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Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
December 11, 2001
3:00 PM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
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| FCC Chairman Michael Powell and DoJ Counsel Joseph Hunt |
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I. Introduction
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to
appear before you and offer my professional opinion on the public interest
merits of the
NextWave settlement, and the necessity of legislation to secure those
benefits for the American
consumer.
As you consider this important matter, and its myriad provisions, I would
respectfully
suggest keeping three central points at the forefront of your deliberations:
First, consider what posture the Government actually is in, as opposed to
where we all
wish it stood. Under the court ruling, NextWave has a rightful claim to the
licenses, and the
Commission's re-auction -- with its glittering bids totaling $16 billion --
has been nullified.
Second, given these circumstances (regrettable though they may be), we must
ask if this
settlement nonetheless salvages substantial value for the American taxpayer.
The Government
concluded that it does, putting the licenses to work and recovering
two-thirds of the proceeds it
would have gotten, had Auction No. 35 not been undermined by the court
ruling.
Third, even if the settlement is slightly bitter to swallow, we must ask if
there is a better
alternative. The Government concluded that the only other alternative posed
greater risks to the
public's interest than did the settlement. In my testimony today, I will
elaborate on these
conclusions..2
And, finally, I respectfully request this Subcommittee and the Congress
consider an
important issue related to this case-settling with NextWave still leaves a
gaping loop hole for
anyone seeking to participate in an auction and then avoid the resulting
government debt by
declaring bankruptcy. Spectrum belongs to the public, and I believe that,
even if we never
provide for installment payments, it is important for Congress to make clear
how spectrum
auctions are to be treated under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code so that these cases
never happen
again. Although prospective protection for our auction program is not in the
settlement
legislation, now would be a good time to consider enacting language of this
nature in order to
provide certainty to all auction bidders, as well as to protect the auction
process.
II. The Posture of the Case
In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to award licenses for spectrum through a
system
of "competitive bidding," or auction. In 1996 and 1997, the
Commission held initial auctions for
C-Block and F-Block Personal Communications Services (PCS) licenses. At those
auctions,
NextWave submitted the winning bid on 63 C-Block licenses and 27 F-Block
licenses for a total
of $4.8 billion. NextWave deposited a $500 million down-payment with the U.S.
Government
and agreed to pay the balance ($4.3 billion) over ten years at a favorable
interest rate.
Each license granted to NextWave by the Commission was conditioned on
NextWave's
full and timely payment of all its installments, and the licenses made clear
that failure to make
such payment caused their automatic cancellation. NextWave failed to pay its
bid commitments,
instead filing for bankruptcy protection in 1998. NextWave filed to reduce
the value of its bids.3
and later fought against license cancellation during the course of its
reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Over the next three years, the Commission, the United States, NextWave, and
others
engaged in intensely fought litigation in numerous courts, including the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit,
and the Supreme Court of the United States. The Second Circuit upheld the
Commission's
regulatory requirement that there be full and timely payment by NextWave for
the licenses. The
Second Circuit also held that the Commission's decision to automatically
cancel the NextWave
licenses and to re-auction the licenses was not contrary to bankruptcy law.
The court did allow
that any administrative claims about the FCC's actions could be raised in the
D.C. Circuit.
Relying on the Second Circuit decision, in January 2001, the Commission
re-auctioned the
spectrum previously licensed to NextWave. In that re-auction (Auction No.
35), 21 wireless
carriers bid $15.85 billion for the new licenses.
Unwilling to yield, NextWave petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the
Commission's
decision to cancel NextWave's licenses for failure to pay. On June 22, 2001,
the D.C. Circuit
ruled that the automatic cancellation of NextWave's licenses violated Section
525 of the
Bankruptcy Code, concluding that the Second Circuit opinion did not squarely
consider this
provision. The gravamen of the D.C. Circuit's decision was that NextWave was
still in
possession of the licenses, raising questions about our having re-auctioned
the licenses in
Auction No. 35. The Government has since sought review of this decision in
the Supreme Court.
This matter is still pending..4
Given these circumstances, the Department of Justice and the FCC began to
explore a
possible settlement of the case. The Government had to find a way to recover
the licenses,
distribute them to the many companies that had won them at the re-auction,
and secure as much
of the re-auction proceeds as possible. This was no simple task. The talks
went on for many
months. I was personally involved in the discussions and regularly kept my
colleagues informed
of the progress, so that they would be prepared if Commission action was
necessary to finalize
any agreement. In the late stages of the negotiations thorny legal issues and
questions of
uncertainty made it clear that it would be very difficult to effectuate any
settlement without
legislative action. The parties reached a mutually agreeable set of terms in
late November, and a
proposal was almost immediately forwarded to Congress by the Attorney General
for your
consideration.
The settlement agreement requires that Auction No. 35 bidders pay the
Government the
$15.8 billion that they bid in exchange for receiving the licenses auctioned
in Auction No. 35.
The Government will then keep $10 billion in net proceeds and will guarantee
by December 31,
2002 to pay $5.8 billion net to NextWave in exchange for its complete release
of all claims to the
disputed licenses.
The settlement agreement is contingent upon the passage of legislation, and
it includes
draft legislation for Congress to consider. There are several reasons why
this legislation is
necessary to effectuate the settlement..5
First, the proposed legislation ensures that Congress has authorized the
settlement and the
movement of funds necessary to implement it. The FCC has no checkbook from
which it could
pay NextWave to relinquish its licenses. Moreover, even if the Auction No. 35
winners paid the
Government first, it is unclear legally what they would be paying for (given
the status of the
auction) and, the Government had no mechanism to turn around and transfer
that money to
NextWave. This congressional action is required to empower the Government to
execute the
settlement.
