Text of
Printed Hearing
The Committee on Energy and Commerce
W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman
Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration's Proposal
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
July 9, 2002
09:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:80680.wais]
CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: CONSIDERATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 25 and JULY 9, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-113
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RALPH M. HALL, Texas
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART GORDON, Tennessee
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
GREG GANSKE, Iowa BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TOM SAWYER, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
CHARLES ``CHIP'' PICKERING, GENE GREEN, Texas
Mississippi KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TOM DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
ED BRYANT, Tennessee BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland LOIS CAPPS, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JANE HARMAN, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky
David V. Marventano, Staff Director
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BART STUPAK, Michigan
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
Vice Chairman BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky (Ex Officio)
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Hearings held:
June 25, 2002................................................ 1
July 9, 2002................................................. 129
Testimony of:
Allen, Hon. Claude, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.................................. 52
Anderson, Philip, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
International Studies...................................... 107
Atlas, Ronald, President-Elect, American Society for
Microbiology............................................... 113
Baumann, Jeremiah D., Environmental Health Advocate, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group............................. 249
Cassell, Gail H., Vice President, Scientific Affairs,
Distinguished Lilly Research Scholar for Infectious
Diseases, Eli Lilly and Company............................ 158
Cobb, Donald D., Associate Director for Threat Reduction, Los
Alamos National Laboratory:
June 25, 2002............................................ 93
July 9, 2002............................................. 198
Copeland, Guy, Vice President, Information Infrastructure
Advisory Programs, Federal Sector, Computer Sciences
Corporation................................................ 223
Costantini, Lynn P., Director--Online Services, North
American Electric Reliability Council...................... 232
Dacey, Robert F., Director, Information Security Issues,
General Accounting Office.................................. 207
Gordon, General John A., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration.................................... 57
Hamburg, Margaret A., Vice President, Biological Programs,
Nuclear Threat Initiative.................................. 166
Hauer, Jerome M., Director, Office of Public Health Emergency
Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services...... 136
Heinrich, Janet, Director, Health Care and Public Health
Issues, General Accounting Office:
June 25, 2002............................................ 71
July 9, 2002............................................. 157
McDonnell, James F., Director, Energy Security and Assurance
Program, Department of Energy.............................. 187
Nokes, David, Director, Systems Assessment and Research
Center, Sandia National Laboratories....................... 83
O'Toole, Tara, Director, Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies, Johns Hopkins University.......................... 118
Plaugher, Edward P., Chief, Arlington County Fire Department,
Executive Agent, Washington Area National Medical Response
Team....................................................... 101
Ridge, Hon. Tom, Director of Transition Planning for Proposed
Department of Homeland Security and Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security............................ 14
Smith, William, Executive Vice President, Network Operations,
BellSouth.................................................. 220
Sobel, David L., General Counsel, Electronic Privacy
Information Center......................................... 258
(iii)
Stringer, Lew, Medical Director, Division of Emergency
Management, North Carolina Department of Crime Control and
Public Safety.............................................. 97
Sullivan, John P., Jr., President and Chief Engineer, Boston
Water and Sewer Commission................................. 238
Tritak, John S., Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance
Office, Department of Commerce............................. 182
Vantine, Harry C., Program Leader, Counterterrorism and
Incident Response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.. 79
Varnado, Samuel G., Director, Infrastructure and Information
Systems Center, Sandia National Laboratories............... 191
Watson, Kenneth C., President, Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security, Cisco Systems, Inc................ 242
Additional material submitted for the record:
Ahern, Jason P., Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Service, prepared statement of............................. 267
Brooks, Linton F., Acting Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy,
prepared statement of...................................... 269
Bryden, Robert A., Stff Vice President of Security, FedEx
Corporation, prepared statement of......................... 272
Holsen, Jim, Vice President, Engineering, United Parcel
Service, Inc., prepared statement of....................... 287
Howe, Barry, Vice President, Thermo Electron Corporation,
prepared statement of...................................... 284
Jones, Gary, Director, Natural Resources and Environmental
Issues, General Accounting Office, prepared statement of... 291
Martin, Steven W., Director, Homeland Security, Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, prepared statement of....... 282
Nokes, David, Director, Systems Assessment and Research
Center, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared statement of 288
Panico, Frank, Manager, International Networks and
Transportation, U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of. 272
Shotts, Wayne J., Associate Director for Nonproliferation,
Arms Comtrol and International Security, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, prepared statement of................. 274
(iv)
CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: CONSIDERATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C.
Greenwood (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Stearns,
Gillmor, Burr, Whitfield, Bass, Fletcher, Tauzin (ex officio),
Deutsch, Stupak, Strickland, and DeGette.
Also present: Representatives Deal, Cubin, Waxman, Markey,
Sawyer, Capps, and Harman.
Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Amit Sachdev,
majority counsel; Ray Shepherd, majority counsel; Nandan
Kenkeremath, majority counsel; Edith Holleman, minority
counsel; and Chris Knauer, minority investigator.
Mr. Greenwood. The subcommittee will come to order. The
Chair would announce before the commencement of opening
statements that, pursuant to the rules, the chairman of the
subcommittee and the ranking member and the chairman of the
full committee and the ranking member of the full committee
will be accorded 5 minutes for opening statements; other
members of the subcommittee shall be accorded 3 minutes apiece.
We welcome the participation of other members of the full
committee who are not members of the subcommittee, and should
they arrive and wish to make opening statements, we will grant
them time--yield them time, the amount of time being dependent
upon how many of them there are.
And the Chair welcomes Governor Ridge, my friend--good to
have you with us--and yields himself 5 minutes for the purpose
of an opening statement.
Good morning. Today the subcommittee will hold the first
day of a multipart hearing to examine how the Bush
Administration's proposal to establish a Department of Homeland
Security will affect the agencies and the operations over which
this committee now exercises principal jurisdiction. Our first
witness is the current Director of the Office of Homeland
Security and our former colleague, Governor Tom Ridge, who is
appearing today in his capacity as the chief of the transition
team for this new department.
The President could have made no finer choice in responding
to the disaster of September 11 than by appointing Tom Ridge to
be Director of the Office of Homeland Security. The challenge
before him is daunting, but those of us who know Tom also know
that he has always heeded his country's call.
In 1968, while still in law school, Tom Ridge was drafted
into the U.S. Army. He fought in Vietnam as an infantry
sergeant and was awarded the Bronze Star. He was the first
enlisted Vietnam veteran elected to Congress.
Now he has been enlisted in a new struggle. True to form,
he has labored tirelessly since last September to help improve
the security of our homeland and our fellow citizens.
The President's proposal is a bold one. It envisions a
department whose mission includes border and transportation
security; emergency preparedness and response; chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures;
information analysis and infrastructure protection. If approved
as now proposed, only the Department of Defense and the
Department of Veterans' Affairs would have more employees than
the almost-170,000 workers proposed for the Department of
Homeland Defense.
Few would dispute the need for consolidation and
coordination of the nearly 100 agencies that now share
responsibility for these critical tasks. This subcommittee's
oversight over the past 2 years also has demonstrated the need
for a single agency to take charge of the responsibility to
enhance the protection of our Nation's critical infrastructure
and key terrorist targets, both in the public and private
sector. The latter includes several industry sectors over which
this committee has principal jurisdiction, including the
electricity and telecommunications grids and our Nation's
drinking water systems.
As our hearing last April demonstrated, precious little has
been done since 1997 when a Presidential blue ribbon panel
urged the establishment of a robust public-private partnership
to identify critical assets, assess their interdependencies and
vulnerabilities, and take steps to mitigate our risks.
Moreover, this subcommittee's oversight with respect to
Federal counterterrorism R&D programs has raised many of the
same concerns. As the General Accounting Office reported to
this subcommittee last September, just prior to the anthrax
attacks on this city, our Federal bioterrorism research
programs, scattered throughout a dozen or more agencies, are
poorly coordinated and lack a clear sense of priority and
focus. The same is true for the myriad of Federal programs
aimed at improving the preparedness of Federal, State and local
governments and emergency response providers to deal with major
disasters, terrorist attacks and other public health
emergencies. In fact, there were so many such programs within
the Department of Health and Human Services itself that in the
bioterrorism bill this committee recently shepherded through
the Congress, we created a new Assistant Secretary at HHS just
to coordinate all these emergency preparedness and response
functions.
And this is just one department. Can there be any doubt why
every serious study of this issue has ended in a call for some
form of centralization, or focal point of coordination in the
executive branch? The President's proposal moves us firmly in
that direction.
The focus of today's hearing is on the critical aspect of
emergency preparedness and response and how the President
proposes to improve our national efforts in this area. We
cannot move too soon. Yesterday, for example, CNN reported on
the new threats being made by a spokesman for al Qaeda who, in
a sickening and warped reference to September 11, told
Americans they should, quote, fasten their safety belts and
then spoke of the death of up to 4 million Americans including
1 million children through the use of chemical and biological
weapons.
Although Governor Ridge will testify today on all aspects
of the President's proposal, the remainder of our panels and
witnesses will focus on the emergency preparedness and response
issue, namely Title V of the administration's proposal. With
respect to those functions or programs that are proposed for
transfer from any agency to the new department, two questions
seem in order: First, how do these programs operate currently;
and second, what are the potential advantages or disadvantages
to the proposed transfer?
In our case, while the President's bill is a useful
blueprint, many important questions remain to be resolved. For
example, what is the scope of the new secretary's authority
over HHS's public health preparedness programs and how might it
alter the current focus on important dual-use programs? Why are
some of the agencies' preparedness and response programs
transferred completely, others transferred partially and others
left unchanged in their respective departments? And for those
assets or functions not fully transferred to the new Secretary,
but under his authority, how does the administration plan to
ensure a workable model with one Secretary directing the assets
or programs of another?
As I said at the outset, the task before the President, the
Congress and today's chief witness is daunting, but whatever
the challenge, we must meet it. In the midst of the battle of
Bunker Hill, Abigail Adams wrote these words to her husband in
Philadelphia:
``Dearest friend, the day, perhaps the decisive day, has
come on which the fate of America depends. Now the fate of
America rests with us, and of one thing I am certain. Unless a
spirit of cooperation and trust informs all of our efforts, we
are unlikely to succeed. And to be successful, we have a duty
to speak plainly to the American people about the clear and
present dangers that lead us to this enormous investment in
this massive undertaking.''
Again, I want to thank Governor Ridge and all of our
witnesses for agreeing to appear before us today, many on short
notice.
I will recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for an opening statement.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Governor Ridge.
This is an issue where I think it is accurately described
that there is no light between any of us in the Congress, the
435 Members of the House and the 100 Members of the Senate. And
I think that we stand completely with the President on the
creation of this department, which is an integral part of the
war on terrorism.
I think if we have learned anything post-September 11, it
is reminding us that the most fundamental thing we can do as a
government and as elected officials is the security of our
constituents. And, in fact, I think we understand that
unfortunately, prior to September 11, we were not looking at it
quite the way we should. And specifically, I think, we
acknowledge at this point that terrorists' or terrorist states'
particularly weapons of mass destruction are an existential
threat to the United States and to our people.
And, Governor Ridge, I have read your comments and I would
completely agree with basically all of them, but one I want to
focus on which I think is the--in a sense, the essence for the
creation of the department is that, at the present time, there
really is no one who is responsible or no agency that is
responsible, but--you are in your position, but no agency that
is responsible for homeland security.
And my experience in life--and I think for most of us if we
think about our experience in life--is, something never gets
done correctly unless someone is responsible and in charge. And
I think that is the essence of, the purpose of this agency
where I think the goal, the need, is absolutely imperative.
I also think the facts of, again, what you have put
together and what others have put together at this point
specifically show the sort of ad hoc dispersed nature of some
of these responsibilities. I think as we move forward--and I
think this is one of these issues where we really are working
hand-in-hand--in a very bipartisan tradition in this committee,
although we have many disagreements, we have many agreements as
well.
We will disagree, as we did last week on prescription
drugs, but on this, I think there are no disagreements. And I
think what we are really looking for is working with you,
working with each other, just really trying to make it as good
as possible.
And I think we are at the level of details. I don't think
that this is a case where the devil is in the details. I really
don't. I think it is the details of working with you to really
try to structure a department that will maximize the imperative
that we are successful.
One of the analogies that I have used in talking about
post-September 11 and I would add to this creation of this
department, I think there are several World War II analogies--
two, really, I think, at least for me, and when I have spoken
about this, they have been very on point.
One is clearly, obviously, Pearl Harbor where the United
States wasn't prepared; and if we look historically, the
Japanese might have seen it as a short-term victory. But I
think historically, obviously it was an incredible disaster for
them. Had the United States entered the war in the Pacific,
which is unclear whether we would not have--would have, and I
think it was overdetermined once we entered the war that we
would be successful.
