|
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
May 7, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This afternoon's hearing to examine the government's
response to SARS, what we can learn from it, and what we must prepare for down
the road, promises to be very informative. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
preparing the most thorough Congressional look at the SARS situation to date.
As the Committee of jurisdiction over matters of public health, it is
essential that we build a solid oversight record early on, so we have the
correct perspective to help us monitor developments with respect to SARS, as
well as other infectious disease outbreaks - be they produced naturally or by
man.
At the outset, we should acknowledge the remarkable, and decisive, actions
taken by public health authorities in the United States - at the CDC especially,
and NIH, FDA, and HHS - and those working with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and various health ministries abroad.
The SARS threat continues and may yet get worse, but we can at least breathe
a sigh of relief because it could have been much, much worse already. Some
people note that we escaped harm because of luck. We have been fortunate, but I
don't think we should let that overshadow the actions of people, of individuals,
that really made the crucial difference on the ground, actions that may have
saved the lives of hundreds and possibly thousands of our fellow citizens.
In the United States, we should appreciate the decisions of the CDC
leadership - Dr. Gerberding, who is before us today -- for casting a very wide
surveillance net to ensure that SARS cases wouldn't escape detection. This type
of thinking and proactive effort is what saves lives.
Decisions by HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson - who said the government's
response on potential SARS vaccines "wouldn't be business as usual" -
and the rapid moves by Dr. Fauci and others at NIH to be ready to battle any
outbreak all suggest we are taking aggressive steps to combat SARS.
This response has been effective to date. And we can trace it right to the
decision that led to the discovery of the deadly SARS outbreak, beginning at a
hospital in Hanoi this past February.
There, a WHO physician and investigator - one Carlo Urbani - was treating a
cascade of deadly infections and urgently pressed Vietnamese health officials to
impose protective health measures, which they did, and he raised the initial
alarm for Dr. David Heymann and his colleagues at WHO in the field who made the
bold decision to issue the rare global alert for SARS.
Carlo Urbani died of a SARS infection, but he saved lives by his decisive
actions, in Vietnam and around the world. We should appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I think we should remember how decisions and actions by people,
by individuals like Dr. Urbani and Dr. Heymann make a difference here, because
part of our job on this Committee should be to ensure that such life-saving
decisions aren't hampered by poor planning, out-of-date regulations and laws, or
other barriers that hinder appropriate public health response.
The panels assembled today will offer us a range of views on what we have
learned, and what we might do to improve the process. I look forward to learning
about the state of public health laws and surveillance systems, for example, and
the state of research and innovation in the area of infectious disease treatment
and vaccines.
Innovation - in this case, the development of cutting edge medicines and
technologies - is sparked by individual insight and decisions, against a
backdrop that encourages such effort. Whether in the area of combating SARS or
bioterrorism - such as through Project BioShield - our efforts should be to help
provide the certainty and incentive that is necessary to encourage such
innovation and for us to reap the benefits from its fruits.
Mr. Chairman, let me also welcome the witnesses for their testimony today at
this timely hearing, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Printer
Friendly |