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Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
December 12, 2001
1:00 PM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Summary of Testimony
I support of H.R. 3406. The elimination of FERC's
merger review authority is the single aspect of this proposed legislation that I
cannot support. I believe it is important for FERC to continue its public
interest-focused merger analysis, and I urge the Subcommittee to consider
allowing FERC to retain the authority to protect the public in this respect.
I believe it is important to have equal and open
access to all transmission at nondiscriminatory rates and comparable terms and
conditions. At the same time, the public power sector has expressed concerns
that should be addressed. I support Chairman Wood's requests for a change to the
legislation to allow all tariffs for open access transmission service be on file
with FERC.
Proposed section 202 mandates that all
transmission utilities - both investor-owned utilities and public power/electric
power cooperative utilities - participate in an RTO. To the extent this
direction will eliminate any existing uncertainty regarding FERC's authority
and permit RTO formation to proceed expeditiously, I support it. I believe that
RTO procedures and standards may need to be adapted over time. I therefore
support Chairman Wood's suggestion for a simple provision to permit FERC to
require RTOs where it finds such RTOs to be in the public interest. This
approach would remove existing uncertainties, while preserving FERC's ability to
tailor its RTO program to an increasingly dynamic marketplace. Should Congress
move forward with section 202, I support Chairman Wood's testimony regarding the
specific standards and procedures.
I agree with the premise that interconnection
rules should be standardized. FERC has begun a process for standardizing
interconnection procedures and protocols, which provides a forum for consensus.
Further, I support the legislation's treatment of PUHCA and PURPA. Also, I
support the legislation's reliability provisions, especially the provision of
sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with reliability rules. I agree
with the bill's approach to incentive and performance-based rate policies for
expansion of transmission networks. Policies such as allowing a reasonable
return on equity or accelerated depreciation for new technologies also would act
to encourage investment.
I believe that the bill's approach to siting is
certainly an improvement over the present jurisdictional scheme. However, I
would prefer that FERC be granted federal eminent domain authority similar to
that we exercise in the siting of interstate natural gas pipelines under the
Natural Gas Act. Finally, I support the strengthening of the Commission's
authority to assess civil and criminal penalties for violations of the FPA and
the increases in the level of such penalties.
Testimony
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Subcommittee's proposed energy restructuring legislation. I
believe it is important for Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to work in tandem to accomplish the critical goal of ensuring
the development of a competitive wholesale electric power market that is fair
and efficient and benefits consumers. While I believe FERC has made great
strides in the effort to increase wholesale competition over the past several
years, I welcome Congressional guidance through legislation that assists in
articulating and clarifying the steps that must be taken toward this end.
My testimony today will comment on H.R. 3406 and
highlight specific aspects of the proposed legislation that I consider to be
especially important from the perspective of a federal energy regulator. As a
general matter, I am very supportive of H.R. 3406. I have testified before this
Subcommittee many times on restructuring issues, and I am pleased that this
proposed legislation is largely consistent with many of the views I have
expressed. I am also pleased that the bill would have the effect of promoting
small-scale renewable generation. As I will discuss in greater detail below,
however, there is one important exception: I do not support the proposed repeal
of section 203 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).
Title I of the proposed legislation deals with
electric supply. Among the provisions of Title I, I would like to address my
comments to interconnection, the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935 (PUHCA), the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), and merger review. I
have previously testified before this subcommittee that interconnection rules
should be clarified and standardized in order to ensure that new sources of
generation are able to interconnect to the transmission system. The Commission
accelerated this process of standardization in October with the issuance of an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) addressing procedures and
protocols for interconnection. The ANOPR encourages parties to reach consensus
on non cost-related issues of transmission interconnection and uses as a "strawman"
the ERCOT model as supplemented by current Commission interconnection policy.
Reports of the progress being made are positive, and I support issuance of a
NOPR as soon as possible. The Commission's intention is to instruct parties to
take up the issues of cost responsibility for transmission interconnections in
the second phase of the transmission interconnection rulemaking.
Section 101 of the proposed legislation would
decide the major issue of cost responsibility by assigning system upgrade costs
to the generator. I believe these pricing decisions need to be made carefully
and with consideration of the multiple factors at issue. Although this
legislative process certainly is one forum for deciding this important issue,
the cost responsibility aspect might also benefit from comments and a consensus
process such as the Commission plans for the second phase of our rulemaking. I
expect the second phase, dealing with cost issues, will be more difficult and
contentious; many states already are expressing their views.