The other analogy is the Manhattan Project. And when it was
started it was not overdetermined that we would be successful
in that effort. But if we were not successful, obviously
history would be a lot different.
Governor, I speak to you, and I know your commitment is
total on this; and I speak to ourselves about this, that I
think that just as we had no choice but to be successful with
the Manhattan Project, we have no choice but to be successful
with what we are doing to prevent weapons of mass destruction
attacking the United States. And I believe the creation of this
department is a critical component of that.
So I look forward to working with you and with my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle over the next, really,
hopefully, just several months. I think setting the date of
September 11 to try to get it resolved by is doable. As you
well know as a former Member, we can always argue about things.
We will have enough things to argue about between now and
January 20 if we want to. Hopefully, we won't.
Hopefully, we will put deadlines on ourselves and force us
with the minutia of details, with the minutia of jurisdiction.
Hopefully, we will get over that and understand that we are all
working together for one goal.
So I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and yields 5
minutes for an opening to the chairman of the full committee,
the gentleman, Mr. Tauzin.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Chairman Greenwood, and I am
pleased to join you in welcoming Governor Ridge to testify on
President Bush's historic proposal for the creation of the new
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.
Governor Ridge, I think you and we, too, understand that we
are going to play some important roles here. But the truth is
that bureaucrats and legislators and even Cabinet-level
officials really play a second-place role when it comes to
defending the country in this very important time. It is the
men and women of the military, the National Guard or the fire
and emergency response teams and the incredible heart and
courage of the people of America who are on the front line, the
eyes and ears of our country, the first responders who really
have this task at hand; and our job is to help arm them and
properly coordinate them.
And I, first of all, want to thank you because the other
side of that coin is that we have learned since September 11
that there can be a lot of finger-pointing in this country when
things go wrong, and there can be a lot of people trying to put
the blame on someone else for not sharing information or
coordinating properly.
You, however, left your job as Governor of the great State
of Pennsyvania at the summoning of our President, and you
decided to be the person where the buck stops in coordinating
and making sure this awful finger-pointing exercise doesn't
happen again. And this is the next, obviously, important step
in that process, to make sure there is someone at a Cabinet
level for whom the final responsibility rests in coordination.
That is an awesome responsibility, sir, and I commend you
for taking it on in this temporary position. And frankly, I
would hope that the President has the good sense, when we are
through with this work, to continue you in a permanent position
if you are willing to undertake it.
I wanted to talk briefly with you this morning about some
of our roles in connection with your role in the establishment
of this new department. First, our committee has jurisdiction,
and we will continue to have jurisdiction, obviously, over many
of the programs that the Department of Energy and the national
labs, the Department of Health and Human Services, all of which
serve vital roles in preparing and responding to chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. All areas where--
if this spokesman for al Qaeda is real and his statements are
believable, all areas of vulnerability these people hope to
exploit in these programs, such as the nuclear emergency
support teams that identify and respond to radiological and
nuclear threats as well as public health programs; such as the
strategic national stockpile of drugs and vaccines that must be
stocked and rapidly deployed, this new department will now play
an important role.
Title V of the President's proposal contains a plan for
consolidating and coordinating these functions. Well, obviously
we have to help you make sure that that is done properly. It is
a critical function as we face new threats.
Second, our committee has jurisdiction and will continue to
have jurisdiction over research and development programs for
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures.
Programs that the Health and Human Services Department, DOE and
national labs in which the country's top scientists are
currently working on new methods for detecting and detecting
terrorist attacks. For example, there are improved sensors to
detect radiological devices, new scanners to screen luggage and
cargo, new technologies to detect and neutralize biological
hazards.
Title III of the President's plan would transfer many of
these programs, and it is important, I think, as we handle this
transfer, to see what we can do about somehow coordinating the
very diverse efforts that are going on in as many as four
different labs on the same subject, and to make sure we get the
best in new, innovative technologies out there to protect our
borders and to make travel in this country as safe as we can
make it.
And a third of the department's jurisdiction will continue
to have jurisdiction over the regulation of many of the
Nation's most critical infrastructure and assets, including
both publicly and privately owned assets in telecommunications
and energy and safe food and drinking water, as well as many
manufacturing facilities in the country that could be targets.
Governor Ridge, I want to thank you for something else: for
being accessible to this committee without subpoena,
voluntarily meeting with us, counseling with us, as we went
through the process post-9/11 of examining all the agencies
under our jurisdiction and all these critical assets, and where
the vulnerabilities might be and what we might do to encourage
the agency heads to begin developing protection and
countermeasures to make sure these assets are protected.
The key is to recognize that most of the critical,
important infrastructures are privately owned, privately
operated. And the only way to succeed is going to be creating
the strong public-private partnerships for national security.
It doesn't create new regulatory regimes in this country, new
bureaucracies that are going to make the economy worse off, but
literally relies upon the strength of those private-sector-
owned and -operated entities to work with us in a partnership
to make sure they are protected properly.
We want to point out one more thing, and I will be asking
you a couple of questions about it. In the meetings we had
post-9/11, we were shocked to find out how many of the
vulnerability assessments that exist in this country, how many
of the detailed plans and drawings and important critical
assets in this country are on the Internet, were available
under the Freedom of Information for anybody to obtain. And
this committee is vitally concerned, as we create this new
department, that there are some common standards for
vulnerability assessments and there are some real strong
amendments, the Freedom of Information Act and other acts that
would unfortunately allow some of this critical information to
be available to people who might use it as a road map for
terror in the future.
We have to cut a delicate balance here because we are a
free society, and we want people to know what our Government is
doing; but there is a line we have to draw when it comes to
providing free to anybody who wants it a road map of how to get
into a nuclear plant or how to find a critical
telecommunications infrastructure, and doing something with it.
Finally, Governor Ridge, we just passed the Bioterrorism
Act. This committee was primarily responsible for its
development, as you know. There are some conflicts now in the
new proposals. We are really beginning to assess, to coordinate
the act we just passed with the new proposal the President just
made. We are going to need your help in doing that. We don't
want to leave some of the good work we did on bioterrorism
undone because we are now changing the structure of things.
Finally, I want to thank the chairman for also calling
today Deputy Secretary Claude Allen and General Gordon, who are
also going to assist us in this inquiry.
Let me say, Mr. Chairman, yesterday I spent some time with
Leader Armey, and I want to inform the committee and the
Governor that we are sticking firmly to the July 12 timetable.
We are going to get this work done quickly. And we in the House
are going to finish the work on this critical national
proposal, and we are going to do it well; and I am going to
thank you for helping us do it right.
[The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin
follows:]
Prepared Statement of W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Commerce
Thank you Chairman Greenwood, I am pleased to join you today in
welcoming Governor Tom Ridge to testify on behalf of President Bush's
historic proposal for the creation of a new Cabinet-level Department of
Homeland Security.
Governor Ridge, let me thank you for the job that you have been
doing--tirelessly and without complaint--to defend our borders and keep
the citizens of this great country safe and secure, in our cities, our
communities, and our homes. After the terrorist attacks last fall,
President Bush asked you to accept perhaps the single most important,
and certainly the most difficult, job in the Nation. And you have risen
to the challenge.
We in the Congress appreciate the job you are doing, and we will
continue to do our part for this cause--a cause that requires us to
make absolutely sure that the men and women who are fighting this war
against terrorism on our behalf, including our military, our
Reservists, the National Guard, and Federal, State, and local law
enforcement personnel, have the tools, the resources, and the support
they need to keep us safe from the harm our enemies seek to bring to
our shores.
With regard to the President's proposal, I support creating a
Cabinet-level department--one that will not only pick up the role of
homeland security coordinator, but a new Department with an empowered
Secretary who has the authority and resources needed to protect our
country from the threats of terrorism.
The Committee on Energy and Commerce has an important
responsibility to assist the Administration with this proposal. First,
we have jurisdiction--and will continue to have jurisdiction--over many
of the programs at the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Labs,
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that serve vital
roles in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear attacks. These include energy programs such as
the nuclear emergency support teams that identify and respond to
radiological and nuclear threats, as well as public health programs,
such as the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs and vaccines that
must be stocked and rapidly deployed in the event of a chemical or
biological attack. Title 5 of the President's proposal contains a plan
for consolidating and coordinating these functions in the new
Department of Homeland Security. We must ensure that this is done
properly and that these programs are integrated in a manner that allows
them to respond promptly in the event of a future attack.
Second, this Committee has jurisdiction--and will continue to have
jurisdiction--over research and development programs for chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures. These are
programs at HHS, DOE and the National Labs in which our country's top
scientists are working to develop new methods for detecting and
preventing terrorists attacks--such as improved sensors to detect
radiological devices, new scanners to screen luggage and cargo, and new
technologies to detect and neutralize biological hazards. Title 3 of
the President's proposal contains a plan for transferring many of these
programs to the new Department. It is important for us to remember that
new and improved technologies and American ingenuity and innovation are
among the greatest advantages we have in fighting terrorism, second
only to the heart and conviction of the people of this country.
Third, this Committee has jurisdiction--and will continue to have
jurisdiction--over the regulation of many of our Nation's most critical
infrastructures and assets, including both publicly and privately owned
assets that are integral to the delivery of telecommunications and
information technology services, the production and distribution of
energy, and the delivery of safe food and drinking water, as well as
manufacturing facilities that may be targets of potential terrorist
actions. Title 2 of the President's proposal would add to the mission
of the new Department the responsibility to analyze vulnerabilities and
improve protection for these critical assets and infrastructures. The
key to our success in this area is to recognize that many of the most
important critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated,
and the only way to succeed in assuring their protection is through a
strong and effective public-private partnership for national security.
After the September 11th attacks, I and other senior Members of
this Committee on a bipartisan basis met with high-ranking private
sector officials to encourage them to work together in a public-private
partnership to ensure that our critical infrastructures are adequately
protected against potential terrorist attacks. Not only must potential
targets of terrorism be adequately protected, but we also must ensure
that sensitive information about these assets, such as vulnerability
assessments, are never allowed to be used as roadmaps for terrorist
action. I believe that the new Department should develop a
comprehensive framework across the critical infrastructure sectors,
including common standards for vulnerability assessments, and that we
in Congress must provide additional legal protections to protect such
sensitive information from improper public disclosure.
Finally, it is worth noting that, just this month, the President
signed a sweeping $4.6 billion dollar bioterrorism preparedness bill
into law, which was shepherded through Congress by Members of this
Committee on a bipartisan basis. Many of the issues that we dealt with
in crafting that new law, and many of the proposals to combat
bioterrorism, will need to be evaluated in the context of the new
Department of Homeland Security. Sorting out roles and responsibilities
for the new Department and the other Federal agencies already tasked
with many of these functions will be a significant challenge that we
must complete quickly.
I commend the President for his proposal. It reflects a sound
framework to get this job done, and I believe credit is due not only to
the President for taking this bold step, but also to those, such as
former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart, who have for sometime
recognized this need and whose foresight and ideas are undoubtedly
reflected here.
Again, I want to thank Governor Ridge, and each of our other
witnesses, including Deputy Secretary Claude Allen from the Department
of Health and Human Services, and General John Gordon, Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of
Energy, for coming here today. I look forward to today's testimony and
to working with the Administration and my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to craft legislation that creates a Cabinet-level Department
of Homeland Security worthy of the people who work tirelessly everyday
to protect us. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the chairman of the
committee, and recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Stupak, for 3 minutes for an opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
today's hearing and welcome Governor Ridge.
We have spent a lot of time since September 11, and I am
sure we will do more in the future. Let me say right away that
I accept the principle that homeland security is so important
that it demands a Cabinet-level position. In fact, as one of
the early cosponsors of some of the proposals put forth by the
Democratic Caucus, it is not whether what caucus put it
forward, but the idea and the principle that we do need a
Cabinet-level position for homeland security.
As such, the Secretary serving as the head of this
department should have the information, the authority and
resources to carry out the task of protecting our citizens and
our domestic resources and infrastructure.
That said, however, I believe that Members of Congress of
both parties want to see a homeland security proposal from the
administration that is more than just a mere shuffling of the
chairs at the table. If the chain of command for organizations
like the Coast Guard and FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, are reorganized, we want to be able to ask about the
missions and the staffing and the cost of the change.
If information-gathering is reorganized--if information-
gathering is reorganized, we want to know what intelligence
will be collected, how it will be distributed and whether the
net change puts information in fewer hands or more hands, and
whether it speeds distribution of intelligence, or does it
encumber it?
Reorganization will come, and the public needs to stay
involved; and it needs to make the President, the Republican
leadership in the House and the Democratic leadership in the
Senate aware of its concerns. And with the chairman putting
forth that July 12 deadline, it is even more important that
those concerns are expressed immediately. Whether
reorganization winds up being merely changed for the sake of
change or a real improvement in protection of our Nation will
depend on the questions that are asked, the debates that are
held and the attention paid to the details of the President's
proposal.
