Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on Cybersecurity and Consumer Data: What's at Risk
for the Consumer. My name is David Morrow, and I am the deputy director for
global security and privacy services at EDS. I have over 25 years of experience
in the information technology ("IT") field as a computer programmer
and analyst, operations chief, security officer, investigator, and consultant.
Prior to joining EDS, I was a security consultant with Ernst and Young, LLP and
Fiderus Strategic Security and Privacy Services, a small, start-up consulting
firm. I also spent 13 years of a 22-year Air Force career as an investigator of
computer crime for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). When
I retired in 1998, I was the Chief of the Computer Crime Investigations and
Information Warfare Division for AFOSI. I am honored to join you today to
present EDS' views on the state of information technology security, two years
after my last appearance before the Subcommittee.
In my testimony two years ago, I focused on the changes in our way of life
after the tragedy of September 11, and the need to make investments to protect
our information networks. I called upon government and industry to increase
their collaboration, to focus not only on physical security but also information
security, and to view cyber security as an essential capital investment rather
than as an expense. I also noted a few ways that government can help industry
bear the burden to protect our information economy and, therefore, our economic
security. At the risk of repeating myself, I do want to emphasize that all those
comments still hold true. Today, I will focus my comments on what has changed in
the last two years, what needs improvement, and once again where I think both
industry and government can make greater efforts.
What has changed?
Thankfully, we have not seen another September 11. However, we are still in a
heightened threat environment. More recent attacks on our information networks,
such as the DNS root server attacks in October 2002 and several high profile
virus and worm attacks, have not stopped us from relying on them to conduct
business and live our lives. In fact, we continue to look to information
technology to drive innovation, efficiency, and productivity in our business
operations. In addition, consumer use of the Internet for recreation and to
conduct business continues to expand. And, our networks and the data on them are
still vulnerable.
At EDS, we are seeing an increase in the tempo and severity of new viruses
and other attacks on our information infrastructure. As I believe many of us
predicted here two years ago, the complexity and sophistication of such attacks
has continued to increase, making the task of defending and repairing our
networks and systems all the more difficult. Installing software
"patches" to deflect intrusions has become the favored way of
addressing impending attacks. But, our clients are concerned about the need to
install patch after patch after patch in rapid succession, on thousands of
servers and tens of thousands of desktops. As you can imagine, it is a daunting
task to do three major patch updates in one week in a large company or
government agency. As these attacks become more frequent, severe, and
sophisticated in often incompatible environments, what we call patch management
has become a larger issue.
Unfortunately, another change we have seen is the increased incidence of
identity theft and criminal misuse of personal information that affects millions
of Americans at any given moment. While there are a variety of both high and low
technology ways to obtain personal identity and credit information, the biggest
"bang" for the criminal "buck" is still to locate and steal
such information from an insecure network. I am disturbed by the increasing
number of identity theft victims, and I believe more effective practices in
network security and protection of personal data would benefit us all, both
individually and as a society. I am glad to see that the Administration and
Congress took the opportunity of reauthorizing the Fair Credit Reporting Act to
address this challenge in a positive way and look forward to the passage of that
legislation very soon.
Another change is the regulatory environment for us and for our clients. The
Federal Trade Commission's new "Do-Not-Call-List", the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and the pending FCRA reauthorization are the latest iterations. They follow
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. None of these regulatory frameworks give specific
requirements for information security - and shouldn't, in my opinion. But in one
way or another, either through greater corporate accountability, stronger
privacy requirements, or new reporting obligations, each has direct or indirect
implications for improving the integrity of data. As such, I would argue that
each raises the level of awareness of information security in enterprises across
the country.
This increasing awareness is a key component in the changes that I have seen
in the last two years. More and more companies are coming to us with questions
about how to address their information and network security. The problem is,
they are still often asking the wrong questions. There is not a silver bullet
that can address everything that achieves a stronger security posture. You can't
point and click and say "done." There are no magic technologies or
software. Information security is a continual process that elevates security
planning out of the traditional information technology silo and involves the
whole enterprise: IT, legal, regulatory, sales, marketing, and security, as well
as each individual employee and business partner. It's hard work, but it's
essential.
