Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee to
talk about a truly critical issue for global public health.
My name is David Sweanor, and I am counsel to the Non-Smokers' Rights
Association [NSRA] in Canada, an organization I have worked for for over 20
years. NSRA has been a primary driver for a very full range of public health
policies aimed at reducing the toll from tobacco. These include health-oriented
tobacco tax policies, restrictions on tobacco sales, comprehensive restrictions
of tobacco advertising and promotion, detailed package-based heath information -
including picture-based warnings covering 50% of packages and package inserts
giving additional health information, comprehensive disclosure of additives and
sales data, and regulatory authority over tobacco manufacturing standards. These
policies have played a key role in very significant drops in Canadian tobacco
consumption, which have outpaced US declines. Last year alone, and largely due
to very significant cigarette tax increases, per capita consumption in Canada
fell by 8%. I believe that this is two to three times the rate of decline in the
US.
In addition to my work in Canada I have, for many years, been very involved
in tobacco control issues in this country, and globally. It is because of my
interest in global public health, combined with the policy interactions between
Canada and the United States, that I welcome the opportunity to speak to you
today.
The public health goals for tobacco policy
It is possible to articulate a concise view of the public health goals of
tobacco control activities. The ultimate goal is to reduce death and disease as
much as is practically possible within the constraints of law and with respect
for human rights. To achieve this goal there are essentially three broad areas
of intervention. We can expand current efforts to prevent smoking onset and that
encourage and facilitate cessation but we must also reduce the toxicity for
those who continue to use tobacco.
While many nations have done much to try to prevent onset of smoking, far
fewer have made significant strides in promoting and facilitating cessation, and
almost none have moved significantly on issues of toxicity reduction. This is a
major concern to me since preventing the uptake of smoking, even when
successful, will not have a significant impact on disease rates for another
20-30 years due to the lag between the onset of smoking and the development of
the resulting diseases. To put this into an American perspective, the World
Health Organization estimates that roughly 10 million Americans will die as a
direct result of cigarette smoking in the next 20 to 25 years. All of these
people are currently smokers, most say they'd rather not be smoking, and only
cessation and toxicity reduction can impact on this unfolding tragedy.
In short, the status quo is horrible. Cigarettes dominate the market, and
will kill roughly 50% of their long-term users. Few consumers turn to FDA
approved Nicotine Replacement Therapies such as the patch, oral inhaler, and
lozenge. FDA-approved products have slowly increased in sales but consumers
currently have far too few choices to replace their cigarettes and inadequate
information to facilitate changes in their delivery system. The development of
long-term replacement products appears to have been stymied by the FDA, and
there has been no meaningful consideration of using these products for long-term
harm reduction. It makes no sense that so little consideration has been given to
how to better use products that the FDA has reviewed and approved as safe - at
least for short term use - to address the broader problems of how best to help
more people quit and how to help about smokers who have tried to quit and can't.
It also makes no sense that there has not been more discussion about whether or
under what conditions smokeless tobacco products might be used to reduce the
disease risk for smokers who cannot quit. The fact that prestigious bodies such
as the Royal College of Physicians have pointed out that smokeless tobacco can
be between 90% and 99.9% less hazardous than cigarettes cries out for serious
examination of how these products can be used as part of an overall effort to
reduce tobacco's health toll.
There may be a way out of this mess.
Nicotine is the primary reason for tobacco use. It provides various
pharmacological effects sought by many smokers. But it is also, especially when
delivered through cigarette smoking, highly addictive. Yet nicotine itself is
apparently responsible for only a very small part of the health damage caused by
tobacco use. The reason smokers are dying in such great numbers is that they are
obtaining their nicotine through the repeated inhalation of smoke. Nicotine
provides the demand for tobacco, but it is combustion that is the principal
reason for the morbidity and mortality.
Simply put, cigarettes are an exceedingly 'dirty' delivery system for the
drug nicotine. If Americans got their nicotine by brewing tobacco leaves and
their caffeine by smoking tea leaves we would be looking at a very different
national disease profile, with tea likely responsible for hundreds of thousands
of deaths per year and tobacco very likely a sidelight on the broader health
picture.
Replacing 'dirtier' delivery systems with cleaner ones is an obvious measure
to take in efforts to reduce toxicity for those who are going to continue using
nicotine. Different nicotine delivery devices will have differing levels of
risk. Theoretically we could place all these products on a spectrum and look at
ways to give information and other incentives that would encourage consumers to
move toward the lowest risk products that can still meet their needs. And one
could also imagine a system of incentives that would encourage manufacturers to
work to create products with lower and lower toxicity levels.
But, like most seemingly straightforward public policy solutions it gets
rather complicated in the real world. If it were truly easy to prevent a half
million deaths a year in this country I am sure these hearings would not even be
necessary since the corrective measures would have been taken many years ago.
The complicating issues
We need to avoid making or reinforcing the mistakes of the past. Millions of
smokers smoke 'light' and 'mild' cigarettes in the false believe that they are
actually safer. It took years for independent scientists and governments to
discover that these products are actually part of a massive consumer deception
on relative risk. An effective harm reduction strategy must begin with an end to
all forms of deception on relative risk and comprehensive science based
regulation of all tobacco products and the marketing for those products. There
needs to be a governmental agency that knows the whole truth about the relative
health risks of different products and that is in a position to insure that
consumers are provided the whole truth in a non-misleading way that promotes the
overall public health. Without comprehensive regulation both the government and
consumers cannot be sure they have complete information or the tools to best
protect the public health.
