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Correspondence The Committee on Energy and Commerce W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman Greenwood Expands Investigation Into Questionable NIH Practices February 4, 2004 The Honorable Tommy Thompson Dear Secretary Thompson: As part of its oversight of the ethics programs at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the Committee has identified a serious concern about the NIH's use
of special authority under Title 42 of the Public Health Service Act. The
special authority, 42 U.S.C. 209(f) "Special Consultants," provides
that under certain circumstances, special consultants may be employed "to
assist and advise in the operations of the [Public Health] Service" without
regard to civil service laws. It appears that since 2000 the NIH has been using 42 U.S.C. 209(f) as a
mechanism to compensate some NIH Institute Directors and other senior NIH
officials at annual salary rates of up to $225,000. One result from using this
mechanism is that these NIH officials employed under 42 U.S.C. 209(f) are not
required under the Ethics in Government Act to file Public Financial Disclosure
Reports (SF 278s), as the Congress and the public have recently learned. I note
that on January 12, 2004, the HHS Associate General Counsel for Ethics requested
a determination from the Office of Ethics to require these certain employees to
file Public Financial Disclosure Reports. In support of this request, the HHS
Associate General Counsel for Ethics stated that the roles of these NIH
officials "carry particularly high levels of responsibility."
(Attachment One) However, closer scrutiny of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) yields an additional concern,
beyond the lack of public financial disclosure. My fundamental concern is that
42 U.S.C. 209(f) on its face appears to be a provision for hiring special
consultants who have limited responsibilities, not as authority for employing
NIH Institute Directors and other high-level NIH officials, who occupy
continuing, full-time positions and exercise broad-based levels of
decision-making responsibility (such as making final decisions on substantive
policies or functions in the NIH chain of command) considered to be inherently
governmental. If this concern is correct, it would mean that high-level NIH
officials compensated under 42 U.S.C. 209(f) lack the legal authority to
exercise their inherently government functions and are improperly holding
themselves out as NIH Institute Directors or other high-level titles when by law
they are only special-consultant employees. Almost two months ago, the Committee staff
contacted the HHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) raising this concern and asked
for background information that would support the use of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) to
compensate high-level NIH officials. Last week, HHS OGC staff advised the
Committee staff of the following: HHS had not yet found any written, legal
opinion supporting the use of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) as a mechanism to hire and
compensate NIH Institute Directors, and other high-level NIH officials. HHS is continuing its search for historical
evidence supporting the use of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) as a mechanism to hire and
compensate NIH Institute Directors, and other high-level NIH officials. At
this time, HHS did not report any such historical evidence to the Committee
staff. There is no current employee at HHS OGC who has
first-hand knowledge about any oral advice given to NIH that led to the use
of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) to compensate high-level NIH officials. NIH was verbally
advised by an HHS attorney, who has since retired from government service. Even though it lacks a written legal opinion,
HHS OGC believes that 42 U.S.C. 209(f) can be permissibly interpreted as an
appropriate authority for hiring and compensating NIH Institute Directors,
and other high-level NIH officials because such authority can be ascertained
through inference. HHS OGC stated that it is a permissible interpretation of
"assist" and "advice" that such consultants have
authority beyond mere advice, but also managerial authority. The statutory
provision in some form appeared in the 1930's and was originally intended to
assist the National Cancer Institute (NCI), giving power to NCI to retain
the services of employees outside 5 U.S.C. 3109, which relates to the
appointment of special experts and includes a limitation that experts hired
under this authority cannot perform administrative and supervisory work.
Because 42 U.S.C. 209(f) lacks such a limitation, it can be inferred that
consultants hired under this provision can perform such administrative and
supervisory work. In addition, the use of the word "appointed"
indicates that these consultants are not contractors since contractors
receive awards not appointments. Notwithstanding the views expressed by HHS OGC to Committee staff, my
concerns about the proper use of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) remain. First, HHS documents
seem to support the understanding that 42 U.S.C. 209(f) is for limited
scientific appointments, not an alternative compensation scheme that permits
high-level NIH officials to continue exercising broad-based, inherently
governmental functions while being paid significantly higher salaries than if
they had remained in the federal civil service system. For example, I note that
HHS Personnel Instruction 304-1 (transmitted May 3, 1996), "Appointment of
Experts and Consultants," references 42 U.S.C. 209(f) as a specific
statutory authority for the Public Health Service under the section 304-1-20,
Legal and Regulatory Authorities. Section 304-1-30, "Policies for
Employment of Experts and Consultants," states: "When expert and consultant appointments are made under one of the
authorities listed in 304-1-20, the services to be performed must be ones that
are properly covered by those authorities; the persons employed must be experts
or consultants by definition; the needed services must be of such a nature that
they can be met by an appointment of one year or less - unless the appointment
is made under a statutory authority permitting a longer term. Experts and consultants will not be employed in HHS to fill positions that
are subject to competitive civil service examinations, position classification,
and the General Schedule pay rates, or in cases where regular employees are
available and have the skills and knowledge to perform the work. Nor will
consulting services be obtained to bypass or undermine personnel ceilings, pay
limitations, or civil service appointment procedures." The section further states: "Neither a consultant nor an expert may be assigned to perform the
duties of a continuing, full-time position. While experts may serve as team
leaders or directors of projects for which they were hired, neither experts nor
consultants may make final decisions on substantive policies or functions in the
agency chain of command." (Emphasis added). On its face, it would appear that past written HHS policy and practice
prohibited the application of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) to high-level NIH employees who
"make final decisions on substantive policies or functions in the agency
chain of command." I note that on November 1, 1999 the NIH Policy Manual
providing guidance on Instruction 304-1 released new instructions about the
employment of NIH, NCI and NHLBI Special Experts. This document discusses Title
42 special-expert appointment authorities, but does not mention 42 U.S.C. 209(f)
as a specific statutory authority. Second, the preliminary view of a specialist in American National Government,
Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
substantiates my concern. The CRS specialist examined the text of 42 U.S.C.
