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Prepared Witness Testimony

The House Committee on Energy and Commerce

 

The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: A Review of the Situation in Pennsylvania

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
February 10, 2003
10:00 AM
St. Mary Medical Center, Sister Claire Carty Auditorium, Langhorne-Newtown Roads, Langhorne, Pennsylvania 

 

Thomas Nasca MD, FACP
Dean
Jefferson Medical School Senior Vice President Thomas Jefferson University President of Thomas Jefferson University Physicians
1025 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA, 19107

Chairman Greenwood, Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, of the United States of America House of Representatives: 

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the important issue at hand. By way of introduction, my name is Thomas J. Nasca, M.D. I am a Board Certified Nephrologist, and am the Senior Vice President of Thomas Jefferson University, the Dean of Jefferson Medical College, the 8th oldest medical school in the United States, and the President of Jefferson University Physicians, the "practice plan" of the nearly 500 full time clinical faculty of Jefferson Medical College. My curriculum vitae is attached to my written testimony. 

I will not present views concerning the causes of the medical liability insurance crisis in this and a number of other states. You have many experts providing testimony clarifying prevailing, often conflicting views on this very difficult issue. 

Rather, I would like to present to you the impact, both currently measurable, and anecdotally not yet measurable (but felt "on the ground") in at least one major medical school and academic medical center which has served the citizens of this country for nearly 200 years. To do so, I will take the liberty of briefly explaining the missions of the academic medical center, the basics of its funding streams, and the impact of rapid escalation of costs, in this case medical liability insurance costs, on these core missions. 

Missions of Medical Schools and Academic Medical Centers

The missions of the 125 allopathic medical schools and their related academic medical centers are public goods. These missions are carried out in an environment with significant governmental and accrediting agency oversight. They are threefold: 

  1. The Mission of Education: education of the next generation of caregivers, including physicians and nurses.
  2. The Mission of Discovery and Scholarship: the search for basic and clinically relevant discoveries which lead to prevention of disease, enhancement of survival, or amelioration of suffering of persons. This mission also includes the dissemination of this information to all practitioners to enhance care across the nation and the world.
  3. The Mission of Clinical Care: the provision of state-of-the-art care, often research based, which will lead to the patient centered care of the individual, provide the opportunity for education of the next generation of caregivers, and the development and dissemination of knowledge beyond the individual patient.

These institution are not only the germinal center for the miracle cures and clinical innovations which have enhanced the life span and quality of life of all Americans. They are also educational gems, the desired destination of potential physicians and researchers across the world. 

Funding Streams to Support the Missions 

1. Funding the Educational Mission

Medical student education is partially supported through tuition dollars of medical students. Educational efforts of the faculty in the pre-clinical years for medical students are supported largely through these dollars. 

In the clinical setting and in the conference room, trainees are supervised in the care of patients. This model of progressive responsibility under direct faculty supervision ultimately yields (after 4 years of medical school, and up to 10 years of graduate medical education) a practitioner who is competent to practice medicine independent of direct supervision. There are limited dollars from tuition to support medical student education. (Tuition supports less than 40% of the total costs of provision of medical student education at Jefferson Medical College). The majority of clinical education is supported through willingness of the physician to perform this important task without institutional compensation. This is done at a cost of time of the physician faculty. 

Thus, medical student education in the clinical phase is provided through the volunteer efforts of clinicians who are faculty members of the school, whether they are "full time" or "volunteer" clinical faculty. In essence, the time spent teaching is being subsidized by the clinical income of the physicians' practice.

Medicare (and in some states Medicaid) recognizes faculty expenses incurred in the education of residents and fellows, but this is not the case for most other insurance providers. Thus, teaching efforts by the faculty on behalf of residents and fellows in the clinical setting are partially supported by Medicare Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME) funding. These dollars come to the faculty from the hospital, in Jefferson's case, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (TJUH).  

2. Funding the Research Mission

In general terms, direct research awards pay for the actual costs of conducting research. Indirect cost recovery is provided by federal sponsors and some other sponsors to support the institutional infrastructure costs incurred in creation of the research environment. Since all direct and indirect costs of the research enterprise are not reimbursed, shortfalls must be provided by the institution. 

