Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today. My name is Dave Baker. I am Vice President for Law
and Public Policy for EarthLink. EarthLink is the nation's 3rd largest Internet
Service Provider (ISP), serving 5 million customers nationwide with dial-up,
broadband (DSL, cable and satellite), web hosting and wireless internet
services. EarthLink regularly receives awards for its customer service and
innovation, including the J.D. Power and Associates award for highest customer
satisfaction among dial-up ISPs and (tie) highest customer satisfaction among
broadband ISPs.
This hearing is about the regulatory status of broadband services, and in
particular whether those services should be classified as "information
services," "common carrier" services, or "something in
between." As the members of the subcommittee are aware, this question has
been the focus of several ongoing proceedings at the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). EarthLink is presently appealing in court the FCC's
declaratory order in the proceeding dealing with the provision of broadband
service over cable facilities, and is anxiously awaiting the FCC's action in the
proceeding dealing with the provision of broadband services over telephone
facilities.
To be frank, EarthLink is dismayed with the answers regarding the regulatory
classification of broadband services that the FCC seems determined to reach. The
law is clear about that regulatory status, and we are dismayed that the FCC
seems determined to ignore the law in an effort to tilt the playing field in
favor of incumbent providers who have built their networks over public rights of
way using federal authorization while protected from competition by federal,
state or local government-granted monopolies.
What is particularly troubling to EarthLink, and I hope would be troubling to
the members of this subcommittee and the Congress as a whole, is the tremendous
and far reaching effect of classifying all broadband services as
"information services" under the Communications Act. The effect is
tremendous because of technology convergence. Digital, packet-switched
transmission networks are replacing analog, circuit switched networks at an ever
increasing rate. It will not be long before most, if not all, of the major
network operators are able to provide all of their services-voice, data, and
video-over packet-switched networks also used to provide Internet services.
The effect would be far reaching because the common carrier transmission
services that are the foundation of the information economy would no longer be
required to be made available to information service providers upon reasonable
request on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. Network owners would be free
to arbitrarily decide who can use their networks, at what price, and on what
terms. This would not only work against consumer interests, but vital
communications links that can be reached today under court order by law
enforcement agencies would suddenly be beyond reach because laws like the
Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) would no longer apply.
Congress would have re-write an entire body of laws that have been carefully
enacted over the years to promote competition, protect consumers, and provide
for public safety. All because the FCC is ignoring not only its own precedents,
but also the plain language that Congress wrote in the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
The central question of this hearing (and of several current FCC proceedings)
is the regulatory classification of broadband services. Let me be clear in
answering this question. All internet access services - whether provided by an
independent ISP like EarthLink, a telco affiliate like Verizon Online, or a
cable company like Comcast - are information services. Let me be equally clear
that all information services are, by definition, delivered via
telecommunications, and the offering of such telecommunications, whether by a
telco or a cable company, for a fee to the public makes them telecommunications
services. This is true whether the Internet access is provided by an independent
ISP or by the network operators themselves. Internet access, broadband or
otherwise, is therefore an information service riding on top of a transmission
component which is a telecommunications service.
In the world of dial-up Internet access these two components are easy to see.
Consumers purchase their phone line from their telephone company and their
Internet service from an ISP such as EarthLink. The telephone company provides a
telecommunications service which can be used to transmit voice or data. The ISP
provides an information service. The consumer dials an EarthLink access number,
which establishes an underlying transmission link through the customer's phone
line; the consumer can then use EarthLink's services to access the Internet. The
underlying transmission link is a regulated common carrier telecommunications
service. The Internet access service is an unregulated information service.
Now suppose that the ISP in the dial-up scenario I just outlined was not
EarthLink but Verizon Online. It would make no difference. The underlying
transmission link (provided by Verizon in this case) would be regulated as a
common carrier telecommunications service, but Verizon Online's Internet access
service would still be an unregulated information service. This is the regime
that the FCC crafted in its seminal 1980 Computer II proceeding, which has been
affirmed by the FCC and federal courts many times in the intervening years, and
which Congress adopted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The FCC created a
level playing field by requiring that the underlying transmission link be made
available by facility owners on a non-discriminatory basis to all ISPs and then
treating all ISPs the same with respect to the unregulated nature of the
information service component, regardless of whether or not the ISP was owned by
the owner of the underlying transmission facility. As a result, competition in
the provision of information services flourished because the facility owners-the
telephone companies in the dial-up world-could not use their ownership of the
underlying transmission facilities to leverage their position in the information
services market.
Broadband Internet access works much the same as dial-up Internet access,
with two exceptions. First, it is faster, because the transmission link has
better electronics or greater capacity. Second, in most cases the end user isn't
given the option of buying separately the transmission link from their home or
office to the switch. Rather, they have to buy that portion of the link as part
of a bundled package of services which combines the information service
component provided by an ISP with the transmission component provided by the
telco or cable company. Furthermore, most broadband ISPs are affiliated with or
directly owned by the transmission facility owner.
In the case of broadband Internet access, the FCC seems determined to take
the exact opposite approach from the one that proved so successful for promoting
competition in the dial-up world. For broadband, the FCC suggests that, so long
as the facility owner refuses to offer consumers the option of buying the
transmission link separately from the information services component, the
bundled package of transmission and information service is an "information
service" under the Communications Act. Therefore neither the information
service component nor the underlying common carrier transmission link would be
subject to regulation. As a result, facility operators are able to shield their
transmission networks from requirements for non-discriminatory access by other
ISPs. This all but eliminates competition among broadband Internet service
providers and not only violates the letter and intent of the Telecommunications
Act, but also does great harm to independent businesses and to consumers.
