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Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

 

Procurement and Property Mismanagement and Theft at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
February 26, 2003
1:00 PM
2322 Rayburn House Office Building 

 

Mr. Steve Doran
Consultant, Office of the President
University of California

 Good afternoon. 

Chairman Greenwood, members of the Subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen: 

Thank you for inviting me here to testify.My name is Steven Doran.Los Alamos Laboratory recruited me to work as an investigator in the Safeguards and Security Division in the Spring of 2002.The recruiter who approached me told me that the Lab was having serious problems with national security and theft, and needed people like me to come in and help them clean it up. 

After interviewing with Mr. Walp, Mr. Michael Wismer and Ms. Nina Epperson, the Lab offered me the job.The Lab recruiter encouraged me to take the job, because working at the Lab would be a service to the Laboratory as well as the country.I went to Los Alamos with the hope that I could be part of a broad effort to stop the rampant theft at the Lab, and protect the security of the country's most important nuclear secrets. 

I started work on July 15, 2002.A few days later, I began to work with the FBI on the Bussolini and Alexander case, where two managers at the Lab had misused the government purchase order system to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars in property.In the following days and months, I saw the FBI's and my successful investigative efforts in this case and all the other cases I was working on thwarted by the Lab's upper level management - Joseph Salgado, Frank Dickson, Gene Tucker, and Stan Busboom.Lab Managers from other departments, including Richard Marquez, Stan Hettich, Dick Stickler, Vernon Brown, and John Tapia attempted to cover up and change and conceal information from our office.

These managers and Lab counsel Dickson continued to make innuendos and threats that Mr. Walp's and my employment could be in jeopardy if we continued investigating the rampant misuse of government credit cards and the purchase order system.Because of the productive working relationship that I developed with FBI special agent Jeff Campbell, Mr. Busboom told me specifically that I had to protect Lab counsel's relationship with the FBI and the United States Attorney, or I would be fired.What he meant was that I should participate in the cover-up of major crimes at the Lab, and use my good relationship with the FBI to prevent them from investigating these matters on their own. 

Although I always followed the orders given me by my superiors, I refused to cooperate in their cover-up.My upper level managers refused to provide me and the FBI with documents we needed for our investigations, discouraged me from interviewing key witnesses, disseminated information about our investigations to the targets of those investigations, and administratively settled cases so that the United States government could not criminally prosecute the wrongdoers.By October, almost all of my investigations had been stopped, or bottlenecked in Mr. Dickson's office.Less than three months after I started work at Los Alamos, I spent most of my workday defending my position that we were working to protect taxpayer funds and the national security, rather than the University of California contract.This meant that I had to do my "real work" at nights and on the weekend.Despite the FBI's repeated requests that Lab management reconsider and assign us to help them, the managers refused to let us help the FBI.

Dedicated former and current employees at the Laboratory supported us, and kept on reporting things to us, even after management began to retaliate against us.I received a call about a possible espionage matter, which I passed on the Counterintelligence Division.When the Division did nothing, I called and e-mailed again.As far as I know, the Laboratory never followed up on this matter.After I was terminated, I got calls from former employees who had documented millions of dollars in fraud, but were ignored by Lab management. 

It is unfortunate that it took the current crisis of confidence in the University of California to put these problems on the national agenda.But now that Congress and the DOE are actively exercising oversight and requiring accountability, it looks as though the University of California is trying to do something about these problems.I hope that Mr. Walp's and my termination has a silver lining - it brought Los Alamos to its senses about putting some order in its house so that it can go about doing its important work in a way that best serves the citizens of the United States.

 

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