Another concern is the lack of details or guidance on standards of acceptable
security practices. There are many organizations that are putting forth
standards that purport to drive best practices or interoperability, for example.
But the proliferation of differing standards has caused some confusion among
some of our clients that has prevented them from making important changes as
they wait for further direction. We often use the ISO Standards because they are
widely accepted, but there is room for improvement in developing standards for
the future that are flexible enough to reflect changes in technology and
business operations.
As modern global businesses become increasingly intertwined through
partnerships, consortia, and merger and acquisition activity, traditional
network and security boundaries are, in many cases, no longer intact. The
security problems of one member of a partnership arrangement or newly acquired
company now quickly become the problems of the entire group as the insecure
network or system becomes the weak link in the entire chain. In addition,
information security entails many things that may not appear to be security
issues at first glance, such as enterprise training, for example. Addressing
these issues requires strategic thinking about:
· the way a company or agency uses information, both on the network and off;
· what information is critical to the enterprise; · what risk mitigation
measures need to be put in place for what functions, how your information
security fits into an overall business continuity plan; and · how privacy and
security policies and processes complement - or contradict - each other in the
business.
Companies need to look at information security in a holistic way to create
and integrate what has been dubbed a "culture of security" in to their
enterprise. This may be a daunting task for those enterprises that are behind,
but it is crucial to ensuring our economic security.
Despite its demonstrated critical importance, we have not seen a universally
overwhelming increase in the amount of investment that companies or the
government are making in information security. Some of the early adopters are
often driven by regulation or in response to an attack, but there are many more
who have taken a wait-and-see approach and hope that the next incident does not
affect them.at least not too much. Part of that is a response to the current
economic situation, and part is still a lack of understanding of the loss
implications from an attack or even a natural disaster.
There is cause for hope, however. In a survey of corporate Chief Information
Officers released earlier this month by Forrester Research, increased funding
for security and privacy efforts were at the top of the list of priorities for
2004. I am hopeful that as the economy continues to recover, these plans will
materialize into concrete actions and investment in the security and privacy of
our national data resources.
What companies have been doing since September 11, is committing some
resources and expertise to the greater dialogue on information security. Trade
associations and other industry groups are including information security in
their work program, or beefing up existing programs. New information sharing
mechanisms are developing, existing ones are working to improve their impact,
and industry groups are putting forth best practices and other guidance for
their industry. EDS was a founding member of the Information Technology
Information Sharing Analysis Center, or ISAC, one of 13 that were set up as part
of Presidential Decision Directive 63 for the designated critical
infrastructures. We have also taken on a role in the National Infrastructure
Advisory Council (NIAC) that was established after September 11.
Importantly, efforts are also extending beyond the so-called high technology
sector. EDS led an effort in the Business Roundtable, an association of Fortune
200 Chief Executive Officers, to develop a roadmap for large corporations in any
sector to seriously consider their cyber security. The publication is called
Building Security in the Digital Economy: An Executive Resource and is submitted
as part of my written testimony.
What still needs improvement?
While I appreciate the increased level of awareness, I still think we need to
do more to increase the level of real investment and improvement in information
security. I believe it requires a recognition that security is not merely good
for its own sake. We need to incorporate the notion of security as a business
enabler into our business models. Enterprises that are looking at security as an
enabler to their business are investing in more strategic ways, and are,
therefore, better able to serve their clients, consumers, citizens, and business
partners. As I said earlier, it's not just a business expense.it's an
essential element in today's strategic - and networked - business model.
I believe the jury is still out on the role of the Department of Homeland
Security in information security. We do applaud the creation of the National
Cyber Security Division (NCSD) as well as its initial efforts on establishing
the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and collaborating with
industry. EDS will be participating in the Cyber Security Summit scheduled for
early December and the ongoing work of the summit's designated task forces.
