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Prepared Witness Testimony The House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Blackout 2003: How Did It Happen and Why?
Full Committee on Energy and Commerce
Mr. Charles J. Durkin Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION My name is Charles J. Durkin, Jr. I am Chairman of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council ("NPCC"), the international regional electric reliability organization for northeastern North America. My business address is Northeast Power Coordinating Council, 1515 Broadway, 43rd Floor, New York, New York 10036. Prior to acceptance of this position in January 1999, I was a senior electric power executive for Consolidated Edison in New York City. I continue to provide consulting services to them and the industry. A summary of my qualifications is included at the end of this statement. I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the electric power disruptions experienced on August 14, 2003 and to tell you about NPCC's numerous follow-up activities. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NPCC Let me start by giving you a brief description of NPCC. The Northeast Power Coordinating Council is one of ten Regional Reliability Councils, which together make up the North American Electric Reliability Council ("NERC"). NPCC's Region encompasses Northeastern North America, including all of New York and New England, and the area in Eastern Canada comprised of the Ontario, Quebec and Maritime Provinces. NPCC is almost equally balanced, 50 percent U.S. and 50 percent Canadian. Approximately 70 percent of Canada's load is located within NPCC's region. NPCC plays a vital role in assuring the reliability of the international, interconnected bulk power systems in its Region. The NPCC Membership Agreement provides for open and inclusive membership, and fair and non-discriminatory governance with the Council's activities directed by a balanced stakeholder Executive Committee. Each NPCC Member is obligated to plan, design and operate its bulk power system in compliance with mandatory regionally-specific reliability criteria and broad-based industry-wide NERC standards. Within NPCC, adherence to reliability criteria is enforced through a comprehensive program of compliance monitoring and non-monetary sanctions. II. WHAT HAPPENED ON AUGUST 14TH The sequence of events experienced in the NPCC Region on August 14th happened in a very short time period (seconds) and was initiated by events outside its boundary. A full understanding of the events will come from careful review of all the data, on a consistent basis. What we know at the present time comes from information supplied by the operating entities within the affected areas. This information is still in the process of being reviewed and time-sequenced by NPCC and NERC. The following information may be revised as the disturbance analysis continues. The immediate electrical events observed in NPCC prior to the blackout occurred starting at approximately 4:10 p.m. EDT with the sudden reversal of power flow between Ontario and Michigan. The NPCC system appears to have remained stable during this initial power surge. Within a minute or so, the NPCC Region observed large inrushing power flows, and severe frequency and load oscillations. This first power swing caused the tripping of inter-regional and regional tie lines. Consequently, portions of the NPCC Region separated from the Eastern Interconnection. As a result:
SUMMARY OF PRESENT ANALYSIS On August 15th, NPCC announced it was assembling an assessment team of regional experts to perform a detailed analysis of events within the Region. This activity, which will require significant effort, will be coordinated with NERC, the DOE, Provinces and States. The analysis is expected to require extensive investigative work to determine the factors within NPCC that contributed to the wide spread blackout. It is anticipated that it will take several months to complete. NPCC has adopted an aggressive three-phase approach in its internal analysis of the blackout; first, to develop a detailed sequence of events within NPCC; and second, to conduct a detailed analysis of the events that resulted in the cascading collapse of a major portion of the NPCC Region and identify areas for analysis. Included in this analysis will be a review of the sequence of the restoration. The third phase of the analysis will develop findings, conclusions and recommendations for further study. In addition, the Chairman of MAAC, a designated representative for ECAR and I, as Chairman of NPCC, have established a flexible coordination agreement with NERC as we proceed with our analysis of the Blackout of 2003. I serve as the Regional blackout investigation facilitator, working closely with the NERC blackout investigation steering group. NERC's efforts will supplement and contribute to the Joint U.S. DOE - Canadian Task Force Investigation. The Regions assigned an existing MAAC-ECAR-NPCC ("MEN") interregional Study Committee the role of lead industry blackout study team and directed them to update the MEN 2003 summer load flow base case computer model to represent the system conditions that existed on August 14th. In addition, building on the dynamics analysis efforts already underway within NPCC, a Major System Disturbance Task Force ("MSDTF") has been formed under the MEN Study Committee to develop a companion dynamics database. These cases will serve as the basis of the computer simulations of the events of August 14th. III. NPCC SYSTEMS OPERATED AS DESIGNED Early indications are that systems in NPCC designed to protect power system equipment operated as expected. Very little power system equipment was damaged by the power surges that came crashing in over the NPCC tie lines. In an occurrence such as this, one of the greatest dangers to the restoration of electric service is the potential for damage to the system itself - the power plants and the transmission lines, and related equipment. If damage of this nature occurs, it potentially could take days, weeks, or months to complete restoration. The complex protective mechanisms installed on the NPCC system, its power plants and related equipment worked as intended and no serious equipment damage was reported. IV. LESSONS LEARNED The events of August 14th have focused attention on the reliability interdependency of systems within the eastern interconnection. This interdependency is by design. The resources of the interconnected systems have throughout the years successfully supported individual utilities during times of capacity shortages and following sudden contingencies. As a result of this support, blackouts have been avoided. However, this interdependency also carries risk and specific responsibilities. The system must be operated consistent with its design in order to reap the economic and reliability benefits associated with interconnections. One primary responsibility is that local actions must be taken to keep local problems from spreading. This appears to not have happened in this case. Speaking from an NPCC perspective, by the time the systems in New York and Ontario saw indications of a serious problem, it was already too late. V. AVOIDING FUTURE BLACKOUTS With regard to actions that can be taken to reduce the potential for future blackouts, we must avoid speculation and wait until the investigation currently underway is completed. Some of these possible actions can be extremely costly. However, in the meantime, NPCC has indicated its support for enactment of U.S. electric reliability legislation and its preference for section 16031 of H.R. 6 as previously passed by the House of Representatives. In a letter attached to this testimony, NPCC has outlined its support for the provisions within this legislation, which authorize the establishment of industry-based reliability organizations, and advance NPCC's international reliability assurance efforts. NPCC prefers the language in section 16031 of H.R. 6, because it contains express acknowledgement of the necessity for more stringent criteria to address the unique reliability needs within New York. CLOSING In closing, I thank you for the invitation to speak with you today, and answer questions you may have. I reaffirm NPCC's unwavering commitment to assuring a high level of electric system reliability and stand ready to take the necessary actions to accomplish this objective. QUALIFICATIONS I graduated from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts, in June 1965 with a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering. Upon graduation from college, I joined Con Edison's Engineering Training Program in Technical Services. I completed the University of Michigan's Public Utility Executive Program in 1981. I was promoted to various positions, from Chief System Operator, to Manager of System Operation, to Vice President of System & Transmission Operations in 1982, and to Vice President of Engineering in 1988. I was named Vice President of Fossil Power in December 1993, and as of October 1997 was named Vice President of Generation Engineering. During the course of my career I have been involved in various committees and activities of organizations such as the New York Power Pool, the North American Electric Reliability Council, the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, and the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies. I have authored numerous papers presented at IEEE meetings, published in IEEE and ASME Journals, and hold a U.S. Patent for a Frequency-Responsive Control Circuit issued in 1971. I was elected a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers in 1994.
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