the first to respond and the last to leave. In Detroit's case it was the fire and emergency departments that handled a number of calls for service. It was Detroit's police that patrolled the streets and kept the city safe. And, it was Detroit's housing workers, along with labor and business leaders, who checked on and delivered food to more than 1,200 public housing and senior housing residents. Local first responders handled this crisis.
The same information networks, communication systems and personnel that cities depend on to provide day-to-day emergency and non-emergency service are critical to effectively dealing with the catastrophic events. 9-1-1, 3-1-1 and other communications/information systems must not only remain operational during any crisis, but also have the ability to handle a dramatic increase in use.
Communication among local, regional, state and federal officials is vital when an incident like this occurs. We still need to make improvements in this regard.
There needs to be thought given to how local jurisdictions will be notified that they are in the midst of a crisis that is regional or even national in scope. In this case, the city first learned that the outage was not simply a local problem from the news media. A comprehensive notification process must be developed quickly.
Communication with the public is also critical. The city placed a high priority on getting accurate and timely information to the public. Within minutes of the blackout occurring, the city was communicating with the public via radio. I held four press briefings during the course of the blackout, updating the efforts to restore power, directing residents to cooling centers and just generally keeping them informed. But, obviously, as this was a power outage situation, communications were limited to those who had access to cable television (which was functioning), car radios or battery powered televisions and radios. The City of Detroit is exploring alternative means of communicating with the public (such as reverse 9-1-1 systems).

How can we avoid incidents like the blackout?

Although there was no horrific loss of life, the power outage -like the attacks of 9/11 - illustrate that there are still a number of steps the nation must take as we seek to improve our emergency preparedness.

First and foremost, we need to take aggressive steps to assess and address the vulnerabilities to our nation's critical infrastructure (Agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services, telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, etc.). As a first step, the nation needs to complete a national threat and vulnerability assessment that identifies vulnerabilities to key systems. Then, we must systematically proceed to address the risks posed by those vulnerabilities. As we approach the two-year anniversary of 9/11, I am concerned that this task has not been completed.

In the meantime, local governments need to be prepared to respond should there be future incidents like the blackout (whether caused by mistake, disrepair or attack). Accordingly, local governments need to be given homeland security funding directly and have the flexibility to use those funds in a way that best meets the needs of that individual city. The needs of Detroit are different from the needs of Los Angeles, and prohibitions against using these funds to enhance a city's service delivery infrastructure are misguided and counterproductive.

I understand that there are those in Washington who believe that if unchecked, homeland security dollars will get funneled off to fill other budget gaps. But to say that these dollars cannot be spent for salaries for first responders, key equipment such as fire trucks, or for the communication and information technology that comprises a city's service delivery infrastructure is just bad policy. Homeland security funds must be available for use by local governments to do things like improve and strengthen their 9-1-1, non-emergency and information systems. These systems must have the redundancy and capacity necessary to be of use during critical events such as the blackout.

Projected Costs Costs to the city based upon the blackout events, are projected to exceed 10 million dollars. We are still compiling this information and hope to have a final number before long.

Conclusion

We have been told that this outage was not the result of a terrorist attack. But, even if terrorism has been ruled out, we should hardly take comfort in that fact. We have certainly revealed to the world some of our vulnerabilities, and it is now time to demonstrate that we are taking the necessary steps to assess the critical issues and address any weaknesses so that we will be prepared in the event of any future crisis.

Thank you.

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