Of important note in these discussions is the unique role of the "Translational Scientist-Clinician." These are the specialized physician scientists who search for cures for illness found in his or her patients. These physician-scientists are the translators of discoveries made in the laboratory into relevant clinical treatments, procedures, or cures. They are usually highly sub-specialized clinicians who care for a group of patients with a particular disease, while also conducting laboratory-based research. Thus, they practice medicine "part time," usually between 15-50% of their effort. Their research time is usually funded through National Institutes of Health awards, or other sources of research funding. Their clinical time must be supported through their clinical practice. Since their practice is part time, high fixed costs, such as medical liability insurance premiums, make the economic dimensions of clinical practice increasingly difficult, or impossible. 

Shortfalls in research faculty, facility and other related costs are born by the institution. Sources of funding for these shortfalls are:

a.     Institutional Endowments

b.    Philanthropy

c.     Surplus clinical revenue from the practice plan (the "dean's tax") 

3. Funding the Clinical Mission

Clinical care is supported through the clinical revenue generated in the care of patients. Institutional support is provided during start-up of new faculty, but the clinical enterprise is expected to be largely self-supporting. Academic physicians and their institutions care for all patients who come to their doors, regardless of their ability to pay. Furthermore, patients with severe or unusual illnesses seek out experts at academic medical centers. These patients require more time, more effort, and oversight. Reimbursement for these services is not routinely recognized by third party payors, and is often systematically inadequate to cover the costs of provision of care. Academic physicians have traditionally accepted lower salaries in order to participate in the tripartite mission of the medical school and academic medical center. Indeed, medical schools have utilized this altruistic dimension of the academic physician to subsidize the education of medical students, residents, and clinical fellows over the past 100 years, in the post-Flexnerian era of medical education. 

The Impact of the Current Crisis on Jefferson Medical College

The tenuous balance between clinical service, education, and the funding of research at Jefferson is in jeopardy of disruption due to the recent, unprecedented increases in cost for medical liability insurance. 

Figure 1. Total Medical Liability Insurance Premiums, Jefferson University Physicians

 

The impact of such dramatic increases, in excess of 100%, are significant on the financial health of the organization. With approximately $145,000,000 in total revenue and expenses in the practice plan (Jefferson University Physicians), malpractice costs in the current fiscal year account for 12.8% of all expenses. Furthermore, the increase in medical liability insurance costs has not abated since it doubled in 2001-2002. The continued annual increase in premiums has forced increases in clinical service provision to merely "keep pace" with the unprecedented costs of insurance. Further, it should be noted that Jefferson University Physicians has had a lower than expected claims history over the past 15 years than expected (by specialty) according to actuarial analysis. It is also important to understand that these figures do not include medical liability insurance costs for the University Hospital (TJUH), where resident physician liability costs hare borne. They are merely the cost of insuring the 469 full time clinicians of the faculty. 

It is instructive to review specialty specific data. Below in Table 1. is listed the per physician medical liability insurance annual premiums for Jefferson physicians for 1996-97 to the present. As can be seen in this data, the striking increase has not only been seen in specialized surgical disciplines such as Obstetrics and Gynecology, but also in the primary care discipline of General Internal Medicine. The impact on actual salaries of physicians in these disciplines is predictable, and seen in Table 2. 

Table 1. Specialty Specific Medical Liability Insurance Premiums,

Jefferson University Physicians

Specialty

1997-1998

1998-1999

1999-2000

2000-2001

2001-2002

2002-2003

2003-2004

Proj.

OB/GYN

48,400

48,000

51,300

60,948

106,600

122,000

137,188

General Surgery

41,600

40,300

43,390

48,500

82,600

91,946

100,164

Internal Medicine

9,780

9,702

10,714

12,000

22,185

24,981

29,650

 

Table 2. Median Specialty Specific Compensation,

Jefferson University Physicians

 

Specialty

1997-1998

1998-1999

1999-2000

2000-2001

2001-2002

2002-2003

OB/GYN

100,000

103,796

114,478

119,544

112,435

110,000

General Surgery

196,500

191,350

197,386

172,703

193,734

212,715

Internal Medicine

180,983

167,770

157,500

158,713

169,869

147,102

  

The result of these increases in medical liability insurance costs at Jefferson has been threefold.

  1. The clinical faculty are providing more clinical services, and spending more time seeing patients.
  2. The clinical faculty are seeing compensation decrease in constant dollars, and in many instances decrease in total dollars. This is despite the fact that salaries at Jefferson are, in general, lower than competitive salary scales at our regional competitors, and when viewed in comparison to other Northeastern University Medical Schools (AAMC Salary Survey).
  3. The time for teaching, conducting clinical research, and for each patient encounter is decreasing.