209(f) and noted that the use of consultants is generally limited to activities
that are not inherently governmental. The CRS specialist stated: "If one
were actually administering a program in which there was authority for such
things as hiring and firing of personnel, having decision-making authority
related to the operation of the agencies and other such activities, that would
be considered to be inherently governmental." In addition, the CRS
specialist looked at the 1996 and 2000 Plum Books published by the House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, respectively. The Plum Book lists over 7,000 Federal civil
service leadership and support positions in the legislative and executive
branches of the Federal government that may be subject to noncompetitive
appointment, nationwide. In the 1996 volumes most of the directors of the
institutes are listed as career incumbents paid under Senior Executive Service
(SES) schedules, with the primary exception of the NCI Director, who is
appointed under a special authority. In the 2000 edition, with the exception of
the NCI director and one vacant position, there are no listings for directors of
the institutes. They apparently were taken off the rolls of positions available
to fill in the federal system. The CRS specialist concluded that on the face of
it, it would support my concern that the positions are being filled by persons
other than federal staff. Finally, the application of Title 42 to high-level NIH decisionmakers has led
to the anomalous result under current ethics law and regulation that these
officials-some who earn more than the Vice-President of the United States and
exercise power over the direction of millions and perhaps even billions of
dollars of biomedical research funding-are not required to file public financial
disclosure reports. The available information indicates that the practice of
compensating high-level NIH officials appears to have started in 2000, well
after the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act and the promulgation of
federal ethics rules. According to HHS OGC, the statutory provision, 42 U.S.C.
209(f), has been in existence since the 1930's in one form or another, well
before the Ethics in Government Act. There is no available information that the
Ethics in Government Act was intended to provide a Title 42 loophole. There is
reason to be dubious about the interpretation of Title 42 applicability to
high-level NIH officials existing at the time of the passage of the Ethics in
Government Act and that the anomalous result was intended. In fact, the
anomalous result of applying Title 42 to high-level NIH officials suggests that
current Title 42 interpretation may not be correct since it is an uneasy fit
with the legal structure of federal ethics laws and regulations. I note that it appears the OGC interpretation of Title 42 and NIH practice of
using Title 42 U.S.C. 209(f) for high-level NIH employees predated your
leadership of the Department. Under your leadership, I am aware that the
Department found and took action with regard to about 70 non-scientific
employees at NIH who were improperly converted from the civil service to
higher-payment appointments under Title 42 (but not under 42 U.S.C. 209(f)). I
am appreciative of your concern to these issues and look forward to working with
you to resolve my concern. Given our concerns, pursuant to Rules X and XI of the U.S. House of
Representatives, please provide the following by February 20, 2004: Does HHS believe that 42 U.S.C. 209(f) can be
permissibly interpreted as an appropriate authority for hiring and
compensating NIH Institute Directors, and other high-level NIH officials? When did the practice of applying 42 U.S.C.
209(f) to NIH Institute Directors start? Who authorized it? What was the
rationale for the authorization? Are all appointments made under 42 U.S.C.
209(f) affected in any way by 5 U.S.C. 3109? If so, are these appointments
in compliance with 5 U.S.C. 3109? All records since January 1, 1999 relating to
the use of 42 U.S.C. 209 (f). All records relating to the use of 42 U.S.C.
209(f) as a mechanism to hire and compensate NIH Institute Directors, and
other high-level NIH officials. Identify all HHS OGC employees who provided any
advice given to NIH that led to the use of 42 U.S.C. 209(f) to compensate
high-level NIH officials. Please provide the number of Title 42 hires at
NIH (with a breakdown for each Institute or Center) for each fiscal year
starting with FY 2000. Please note that, for the purpose of responding to these requests, the terms
"records" and "relating" should be interpreted in accordance
with the attachment to this letter. Thank you for your assistance. If you have any questions, please contact Alan
Slobodin of the Majority Committee staff at (202) 225-2927. Sincerely, James C. Greenwood Cc: Peter Deutsch, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Related Documents The
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