Again, welcome, Governor Ridge; and I look forward to
hearing from you and other witnesses today.
And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for 3
minutes for an opening statement.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Governor Ridge, we welcome you to the committee today
and look forward to your testimony on what President Bush has
described as the biggest restructuring of the Federal
Government in 40 years. We also look forward to the testimony
of the witnesses on the other three panels.
I think all of us understand and recognize that this is a
complex piece of legislation, and it will be interesting to
determine exactly how the new Department of Homeland Security
will interact with the existing agencies in working out the
areas of responsibility, and who has direct authority.
So I am looking forward to the testimony today as we embark
on this very important legislation, and thank you for being
here.
Mr. Greenwood. Chair thanks the gentleman, and the Chair
notes the presence of the two gentleladies from California who
are members of the full committee, but not members of the
subcommittee. We welcome your participation.
The Chair recognizes the presence of the gentleman from
California. The Chair will grant each of you 3 minutes for an
opening statement, beginning with Mrs. Capps.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
holding this hearing.
And welcome and thank you, Governor Ridge, for yet again
coming before us with information and insight into what is
happening to this restructuring effort.
I don't have formal remarks; I am very eager to get into
the conversation. I came to Congress after putting in a couple
decades' work in public health in my community. I am very eager
to hear how this legislation, which I helped craft--the
bioterrorism preparedness bill--to ensure those resources get
in the hands of the first responders.
Each time I go back to my district, the safety and health
people there are wondering and asking about this. And I am very
concerned that we do this with all haste. While this
restructuring is very preoccupying, and I can understand that,
we can't forget that our mission really is in the local
communities, because that is where this battle needs to be
waged.
So I will be yielding back my time and looking forward to
the hearing. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and yields 3
minutes to the other gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to
thank the chairman of the full committee for personally
inviting me to participate.
Good morning, Governor Ridge. I would hope that once we set
up this Department of Homeland Security, you would not have to
spend the entire summer testifying before Congress ever again.
I think this concept is very important. As you know, many
pieces of it were borrowed from legislation some of us
introduced on a bipartisan basis up here. You have put them in
a different order, but I am proud to support your proposal and
am one of the original cosponsors of the Armey bill that was
introduced yesterday.
I think that we, up here, can contribute a few refinements
that would help the legislation be more successful. And I just
want to address one area right this minute in my remaining few
seconds, which is public-private partnerships.
You were nice enough to participate last week in a really
spectacular meeting that 12 members cohosted on a bipartisan
basis called Technology and Terrorism. We had 120 CEOs up here,
and they were talking about their frustration with connecting
their technologies into our homeland security effort.
The mechanism for doing this needs to be refined in this
new department. H.R. 4629, introduced by Congressman Tom Davis,
has some very good ideas in it, but I would hope, as we
proceed, that we do refine this procurement process.
Second, I said public-private partnerships. On the
partnership point, the government at the Federal, State and
local levels must work more closely with private entities to
ensure homeland security. The Government is responsible for
providing security for citizens, but the private sector shares
the responsibility to protect against attack or disruption, and
it controls many of the assets needed to do so.
When we have questions, I will ask you more about this, but
let us as a committee, especially one focused on commerce, lend
our expertise, working with your office to make the public-
private partnership piece of this legislation more effective.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Greenwood. Chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes 3
minutes for purposes of an opening statement to the gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Stearns.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Ridge, you are going to have a lot of patience in
life. Governor of Pennsylvania might look pretty good to you
after this process. They think you are doing a great job, and
we are here to support you in any way we can and we're just
glad, as a U.S. citizen, you're willing to tackle this.
Most of my speech, Mr. Chairman, I will make part of the
record by unanimous consent.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection.
Mr. Stearns. I think it's already been pointed out, not
since--the creation of such an enormous department, like this,
encompassing a vast organization of Government resources has
not been attempted since the National Security Act of 1947.
I think one of the concerns some of us have, Governor
Ridge, is that while we take all this organization and move all
these departments together, what about the intelligence
failures and what are we doing to streamline within a
department--if you just take all these departments and put them
together and do nothing to change the individual departments
and streamline them and give them more high tech equipment and
make sure that these departments are talking to each other--you
know, that would be the question: Is the President's proposal
adequate in that respect?
Two FBI units, a national domestic preparedness office and
the National Infrastructure Protection Center would be
transferred to the department under the President's plan. What
about reform or transformation of the FBI, the CIA, related to
counterterrorism? You know, in light of what we learn and see
in time and U.S. News report, there has got to be something
done there, and I think it would be a false assumption for
Americans to think just making this new Homeland Security is
going to solve all the problems.
We on the Energy and Commerce Committee are very concerned
about some of our jurisdiction and how that is going to work,
because once we have a department getting its funds through
you, yet the department remains in one agency, how is that
going to work?
So you have a daunting task ahead of you, and I want to
commend you. And I assume you are part of the wellness
preparedness program the President has in running every day and
making sure you are not stressed out here. Godspeed to you and
thank you for testifying.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and the
Chair recognizes for 3 minutes the gentleman from California,
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome,
Governor Ridge, to this hearing. I am very glad to have this
opportunity to further examine the Bush Administration's
proposal for the Department of Homeland Security.
The proposal raises many questions of importance to this
committee as well as other committees. I am very concerned
about the proposed transfer of important public health
functions of the Department of Health and Human Services. I
believe that the transfer of these functions may undermine the
rebuilding of core public health capacities that is now under
way. If our public health system is structured and viewed
exclusively through the lens of fighting terrorism, it may
seriously weaken our ability to respond to other threats to the
health of the American people.
It appears that several HHS offices are to be transferred.
These include Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National
Disaster Medical System and the Metropolitan Medical Response
System. With these offices may go significant authority to
oversee our Nation's response to public health emergencies.
Such a transfer may also shift to the Department of
Homeland Security the power to make bioterrorism and emergency
preparedness grants to State and local public health systems.
These grants were the cornerstone of the recently enacted
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act. Their
purpose was not only to fund specific preparations for
bioterrorism. Just as critically, the grants were intended to
turn around decades of neglect of our Nation's public health
infrastructure.
It is beyond argument that our public health system is in
disrepair, and we cannot protect our citizens from bioterrorist
attacks if our public health system is not working. Detecting
and responding to a bioterrorist attack is just like detecting
and responding to other emerging epidemics. It requires fully
functioning and coordinated public health systems at the local,
State and Federal levels.
For this reason, the bioterrorism bill directed HHS to
coordinate the repair of Federal, State and local public health
systems as part of bioterrorism and emergency preparedness. The
expertise to establish priorities and coordinate this effort
lies with the public health experts and scientists at HHS and
CDC. If priority-setting, coordination and/or grant-making
functions are transferred to a new department, focused on
terrorism, I am very concerned that the necessary rebuilding
and upgrading of our public health response system will take a
back seat.
If we attempt to protect ourselves against terrorist
attacks at the expense of our Nation's public health system, we
may find that we have undermined rather than enhanced our
Nation's true security.
And I thank you for this opportunity for an opening
statement, and I look forward to working with you, Governor
Ridge, on this very important issue.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Strickland, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Ohio
Let me start by thanking Chairman Greenwood and Ranking Member
Deutsch for holding this hearing today. All Americans are aware of the
need to rethink how we defend our country, and so I thank Governor
Ridge, as well as the witnesses who will follow him, for being here to
answer our questions about the president's proposed Department of
Homeland Security. I am pleased that the Administration has attempted
to put together all the ideas for increased domestic security that have
been raised during the past eight months, many of which have been
discussed in hearings like this. Now Congress must fulfill its role to
balance the power of the Executive Branch and question the president's
proposal. It's our responsibility on this panel today to ask questions
of our witnesses that will allow us to flesh out the skeletal
suggestion put forth by the president as well as to create a new
department that will best serve the constituents whom we represent here
in Washington.
When we talk about protecting America, we should be thinking in
terms of what's proactive and preventative instead of only what's
reactive and responsive. While we all understand the need to formulate
``countermeasures'' and to devise plans for ``emergency preparedness
and response,'' I am concerned that the president's proposal may not
give the secretary of the new department enough authority to prevent
disaster. We have learned from the news media in recent weeks that we
might have averted the terrorist attacks on September 11th if our
federal agencies had been configured differently or had communicated
with each other more effectively. In other words, we might have been
able to prevent disaster.
In my view, we have two main strategies at our disposal: we can
deter future attacks with our brawn, or we can halt them with our
brain--with our intelligence capabilities. We can spend hundreds of
millions of dollars on star wars, or we can spend a couple hundred
dollars on language courses so that we have linguists who can translate
the mountains of raw intelligence data that we collect but never
analyze. But, even if all the data are analyzed and packaged in a form
that is presentable to the secretary of the new department, what
assurances do we have that one intelligence gathering agency, be it the
CIA, the NSA, or the FBI with its new powers, would share its reports
with the others? Will the new secretary have any authority to ensure
that information is shared and that our intelligence operations are
working together to prevent disaster? These questions are among many
that we will be seeking answers to in the coming weeks.
In particular, last Fall I wrote to Secretary Abraham to express my
concern for the safeguarding of our federal nuclear facilities and the
nuclear materials stored at these sites. Substantial quantities of
nuclear materials, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium, are
stored in chemically and physically unstable forms across the
Department of Energy complex. Some of these nuclear materials are
stored in outdated containers that often sit in deteriorated facilities
or even outside, exposed to the elements. In either case these storage
facilities were not built with the intention of protecting nuclear
materials from terrorist attacks. At the DOE facility in Piketon, Ohio,
for example, the majority of the 16,000 depleted uranium hexafluoride
canisters stored onsite are out in the open.
I think it is tremendously important that we have an understanding
of how the Department of Homeland Security will protect America and its
citizens from acts of malice against the physical structures and
containers holding special nuclear materials, by-products, and source
materials, especially in those cases where the physical structures may
be vulnerable to significant radiological and other consequences.
I anticipate hearing from the witnesses about how such drastic
governmental restructuring will affect--good or bad--the ability of the
different agencies to fulfill their objectives. I look forward to a
thoughtful and candid discussion of the proposals to protect our
nuclear assets, in addition to plans for safeguarding Americans if
terrorists were to strike at nuclear facilities. I thank the Chair and
yield back the remainder of my time.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this initial hearing on the
President's proposed new cabinet agency for homeland security. I have
made no secret of my skepticism that mere reorganization can solve the
problems we face, or that reorganization would not create significant
new problems. That is why this hearing, and others like it across the
Congress, are so necessary. They cannot simply be ``check the box''
exercises.
The Committee on Energy and Commerce will need to address several
questions in the coming weeks about the proposed new structure. First,
I note we just passed, and the President just signed, a carefully
crafted comprehensive bioterrorism measure. It established programs to
rebuild our public health infrastructures at the state and local
levels, which are where responses to terrorism occur, as well as
strengthened the federal capacity to address possible threats. Will the
new Department actually increase fragmentation in the largely cohesive
federal effort against bioterrorism and other public health
emergencies? Will the new Department undermine the state and local
public health focus of the new law?
Second, will the Department's security activities undermine the
enforcement of existing environmental, health and safety protections,
or be otherwise detrimental to such safeguards developed over many
years after full and open consideration by the Congress? Will the
Department be given broad authority to override existing statutes and
regulations? Will the accelerated and superficial treatment accorded
thus far to this proposed reorganization provide an opportunity for
major mischief?
Third, and more broadly, will this reorganization result in more
confusion, more expense, more bureaucracy, more people, more harm to
the civil service, more harm to public employee unions--and less work?
Will the country actually be more vulnerable during what will likely be
a lengthy transition period? Will the Department remain fully
accountable to the people, and to the Congress, for its security
mission as well as for the non-security functions it may inherit?
Our constituents will expect us to know the answers to these and
many other questions before we act. Today's hearing is a small step
towards developing the kind of understanding we will need to address
this matter responsibly.
Mr. Greenwood. Governor, you are aware that the committee
is holding an investigative hearing and when doing so has had
the practice of taking testimony under oath. It is my
understanding that you have no objection to offering your
testimony under oath.
Mr. Ridge. None.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair also advises you that under the
rules of the House and the committee, you are entitled to be
advised by counsel. My understanding is that you don't feel the
need to be advised by counsel.
Mr. Ridge. That's correct.
Mr. Greenwood. If you would stand and raise your right
hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you Governor, you are under oath and
we look forward to your testimony and please begin.
TESTIMONY OF HON. TOM RIDGE, DIRECTOR OF TRANSITION PLANNING
FOR PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ridge. Chairman Greenwood, Ranking Member Deutsch and
subcommittee members, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to
testify--with the microphone on--in support of the President's
historic proposal to unify our homeland security efforts under
one Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, all of America
has risen to the challenge of improving the security of our
homeland. In partnership with Congress, with States and
localities, with law enforcement, with the private sector and
academia, America has made great progress in securing its
borders and preserving its way of life and the security of its
citizens.
