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The House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
June 3, 2003
10:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Stearns. My name is Steve Burton and I am the Vice President
of Smoking Control, Strategic Development and Switch for GlaxoSmithKline
Consumer Healthcare (GSK). I have had responsibility for marketing
over-the-counter nicotine replacement therapy products (Nicorette gum, NicoDerm
CQ patch, and most recently the Commit lozenge) since they were switched from
prescription status in 1996. On behalf of GSK, let me thank you and members of
the Subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing
and to share GSK's views on the matter before Congress and the public health
community at large. GSK applauds the subcommittee for holding this hearing
titled "Can Tobacco Cure Smoking - A Review of Tobacco Harm
Reduction." My testimony will concentrate on what can be done to help
smokers who are concerned about their health and interested in reducing the risk
of smoking. In particular, I want to offer what we have learned through our
research with consumers to help illustrate what they expect novel tobacco
products to provide and how they might be used in a real world setting. I will
also comment on the adverse public health consequences that could arise when
smokers have the new choice to use novel tobacco products instead of FDA
approved medicines and other scientifically proven methods of quitting. We
believe that an understanding of consumer beliefs and behavior can play a
critical role in the design and effective implementation of public health
programs and that will be our principal contribution today.
Smoking as the Leading Cause of Preventable Death and Tobacco Control Policy
Progress to Date
You are familiar with the staggering statistics associated with the use of
tobacco. 440,000 Americans die prematurely each year because of tobacco use (CDC
2002a). More than 6 million of our children alive today will die prematurely
later in life because of their use of tobacco (CDC 2002b). The use of this
deadly and addictive product constitutes the leading preventable cause of death
and disease in the United States each year. While we need to accelerate our
progress in reducing the harm of smoking, we should be proud of the fact that
millions of smokers have been able to quit completely, youth initiation has been
on the decline, and overall prevalence of smoking is slowly trending downward.
These significant public health gains are the result of a combination of
environmental factors and changes in public health policy led by our elected
officials, our regulatory community and the public health field. Examples of
these efforts include higher tobacco taxes, restrictions on smoking in the
workplace and public places, greater availability of proven treatments, and
successful state-based and national youth prevention programs. These and other
factors have encouraged more smokers to make serious quit attempts and to be
more successful in achieving a smoke free status. GSK has played a small but
important part in the overall effort to help adult smokers become tobacco free,
and our primary mission remains to reduce the mortality and morbidity associated
with smoking by offering smokers proven methods of quitting completely - the
ultimate way to reduce risk.
New Challenges to Recent Progress in Helping Smokers Quit
It is well established that overcoming an addiction to tobacco is one of the
most daunting and enduring medical challenges an individual can face. In fact,
it usually takes multiple attempts for most smokers to become abstinent, and
each effort takes a high degree of motivation and personal courage to overcome
the psychological and physiological effects of withdrawal from the highly
addictive and often socially rewarding use of a cigarette.
To overcome this powerful addiction, smokers need encouragement and support to
promote quit attempts and to convert these attempts into positive health
outcomes. This includes making effective use of available treatments. Smokers
receive this encouragement in a number of ways - from their friends, their
health care professional, and also from their government and other public
institutions. The decision to quit is easily influenced by smokers' beliefs in
their own ability to quit and by their understanding of the alternatives they
have to mitigate the risks of smoking. Our research with smokers suggests that
the unregulated availability of so-called reduced risk products could lead
millions of smokers to delay or reconsider quitting. A perception that novel
tobacco products have the endorsement of our public institutions would
discourage smokers' commitment to quitting and introduce the confounding and
potentially very deceptive notion that smokers can now reduce their risk or even
"quit" by continuing to smoke with these novel tobacco products, a
so-called "harm reduction" approach. While the health benefits of a
harm reduction approach have yet to be proven and remain largely theoretical,
the risks of unregulated access to novel tobacco products are clear and present
dangers that could undo years of progress by Congress, the FDA and the public
health community of which we are a part.