The net result of such phenomena is predictable. Faculty morale is suffering, and individual faculty members are questioning the utility of spending as much time in direct clinical practice as the physicians in private practice, with less and less time able to be dedicated to research and education. This phenomena is not confined to Jefferson. In a soon to be published study conducted by the Group on Practice Affairs of the Association of American Medical Colleges, faculty morale brought about by these and related phenomena is dropping significantly. (Lynne Davis Boyle, AAMC, unpublished data). 

The impact on faculty, if continued, is clear. Dissatisfaction with the academic practice of medicine will lead to loss of faculty from medical schools, and the inability to recruit the best and brightest young faculty to fill their shoes. Deterioration of the educational and translational research efforts will have long-term disastrous effects on the public. As the country is looking to the academic medical community to solve problems such as cancer, heart disease, while providing protection from bio-terrorism and emerging diseases, the academic medical community will be disintegrating. 

Much has been written concerning the fragility of the American Health Care system. After over a decade of absent capital reimbursement, "cost minus" adjustments in hospital reimbursement, managed care "discounting" of physician reimbursement, recent reductions in Medicare reimbursement for physician services, and dramatic escalations of medical liability insurance premiums for hospitals and doctors, the health care system is in a precarious state. An important subset of this health care system is the Medical School-Academic Medical Center. These 125 medical school based delivery systems are a national resource. They clearly are jeopardized, and the message is reaching those who are choosing medicine as a career. In addition to those students who have chosen not to pursue medicine as a career (applications are down from a high of >45,000 in 1996 to <32,000 in 2002, source, AMCAS, AAMC), the attitudes of graduating students and residents are instructive. Attached in the Appendix to this testimony are two documents obtained from the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC). The first is a comparison of the results of the graduation questionnaire administered to all medical students (>95% response rate). In analysis of this question, responses of students indicating an intent to ultimately practice in the state of Pennsylvania are compared to all other students completing the questionnaire. Of note are two important phenomena. First, there was little difference between students interested in practicing in Pennsylvania and the rest of the country in 2001. Additionally, there were 525 students intending to practice in Pennsylvania.

 Second, in 2002, there is a clear trend seen in the students interested in ultimately practicing in Pennsylvania, with 92.1% of students agreeing or strongly agreeing (with 60.0% strongly agreeing) with this statement, in comparison to a stable 84.6% (40.1% strongly agreeing) in students interested in practicing in other states. Finally, a trend may be developing. There were only 445 students indicating intention to practice in Pennsylvania. This is a reduction of 80, or 15% over the prior year. 

Table 3. Opinion of Graduating Medical Students (2001 and 2002) on Medical Liability: Students Planning to Practice in Pennsylvania vs. All Graduating Students

 

Question: Based on your experiences, indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"Physicians' legal liabilities and the high cost of malpractice insurance are major problems."

 

Year

Category of Graduating Medical Student

Strongly Agree

(%)

Agree

(%)

No Opinion

(%)

Disagree

(%)

Strongly
 Disagree
 (%)

Count

(%)

2001

Plan to Practice in Pennsylvania

39.8

46.9

10.3

2.9

0.2

525

2001

All Graduating Students

34.4

48.10

12.8

4.6

0.1

14,139

2002

Plan to Practice in Pennsylvania

60.0

31.2

5.6

3.1

0.0

445

2002

All Graduating Students

40.1

44.2

11.7

3.8

0.2

14,162

 

Source: 2001 and 2002 Medical School Graduation Questionnaire, Association of American Medical Colleges. Lynne Davis Boyle, personal communications.  

Medical students are years away from a practice site choice. Residents and fellows make that choice at the end of their training. GME Track (AAMC) is a survey intended to follow these and other trends. Results from the recent GME Track survey provide more concerning information which, if it is a trend, would demonstrated significant concerns for the future flow of young physicians to Pennsylvania. 