Section 101 of the proposed legislation also
requires the Commission to promulgate the technical standards for generators
interconnecting with distribution facilities. Although it is no modest
undertaking to establish national standards for distribution interconnections, I
do believe reducing obstacles for small-scale distributed generation can produce
good results. Distributed generation can increase options for consumers and
would provide added reliability to the grid. Standards for all players, as well
as the net metering provisions included in this legislation, may encourage the
growth of this fledgling movement toward decentralization of the electric grid.
Of course, we should expect the states to insist on a process that allows their
opinions and concerns to be heard since this section shifts jurisdiction to the
federal level.
The proposed legislation repeals PUHCA and
replaces it with increased access by the Commission and state regulators to
certain books and records. I support this legislation. The proposed legislation
also repeals prospectively the PURPA mandatory purchase obligation. I support
the repeal of the mandatory purchase requirement in Section 210 of PURPA. I also
support proposed section 133 of the bill, which would "grandfather"
existing PURPA contracts.
I would like to highlight Subtitle D of Title I,
which would eliminate FERC's merger review authority now embodied in section
203 of the FPA. This is the single aspect of this proposed legislation that I
cannot support. The title itself of Subtitle D, "Redundant Review of
Certain Matters," reveals my basic concern in this regard: I do not agree
that FERC merger review is redundant. All merger reviews are not created equal.
FERC's FPA "public interest" standard is different from the "no
harm to competition" antitrust standard of the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act. The relevant information required for the type of review conducted by FERC
is not the same information required by another agency conducting antitrust
review of the same merger. While the same merger may be reviewed by various
agencies, the analyses are not parallel; standards and requirements vary from
agency to agency.
I believe it is important for FERC to continue
its public interest-focused merger analysis, which looks at a merger's effects
on rates, regulation, and competition. FERC, in its regulatory role, is
particularly attuned to the issues that may arise as a result of competition and
industry consolidation, including technical issues and new kinds of mergers
that may lead to the blurring of traditional utility services with other
business lines. By acknowledging these issues, I believe that FERC has developed
a dynamic and flexible process - one that is required in today's market. I
urge the Subcommittee to continue to allow FERC to retain the authority to
protect the public in this respect.
Title II of the proposed legislation deals with
transmission operation. Section 201 of the proposed legislation would allow the
Commission to require all public utilities and transmitting utilities to offer
open access transmission services, extending the requirement for open access to
transmitting utilities that are not public utilities. As I have testified on
other occasions, I believe it is important to have equal and open access to all
transmission at nondiscriminatory rates and comparable terms and conditions. At
the same time, the public power sector has expressed concerns unique to its
status, and these concerns should be addressed with respect to sections 201 and
202. Chairman Wood's testimony requests a change to the legislation to allow all
tariffs for open access transmission service be on file with the Commission. I
share the Chairman's concerns on these issues and support his testimony in this
regard.
Section 202 addresses Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs). There is no more important effort underway at FERC today
than the formation of RTOs. Since the Commission began promoting RTOs as a means
to remove barriers and impediments present in wholesale electricity markets, I
have been fully committed to the goal of RTO formation. While there is room for
disagreement on the best path to attain the goal of fully functioning RTOs, FERC
is very actively pursuing the completion of the development of RTOs with clear
responsibilities, independence, and sufficient scope.
When the Commission issued Order No. 2000 in
December 1999, we decided to adopt an open and collaborative process that relied
on voluntary regional participation. Since that time, I have strongly urged that
FERC not depart from the basic philosophies embodied in Order No. 2000,
particularly in the absence of a formal decision to do so, informed by the views
of interested parties and state commissions. In my view, sufficient question
remains over FERC's authority to mandate the formation of, or participation
in, RTOs, such that any moves on our part toward a mandate will be
counterproductive to FERC's ultimate goals. My concern is that this lack of
clarity could lead the industry and the Commission to divert resources away from
the important task of RTO implementation, and instead toward expensive and
time-consuming litigation over FERC's authority. I therefore support
Congressional clarification of FERC's authority with respect to RTOs.