Finality was a second and critical factor in reaching agreement. Both
NextWave and the
Auction No. 35 winners were unwilling to participate without confidence that
after having
reached agreement and forgone other opportunities, the agreement would not be
overturned in
court. The proposed legislation attempts to address these issues. It contains
a judicial review
provision, patterned on other Acts of Congress, that provides for expedited
review, limited to
constitutional claims. Any challenge to the legislation, the settlement
agreement itself, or to
actions taken by the Commission would be funneled into one court of appeals
(the D.C. Circuit)
and would be on a fast track for review. This provides assurance that the
American public will
receive the benefits of the settlement with minimum additional litigation
delay.
Third, the legislation provides the guarantee necessary for NextWave to
relinquish its
claims on the licenses. In return, NextWave will be paid once the Government
receives Auction
No. 35 receipts equal to the payments to be made to NextWave but no later
than December 31,
2002..6
Fourth and finally, I would like to say a word about the December 31 st
clause in the
settlement agreement. This is not, as some have maintained, an effort to jam
the Congress into
agreement. Congress, of course, remains free to consider the deal as it sees
fit, and may modify
the terms under its prerogatives. No private contract can limit the
legislative power. The date
merely reflects the fragility of the coalition and its interests. The Auction
No. 35 winners need
quick resolution in order to justify forgone alternatives, finance the
purchase, and plan for the
future. The bankruptcy proceeding continues to march forward and the parties
each must take
positions there. Also, the Supreme Court case continues to move forward. The
parties felt that
after December 31 st ,
they were unwilling to promise to be a party to settlement, given other
exigencies. I merely ask Congress to keep those risks in mind as it
deliberates over the
legislation.
We recognize that the compressed period for analysis and reasoned discussion
makes this
task difficult for you and your staff, and we appreciate the attention and
care that has already
been shown by Congress in considering this settlement and legislation.
III. The Settlement Proposal is in the Public Interest
Given the magnitude of this settlement in terms of money and its complexity,
it is
challenging to sort through conflicting claims about its merits. I have
concluded after long and
substantial examination that this settlement is squarely in the public
interest, as has the Attorney
General and the White House. I am convinced because, at bottom, the
settlement satisfies three
essential Government objectives:.7
. First, it removes the licenses from a
bankrupt bidder, and distributes them to companies
that bid in the re-auction, who can put them to use almost immediately.
Increasing
spectrum in the market will partially help address the current spectrum
shortage-
improving quality of service and providing capacity for new advanced
services, such as
Third Generation or so-called 3G.
. Second, it ends nearly five years of
litigation that would likely continue for several more
years, leaving the spectrum fallow and the treasury empty.
. Third, it gives the taxpayers $10
billion dollars, double the
amount of money they stand
to gain from NextWave ($4.3 billion, paid in installments over 6 years). This
money
flows to the U.S. Government at a time that the funds are sorely needed.
IV. What are the Better Alternatives to Settlement?
The main reason to settle is that settlement is preferable to the
alternatives. If the
Commission continues to litigate and the Supreme Court declines to take the
case, the decision of
the D.C. Circuit will stand and NextWave will be the licensee. In that
scenario, NextWave likely
would elect to continue to pay for the spectrum over time at advantageous
interest rates.
Pursuant to the installment payment program, NextWave could pay for the
spectrum over six
years at a rate of 6.5 percent for C-Block licenses and 6.25 percent for the
F-Block licenses.
That would leave the Treasury with substantially less than the $10 billion in
revenues that would
be generated by the settlement..8
Even if the Supreme Court grants the Government's petition for certiorari,
the Court
might not rule in the Government's favor on the merits. In addition, even if
the Supreme Court
rules in favor of the Government, it might remand the matter to the D.C.
Circuit for further
action on several legal issues left unresolved in the panel's initial
decision-any of which could
result in NextWave remaining the licensee.
No matter what the outcome, litigation would likely mean years of further
delay of the
Commission's ability to grant spectrum licenses for much-needed wireless
services for American
consumers. The Commission first auctioned this spectrum in 1996 and 1997, yet
the spectrum
has never been used. Even a favorable ruling from the High Court might not
arrive until late in
2003. Without a settlement, valuable spectrum may well remain fallow at a
time when our
economy and the consumer need it most.
Moreover, even if the Government ultimately prevailed in all litigation,
there is
uncertainty about the future value bidders would place on the spectrum given
fluctuations in the
marketplace. Several high bidders in Auction No. 35 have indicated that if
the settlement does
not go forward and there is further litigation, they should be released from
the obligations of
Auction No. 35. They would argue, for example, that they should be entitled
to the return of the
$3.2 billion in deposits held in non-interest-bearing accounts by the
Government. It is uncertain
at what price this spectrum would sell for at the conclusion of the
litigation..9
V. Conclusion
The Commission and the other parties to the NextWave case have negotiated
long and
hard to resolve a matter of critical importance to the American public. We
have attempted to
settle this matter in a way that protects the public interest, ensures that
the spectrum is put to
prompt use, and guarantees that the American people receive fair value for
the spectrum. I
would like to thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to provide
information on the
NextWave settlement. I look forward to answering any questions you may have
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