As you no doubt have heard, the great fear held by many public health experts is
that these new tobacco products may be nothing more than a scientifically
sophisticated version of the "light" cigarette. The introduction of
"light" and "ultra light" cigarettes is an object lesson in
how policy decisions can unwittingly mislead the public and undermine cessation.
Public health officials now believe, many decades too late to be of any help to
the health-concerned smoker who switched to lights over the last thirty years,
that lights appear to have been deliberately designed so as not to reduce tar
and nicotine deliveries when smoked by human beings.
As the National Cancer Institute recently stated, in the definitive study from
the federal government on the deception linked with "lights,"
"Marketing this illusion of risk reduction would have been of concern even
if the target for these brands had been confined to continuing smokers. Instead,
these brands were targeted at those smokers who were thinking of quitting in an
effort to intercept the smokers and keep them smoking cigarettes." (USDHHS,
2001, page 5)
Due in large part to the deliberate design of "lights," there was no
reduction in the death and disease burden from tobacco as a result of the
marketing of "light" cigarettes. NCI concluded that "The absence
of meaningful differences in smoke exposure when different brands of cigarettes
are smoked and the resultant absence of meaningful differences in risk make the
marketing of these cigarettes as lower-delivery and lower-risk products
deceptive for the smoker. The reality that many smokers chose these products as
an alternative to cessation-a change that would produce real reductions in
disease risks-makes this deception an urgent public health issue." (USDHHS,
2001, page 1)
Thirty years ago, well-intentioned public health officials encouraged
health-concerned smokers who could not quit smoking to switch to
"lights." At all costs, we must avoid repeating the mistakes with
today's products that were made thirty years ago with "lights."
Consumer Understanding of Risk of and Interest in Novel Tobacco Products
At the outset, one critical fact must be recognized. Complete abstinence is the
only method that reduces the future health risk of smoking to almost zero, and
allows for an ex-smoker to achieve a long-term prognosis essentially equivalent
to a never smoker after 10-15 years of abstinence (USDHHS, 1990). The emergence
of novel tobacco products does not change this fact. Novel tobacco products have
not been studied with the same rigor of smoking cessation medicines and methods.
Nor have the studies that have been conducted on these products been submitted
to FDA for evaluation. There is only one proven way to reduce the harm from
tobacco, and that is to quit.
On the other hand, consumers are all too willing to grasp at the belief that
novel tobacco products are indeed safe and effective alternatives to smoking
their current cigarettes. As an example, we fielded a large consumer survey that
exposed the Eclipse concept (a novel cigarette design that is claimed to
primarily heat rather than burn tobacco) to 1000 smokers and 499 ex-smokers. In
the survey, after hearing a brief account of claims for Eclipse, almost all
current smokers (91.4%) thought Eclipse was safer than Regular cigarettes.
Moreover, almost a quarter (23.9%) considered Eclipse to be completely safe. On
average, participants expected that Eclipse would reduce smoking risk by 62.1%
compared to Regular cigarettes, with three quarters (75.9%) expecting that
Eclipse would reduce health risks by at least 50%. Eclipse was also regarded as
significantly safer than current Light or Ultra Light cigarettes. Compared to
the 23.9% who regarded Eclipse as completely safe, only 9.4% and 11.3% regarded
Lights and Ultra Lights, respectively, as completely safe. The fact that
consumers perceive novel tobacco products to carry less health risk than smoking
even light or ultra light cigarettes should be troubling to those who are
concerned with the death and disease caused by tobacco products.
We know that approximately 70% of smokers are interested in quitting (CDC,
2002c). GSK's mission is to reduce death and disease by inspiring more smokers
to become tobacco, and ultimately, nicotine free. The scientific data behind our
treatments, such as Nicorette gum, NicoDerm CQ patch, the Commit lozenge, and
the prescription smoking cessation drug Zyban, has been evaluated and approved
by the Food and Drug Administration. These products have been approved as being
both safe and effective for use in trying to quit. With the help of our products
and those of other treatment providers, millions of smokers in this country have
successfully stopped smoking and eliminated all of the risk of continued tobacco
use.