The President believes our Nation must now take the next
critical step by unifying our efforts under a single Department
of Homeland Security. Only Congress can create such a
department, and I am here today to personally convey the
President's deep desire to work with Members to accomplish this
goal. The President believes that the creation of a single
department with a single, clear line of authority, as quite a
few of the members of the committee have discussed, would not
only improve our preparedness for future attack, but also
strengthen these partnerships, thereby helping to prevent a
future attack.
Earlier this month, the President signed an executive order
appointing me as Director of the Transition Planning Office for
the Department of Homeland Security, to be housed within the
Office of Management and Budget. While I will still retain the
title of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, my
testimony today will be given as Director of this new entity.
This proposal was the result of a deliberative planning
process that really began with an effort led by Vice President
Cheney a year ago, in May of 2001, and continued as part of the
mission of the Office of Homeland Security when it was created
on October 8, 2001, as well.
My staff and I have met with thousands of Government
officials at the Federal, State and local levels, with hundreds
of experts and many, many more private citizens. Throughout
these discussions, we have constantly examined ways to organize
the Government better.
The President's proposal also draws from the conclusion of
many recent reports on terrorism, reports by blue ribbon
commissions such as Hart-Rudman, Bremmer and the Gillmore
Commissions, as well as a variety of reports from the many
think tanks who have really investigated the issues relating to
international terrorism and homeland security over the past
several years.
It also draws, admittedly--and proudly I might add--from
the legislative proposals of Congressmen and Congresswomen,
including Mac Thornberry and Jane Harman, Ellen Tauscher, Jim
Gibbons, Saxby Chambliss and others, along with Senators Joe
Lieberman and Arlen Specter and Bob Graham.
This historic proposal would be the most significant
transformation in the U.S. Government since 1947. The creation
of this department would transform the current, rather
confusing patchwork of Government activities related to
homeland security into a single department whose primary
mission--whose primary mission is to protect our homeland.
Responsibility for homeland security is currently dispersed
among more than 100 different Government organizations, and the
President believes--and I sense that it is a belief shared with
many Members of the Congress of the United States, both
Chambers, both parties--that we need a single department whose
primary mission is to protect our way of life and our citizens;
a single department to secure our borders, synthesize and
analyze intelligence, combat bioterrorism and direct Federal
emergency response activities.
The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security is
one more key step in the President's national strategy for
homeland security. Like the national security strategy, ladies
and gentlemen, the national strategy for homeland security will
form the intellectual underpinnings to guide the decisionmaking
of planners, budgeters and policymakers for years to come.
From securing our borders to combatting bioterrorism to
protecting the food supply, most of the initiatives of the
Federal Government in pursuing--excuse me, the majority of the
initiatives the Federal Government is pursuing as part of our
strategy to secure the homeland have already been discussed
publicly. We will certainly refine them with the national
strategy. The strategy will pool together all of the major
ongoing activities and new initiatives that the President
believes are essential to our long-term effort to secure the
secure the homeland.
Now permit me, if you will, just a few comments with
regards to details of the President's plan.
Preventing future terrorist attacks must be our No. 1
priority. Because terrorism is a global threat, we must have
complete control over who and over what enters the United
States. We must prevent foreign terrorists from entering and
bringing in instruments of terror, while at the same time
facilitate the legal flow of people and goods upon which our
economy relies. Protecting our borders and controlling entry to
the United States has always been the responsibility of the
Federal Government. Yet this responsibility is currently
dispersed among more than five major Government organizations
in five different departments.
The new department would unify authority over the Coast
Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service
and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service of the Department of Agriculture and the recently
created Transportation Security Administration. All aspects of
border control, including the issuing of visas, would be
informed by a central information-sharing clearinghouse and
compatible data bases. It will be greatly improved in that
process.
The new department would unify government's efforts to
secure our borders in the transportation system that move
people from our borders to anywhere in this country within just
a matter of hours.
Although our top priority is preventing future attacks, Mr.
Chairman, we cannot assume that we will always succeed. We
cannot assume--it would be perilous to assume we could create a
fail-safe system. Therefore, we must also prepare to recover as
quickly as possible from attacks that do occur.
The Department of Homeland Security will buildupon the
Federal Emergency Management Agency as one of its key
components in this effort. The new department would assume
authority over Federal grant programs for local and State first
responders, such as fire fighters, police and emergency medical
personnel, and manage such critical response assets as the
nuclear emergency search team and the national pharmaceutical
stockpile. It would build a comprehensive national management
system that would consolidate existing Federal Government
emergency response plans into one genuinely all-hazard plan.
The department would ensure that response personnel have
and use equipment and systems that allow them to communicate
with one another. As the President made clear in the State of
the Union address, the war against terrorism is also a war
against the most deadly weapons known to mankind--chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. If our enemies
acquire these weapons, there is no doubt in anyone's mind, I
believe, that they will certainly use them. They will use them
with consequences potentially far more devastating than those
we suffered on September 11.
Currently, efforts to counter the threats of these weapons
are too few and too fragmented. The President believes we must
launch a systematic national effort against these weapons that
is equal in size to the threat that they pose, and the
President's proposal, we believe, does just that. The new
department would implement a national strategy to prepare for
and respond to the full range of terrorist threats involving
weapons of mass destruction.
The Department of Homeland Security would set national
policy and establish guidelines for State and local governments
to plan for the unthinkable, and direct exercises and drills
for Federal, State and local weapons of mass destruction
response teams. At the very heart of this particular feature of
the President's proposal is to develop even stronger
partnerships with the State and local first responders. The
homeland will be secure when the hometown is secure, and that
is why the President believes very strongly that we need to
have this relationship with the State and local governments and
build in that relationship as the Federal support for the kind
of equipment, drills and training essential to build a national
capacity to be able to respond to these threats.
The Department of Homeland Security would provide direction
and establish priorities for national research and development,
for related tests and evaluations and for the development and
procurement of new technology and equipment. Additionally, the
new department would incorporate and focus the intellectual
power of several important scientific institutions including
our national labs in this effort.
Finally, preventing future terrorist attacks requires good
information in advance. The President's proposal recognizes
this and would develop a new organization with the authority
and the capacity to generate and provide such critical
information. The new department would fuse intelligence,
integrate intelligence from multiple sources and other
information pertaining to threats to the homeland, including
information from the CIA and the FBI, as well as the NSA, INS,
Customs and the many other departments and agencies that have
an information-gathering, intelligence-sharing capability
within this country.
It would also comprehensively evaluate the vulnerabilities
of America's critical infrastructure to which many of the
Members alluded and note the pertinent intelligence against
those vulnerabilities for the purpose of identifying protective
priorities and supporting protective steps being taken either
by the department, other Federal departments and agencies,
State and local agencies and the private sector.
The individuals that work for the organizations tapped by
President Bush for the new department are among the most
talented and certainly the most capable patriots in our
Government. We are proud of what they are doing to secure our
homeland, and we call upon them to continue their crucial work
while the new department is created. This consolidation of the
government's homeland security efforts can achieve great
efficiencies and free up additional resources over time for the
fight against terrorism. They should rest assure that their
efforts will only be improved by the Government reorganization
proposal made by President Bush.
To achieve these efficiencies, the new Secretary will
require considerable flexibility in procurement, integration of
information technology systems and personnel issues.
Even with the creation of a new department, ladies and
gentlemen, there will remain a strong need for a White House
Office of Homeland Security. Homeland security will remain a
multidepartmental issue and will continue to require
interdepartmental collaboration and coordination. Additionally,
the President will continue to require the confidential advice
of a close assistant. Therefore the President's proposal
intends for the existing Office of Homeland Security to
maintain a strong role. The President believes this will be
critical for the future success for the new office itself.
During the transition period, Mr. Chairman, the Office of
Homeland Security will maintain vigilance and continue to
coordinate the other Federal agencies involved in homeland
security.
The President appreciates the enthusiastic, bipartisan
response from Congress and is gratified by the expressions of
optimism about how quickly this bill might be passed. Until the
Department of Homeland Security becomes fully operational, the
proposed department's designated components will continue their
mandate to help ensure the security of this country.
During his June 6 address to the Nation, the President
asked Congress to join him in establishing a single, permanent
department with an overriding and urgent mission, securing the
homeland of America and protecting the American people.
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. We know
that the threats are real and the need is urgent. In working
together, we all know we must succeed in this mutual endeavor.
President Truman did not live to see the end of the cold
war, but the war did end, and historians agree that the
consolidation of Federal resources was critical to our ultimate
success.
Ladies and gentlemen, my colleagues in this effort, we,
too, have that opportunity for leadership and to create a
legacy that will benefit future generations as well. I thank
you for the attention you have given my remarks and your public
expressions of both desire and will to work together to achieve
our mutual goal that is reorganizing Government to enhance our
ability to protect our fellow citizens and our way of life; and
I thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Ridge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Ridge
Introduction
Chairman Greenwood, Congressman Deutsch, Subcommittee Members, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today in support of the
President's historic proposal to unify our homeland security efforts
under one Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.
Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, all of America has risen to
the challenge of improving the security of our homeland. In partnership
with Congress, with states and localities, and with the private sector
and academia, we have worked to map and protect our critical
infrastructure, including nuclear power plants; to seal our borders
from terrorists and their deadly cargo; to strengthen enforcement of
our immigration laws; and to prepare for and prevent attacks involving
weapons of mass destruction.
The President believes our nation must now take the next critical
step by unifying our efforts under a single Department of Homeland
Security. Only Congress can create such a Department, and I am here
today to personally convey the President's deep desire to work with
Members to accomplish this goal. He believes the creation of a single
Department with a single, clear line of authority would not only
improve our preparedness for a future attack, but also strengthen these
partnerships, thereby helping to prevent a future attack.Earlier this
month, the President signed an Executive Order appointing me as
Director of the Transition Planning Office for the Department of
Homeland Security, to be housed within the Office of Management and
Budget. While I will still retain the title of Assistant to the
President and Homeland Security Advisor, my testimony today will be
given as the Director of this new entity. I look forward to responding
to your questions after providing a short statement on the proposed
legislation and how it would make Americans safer.
The President's Proposal
On June 6, 2002, President Bush addressed the nation and put forth
his vision to create a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security. Two days ago, on June 18, 2002, I delivered to the Congress
the President's proposed legislation for establishing the new
Department. This is an historic proposal. It would be the most
significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-
century. It would transform and largely realign the government's
confusing patchwork of homeland security activities into a single
department whose primary mission is to protect our homeland. The
proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security is one more key
step in the President's national strategy for homeland security.
It is crucial that we take this historic step. At the beginning of
the Cold War, President Truman recognized the need to reorganize our
national security institutions to meet the Soviet threat. We emerged
victorious from that dangerous period thanks in part to President
Truman's initiative. Today we are fighting a new war against a new
enemy. President Bush recognizes that the threat we face from terrorism
requires a reorganization of government similar in scale and urgency to
the unification of the Defense Department and creation of the CIA and
NSC.
Currently, no federal government department has homeland security
as its primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security
are dispersed among more than 100 different government organizations.
Creating a unified homeland security structure will align the efforts
of many of these organizations and ensure that this crucial mission--
protecting our homeland--is the top priority and responsibility of one
department and one Cabinet secretary.
Immediately after last fall's attack, the President took decisive
steps to protect America--from hardening cockpits and stockpiling
vaccines to tightening our borders. The President used his legal
authority to establish the White House Office of Homeland Security and
the Homeland Security Council to ensure that our federal response and
protection efforts were coordinated and effective. The President also
directed me, as Homeland Security Advisor, to study the federal
government as a whole to determine if the current structure allows us
to meet the threats of today while anticipating the unknown threats of
tomorrow. After careful study of the current structure--coupled with
the experience gained since September 11 and new information we have
learned about our enemies while fighting a war--the President concluded
that our nation needs a more unified homeland security structure.
The Department of Homeland Security
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security would empower a
single Cabinet official whose primary mission is to protect the
American homeland from terrorism. The mission of the Department would
be to:
<bullet> Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
<bullet> Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and
<bullet> Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.
The Department of Homeland Security would mobilize and focus the
resources of the federal government, state and local governments, the
private sector, and the American people to accomplish its mission. It
would have a clear, efficient organizational structure with four
divisions.
<bullet> Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
<bullet> Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures
<bullet> Border and Transportation Security
<bullet> Emergency Preparedness and Response
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection section of
the Department of Homeland Security would complement the reforms on
intelligence and information-sharing already underway at the FBI and
the CIA. The Department would analyze information and intelligence for
the purpose of understanding the terrorist threat to the American
homeland and foreseeing potential terrorist threats against the
homeland.
