 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
Prepared Witness Testimony The House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Blackout 2003: How Did It Happen and Why?
Full Committee on Energy and Commerce
Mr. Eugene R. McGrath
Introduction Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. My name is Eugene McGrath and I'm the chief executive officer of Consolidated Edison, Inc. Con Edison's distribution companies, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., deliver energy to 3.4 million electric customers. Our service area includes New York City and Westchester, Orange and Rockland Counties in New York, as well as small portions of northern New Jersey and Pennsylvania. During the restructuring of the electric industry in New York, we sold most of our generating facilities and transformed from vertically integrated utilities into electric delivery utilities. Primarily, we transmit and distribute electricity that is generated by others. Con Edison also distributes gas throughout most of its service area and steam in portions of Manhattan. We are a member of the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the PJM Interconnection (PJM), which administer the wholesale electricity markets and operate the bulk power transmission grid in New York and a multi-state region including Pennsylvania and New Jersey. I welcome the opportunity to discuss Con Edison's experience during the August 14th power outage and to participate in the investigations and the efforts to learn from this event. The power outage was a widespread, fast moving event that has not yet been fully analyzed. A number of organizations have initiated investigations, including the U.S. - Canada Joint Task Force on the Power Outage, the U.S. Department of Energy, the North American Electric Reliability Council, the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, the utility regulatory commissions in New York and other affected states, the regional ISOs, and various utilities including Con Edison. In time, I'm confident they will paint a full picture of the events. But a great deal of data remains to be collected and analyzed, and we should take care not to draw conclusions prematurely. I'd like to talk about what happened at Con Edison on August 14, how we turned the power back on, and then offer some thoughts on broader energy policy. The Power System Shutdown: August 14 On August 14, just before the outage, the Con Edison system was operating with adequate resources and there were no unusual conditions. Preliminary reviews have indicated that the initiating event(s) occurred hundreds of miles outside of the Con Edison service area. Just before 4:11 p.m. EDT, voltage on our system began fluctuating and declining and frequency began to drop. Low system frequency triggered sensors that actuated an automatic, four-step under-frequency load shedding program disconnecting approximately 50% of our load. The voltage continued to fluctuate and did not recover. There was a loss of generation and transmission and the system shut down very quickly. Changes put in place as a result of our experience from the 1965 and 1977 outages allowed our system to shut down without significant electrical or mechanical damage. At this point, studies are underway to understand what caused these changes in frequency and voltage and to determine the exact sequence of events. We are continuing to analyze all of our own data and will review information from others as it becomes available to us. Restoration, August 14-15 We started restoration efforts immediately. Pre-determined system start-up plans were available to the system operators and they were able to begin restoration without having to perform time-consuming analyses and planning. Highly trained and experienced operators staff our control rooms. In New York City, because of our load density and the complexity of our underground system, restarting has to be done very carefully, thoughtfully, and methodically and in coordination with others. It requires tight control of system voltage and balancing cable and equipment capacity with customer load and available generation. The first priority was to establish a stable "backbone" by sequentially reconnecting parts of the transmission system to transmission lines that were connected to a source of power, and as each new section was energized, picking up the amount of customer load necessary to maintain adequate transmission system voltage. This required close coordination with the NYISO to make certain the transmission line had the capacity to support the incremental customer load. Once the "backbone" became stable and as generation came on line, substations and distribution lines were energized picking up the remaining load. Electricity was fully restored in 29 hours and for many customers much earlier. I'm glad to report that our restoration effort was completed without injury to the public, Company personnel or significant damage to equipment. Conclusions Substantial data is available that should allow the various investigators now at work to determine the causes and sequence of events. I'm optimistic that what we learn from these investigations will enable us to further reduce the small probability of such events recurring in the future. A lot of attention has been focused on the grid, and the possibility that interconnections between regions aggravated the situation. The Con Edison transmission system is connected to the eastern transmission grid that covers large parts of the country from the Northeast to the Rocky Mountains and into Canada. The interconnection of transmission systems improves the reliability of individual systems. Transmission lines provide access to additional generation when local generating resources are off line or insufficient to meet peak loads. Transmission lines also provide access to economic sources of electricity. Turning New York - or any other region - into an energy island, without significant interconnections, might protect us from disruptions that originate outside our service area. But doing so would also significantly increase costs and undermine reliability in other ways. The power outage has also stimulated a lot of debate and discussion about our national energy system, and about energy policy. I would like to address some issues that we should keep in mind as we approach these challenges. Delivering electricity is essential to economic growth, and it is crucial for energy companies to stay ahead of demand and maintain strong generation, transmission and distribution systems. Day to day reliability depends upon redundancy, flexibility and capacity. To that end, I offer the following comments: · The planning of electric generation and transmission should be integrated across and within regions. · When planning to meet load growth, priority should be given to locating generation at or near load centers. · The process for siting electric transmission, generation, and distribution facilities must be improved so that utilities and other investors can install the facilities needed to meet growing loads and support economic development. · There must be adequate financial incentive to invest in all elements of the electric infrastructure. · Communication among regions must be enhanced. Mandatory reliability rules established by an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), as proposed in HR 6, are an important step toward enhancing national electric system reliability. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should provide oversight. We also believe that local independent reliability organizations, such as the New York State Reliability Council, should be permitted to develop and promulgate stricter reliability standards when local conditions warrant. The efforts that this committee is making to examine these issues will improve the nation's electric system. I thank you for the opportunity to participate.
|
|||||||||||
|