Pennsylvania-Trained Residents in "High-Risk" Specialties:

Immediate Career Plans Upon Completion of Training Programs, 2000 - 2002*

Source: AAMC GME Track, 2000 - 2002  

Specialty

Of Those Choosing

Private Practice:

% Remaining inPennsylvania

2000

Of Those Choosing

Private Practice:

% Remaining inPennsylvania

2001

Of Those Choosing

Private Practice:

% Remaining inPennsylvania

2002

% Change

2000 - 2002

Neurosurgery

25 %

0 %

0 %

100%

decline

OB/GYN

44%

42 %

28 %

36%

decline

Anesthesiology

56 %

25 %

10 %

82%

decline

Orthopedic Surgery

50 %

50 %

0 %

100%

decline

Radiology (Diagnostic)

0 %

40 %

0 %

0 %

Internal Medicine

46 %

45 %

41%

11%

decline

Summary:

  • While the table reflects data compiled via a relatively new survey (responses are not high, but are increasing over time), preliminary data show a trend of residents leaving the state upon completion of their training program.
  • Although there is no specific evidence of a relationship between residents' choices and the liability issue, there is also no evidence that would rule it out.

*Notes on Data:

·      "GME Track" surveys residency program directors annually. The survey includes a request for program directors to identify the immediate career plans of residents who have completed their training.

·      Data reflects only those residents who have completed their training, plan to enter private practice, and whose program directors responded to the survey.

·      "High-Risk" reflects specialties commonly identified by the physician community and the press, as well as specialties that have helped lead recent physician "strikes".

 

As can be seen from this early data, the Pennsylvania practice environment is viewed negatively by young physicians entering residencies (graduation questionnaire) and leaving residency and entering private practice (GME Track data). 

These data, coupled with the emerging national data on faculty morale, the local information I have provided to you raise issues which must be addressed.The emerging realization that Medical Schools and Academic Medical Centers are nearing their limit of survivability of the external economic factors that are buffeting all of health care should be of concern to all. 

The physician who educates the next generation of physicians is performing a societal good greater than the actual provision of patient care. She is making it possible for thousands of other patients to receive health care from those she is training. The physician-scientist who creates a new treatment not only treats the patient on whom the treatment is proven efficacious, he gives that treatment to others, to treat others.

 Two anecdotes may help underscore these points. 

I was approached by a young physicians who was completing his training at Jefferson last June. I have known him for almost 10 years. He was from coal country in Pennsylvania, and was a high school quarterback. He was a local hero, but decided to pursue his dream of becoming a doctor rather than play football in college. He came to Jefferson, graduating in 1993. He completed his Internal Medicine residency at Jefferson, and just complete 4 years of Cardiology training. He had a budding career in academic medicine, having already written two research papers, and showing tremendous teaching talent as well. He was offered a position on the faculty, but reluctantly declined. He entered the private practice of Cardiology less than 2 miles away, across the river in New Jersey. His reasoning was that he was afraid that the medical liability crisis in Pennsylvania could never be solved, and that he had to be sure that he could support his family, and pay back his student loans. He clearly indicated that this was a pragmatic decision, as he always had dreamed of being a teacher of doctors. (Physician's name withheld). 

A young surgeon at Jefferson developed a new machine that would permit the safe operation of a previously lethal heart problem. He worked on this machine day and night for over 5 years, testing it in animals, working with engineers from a computer manufacturer, and discussing each nuance with a host of other medical specialists. His salary was paid by the institution, from funds generated by others. He finally tested his machine on a patient, and it worked. That test occurred 50 years ago this Spring, at Jefferson. The physician was John Gibbon, M.D., and the machine he tested was the first cardiac by-pass machine ever successfully used in a human. Dr. Gibbon revolutionized the care of patients with heart disease, and has saved millions upon millions of lives because of his invention. He was a Clinician Scientist, a translator of results from the laboratory to the bedside. He was doing something that no one thought feasible. Were he trying to accomplish a like feat in today's environment, there might be inadequate institutional money to support his clinical research.

We cannot, as a nation, loose the physician teachers, or the physician scientists. We cannot permit the medical liability insurance costs to consume tens of millions of dollars per year at Jefferson, or any other institution. These are dollars required to constructively build the future of health care, its practitioners, and its innovations, with a goal of improving the care of our citizens. I believe that states such as Pennsylvania, because of unique circumstances, may be incapable of fixing this problem. Short term fixes fail to solve the fundamental structural issues, and merely divert resources from other needs. I wish you well as you tackle, and hopefully solve for all of us, this pressing national issue that threatens the fabric of our academic medical centers.

 

Respectfully submitted,

   

 

Thomas J. Nasca, M.D., FACP

Senior Vice President, Thomas Jefferson University

Dean, Jefferson Medical College

President, Jefferson University Physicians

 

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