Furthermore, the Department would comprehensively assess the
vulnerability of America's key assets and critical infrastructures,
including food and water systems, agriculture, health systems and
emergency services, information and telecommunications, banking and
finance, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, dams),
transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways), the chemical and
defense industries, postal and shipping entities, and national
monuments and icons. Critically, the Department would integrate its own
and others' threat analyses with its comprehensive vulnerability
assessment for the purpose of identifying protective priorities and
supporting protective steps to be taken by the Department, other
federal departments and agencies, state and local agencies, and the
private sector. Working closely with state and local officials, other
federal agencies, and the private sector, the Department would help
ensure that proper steps are taken to protect high-risk potential
targets.
In short, the Department would for the first time merge under one
roof the capability to identify and assess threats to the homeland, map
those threats against our vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, and
organize preventive or protective action to secure the homeland.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
The war against terrorism is also a war against the most deadly
weapons known to mankind--chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear weapons. If the terrorists acquire these weapons, they will use
them with consequences that could be far more devastating than those we
suffered on September 11th. Currently, our efforts to counter the
threat of these weapons to the homeland are too few and too fragmented.
We must launch a systematic national effort against these weapons that
is equal to the threat they pose.
The President's proposed legislation would accomplish this goal. It
would authorize the Department of Homeland Security to lead the federal
government's efforts in preparing for and responding to the full range
of terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction. To do this,
the Department would set national policy and establish guidelines for
state and local governments. It would direct exercises and drills for
federal, state, and local chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) attack response teams and plans. The result of this
effort would be to consolidate and synchronize the disparate efforts of
multiple federal agencies currently scattered across several
departments. This would create a single office whose primary mission is
the critical task of protecting the United States from catastrophic
terrorism.
The Department would serve as a focal point for America's premier
centers of excellence in the field. It would manage national efforts to
develop diagnostics, vaccines, antibodies, antidotes, and other
countermeasures. It would consolidate and prioritize the disparate
homeland security related research and development programs currently
scattered throughout the Executive Branch. It would also assist state
and local public safety agencies by evaluating equipment and setting
standards.
Border and Transportation Security
Our number one priority is preventing future terrorist attacks.
Because terrorism is a global threat, we must attain complete control
over whom and what enters the United States in order to achieve this
priority. We must prevent foreign terrorists from entering our country
and bringing in instruments of terror. At the same time, we must
expedite the legal flow of people and goods on which our economy
depends.
Protecting our borders and controlling entry to the United States
has always been the responsibility of the Federal government. Yet, this
responsibility is currently dispersed among more than five major
government organizations in five different departments. Therefore,
under the President's proposed legislation, the Department of Homeland
Security would for the first time unify authority over major federal
security operations related to our borders, territorial waters, and
transportation systems.
The Department would assume responsibility for operational assets
of the United States Coast Guard, the United States Customs Service,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the Border
Patrol), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the
Transportation Security Administration. The Secretary of Homeland
Security would have the authority to administer and enforce all
immigration and nationality laws, including, through the Secretary of
State, the visa issuance functions of consular officers. As a result,
the Department would have sole responsibility for managing entry into
the United States and protecting our transportation infrastructure. It
would ensure that all aspects of border control, including the issuing
of visas, are informed by a central information-sharing clearinghouse
and compatible databases.
Emergency Preparedness and Response
Although our top priority is preventing future attacks, we cannot
assume that we will always succeed. Therefore, we must also prepare to
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The
President's proposed legislation would require the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure the preparedness of our nation's emergency
response professionals, provide the federal government's emergency
response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and aid America's
recovery.
To fulfill these missions, the Department would oversee federal
government assistance in the domestic disaster preparedness training of
first responders and would coordinate the government's disaster
response efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would
become a central component of the Department of Homeland Security, and
the new Department would administer the grant programs for
firefighters, police, emergency personnel, and citizen volunteers
currently managed by FEMA, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of Health and Human Services. The Department would manage
certain crucial elements of the federal government's emergency response
assets, such as the Strategic National Stockpile. In the case of an
actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other
emergency, the Secretary of Homeland Security would have the authority
to call on other response assets, including Energy's and the EPA's
Nuclear Incident Response teams, as organizational units of the
Department. Finally, the Department would integrate the federal
interagency emergency response plans into a single, comprehensive,
government-wide plan, and ensure that all response personnel have the
equipment and capability to communicate with each other as necessary.
State/Local Government & Private Sector Coordination
The Department of Homeland Security would consolidate and
streamline relations on homeland security issues with the federal
government for America's state and local governments, as well as the
private sector. It would contain an intergovernmental affairs office to
coordinate federal homeland security programs with state and local
officials. It would give state and local officials one primary contact
instead of many when it comes to matters related to training,
equipment, planning, and other critical needs such as emergency
response.
Secret Service
The Department of Homeland Security would incorporate the Secret
Service, which would report directly to the Secretary. The Secret
Service would remain intact and its primary mission will remain the
protection of the President and other government leaders. The Secret
Service would also continue to provide security for designated national
events, as it did for the recent Olympics and the Super Bowl.
Non-Homeland Security Functions
The Department of Homeland Security would have a number of
functions that are not directly related to securing the homeland
against terrorism. For instance, through FEMA, it would be responsible
for mitigating the effects of natural disasters. Through the Coast
Guard, it would be responsible for search and rescue, navigation, and
other maritime functions. Several other border functions, such as drug
interdiction operations and naturalization, and would also be performed
by the new Department.
White House Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council
The President intends for the White House Office of Homeland
Security and the Homeland Security Council to continue to play a key
role, advising the President and coordinating a vastly simplified
interagency process.
Making Americans Safer
The Department of Homeland Security would make Americans safer
because our nation would have:
<bullet> One department whose primary mission is to protect the
American homeland;
<bullet> One department to secure our borders, transportation sector,
ports, and critical infrastructure;
<bullet> One department to integrate threat analyses and vulnerability
assessments;
<bullet> One department to coordinate communications with state and
local governments, private industry, and the American people
about threats and preparedness;
<bullet> One department to coordinate our efforts to protect the
American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass
destruction;
<bullet> One department to help train and equip for first responders;
<bullet> One department to manage federal emergency response
activities; and
<bullet> More security officers in the field working to stop terrorists
and fewer resources in Washington managing duplicative and
redundant activities that drain critical homeland security
resources.
The New Department Would Improve Security Without Growing Government
The Department of Homeland Security must be an agile, fast-paced,
and responsive organization that takes advantage of 21st-century
technology and management techniques to meet a 21st-century threat.
The creation of a Department of Homeland Security would not
``grow'' government. The new Department would be funded within the
total monies requested by the President in his FY 2003 budget already
before Congress for the existing components. In fact, the President's
FY 2003 budget will increase the resources for the component parts by
$14 billion over the FY 2002 budget. We expect that the cost of the new
elements (such as the threat analysis unit and the state, local, and
private sector coordination functions), as well as department-wide
management and administration units, can be funded from savings
achieved by eliminating redundancies inherent in the current structure.
In order to respond to rapidly changing conditions, the Secretary
would need to have great latitude in re-deploying resources, both human
and financial. The Secretary should have broad reorganizational
authority in order to enhance operational effectiveness, as needed.
Moreover, the President will request for the Department significant
flexibility in hiring processes, compensation systems and practices,
and performance management to recruit, retain, and develop a motivated,
high-performance and accountable workforce. Finally, the new Department
should have flexible procurement policies to encourage innovation and
rapid development and operation of critical technologies vital to
securing the homeland.
Working Together to Create the Department of Homeland Security
President Bush recognizes that only the Congress can create a new
department of government. During his June 6th address to the nation,
the President asked Congress to join him in establishing a single,
permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: securing
the homeland of America, and protecting the American people. I am here
to ask, as the President did, that we move quickly. The need is urgent.
Therefore, the President has asked Congress to pass his proposal this
year, before the end of the congressional session.
Preliminary planning for the new Department has already begun. The
formal transition would begin once Congress acts on the President's
proposed legislation and the President signs it into law. Under the
President's plan, the new Department would be established by January 1,
2003, with integration of some components occurring over a longer
period of time. To avoid gaps in leadership coverage, the President's
proposal contemplates that appointees who have already been confirmed
by the Senate would be able to transfer to new positions without a
second confirmation process.
During this transition period, the Office of Homeland Security will
maintain vigilance and continue to coordinate the other federal
agencies involved in homeland security. Until the Department of
Homeland Security becomes fully operational, the proposed Department's
designated components will continue to operate under existing chains of
command.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Governor; thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for purposes of
questions.
Governor, as you know, this committee worked hard to pass
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002; and the title of that act, Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response was meant
to underline the dual-use nature of the programs and the grants
that we wanted to create.
We directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
that statute to award grants to States, cities and hospitals
and other health care facilities and providers to enhance
education, training, supplies and equipment at the local level
for bioterrorist attacks and other public health care
emergencies, many of them naturally occurring.
The--we noticed in the bill, DOJ--we did that because we
know that DOJ and FEMA were geared toward more traditional
first responders, such as fire and police, and we wanted to get
these grants out to the health care providers.
In the President's homeland security proposal, these
bioterrorism programs would be continued to run through HHS,
but the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security could
essentially control the HHS programs by establishing its
parameters and setting its priorities. The question is, how do
we make sure that these resources are there to prepare for an
assault by West Nile virus or a new strain of influenza, so we
have preparedness for the naturally occurring disasters and
still are prepared for possible terroristic--bioterroristic
attacks and how do you see the Secretary coordinating those
concerns?
Mr. Ridge. Mr. Chairman, first of all, you and your ranking
member on the committee need to be congratulated once again for
the extraordinary effort on the bioterrorism measure. It went a
long way in helping focus the departments and the Government
and on the critical need not only now, but in the future in
dealing with this issue.
You raise a very important issue that hopefully is dealt
with to your satisfaction within the legislation. You note very
appropriately that the public health system really is a dual
infrastructure. Whether the microbes of an infectious disease
are brought to us in an envelope from a terrorist or as a
result of Mother Nature, it is still problematic to citizens
and communities.
The Health and Human Services will continue to have an
independent funding stream to direct the resources to the dual
infrastructure, the CDC and NIH and other laboratories and
research facilities as well. But by specific legislative
language included in this proposal the President submits to
you, there is a direct responsibility for the new Cabinet
Secretary to cooperate and coordinate and establish priorities
in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
It, incidentally, is a partnership that predated the
legislative proposal. Secretary Thompson has worked very, very
closely with the Office of Homeland Security and the White
House, and in fact, Secretary Thompson and his people worked
closely with us on the language of this legislation.
So your interests are appropriate in ensuring that the
collaboration that preexisted, that this proposal continues to
exist; and we believe that the language in the President's
initiative ensures that.
Mr. Greenwood. Kind of a day-to-day basis, I mean, what
happens if the Secretary of Homeland Security calls up the
Secretary of HHS and says, I am concerned about some
intelligence that we are gathering about the potentiality of a
bioterrorist assault in a particular part of the country, and I
would like to marshal some CDC forces out there, and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services says, I don't think we
can spare that right now, I am worried about an outbreak of a
pathogen naturally occurring that the CDC has been monitoring
in another part of the country; and the two Secretaries become
less than congenial in their cooperation?
How do you see that being resolved?
Mr. Ridge. I think there probably would be a two-step
process. First of all, since the President seeks to retain the
Office of Homeland Security within the White House, we will
continue to have a coordination role. The matter may be
resolved by the intervention of the Assistant to the President,
bringing the parties together.
It is a process that we have used on several occasions
internally, and I suspect that would be used again. I believe
that is at the heart of the President's decision to keep that
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security operational
within the White House.
But, second, obviously if there is a disagreement between
Cabinet members or among Cabinet members, the ultimate tie
breaker is the President of the United States.
Mr. Greenwood. So it is your understanding that the
Secretary of Homeland Security would not be able to say to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, I have listened to what
you have said, appreciate your concerns, now do what I tell
you--wouldn't have the power to override unilaterally?
Mr. Ridge. I believe the President preserves the autonomy
of both Cabinet Secretaries.
Clearly, the intelligence information that would be
available to the Secretary of Homeland Security would also be
available to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; and
based upon that information, based upon vulnerability
assessments that are available to both, it would hopefully
result in an agreement on joint action.
But in the possible event that a difference of opinion
would arise, there are tie breakers to move quickly.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I guess my focus
is a follow-up on what the chairman mentioned.
We are getting into some of the details. I think there is a
concern, just trying to flesh out this issue, of how we
envision--because we actually think we have done a good job and
are doing a good job and continue to make strides in the public
health area that--you know, taking public health into--or what
would be left.
What is your vision of what would be left in HHS of public
health issues after the Department of Homeland Security takes
out the significant component?