Unintended Consequences of Novel Tobacco Products- Consumer Perspective
From a public health perspective, we should be concerned about the new crop of
tobacco products bearing unproven claims to reduce exposure and risk. The
greatest danger is that these products may pose a significant threat to
cessation efforts - regardless of whether a smoker would have used one of our
products in a quit attempt or chosen another quit method. Smokers who see the
claims for products like Eclipse may now think that a safer cigarette genuinely
exists. This may make them less interested or inclined to try to quit smoking
entirely.
There is the added concern that ex-smokers may start smoking again, thinking
that they can now safely consume tobacco products. Likewise, those who never
smoked, particularly adolescents, may take up smoking for the first time, using
one of these new products under the assumption that a safe cigarette exists.
The consumer survey data commissioned by GSK on smoker and ex-smoker attitudes
towards Eclipse, one of the new generations of tobacco products sold by R. J.
Reynolds, confirms these concerns (Shiffman, Pillitteri, Burton, et al,
unpublished manuscript). Reynolds makes explicit health claims about reductions
in disease risks for Eclipse, including "less risk of cancer," and
"a lower risk of chronic bronchitis, possibly even emphysema" (www.eclipse.rjrt.com,
December 2002).
The survey found that 57.4% of smokers said they were "somewhat
likely" or "very likely" to purchase Eclipse within the next six
months. Most importantly, after hearing about Eclipse, there was a net decrease
of 19% in smokers who were contemplating quitting within 6 months. Furthermore,
15% of the young adults who had recently quit smoking were interested in buying
Eclipse.
In a second study focusing on a novel smokeless tobacco product among smokers
interested in quitting, similarly high levels of purchase interest were
reported. Around 41% of the sample were very or somewhat likely to want to use
the novel smokeless product. Purchase intent (46%) was higher in consumers with
an interest in using nicotine replacement therapy to quit, a surrogate for
smokers more likely to actually commit to a serious quit attempt. When asked how
they would use these smokeless products, 15% of the sample reported they would
use the smokeless tobacco product as a substitute for cigarettes at times when
they could not smoke, 29% as a way to reduce their smoking rate, and another 36%
as a way to cut back on their smoking in preparation for quitting.
These results suggest that Eclipse, and its new brethren of tobacco-based
products that have not been proven to reduce the risk of smoking in any
meaningful way, are a threat to cessation and risk converting ex-smokers back to
their deadly addiction.
Do these products genuinely reduce exposure and risk? We do not know because
exposure and risk are determined by the overall pattern and years of use by
smokers in real world conditions, not just by physical makeup of the product.
Nor do we know how these products perform in the laboratory. But here are a few
observations that should be of profound concern to the public health community
of which you are a part. Eclipse advertising declares that exposure to carbon
monoxide may be higher than traditional cigarettes. Eclipse has been shown to
contain filaments of glass particles not found in traditional cigarettes that
would be inhaled deeply into the lungs (IOM 2001). The new Quest cigarette
offers a program claiming to reduce levels of nicotine consumption while keeping
the level of cancer-causing tar unchanged - and the tar levels are higher than
the majority of low tar brands consumed today. Many experts would argue that, as
was the case with "light" cigarettes, smokers of Quest would consume a
greater number of the reduced nicotine cigarettes in order to avoid withdrawal
and maintain the reinforcing effects of their nicotine addiction. These smokers
could end up consuming more tar with the reduced nicotine cigarette than their
traditional brand of cigarette.
Scientific Perspective - The Risk/Benefit Equation for Novel Tobacco Products
I expect the scientific community and tobacco control experts to provide their
view on the potential risks and benefits of expanded use of novel tobacco
products. They believe the tobacco industry's motivation is to perpetuate the
use of tobacco-based products by introducing a new generation of tobacco
products. By offering promises of reduced exposure to toxins in tobacco smoke,
and even making claims to reduce the risk of cancer and other diseases, these
products raise profound and troubling public health policy questions for our
partners in the tobacco control community.
