I want to begin by thanking Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, and the
Members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. My name is
Thomas Jones. I am a partner in the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher. I
am testifying today on behalf of three competitive local exchange carriers or
"CLECs": Allegiance Telecom, Conversent Communications, and Time
Warner Telecom. I would ask that in addition to my testimony today, you include
in the record a joint paper to be filed by these companies in the FCC's Title I
proceeding.
Allegiance, Conversent and Time Warner Telecom are all facilities-based CLECs
that serve business customers. Allegiance and Conversent deploy their own
switches, but they rely on the right established in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 to use unbundled broadband loops from the ILECs to provide telephone and
broadband data services to small and medium-sized business customers. Time
Warner Telecom uses its own facilities to provide voice and broadband services
to medium and large business customers, but must still purchase broadband loops
from the ILECs to serve many of its business customers.
I would like to explain today why the FCC's proposal to reclassify the
transmission used in ILEC broadband Internet access as an unregulated Title I
service threatens Congress' established telecommunications policies in two
fundamental ways. First, by reclassifying these services out of Title II and
reversing decades of precedent, the FCC would eliminate the ILECs' obligation to
sell broadband loops to their CLEC competitors. For most small and medium-sized
business customers, the ILECs own the only broadband loops. No other service
provider, including cable, wireless or satellite, has deployed ubiquitous
business end user connections that have the upstream capacity, reliability and
security features of ILEC loops. The ILECs' market power over business loops
remains, regardless of what is sent over its loop facilities, whether it be
broadband or narrowband, or if the loop is old, new, borrowed or blue.
Therefore, the only way for CLECs to serve the business market is by purchasing
ILEC broadband loops. Eliminating their right to do so under Title II, which
mandates reasonable prices and service quality, will likely destroy competition
in this dynamic and innovative segment of the economy.
The purported goal of the FCC's proposal is to treat ILEC broadband and cable
modem services the same way. However, the end result of reclassifying ILEC
broadband transmission as a Title I service would be to throw the baby out with
the bath water. ILECs would no longer be required to share broadband loops in
the residential/mass market in which cable competes, but ILECs would also no
longer be required to provide broadband loops in the business broadband markets
in which cable usually does not compete and in which the ILECs usually own the
only broadband end user connections.
If the FCC wants to consider deregulating certain aspects of ILEC broadband
transmission, it can only do so within the scope of its statutory authority
established by Congress in the Communications Act. To the extent that there is
any justification for deregulating the ILECs, and it is our testimony that ILECs'
market power continues to warrant regulation, then the FCC must justify such
deregulation under the standards set forth by Congress in Section 10 of the Act.
That provision gives the FCC the authority to target forbearance to markets
where the ILECs lack market power. From both a policy and legal perspective,
Section 10 is the only legitimate vehicle for deregulating ILEC broadband.
Second, reclassifying the broadband transmission used to provide ILEC Internet
access as a Title I service threatens many core social and national security
policy objectives established by Congress. For example, the FCC's proposal could
cause statutory requirements regarding universal service, privacy, access to the
disabled, and unauthorized changes in service providers to become inapplicable
to broadband. Moreover, the requirements of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) might not apply to transmissions delivered over
broadband, including voice over IP.
While some observers believe the FCC can selectively reimpose these requirements
under Title I, I respectfully submit that such an effort is beyond the FCC's
jurisdiction. The Communications Act specifically states that the requirements
of Title II only apply to the extent a telecommunications carrier is engaged in
providing telecommunications services. Reclassification would mean that ILECs
would not be providing broadband as telecommunications services, and Supreme
Court precedent teaches that the FCC may not rely on its Title I authority to
change that fact.
In sum, we urge Congress to remind the FCC that it lacks the authority to
interpret Title II out of the Act whenever it pleases. Congress has specified
the mechanism that the agency may use to deregulate as warranted without
negative consequences for competition and other congressional goals -- that
mechanism is Section 10, not reclassification.
Again, thank you for allowing me to participate here today, and I would be happy
to answer any questions.
APPENDIX
SEC. 10. [47 U.S.C. 160] COMPETITION IN PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE.
(a) REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY. -- Notwithstanding section 332(c)(1)(A) of this Act,
the Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of
this Act to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class
of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of
its or their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that --
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that
the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in
connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service
are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
protection of consumers, and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with
the public interest.
(b) COMPETITIVE EFFECT TO BE WEIGHED. -- In making the determination under
subsection (a)(3), the Commission shall consider whether forbearance from
enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market
conditions, including the extent to which such forbearance will enhance
competition among providers of telecommunications services. If the Commission
determines that such forbearance will promote competition among providers of
telecommunications services, that determination may be the basis for a
Commission finding that forbearance is in the public interest.
(c) PETITION FOR FORBEARANCE. -- Any telecommunications carrier, or class of
telecommunications carriers, may submit a petition to the Commission requesting
that the Commission exercise the authority granted under this section with
respect to that carrier or those carriers, or any services offered by that
carrier or carriers. Any such petition shall be deemed granted if the Commission
does not deny the petition for failure to meet the requirements for forbearance
under subsection (a) within one year after the Commission receives it, unless
the one-year period is extended by the Commission. The Commission may extend the
initial one-year period by an additional 90 days if the Commission finds that an
extension is necessary to meet the requirements of subsection (a). The
Commission may grant or deny a petition in whole or in part and shall explain
its decision in writing.
(d) LIMITATION. -- Except as provided in section 251(f), the Commission may not
forbear from applying the requirements of section 251(c) or 271 under subsection
(a) of this section until it determines that those requirements have been fully
implemented.
(e) STATE ENFORCEMENT AFTER COMMISSION FORBEARANCE. -- A State commission may
not continue to apply or enforce any provision of this Act that the Commission
has determined to forbear from applying under subsection (a).