Mr. Ridge. One of the most critical pieces, I believe, is
our public health infrastructure. NIH and CDC remain an
integral and robust part of the Health and Human Services
research effort, outreach effort and response effort.
So I think the point of the legislation is to create an
environment and a means by which the Secretary of Homeland
Security, working in collaboration with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services and understanding that the research
infrastructure preexisted the Department of Homeland Security
and has a longstanding relationship with Health and Human
Services, CDC, NIH and the other laboratories to which they may
refer research--that infrastructure continues to exist.
And Health and Human Services will obviously have the
opportunity to come up and work with Congress on public-health-
related issues specifically. But as they work on health-related
issues, bioterrorism issues, there will be that collaborative
relationship between the two.
And when it comes to local preparedness, that grant program
that heretofore had been in Health and Human Services, will be
shifted to the Department of Homeland Security. It will be in
everyone's best interest, however, recognizing the dual nature
of the infrastructure that exists out there in the public
health system, that the work is done in collaboration; and that
is the specific reason that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services is mentioned in this legislation--in Title III, I
believe.
Mr. Deutsch. Again, this is not really in any way a
critique, but the best result.
Mr. Ridge. We are trying to work to refine it.
Mr. Deutsch. Focusing on this issue specifically--and you
just mentioned it, and that is--our understanding is that the
public health funding mechanism that HHS does, the department
will take over all of that. And theoretically--again within
your mission, or not your person, but the mission of the new
department, this is again--I guess where the concern lies is
that in my opening statement, I talked about the fact that I
think people are doing a much better job. In fact, it is a
necessary condition that they have responsibility, that they
have goals and that they achieve those goals.
Unfortunately, a lot of the things related to public health
are not what we, I think, really envision as your goal as a new
department. And I guess the concern I have, and I think many of
the members of this subcommittee and committee share, is that,
if anything, we need to be pushing forward on all sorts of
public health issues that are really not a component of--as you
said in your answers previous to this, are not really a
component of bioterrorism or chemical, you know, potential
weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
So how do we--I mean, I understand what you are saying. But
as we are structuring an agency, how do we deal with this
concern, I think, is a very real question. And I know you
responded----
Mr. Ridge. I think you raised a very important point and
you have offered, as all the committee members have, to work
with us on refining the language so that it continues to meet
the goals of the President as well as the committee's goal of
continuing to buildup a public health infrastructure that has
been--that has deteriorated over the past decade or so for lack
of funding; and that refinement we'll just have to work with
you on as we go about moving this legislation forward.
But it is clear that the public health infrastructure, any
investment from--either directly from Health and Human Services
or Homeland Security will end up having dual value, one in
combating terrorism, another just making our public health
system more robust and, frankly, long-term, improving the
overall health of the country generally.
So working out that refinement with you in the language to
make sure that we meet both objectives is certainly something
we want to do.
Mr. Deutsch. I see my time is running out. I would like to
ask one much more general question, which is, what lessons have
we learned and going forward at this point in the creation?
Obviously we talked about what happened post-World War II and
the creation of the National Security apparatus. But really,
the more recent agencies, the Department of Energy, other
agencies in terms of their creation. And I've read a number of
press accounts of just historically your interviews with people
that the creation of a new department almost by definition has
inherent bureaucratic problems in terms of staffing issues, in
terms of other issues.
I mean, how are you approaching the just systemic problems
of, you know, creating that large of a bureaucracy, and what's
the apparatus that you have in place at this point in time to
deal with some of those acknowledged issues that you will face?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, first of all, the legislation
provides from the effective date a year transition period,
because clearly your ability to aggregate all these people and
all these departments and the infrastructure is certainly going
to take some time. And so there is a year transition process.
And you and I can well imagine that it will probably take even
longer than that to get the kind of specific changes and
refinements we need to maximize the effectiveness of this
organization. But we have got a good period of time, a year
transition.
Second, the President has asked in his proposal that the
new Secretary be given more flexibility and greater agility in
order to deal with issues such as the information system
integration procurement and, for that matter, personnel. And
depending on the wish and will of the Congress of the United
States investing in the new Secretary the ability--the
flexibility to deal with some of these issues I think would
depend how quickly we can get the system operating to maximum
effectiveness.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Ridge, I hope you will give me a minute just to
get something off my chest. There is a lot of work in this bill
and a lot of work that I know you are doing in terms of
securing our borders, and they need to be secured, but there's
three points I want to quickly make.
One is that the instruments for terrorists to use against
our people are here. The jet fuel that was exploded at the
World Trade Center and here at the Pentagon was made in
America. The airplanes were built in America. And the fuel
trucks and the ambulances that a couple of people in New Jersey
were trying to buy this week were made in America. And I
suspect that we haven't paid enough attention to that. We had
better, that someone with an evil intent against our people
doesn't have to bring a doggone thing in through our borders.
We have got a lot of stuff right here in America that they can
turn against us if they are evil enough and intentional enough
to do it.
Second, the terrorists are here. They are not in
Afghanistan. If anybody has not seen Jihad in America, pick it
up from PBS. The cells are operating not just in New York and
Washington, but in little communities all over this country, in
St. Louis, in New Orleans, in Kansas City and communities all
over this country. They are here, they are operating, and they
have come in under student visas. And in the 1990's, I started
an effort to try to do something about students, and could not
get any attraction to the issue. But we have let people in
under student visas and left it entirely up to the school to
track their movements. Some of them never registered to go to
school; if they did register in school in English, they could
switch to chemical engineering or nuclear engineering, for all
we know, and nobody ever notified the State Department. And if
they graduated or if they left, nobody notified the State
Department, and they have settled in in communities all over
this country. And we need to face that fact. We have let them
in and they are here, and they are waiting for new
instructions. And we had better face that fact. And the
information they need to do is harm is so readily available in
a free society. We really have to be careful.
In the 1960's, 1970's, in the State legislature in
Louisiana, I tried to require a--pass a bill to require the
desensitization of something as common as ammonium nitrate
fertilizer and make sure you wouldn't mix it with fuel oil and
make a bomb. Couldn't get any traction on it. This committee
held hearings on this issue. But a guy named McVeigh simply had
to go in an agriculture center and buy some fertilizer and go
to a hardware store and buy a few canisters of butane gas, and
he built a bomb that took down a Federal building.
We predicted that in the 1970's when we were debating
whether we should desensitize ammonium nitrate fertilizer
before it's sold in the markets. Information about how to do
that is on the Internet. Information about how to use thousands
of available chemicals and products we make in America to turn
them into weapons of destruction, here in America, not
imported, not bringing a doggone thing in through a ship or a
plane, but right in this country, the information on how to use
those things, readily available.
You have got an awesome task; we have an awesome task. But
we have to face the facts: We have let the enemy in; he resides
among us; and he is prepared to use the things, the common
things in our lives to turn them against us, to do us harm. And
a free society, a Nation that prides itself on freedom of
information and a free access to goods and supplies and
information suddenly is challenged about how to balance all
those incredibly important rights that make us special, make
this country special, against now the threat that lives at home
with us in our own neighborhoods. And, this department is going
to be critical.
And I want to ask you a couple of questions about it, but I
want to make that statement first, because I hope everyone
realizes just how serious this business is, and how creating a
department with the absolute buck-stops-here authority to
organize and coordinate and to do anything within our legal
system to stop these people from harming our citizens here in
America now, unlike any threat we have faced in the history of
our country, is going to be simply awesome, and we have got to
do this thing right.
I noticed in the President's proposal, for example, that
the Freedom of Information changes. The changes you recommend
being made about providing new protections against public
disclosure of some sensitive information is limited only to
information that's provided voluntarily, and is non--it is
provided by non-Federal entities with respect to critical
infrastructure activities. I wonder why that's limited. I
wonder why, when the government compels a private entity, such
as a safe water drinking facility or an electric generation
facility or a manufacturing plant that's manufacturing critical
components--when the government complies, they have to submit a
vulnerability assessment, and it's under government requirement
mandate to do so, why we couldn't protect that information as
much as we would protect information that's voluntarily
supplied. I hope you look at that.
Mr. Ridge. We will.
Chairman Tauzin. I hope you look at whether or not the non-
Federal entity limitation is a good one, or whether there are
some Federal entities that may supply information to your--to
our new Department of Homeland Security that ought not be in
the public domain; that may be accessible by the right persons
in the government, but nevertheless protected from disclosure
on the Internet because it may open the door to some sort of
road map for destruction. We need to be careful, very careful
about that, as we go down the future.
I notice in the bill, Governor Ridge, that one of the R&D
programs, nuclear smuggling, is exempted from complete transfer
to the Homeland Security office, that it suggests instead that
the DOE jointly operates the program. I wonder if that isn't a
better model for a number of R&D programs. And I would--you
don't need to respond today, but I would love your office,
before we act on this proposal, to explain to us why that model
wouldn't work for a number of the other R&D programs which are
equally sensitive as nuclear smuggling might be in terms of
joint operation, rather than simple pure transfer out of the
department.
I want to emphasize the points that Mr. Waxman made about
our public health entities, and I believe Chairman Greenman
made it, too. When we debated the bioterrorism bill, we were
very, very careful not to create a special unit at the CDC that
strictly related to terrorist attacks to our public health,
because, frankly, when an outbreak of infectious disease hits
or something else happens in this country, we don't know at the
start how it happened, we just know we have got a problem on
our hands. CDC has to respond whether it's a terrorist or
whether it's a natural pathogen in our society. And we have to
be careful that we don't create a situation where bureaucrats
have to first debate where to send the issue before we can
respond. And I would hope that as we evolve this new
department, we are careful about that.
I would like to point out to the committee again in regards
to my opening statement, we discovered just last week that the
smallpox--rather, the anthrax bacteria that was sent in the
mail was probably cultured here in America, not brought in over
borders, again, but cultured here in America and may be
cultured again in America.
CDC needs to respond whether it's someone culturing it in a
lab and it accidentally gets out, or someone has got an evil
intent in sticking it in the mail trying to kill people. They
have got to have a clear capacity to respond and not wait for
some bureaucrat to say, ``Okay. We don't think it's a terrorist
attack, so you are in charge instead of us.'' that's a very,
very sensitive decision we have to make.
I want to also mention that in regard to--in regard to the
President's proposal, there is a proposal in here to give the
new Secretary authority to take, seek--or, seek to effect
protective measures to secure critical assets, including those
in the private sector. I mentioned this in the opening
statement, but I hope you pay an awful lot of attention. I want
to look at this very carefully before we complete action on
this bill.
The last thing we need is to create another bureaucracy
with regulatory authority in this area, and I would hope this
is not designed to do that. And we are going to be watching
very carefully that this truly represents an effort to
coordinate the public/private partnership rather than creating
new lines of authority that are going to contradict other
regulatory agencies of the government in some of these private
sector operations.
Finally, Governor Ridge, I think one of the best pieces of
information and advice that came to the President the other day
at our meeting with you came from John Dingell of Michigan, the
ranking member of our full committee, who pointed out to the
President and to you--and I wanted to emphasize his words
again--that we have seen in the past creation of Federal
agencies cobbled together out of pieces of different other--
different agencies, with other different cultures and with
other different organizational structures. We have seen the
creation of some big messes. He cited the Energy Department as
one. I want to second that.
The Energy Department represents one of the most difficult
organizations in the government to manage because it was
cobbled together, with all sorts of different pieces, some of
which contradict one another; there are fiefdoms all over that
department that don't cooperate with one another, that the
right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing, and
wouldn't want to know if it was told.
The problems inside the Energy Department are not because
of the--of any particular leaders, and Mr. Abraham is doing his
best, as you know, to manage that department, as other
Secretaries have done before him. It was a problem inherent in
the way it was constructed.
I would urge you and the President to pay special attention
to Mr. Dingell's words here, as we cobble together a new
department, one that may be more critical than any we have ever
cobbled together in a long, long time. I would hope that you
pay special attention to the pieces you put together, and to
make sure we don't create another mess like we have created
with the Energy Department.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ridge. Thank you very much for your commentary, your
observations, and the recommendations and concerns you have
expressed. Let me just try to summarize a quick response,
noting the many interests and concerns you have with the
legislation: That a good organization isn't necessarily a
guarantee of success. A flawed organization is guarantee of
failure. And that's why we believe that working together with
Congress as we refine the ideas and address the concerns,
hopefully, we can avoid the pitfalls that have undermined
earlier reorganization efforts, and never really led to the
unity of command and the kind of effectiveness that I think
those who had organized it way back when had intended and had
hoped. We need to avoid all those pitfalls as we ramp up this
new organization.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes for 5 minutes for inquiry the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Ridge, you said in your statement that homeland
security works when the hometown is secure. I want to talk a
little bit about IBETs and some of the intelligence-gathering
stuff that we have going on in this country. The IBETs, as you
know, are Intelligence Border Enforcement Teams, and there are
13 of them, and after September 11, I think Customs did a
pretty good job. But I want to point out where I think there is
a gaping hole. I want to see if this is still driven by
Customs, or will Homeland Security now take charge.
