Prepared Statement of The Honorable Joe Barton

The Threat of and Planning for Pandemic Flu

Subcommittee on Health
May 26, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you for holding this hearing on this important public health issue.

Experts say another killer flu is inevitable. We don't know when or where it will begin, or exactly how many millions it may kill. We only know that a pandemic flu has happened before and it must surely come again. Historically, influenza pandemics have been deadly. With a world population of 6.5 billion, even a relatively mild pandemic could kill many millions of people. In the United States the risk varies from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. Think of it like this - a bad flu outbreak could kill more Americans than either or both of the last century's world wars. It is probably fair to expect that some of us in this room today would be sick, and a handful of us would die.

Right now we are monitoring some serious developments in Asia concerning a recent avian flu strain. Both the World Health Organization and the Department of Health and Human Services has expressed serious concern over these strains developing into a global pandemic.

Organizations around the world and HHS have taken significant steps to mitigate the potential effects of influenza pandemic. I applaud the efforts that both the private sector and public sector are making to address the potential need for different means of vaccine production. I also applaud the Secretary of HHS for the emphasis on planning and preparedness for pandemic flu and cooperation with international organizations.

In many other ways, however, we remain very vulnerable. The global vaccine industry is fragile and sparse. The capacity to gear up and produce necessary vaccines in the event of a pandemic is limited. Liability concerns may hinder production and distribution of any new vaccine. With ordinary flu vaccine production so low, the amounts we can produce in the face of a global pandemic are insufficient. Moreover, the time frames for development, production, and approvals leave millions vulnerable.

Antivirals may also be a useful countermeasure. We can place such countermeasures in the National Strategic Stockpile. I am glad we have done so for over 2 million courses of treatment, but I want to ask whether this is sufficient in the face of the threat. The amount in relation to the population appears to be much less than what other countries are doing.

I note that many similar planning and preparedness activities will be relevant in the face of bioterrorism and other emerging threats. We will need to aggressively work on these issues. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on this timely and important topic.

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