The FCC's interpretation is at odds with both the letter and the spirit of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended
by the Telecommunications Act, defines "information service" as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information
via telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. 153(20). The term
"telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." 47 U.S.C. 153(43). As the statutory language makes clear,
information services are made available to consumers using a transmission
network. Up to this point I believe there is no disagreement among any of us
sitting at the table. It is the next step which the Commission refuses to take,
and over which there is disagreement among the witnesses today.
In 1996, when Congress added the terms "information service" and
"telecommunications" to the Communications Act, they also added the
terms "telecommunications service" and "telecommunications
carrier." A "telecommunications service" is "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users
as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
facilities used." 47 U.S.C. 153(46). Any provider of telecommunications
service is a "telecommunications carrier," and telecommunications
carriers are to be treated as "common carriers" subject to regulation
under Title II of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. 153(44).
The structure Congress enacted in 1996 mirrors the structure the FCC adopted
in its 1980 Computer II decision. The definition of "information
services" cross references the defined term "telecommunications,"
which in turn is incorporated in the definitions of both
"telecommunications service" and "telecommunications
carrier." The transmission component that is integral to the delivery and
definition of "information service" is treated separately under the
Act for regulatory purposes, just as transmission had been treated separately by
the FCC for 15 years prior to the passage of the 1996 Act. The language of the
definition of both "telecommunications carrier" and
"telecommunications service" make plain that they are intended to
apply broadly; they apply to "any provider" "regardless of the
facilities used."
"Telecommunications carriers" and "telecommunications
services" are the key terms that Congress used to define the
pro-competitive provisions of the 1996 Act. Almost all of the rights and
responsibilities in the 1996 Act attach or apply to telecommunications carriers,
which the statute says are to be treated as common carriers to the extent they
provide telecommunications services. Yet under the FCC's interpretation those
terms would apply only to those facility owners who chose to make a
"separate" or "stand-alone" offering of telecommunications
to the public - those facility owners that chose instead to offer their
telecommunications to the public only if the public also buys the facility
owner's chosen information service get to escape regulation as a common carrier.
Two examples illustrate severe problems with the FCC's approach. First,
consider the case of a competitor who seeks to offer information services in
competition with the information services offered by a facility owner - say an
RBOC or a cable company. If EarthLink wants to continue to compete in the
information services market, but is now denied access to the broadband
transmission networks needed to offer its services to consumers, then presumably
EarthLink would have to build its own broadband facilities to reach consumers.
Yet to build those facilities, EarthLink would have to become a common carrier
in order to take advantage of any of the market opening provisions Congress
enacted in 1996. Those provisions only apply to telecommunications carriers and
telecommunications services. At the same time, EarthLink's competitors, the
RBOCs and cable companies, who already have existing transmission networks that
reach almost every customer, would be unregulated with respect to the same
transmission services for which EarthLink would be regulated.
Going back to the days of old Ma Bell AT&T, the telephone companies
enjoyed a government-granted monopoly market for almost a century in which to
build out their transmission networks. The cable companies had monopoly
franchises, the federal cable-telco cross ownership ban, and below cost access
to ducts and poles for over 15 years in which to build out their networks. Today
the telephone companies and the cable companies still each have 85% or more of
the customers in their core business - phone or cable - from which to draw a
steady revenue stream as they push into the information services market. And
they have some 95% market share of all broadband DSL or cable modem customers,
respectively. Yet EarthLink and other potential competitors to these incumbent
facility owners would, under the FCC's interpretation, have to undertake the
impossible task of building their own last-mile network - without any protection
or subsidy-in order to continue to compete in the information services business.
This result stands the 1996 Act on its head.
Second, the FCC's own documents demonstrate that their interpretation can
only work if words are added to the statutory language that Congress adopted in
1996. The statutory definition of "telecommunications service" states
that such service is "the offering telecommunications for a fee directly to
the public" without qualification. But the FCC, in both their declaratory
order in the cable modem proceeding and in their briefs defending that order to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, insists that a telecommunications
service only exists if there is a "stand-alone" offering for a
"separate" fee. Only by adding words that don't exist in the statute
can the FCC make their version work.
In summary, it is crucial to distinguish between broadband information
services and the underlying telecommunications services which deliver them.
Internet access services, whether narrowband or broadband, and whether offered
by an independent ISP, an RBOC, or a cable company, remain unregulated
information services. But the facility based transmission services that underlie
all information services remain common carrier telecommunications services,
regardless of whose broadband Internet service the customer subscribes to and
whether or not the facilities operator offers those transmission services
separately to consumers or as part of a combined package of services that
includes information services. Consumers and the economy have benefited over the
past twenty plus years from robust competition in an unregulated information
services industry. That unregulated competition in information services was made
possible because the underlying transmission networks remained subject to
regulations that require that they be offered to all ISPs on non-discriminatory
terms and conditions.
In most areas of the country today there are at best two broadband networks;
for many residential consumers there is effectively only one. Both the telephone
networks and the cable networks were built with government-granted monopolies
over public rights of ways using Federal authority using rate-payer money. To
allow these facility owners to now repudiate their obligation to share those
transmission networks on a non-discriminatory basis with others who seek to
offer telecommunications or information services to the public is an abuse of
the law and is anti-competitive. Such an approach would take a robustly
competitive and level playing field and tilt it heavily in favor of a few
players by allowing them to leverage their transmission facility monopoly into
domination of new areas and services. Clearly that was not what Congress wrote
or intended when it passed the 1996 Act.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to
answer any questions.