We should consider carefully the recent findings published in the American
Journal of Epidemiology, that reductions in cigarette use, as measured by daily
smoking rates, had no impact on health risks from smoking among a large
population of heavy smokers (Godtfredsen et al, 2002). Smokers who attempt to
reduce the harm of smoking by cutting down on the number of cigarettes they
smoke compensate in the same way that smokers of so-called light cigarettes
compensated by smoking each cigarette more deeply. Smokers who attempt to reduce
their smoking rates without the support of pharmacotherapy experienced the same
degree of harm as smokers who did not reduce their smoking rates.
The novel tobacco products take various forms. Some burn tobacco or employ novel
technologies to burn or heat tobacco. Others are tobacco-based but do not burn.
The combusting products include Omni and Advance, and promise to reduce or
eliminate exposure to a subset of toxins in tobacco smoke. The novel products
include Eclipse and Accord, and claim to reduce toxin levels or secondhand
smoke. The non-combusting (i.e. smokeless) products include Ariva, Revel, and
Exalt, promise tobacco satisfaction in situations (e.g. at work or on a plane)
where smoking is not possible or permitted.
Whether they combust or not, all of these products are aimed squarely at the
health-concerned smoker. They have entered the marketplace in the absence of any
independent scientific evaluation of their claims, and without any governmental
scrutiny of the products or their claims.
Equally troubling are the claims for the smokeless products, like the Ariva
tobacco lozenge. In isolation, one could argue that a tobacco-based product that
does not burn tobacco leaf has a lower risk profile than one that does. But this
could be a short-sighted view to take given the historical behavior of the
smokeless tobacco industry operating outside of a credible regulated
environment. Reviews of past marketing practices report that this industry
deliberately targeted young males, particularly athletes, in the 1970s and
revived lagging sales by promoting use of smokeless among teenage boys who had
not previously used tobacco. Further, these same reports note that this industry
specifically designed and promoted products with varying levels of nicotine
delivery, perceived strength and a range of flavors (including
"candy-like" flavors) so as to facilitate early use by adolescents and
their progression to more addicting, higher nicotine products (FDA Proposed and
Final Rule, 1995 and 1996; Bonnie and Lynch, 1994).
Furthermore, the health benefits of products like Ariva presumably result in
part from the assumption that Ariva would be used to completely replace all
cigarette use and thus overall exposure to toxins would decrease. It is equally
plausible that smokeless tobacco products would be used in addition to a
smoker's typical level of cigarette consumption, and this is precisely the type
of real world consumer behavior that must be assessed prior to market entry, not
years after this unfortunate consequence has been documented retrospectively.
Smokers who might have otherwise been inclined to try to quit, may latch on to a
smokeless product bearing an "Anytime. Anywhere." or a "WHEN YOU
CAN'T SMOKE" claim, and use it to perpetuate their smoking through the dual
use of combusting and non-combusting tobacco. In fact, the United States
Smokeless Tobacco Company expressed the view in their 2000 annual report that
the dual use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco "represents great
potential for future expansion of the business" (UST, Inc, Annual Report,
2000, page 9).
In the absence of public health-based regulation of these products, and well
controlled studies of actual patterns of consumer use completed prior to market
entry, we have no way of knowing whether this new generation of products will
reduce exposure and risk in any meaningful way when used by smokers under normal
or typical conditions of use. Nor do we understand the impact on quitting
behavior amongst those smokers who otherwise would have achieved complete
abstinence when they are exposed to the unsubstantiated claims of these novel
tobacco products. Even more of a concern, we will not know what effect this
marketing will have on the possibility of young people initiating tobacco use.
The unfettered access to the marketplace for these products has created a
massive, uncontrolled clinical trial, with commercialization and hefty promotion
and advertising preceding a scientifically credible demonstration that there is
adequate proof to support the marketing claims and expected public health
outcomes of these products.