Thanks to my friend here, Mr. Strickland, here is Michigan.
It's just a map of Michigan. You have an IBET down here in the
Detroit area, right down here. And that comes right around
here, so that's pretty much covered here. But then you don't
have another IBET until you get way over here to Thunder Bay,
Canada. So all this area in here--and by the way the crow
flies, if you did a straight line, it's about 700 miles. But
where we have a lot of activity is here in Sault Sainte Marie,
Canada.
Mr. Ridge. Right.
Mr. Stupak. And that's about 700 miles. When you come over
here, the islands are right here by Drummond and then the
Channels. It's very easy, St. Mary's River, are very easy to
cross. It's a major hole in our IBETs. So my question is, if
you are going to do an IBET, who will make that determination
now? Customs? Or will Homeland Security?
Mr. Ridge. Customs will be an integral part of the
reorganization effort. Interestingly, you talk about this
rather unique alignment of multiple agencies led by Customs.
Because when I complete the hearing today, I am going to spend
a little time with some of the officials that are running one
down in Key West. It's a good model. It's been very effective
where it has been deployed. I see no reason why the new Cabinet
Secretary would do anything other than to try to continue to
enhance and empower its activity.
As you know, the President in his 2003 budget proposal also
calls for I think the largest increase in support for the Coast
Guard ever. We need additional people and boats and platforms
to buildup their capacity, because clearly now border security
and port security has taken on an enhanced dimension. So----
Mr. Stupak. But then who would do an IBET then? Coast Guard
or Homeland Security now?
Mr. Ridge. Well, by definition, if the Coast Guard's doing
it under the new department, Homeland Security would be doing
it. Again, it is a best practice that I would suspect that the
new Secretary would continue to try to deploy. It has proven to
be successful.
Mr. Stupak. Well, at these IBETs, and even--we don't have
an IBET here at Sault Sainte Marie, where I think we should. We
do have the Sault Area Intelligence Committee, and they are
working with the Canadians, and we have 12 Federal agencies
working out here trying to help secure the border here. But the
problem with that one--that's one of the problems we are
concerned about--is, while you have 12 agencies working well
with the Canadians and all the local and county law
enforcement, no is one is in charge. You have 12 agencies. They
are all working together cooperatively--and I don't mean to be
critical of what they do. I think they do a great job. But if
something happens or if someone has to call a shot, we are
going to do this, there is no one there who is in charge. And I
think that's one of the problems we have when we start talking
about security at our borders and elsewhere. And I would hope
the new Homeland Security would have, at least at these area
intelligence committees, someone to go to. Who is the go-to
person in that local area, is what we sort of need to do.
Mr. Ridge. You highlight a feature of border security that
became evident to me as we put together a team from Customs and
Coast Guard and INS and other agencies that deal with border
security to develop a 21st century smart border accord with our
friends in Canada.
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Ridge. That's an ongoing process, where we look to
critical review of our infrastructure, protective
infrastructure, and how we facilitate the flow of people and
goods, at the same time enhancing security.
So under the new agency, the coordinating function to a
certain extent would be replaced by a command function, because
you have Customs in one department, you have INS in one
department, you have Border Patrol in another.
Mr. Stupak. FBI.
Mr. Ridge. Now, under the President's proposal, they would
be all aligned singularly under an under secretary. So I think
you will enhance the effectiveness of that kind of program,
because you now have a command structure that can direct that
it be done. And it is a good practice.
Mr. Stupak. But if it's the IBET or like the Sault Area
Intelligence Committee, I guess what I want to know, so we
aren't pointing fingers like we do after September 11, where
would I go to get full accountability on the issue? Who or what
department--and, as we say--does the buck stop here? And, will
the department order Customs to do it, the new department? Who
is going to have the accountability? Where does the buck really
stop with that new proposal?
Mr. Ridge. I think it's a very appropriate question that
you've asked, because you want the authority to get things
done, be aligned with the accountability. And, at the end of
the day, that will be determined by the new Cabinet Secretary.
But----
Mr. Stupak. So the Cabinet Secretary would be----
Mr. Ridge. Clearly, I think that's the primary reason
behind the President's reorganization effort aligning authority
with accountability.
In here, what you finally have is a consolidation of the
many agencies involved in IBET under one command structure. You
can do--you can go so far trying to coordinate activity among
organizations. I think you can go even further when you can
command activity among organizations. And now I think you have
a unitary command structure that will enhance the capacity of
those multiple agencies to do that kind of job.
Mr. Stupak. Well, when you see your Florida IBET, I would
be interested in seeing your reaction to it, and see if there
is one person in charge down there, or are we still all
cooperatively.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Ridge, Chairman Tauzin touched on a matter that
I'm interested in and I'm sure other members of the committee
are also, and that was the FOIA protection in the President's
proposal being limited to voluntary information supplied by
non-Federal entities. And, as he has indicated, EPA and others
sometimes require entities to provide vulnerability
assessments, which, under the President's legislation, would be
subject to a FOIA request. Is that an issue that you all are
willing to revisit and determine whether or not his proposal
would be subject to change in that area, or not?
Mr. Ridge. Yes, it is, Congressman. I mean, the legislation
as drafted was directed specifically at a problem that has been
experienced by a lot of the Cabinet Secretaries, and even
during the work of the Office of Homeland Security, and that
is, getting an understanding that 80 to 90 percent of the
critical infrastructure in this country is owned by for-profit
entities. And they are anxious, just as all Americans are, to
help. They are anxious to participate. They want to let the
government know, for a variety of reasons, where they view
themselves as vulnerable. As--the companies are custodians of
not only the proprietary interests, but they're neighbors in
communities, they're corporate citizens, and have a
responsibility to all these different groups. But they are
not--our sense is that they would be a lot more forthcoming
voluntarily in sharing this kind of information with us if it
was part of a limited exemption to the Freedom of Information
Act.
So whether or not we expand it is certainly worth
consideration, not only in this bill but down the road in the
years ahead.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Well, thank you, Governor. And I
notice also that some of the transferred functions that would
be coming into the new department relate to DOE's non-
proliferation work with certain countries, and particularly
Russia. And this is a little bit parochial interest of mine,
narrowly focused, and maybe you don't know the answer to it,
but recently DOE entered into a new agreement with the United
States Enrichment Corporation to be the executive agent for
bringing in enriched uranium from Russia as a part of the non-
proliferation efforts in that country. Is that the type of an
agreement that would be transferred to the new agency, or would
that remain with the National Security Council? Or do we know?
Mr. Ridge. That kind of agreement as presently drafted, I
believe, with remains with the National Security----
Mr. Whitfield. Okay.
Mr. Ridge. [continuing] apparatus of this country.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay.
Mr. Ridge. You should know that the agencies and
departments and programs that we have drafted into the
Department of Homeland Security has been done with very close
collaboration with the Department of Energy and others. And
because of the complex nature of these programs--you just
alluded to one of them--there are international aspects to this
that involve issues that are related to homeland security, but
also involving the Department of State and the National
Security Advisory and the like. So, we have been very careful
in drafting these programs. But that would remain with the
national security apparatus of this country.
Mr. Whitfield. I notice that we have some private
companies, like FedEx and the Port of Virginia that are
actively testing and pursuing installation of radiation
detection devices throughout their systems right now. But there
are no Federal standards in this regard for radiation detection
devices, and there is no single Federal entity to which the
companies can look to guidance--for guidance and support. Will
this new Department of Homeland Security be able to assist in
providing leadership in that area for these private companies
that want to pursue this?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, you've raised that question;
Congresswoman Harman has raised that question. Literally dozens
of your colleagues have done the same thing.
It is the purpose of the creation of the unit within
Homeland Security of weapons of mass destruction
countermeasures, and to involve a means by which we can
establish the kind of standards and the point of access so the
companies can work--know, one, the standards that we would like
their equipment to meet; and, two, a point of access to get
their equipment, their technology tested against those
standards.
So, again, this is a work in progress, but develop a center
of excellence around the Lawrence Livermore Lab, but using the
other national labs and the other research facilities in this
country, we would hope to, one, create a point of access for
testing and evaluation; and, two, as we develop national
strategy, to set national standards.
One of the big challenges we have in setting a--in
developing a national strategy over a Federal system is we
can't necessarily dictate to State and locals or Federal
agencies, for that matter, the kinds of equipment that they
must acquire or purchase. But by setting standards, we can go a
long way in making sure that the equipment, from whomever the
vendor might be, is interoperable with the other equipment that
may be needed at the time.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Strickland, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you. And my friend from Michigan has
a quick question here. I do have some questions, but I will
yield the time to him temporarily.
Mr. Stupak. Thanks.
Exactly on that point, on the radiation detection issue.
Customs said we are going to do it, and then Customs says we
know nothing about it, so they give it to DOE. DOE says we
don't know anything about it, so we give it to Lawrence
Livermore now. So now we have three ways down the scale. Who is
making the decision? Who is going to be ultimately responsible
and accountable? This has been going on for some time.
Mr. Ridge. It has.
Mr. Stupak. And someone has got to say enough is enough.
Let's get the decision done. Let's get it made. Here, you have
got Customs in saying, do this. Then they say, well, we really
don't know anything about it, so we will give it to DOE. They
contract to DOE; DOE says, yeah, good idea. We should do a
standard, but we don't know what it is. Let's contract to one
of our labs.
Now we are three ways down the ladder and three rungs down
the ladder. How is this ever going to get done? We need someone
to take the bull by the horns and say get it done.
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, I think you reflect a challenge not
only for Homeland Security in terms of how those three
departments operate, but overall the operation of the Federal
Government. You know, bringing some kind of a concerted effort
to resolve these issues and getting someone to make a decision
based upon a national strategy, national priorities, and
national vulnerabilities is what needs to be done, and that is
at the heart of the President's proposal.
One, the Department of Homeland Security, where this kind
of issue can be resolved once a strategy is developed,
priorities have been developed based on vulnerabilities and
threat assessments, and then targeting the research, the
appropriate research dollars to that end.
We have a fairly robust and fairly expansive and expensive
series of research and development activities within the
Federal Government. It's ad hoc, and at least under the
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, those kinds of
efforts relating to protecting our way of life and our citizens
would be given, I think, a strategic focus, long overdue, as
you pointed out in your question.
Mr. Stupak. Right. And in this whole thing, we have
entities willing to install the equipment, we have vendors
willing to sell the equipment. How do we bring it all together
is really sort of the crux. Going back to the accountability
issue, we have vendors, again, willing to sell, you have got
people willing to install. But what do we install? What's the
standard? How do we do it? That's--that's the part we have got
to get our hands on, and I'm just looking for more specific
proposals in the President's legislation that would put someone
in charge to get it done, to get that accountability.
Mr. Ridge. Well, I think if you take a look at the one unit
in there that deals with research and development and science
and technology, that is the President's intention, that the
centerpiece of the strategic--the strategic direction for
homeland security research and development would be here. It
would be through the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. You would
have centers of excellence at some of the other laboratories.
We have got an extraordinary system of academic research
institutions around this country. I mean, we have got plenty of
people who are prepared intellectually with the laboratories
and the experience to direct their focus once the Federal
Government decides where that--where that research should be
directed. We have got plenty of people out there that can help
us do it, once we give them specific direction. We don't do it
now. We just do it on an ad hoc basis.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to share some
information that was in the Youngstown Vindicator regarding the
possible location of the new department, and just to let you
know that Youngstown, Ohio would be more than happy to provide
a home for your new department. There has been some discussion.
Mr. Ridge. I thought maybe in Pennsylvania somewhere. But
apparently----
Mr. Strickland. That's exactly what I was thinking.
Mr. Ridge. We can get close to the river.
Mr. Strickland. Sir, so that we both can benefit. But I
have been thinking about this new department since the
President has made his proposal, and one of the things that has
concerned me is the fact that it appears that there was at
least some failure to analyze data and to communicate data and
so on. And I've been wondering how this new Secretary who is
going to be responsible for homeland security is going to be
able to do what they need to do--he or she needs to do if they
don't have some direct authority over the agencies that are
most responsible for intelligence in this country, specifically
the FBI. And I'm wondering, how will the new Secretary be able
to assure us and the Nation that the failures that have been
identified in terms of not only data collection but data
analysis and dispensation and the sharing of data and so on,
how will the Secretary be able to deal with that problem, if it
continues to exist, without having some direct authority over
that agency?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, your question goes to the heart of
the ultimate desire of the President, the Congress of the
United States, and the people of this country, must do
everything we can to prevent the attacks from occurring in the
first place. And at the very heart of that effort is acting on
credible intelligence and information, interdicting and
preventing the attacks from occurring.