Proposed section 202 mandates that all
transmission utilities - both investor-owned utilities and public power/electric
power cooperative utilities - participate in an RTO. To the extent this
direction will eliminate any existing uncertainty regarding FERC's authority
and permit RTO formation to proceed expeditiously, I support it. Proposed
section 202 also requires FERC to establish uniform market rules, including the
establishment and enforcement of "seams" agreements. This direction is
consistent with a generic rulemaking proceeding that FERC already has announced.
While the RTO standards embodied in the proposed
legislation are, for the most part, consistent with those established in Order
No. 2000, I believe it is possible that RTO procedures and standards may need to
be adapted over time. In his testimony, Chairman Wood suggests that instead of
codifying detailed standards and procedures for implementation of RTOs,
additional flexibility for FERC to oversee an adaptive process might be
warranted. Chairman Wood advocates a legislative approach that would have
Congress adopt a simple provision permitting the Commission to require RTOs
where it finds such RTOs to be in the public interest. I believe this approach
would serve to remove existing uncertainties, while preserving FERC's ability to
tailor its RTO program to an increasingly dynamic marketplace.
If Congress decides to take the approach of
codifying RTO standards and procedures, Chairman Wood's testimony outlines
several concerns regarding (1) the right of a single RTO applicant for an
evidentiary hearing; (2) the requirement for "preponderance" of the
evidence supporting FERC decisions; (3) the judicial review provision; (4) the
requirement for a proposed RTO to have "sufficient generation within the
RTO's boundaries to serve the load within such boundaries;" (5) the right
of each pubic utility in an RTO to make rate filings; (6) the definition of
"market participant;" and (7) the preclusion of FERC modification to
the governance and scope of an RTO approved before the law's enactment. I share
the Chairman's concerns on these issues and support his testimony in this
regard.
Title III of the proposed legislation provides
for Commission certification of one electric reliability organization to develop
and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system. I agree that the
voluntary reliability system, which has been in place for over three decades,
should be replaced with one in which a self-regulated independent reliability
organization, with oversight by the Commission, establishes and enforces
mandatory reliability standards. I especially support the provisions of section
216(e), which provides for sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with
reliability rules. In my view, such a change in the manner in which the
reliability of the interconnected grid is overseen and managed is required in
order to ensure a competitive bulk power market.
The provisions of Title IV direct the Commission
to conduct a rulemaking to establish incentive and performance-based rate
policies for expansion of transmission networks to promote expansion of the
transmission grid to support the growth of competitive markets. Section 401
states that such policies should encourage the deployment of new transmission
technologies to increase capacity of existing networks and to reduce line
losses; promote environmentally sound transmission design techniques; and
promote the efficient use of transmission systems on a real-time basis. I
believe that the Commission's transmission rate policies should encourage and
promote such policy objectives. I would point out that I believe these goals may
be achieved through rate policies other than incentive or performance-based
rates. In my view, policies such as allowing a reasonable return on equity or
accelerated depreciation for new technologies would act to encourage such
investment.
Section 402 would give the Commission a
"backstop" role in transmission siting. I believe that this is
certainly an improvement over the present jurisdictional scheme, in which the
Commission has no role in the permitting and siting of new transmission
facilities. However, as I have testified previously, my primary concern with a
backstop role for the Commission is that such an approach could result in costly
and inefficient duplication of processes, records, and efforts by the various
decisional authorities involved in transmission siting.
My preference would be for FERC to be granted
federal eminent domain authority similar to the authority the Commission
exercises with respect to the siting of interstate natural gas pipelines under
the Natural Gas Act. The Commission could develop procedures to ensure
cooperation with the states and provide for regional participation. I believe
that this more centralized approach is preferable from an efficiency standpoint,
and will result in less bureaucracy and more timely decisions for transmission
providers and consumers. I am not advocating that the Commission should have
siting authority for electric distribution lines or power plants. I believe that
state governments are best positioned to make those determinations.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the
provisions of Title VII of the proposed legislation. These provisions strengthen
the Commission's authority to assess civil and criminal penalties for violations
of the FPA and increase the level of such penalties. I have advocated such
changes and believe they will greatly aid the Commission in fulfilling its
regulatory responsibilities.
In conclusion, I again thank the Subcommittee for
this opportunity to comment upon the Subcommittee's proposed legislation. As I
have testified in previous hearings before this Subcommittee, the Commission
must have sufficient authority to advance its goals of achieving fair, open and
competitive bulk power markets. I believe that this legislation, with the
modifications I have suggested, would clarify our authority and greatly assist
the Commission in realizing the benefits of wholesale competition.
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