Regulatory Approaches for Novel Tobacco Products: Recommendations
The most appropriate way to assess the potential risks and benefits of these
products is through a regulatory system that assures the public of comprehensive
regulation of all tobacco products; a system where a public health-based
regulatory agency evaluates products and claims before they enter the
marketplace. As this Subcommittee goes forward with its consideration of the
role of tobacco-based products in a harm reduction framework, we need to ensure
that an appropriate degree of scientific and regulatory accountability is
brought to bear on any tobacco products that purport to reduce exposure or risk.
One way to achieve this accountability is by insisting that no product or claim
should appear in the marketplace until it has been evaluated by an independent,
public health-based regulatory authority. Such an agency, and we believe it
should be FDA, should decide whether there is an adequate scientific basis to
support whatever claims the manufacturer seeks to make.
Whereas the tobacco-based products are carefully designed to perpetuate tobacco
use, or at least could have that real world effect, in contrast GSK and other
providers of treatment interventions offer quitting programs rigorously studied
and evaluated for their safety and efficacy by FDA prior to appearing in the
marketplace. We are proud of the collaboration we entered into with Congress,
the FDA and the public health community in the mid-1990s to expand access and
utilization of nicotine replacement therapies by marketing them as
over-the-counter medications starting in 1996. (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 1997), (Shiffman et al., 1997), (Centers of Disease Control and
Prevention, 2000a), (Keeler et al., 2002). We have been encouraged by the
evidence that offering treatments directly to consumers can significantly
increase utilization of these products to support quit attempts.
Yet, we have not exhausted our opportunities to innovate in the area of tobacco
dependence treatment through the use of pharmaceuticals and other public health
interventions that expand utilization while also improving outcomes, as recent
success in the area of quit lines have shown. We believe it should be the policy
of our government to encourage sponsors to develop new indications and uses for
current products, and to work with sponsors to accelerate development of a range
of novel treatment products. GSK has a number of new products that offer the
promise of more consumer acceptable formulations and regimens and a range of
experimental drugs are in development within industry and academia. For
instance, over-the-counter nicotine replacement therapy products are limited to
up to 12 weeks of use as compared to six months or more under their former
prescription status. Addiction experts have argued that the appeal and
effectiveness of currently marketed treatments could be enhanced dramatically
should we consider new uses and indications such as combination therapy, use of
intensive behavioral interventions alongside pharmacotherapy, reduction of
cigarettes alongside a gradual increase in medicinal nicotine administration,
and use of NRT for relapse prevention and long term maintenance of cessation.
Promising drugs and interventions like these should be fast tracked when judged
by the FDA to qualify for such status.
Finally, GSK welcomes scientifically validated and regulated claims for
tobacco-based products. It is not our position that novel tobacco products
cannot be marketed today under existing tobacco regulations or that it is
unconceivable that such products might make a public health contribution. Our
position is that any health claim, expressed or implied, should be
scientifically demonstrated and reviewed by FDA before such claims are exposed
to the most vulnerable within our society - those who have recently quit, are
highly motivated to quit, or are tempted to begin smoking. For a marketplace
flooded with unproven and unregulated health claims for novel tobacco products
will not only undo years of progress in the tobacco control effort but also
damage our capacity to bring even more effective and consumer accepted
treatments to the millions of consumers who want and deserve meaningful
improvements in their health status.
Today half of ever smokers have become former smokers. Our challenge and yours
is to ensure that successful quitters are not lured back to smoking and the vast
majority of smokers who can and will eventually quit completely are not
discouraged from reducing the harm of smoking to zero. As to the remainder of
smokers who may not be able to quit, and we would argue that we have many
opportunities yet before us to reduce this number further, we need to find
interim and credible solutions to reducing harm to their health. The current
cadre of novel tobacco products, if allowed to remain in the market absent
scientific evidence of a positive health impact within the population, should
nonetheless be prohibited from making implied or expressed claims of health
improvement until such time as adequate proof and public health regulatory
approval has been obtained.
At GSK, we stand ready to assist the Subcommittee in any way that we can on
these critically important and challenging questions of how to reduce the
extraordinary death and disease toll caused by the use of tobacco products.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be happy to
answer any questions that the subcommittee might have.
###
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