However, we hope that its placement in the new agency does not illustrate a lack
of concern, authority, or funding for information security efforts in the US
government. We all need to be diligent to make sure the NCSD's efforts are
maintained and relevant.
Virtually every one on this panel two years ago called for a public-private
partnership and increased collaboration on cyber security. Arguably, we have
made important strides in that direction as more companies, people, and agencies
are talking about these issues in our associations and in government groups.
These efforts are encouraging, but I argue we can do more, particularly by
coordinating and learning from them, rather than duplicating them. In addition,
once again we cannot look at individual aspects of security in isolation. As we
consider our infrastructure protection, we have to look at the convergence of
physical and cyber security because they can no longer be looked at
independently.
In sum, I would characterize our state of information security readiness as
marginally better than it was two years ago, with hope for greater improvement.
While more are concerned, many are not doing as little as possible to remedy the
problems they have. While more are aware of the threat, they are not mitigating
the corresponding risks with appropriate measures. And, while there is more
activity and public-private collaboration on information security, it is not
well coordinated across the spectrum of industries and issues that are impacted
by security measures.
What can be done?
First, we can continue our efforts for a more coordinated program of
industry-government cooperation. The release of the Administration's National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace earlier this year provides a framework for
continued work, and I urge both industry and government to take advantage of the
upcoming Summit to solidify some of that work going forward. The Department of
Homeland Security's National Cyber Security Division provides a focal point for
monitoring industry efforts and participating as appropriate. As DHS solidifies
its operations, we should ensure that the division has the appropriate mandate,
funding, and industry coordination to support its activities.
Second, we can strive to improve information sharing mechanisms that are an
important component of the public-private partnership on cyber security. For
example, the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are still active
and are looking for ways to be more effective for their industries. I would
argue the ISACs should also look for ways to communicate and even collaborate
with each other when appropriate. Just as we cannot put information security
into one silo, we cannot look at each industry sector in isolation. We are all
interconnected now and rely on not only the security of our own network, but
that of our suppliers, customers, partners, and competitors. Industry was
collectively pleased when Congress provided for Freedom of Information Act
exemptions for information shared on cyber security in the Homeland Security
Act. We urge Congress to preserve the integrity of that provision in any future
reviews of the Act in order to allow continued information sharing about
vulnerabilities, breaches, attacks, and other actual or anticipated cyber
incidents. Our experience has repeatedly shown that effective and timely
information sharing is one of the most effective ways to prevent widespread
incidents and to combat them when they do occur.
Third, we still believe there are areas where incentives are necessary for
companies to allocate the necessary funds to upgrade their information security.
This is particularly true for functions that the US Government deems to be of
critical importance to our economic - and, therefore, our national security.
Fourth, we must continue to emphasize research and development for
innovations in information security and encourage Congress to keep these avenues
open for resolution in the budget process.
Fifth, I remain a strong proponent of ways in which we can continue to
develop and professionalize the cadre of information security professionals
practicing today. In the past two years we have seen a notable increase in the
number of educational institutions offering courses and even advanced degrees in
information security topics. While this is an encouraging sign, I still believe
that there is great room for improvement in expanding the discussions beyond the
purely technical disciplines and into the more general business curriculum.
Finally, as stated earlier, our intertwined information networks are global
in nature and transcend traditional borders. That directly impacts global
companies such as ours as well as consumers. It is imperative that we engage in
the global dialogue on information security as well. I commend the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation for their efforts to bring this issue to the international arena.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would just like to emphasize the fact that the improvements
we have made over that last two years in information security have much to do
with an increasing awareness of cyber security concerns for all of us. Increased
awareness here at home and abroad will continue to be crucial for our security
going forward, and I support efforts such as this hearing toward that objective.
We are better off and heading in the right direction, but we can and need to do
more - now. I have outlined some suggestions for future focus that I hope are
helpful to the Committee.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to share my views and EDS'
experience once again. I will be happy to answer any questions you and the
Members of the Subcommittee may have.