Regulation is only a first step, and is not an end in itself. It needs to be
based on clear goals. Here, briefly, are some of the issues I think we need to
consider when looking at potential reduced-risk products:
1) What is the degree of certainty that we want to have that a product truly
does reduce risk compared to standard cigarettes? On a one-for-one basis this is
not a difficulty when looking at medicinal nicotine products such as the patch
and nicotine gum that are already fully regulated. It should also not be a
difficulty with low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco, given the massive differences
in potential disease risk compared to cigarettes, if there was a mechanism that
could stipulate the actual level of nitrosamines and other harmful substances in
these products. If all cigarette use were simply replaced by medicinal nicotine
and low nitrosamine smokeless tobacco products the death rates would be
massively lower. But there are many products, especially combustion-based
products, where the degree of risk reduction is by no means understood. There
needs to be some system in place that can credibly evaluate the relative risks
of all tobacco products.
2) What about the risk from a product that only replaces some cigarettes? It
is quite possible that a product could be far less hazardous than cigarettes,
but replace so few of the cigarettes that someone smokes that it would have no
appreciable impact on risk. Yet if smokers believe such a product to have
significant health benefits they are, once again, being deceived. How can we
develop guidance on issues of 'smoking reduction'?
3) How can we effectively place various current and future products on a
'continuum of risk' so that we can communicate to users the information they
need to make fully informed decisions? Many smokers believe that 'light'
cigarettes are significantly less hazardous than regular cigarettes, which is
perhaps the greatest consumer deception of our time. Consumers also believe that
the 'tar' and nicotine listed on ads is what they actually get from smoking
various cigarettes. As shown in Appendix 1, many also believe that nicotine
causes cancer and that using smokeless tobacco is as deadly as smoking. In
addition most harbor misunderstandings about the workings and potential risks
from medicinal nicotine that only serve to keep them from availing themselves of
these proven safe and effective means of quitting smoking. This level of
confusion about such a critical public health issue is truly alarming, and could
possibly even worsen as new and unregulated products hit the market.
4) How can we prevent efforts at toxicity reduction from undermining our
efforts on cessation and prevention of uptake? The main planks of good public
policy should be complementary rather than adversarial. If the promise of
toxicity reduction reduces quitting or encourages more people to enter [or
re-enter] the market the unintended consequences could negate any potential
health gains from the intervention. This is the reason that meaningful
regulation of both claims and how potential harm reduction products are marketed
is critical.
5) Who should communicate messages to the public? One of the realities of the
present environment, and one borne out by the history of foods and drugs prior
to the existence of the FDA, is that without strong government oversight those
with a vested interest in selling products should not be trusted to communicate
full and truthful information. With foods and pharmaceuticals there are now
stronger grounds to believe claims due to the intervention of a credible,
objective and expert third party. Such third party validation is as important to
tobacco companies as it is to public health. Even a tobacco company that tried
to tell the truth about a massively reduced-risk product would probably not be
believed in today's environment. It is critical that FDA be given effective
authority over all tobacco products in order to ensure that consumers are not
misled about the relative risks of different products, including reduced risk
tobacco/nicotine products.
6) How can we be assured that the messages conveyed to the public are being
appropriately interpreted? What if smokers believed that smokeless tobacco was
something they could switch to after they developed a smoking related disease
like lung cancer? What if they believed that all smokeless tobacco [including,
say, that sold in Sudan or Central Asia] had the same risks? There appears to be
a strong need for an institutionalized form of post-marketing surveillance, both
to assess attitudes and behaviors.
7) How do we stay on top of what could be a rapidly changing environment?
Approximately 45 million Americans spend roughly $80 billion a year buying a
dirty drug delivery system that is killing over 400,000 of them - and tens of
thousands of non-smokers - annually. If this market were subject to effective
FDA regulation that actually promotes competition based on good science and
marketing that is not misleading, private enterprise and informed consumers
would cause a marketplace revolution. Just as did the legal reforms on foods and
drugs in 1906 and 1938.
These are tough issues. But the need to address them is truly monumental.
Your fellow citizens are dying from tobacco use, but they are also dying for
want of truthful information on relative risks and from a lack of viable
alternatives to cigarettes. There is a need for prompt action. The FDA and FTC
already have authority over medicinal nicotine. I would hope that they would
begin an immediate examination of how they might use their existing authority to
expand the availability of these products and to explore their potential for
harm reduction. Smokeless tobacco products could also be a key part of a harm
reduction strategy if a federal agency were given the authority to regulate the
content of these products and how they are advertised. I would hope that this,
too, could be done quickly.
There are no easy answers. There is, instead, a need to balance potential
risks and benefits. There is a need to assess the science behind new products
and the best way to communicate relevant information to consumers, and how best
to regulate a market in order to give maximum protection for consumers. There is
also a great need to stimulate discussion on how to proceed. It is no longer a
question of whether there will be alternatives to cigarettes or whether truthful
information on relative risks should be communicated to consumers. It is,
instead, an issue of how to evaluate products and of how to communicate
information in a way that complements public health goals and provides consumers
with much needed information about the relative risks of alternative products.
Thank you for your time,
APPENDIX 1
Data From: Informing Consumers about the
Relative Health Risks of Different Nicotine Delivery Products
, K.
Michael Cummings, PhD, MPH, Gary A. Giovino, PhD, Maansi A. Bansal, Andrew
Hyland, PhD, Jan Hastrup, PhD, Berwood Yost,
National
Conference on Tobacco or Health New Orleans, Louisiana, November 2001
APPENDIX 1, page 2