By specific legislative language, the Congress of the
United States will empower the new Secretary to secure the
reports and the assessments and the analytical work done by the
CIA and the FBI, but also be empowered to get the information
and intelligence that any other agency generates. This is an
historic new capacity within the intelligence community,
because within the Department of Homeland Security there will
be an integration and fusion function that heretofore has not
existed. It will be based upon whether or not that assessment--
there are credible assessments with regard to threats, because
in the same department you will match that up against potential
vulnerabilities. More often than not, private rather than
public. But if you have a credible threat targeted to a
specific sector, to a specific company, to an area, you will be
able to match and take a look at the vulnerabilities that may
exist there, and then, again, in the same department have a
recommendation of prescriptive or protective measures to be
taken in response to the threat based upon the vulnerability.
Let me just say, if I might, that the President believes
very, very strongly that the CIA, which obviously gathers from
time to time information that is relevant to domestic
terrorism, also secures information with regard to terrorism
around the world, also is involved on a daily basis with
securing information with regard to challenges from sovereign
states. Weapon systems, biochemical systems, and the like. So
the portfolio of responsibilities for the CIA far, far exceeds
just the targeting of domestic terrorist information.
The President also believes very strongly that there is a
direct line of authority, the DCI to one person in the
executive branch, and that's directly to the President of the
United States.
The President also believes that the FBI should remain an
integral part of the chief law enforcement agency of this
country, the Attorney General's Office.
But again, by specific legislative language, if the
Congress adopts the President's proposal, you will create a new
capacity of intelligence, integration, fusion, analysis, and
then application. Because the reports and the assessments--the
Phoenix memo would come to the new agency. Prior to this
legislation, the Phoenix memo might have been lost in the
department, in the FBI; but as the language is written with
regard to the President's new Department of Homeland Security,
the Phoenix memo would obviously be shared internally, but also
be a piece of the information, the gathering that the FBI has
done that would be shared with the new Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Ridge. I'm sorry. It's a long-winded answer to a very
appropriate question.
Mr. Greenwood. That's what we are here for.
Mr. Ridge. All right.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Kentucky is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fletcher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Governor, I want to thank you. I know we all have some
questions how this new agency will operate. I think there is
very little question as to your capability of leadership and
the choice that the President has made in you. So I want to say
thank you for your leadership thus far.
As I look over your testimony, and of the three really
mission areas of this new agency, to prevent terrorist attacks,
reduce America's vulnerability, and minimize the damage and
recovery from attacks that do occur, I think I understand a
little more clearly the prevention portion and kind of the
reducing vulnerability. In the minimizing the damage and more
in the response, as I understand it, if there were a major
terrorist attack today, of whatever type it might be that the
roles and responsibilities of the various Federal agencies that
respond to such emergencies are currently well-defined in the
Federal response plan.
Mr. Ridge. Right.
Mr. Fletcher. The FBI would be the lead for the crisis
management portion; FEMA would lead for consequence management;
and, if the attack occurred overseas on foreign soil, then the
State Department would take the lead. And there are various
other scenarios as well where the lead Federal agency may
change.
I think we have all been assured that this seemingly
convoluted system would work and that everyone would understand
the chain of command in it. But under this new plan, let me ask
you, would the new Homeland Security Secretary be the lead
Federal agency for all events, whether criminal or whether of
natural origin, whether domestic or foreign? How would that be
sorted out?
Mr. Ridge. I believe it is the intent of the President that
the unit within the new department dealing with the emergency
preparedness and response become an all-hazard agency, and that
is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Heretofore, it
would be responsible for the consequence management of acts of
nature and potentially even horrific accidentally caused acts,
such as the fires out in Arizona, but under the President's
proposal become the lead agency to respond to both terrorist
incidents and natural incidents as well.
Mr. Fletcher. Well, what--given that, and the FBI--say you
went back to an event like 9/11--of course, the Justice
Department, there is criminal investigations of the Department
of Defense.
Mr. Ridge. Right.
Mr. Fletcher. How would you see as far as the leadership
role of the Secretary of the agency in responding? What roles
would the FBI take? Would they still lead the criminal aspect
and FEMA the natural disaster, if it were a different
situation? And what would the new Secretary's responsibility--
and who would be the lead--who is going to be the boss in some
of these decisions?
Mr. Ridge. First of all, I would share with you that at the
time the disaster occurs, I think the lines are--between law
enforcement and FEMA are very much blurred, because the natural
impulse of the men and women who rush to the scene, whether
they are police, firefighters, emergency medical folks, or
civilian volunteer, are to save as many lives as possible. And
so I think you'll find that the first responders at the scene
as you go about trying to save lives as quickly as possible
will ultimately have the responsibility. That means as soon as
FEMA can get to the scene, they would oversee the response and
recovery effort. That is not to exclude, if the circumstances
warranted, the FBI from the very beginning trying to preserve
whatever evidence there might be at the scene. But as we have
discovered in the two horrific--in the multiple horrific events
around 9/11, the first impulse is to save lives. And that's
exactly what they did. And the information that the FBI has
gleaned isn't so much from the scene of the crime, it's from
other sources as they patch together the profile of the
terrorists and learned what they did and how they did it in
preparation of the 9/11 tragedies.
Again, the anthrax is a little bit different situation
where you really had to have a collaborative effort at the
scene.
So I think it's going to vary from incident to incident.
But at the end of the day, I believe you are going to have--you
need FEMA to be in charge of the response. Mr. Fletcher. Then
the FBI would still maintain control and the lead of the
criminal aspect of it?
Mr. Ridge. Correct.
Mr. Fletcher. FEMA, kind of the first response and the
humanitarian----
Mr. Ridge. Right.
Mr. Fletcher. To make sure to reduce the loss of life, and
recovery.
Mr. Ridge. Correct. Interestingly enough, when I visited
Fort McClellan in Alabama where they are preparing first
responders to get to the scene, they were training the firemen
and the emergency medical technicians and others to be
sensitive, depending on the scene and the kind of incident,
about the necessity of trying to preserve what might be viewed
later as evidence. And, at the same time, they were training
the police, the local police, the State police, the auxiliary
police, how to respond in a more traditional life-saving
capacity.
So there is a sensitivity within the first responder
community to protect each--to support each other in the long-
term--with regard to their long-term duties. But the first
response when people get to that scene is to save lives, not to
gather evidence. But then it sorts itself out down the road.
Mr. Fletcher. And I think, certainly, as this goes along I
think, at least in my mind, it would help to be a little more
clear of, you know, who is going to be in charge of what,
who's--because one of the problems you have in management is
always if you have two or more bosses, it makes it very
difficult where the responsibility lies in a lot of these
issues.
Mr. Ridge. Clearly, the law enforcement function related to
a terrorist incident, the investigation, the follow-on would
vest in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I mean, hopefully,
there is no confusion there. Where there is confusion from time
to time is who is in charge as soon as the incident occurs. And
the experience that America witnessed and participated in on 9/
11, people didn't pay any attention to the authority given to
them by virtue of the badges, whether it was law enforcement or
first responder. The first impulse is, let's go in and save
lives. Then you have a very appropriate delineation of
responsibilities. But the investigative, the law enforcement
side of this still belongs to the FBI.
Mr. Fletcher. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, Governor Ridge, I want to pick up on a theme
you referred to earlier, that our homeland is secure when the
hometown is secure, going back to that local system and systems
in place.
I want to concentrate, if I could, on the Center for
Disease Control, the CDC, and how that affects our local
communities. In the third panel, a representative from the GAO,
Janet Heinrich, has made a couple of statements that I want to
bring into this and give you a chance to respond to her.
She is expressing ``concerns about the proposed transfer of
control from HHS, to the new Department for Public Health
Assistance programs that have both basic public health and
homeland security functions.'' And she says ``these dual-
purpose programs have important synergies that we believe
should be maintained.'' And she expresses concern ``that
transferring control over these programs, including priority
setting to the new department, has the potential to disrupt
some programs that are critical to basic public health
responsibilities. We do not believe''--these are her words--
``that the President's proposal is sufficiently clear on how
both the homeland security and public health objectives would
be accomplished.''
And, if I could, again, I was privileged to visit with
Congressman Deutsch the Center for Disease Control site not
long after 9/11, and to see that CDC was stretched beyond
capacity before that date and now have so many additional
responsibilities. And acknowledging that when I, in my years of
being a school nurse, relied on them very directly for help
with ongoing epidemics and issues of, for example ``is there
enough flu vaccine on hand?'' These are the questions that my
first responders are asking me. And so can you describe and
will you describe how these fears can be allayed?
Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, again, you and your
colleagues have raised a very important question with regard to
the distinction between homeland security, related research and
activities of the CDC, and the traditional public health work
of the CDC. And we believe there is a very distinct care line
here where the Department of Homeland Security would be
involved in those issues that had primary--not necessarily
exclusive, but primary homeland security dimension. That's not
to say that the CDC would not continue to deal with public
health issues, maternity care, child care, immunizations. I
mean, are they going to continue to have the same programs they
have working with the States and the localities on a variety of
public health issues, continue to have the programs dealing
with the restoration of some of the public health
infrastructure, continue to have money for research-related
issues of cancer and smoking and things of that sort?
Mrs. Capps. Right.
Mr. Ridge. So I think--I think there is a distinguishable
line now. And if we need to further clarify that with language
in the legislation, we certainly want to entertain that. But
it's also, I think, very important to note that the legislation
specifically calls for the two Secretaries to establish the
kind of relationship so that both can take advantage of the
dual-use infrastructure that has been built up through the
extraordinary work of the Health and Human Services and the CDC
over the past decades.
Mrs. Capps. Let me thank you, and--but push this even
further.
Mr. Ridge. Sure.
Mrs. Capps. Because we can talk about charts and flow
charts, but it really becomes clear when you talk about
dollars. And CDC, many would say, including me, was underfunded
before 9/11. How will the dollars flow to do those basic
activities?
And let me add on to that an additional challenge that we
have faced here in our House subcommittee, what some would
say--at least from where I sit in California--a crisis of
health care delivery. And the upper payment limit cuts to the
State of California, for example, will take $300 million from
our public health safety net hospitals. That's going to be
difficult if there is no bioterrorism attack. That's going to
be a real hardship on a State like ours. And those institutions
are exactly where people go when they--when the flu epidemics
hit and when if, God forbid, there is a bioterrorist attack.
That's exactly where people will go.
If we continue to cut resources to these programs, these
hospitals, how can we add on another layer of preparedness?
Mr. Ridge. Well, I tell you, I think you raise a question
that under a new configuration of the executive branch would be
appropriately raised with both the new Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The
point being is that there will be an identifiable money stream
with regard to specific programs that I think that can be
identified and can be identified today. Over the years,
obviously the Congress of the United States will have
opportunity to increase dollars, whether it's through homeland
security for those issues and that research relating more
particularly to weapons of mass destruction, bioterrorism,
chemical attacks and the like, but also work with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to bolster and fund programs
related strictly to public health.
I mean, so many of these programs--and again, that will be
a balancing act that will require the best efforts of both the
executive branch, but working in collaboration with the
Congress of the United States that ultimately has the
constitutional responsibility and authority to appropriate the
monies. So you'll help create that balance.
Mrs. Capps. Well, I know my time is up. But, you know, the
President has said there are no additional dollars for this
effort; and we are saying there weren't enough in the
beginning. What shall we do now?
Mr. Ridge. Well, there are--for the--for 2003, as we ramp
up the new Department of Homeland Security, the President has
spoken, recognizing what he has in the 2003 budget, which
includes about a $14 billion increase for homeland security
initiatives over the 2002 budget. What happens in the 2004 and
beyond again will depend upon the interaction and the
priorities set collectively between the Congress of the United
States and the President.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and
recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gillmor.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Governor, one of the things I wanted to inquire about
was in the bioterrorism bill, which we just completed, we
provided for drinking water systems' vulnerability assessments
and recommendations for action be done by EPA. Now under the
proposed bill we have, it's my understanding that would take
that authority out of EPA and put it under the new department.
I guess the question is, does it make a lot of difference? Is
it something that you feel really is an improvement in homeland
security, or would it just as well be left with EPA where there
is at least some body of expertise?
Mr. Ridge. It would be our hope that the President's
initiative could be embraced to include pulling that into the
Department of Homeland Security because of the vulnerability
assessment requirements that will be imposed upon the new
department. If it's the congressional will to keep it at the
EPA and mandate that that information be shared and become part
of the infrastructure, the information infrastructure upon
which the Department of Homeland Security operates, so be it.
But it's just a feeling that we--in this new department, we
have got, remember, the threat assessment matched against the
vulnerabilities. And clearly, the water system, the energy
systems, telecommunications, utilities, financial systems and
the like are part of our critical infrastructure. So it was
consistent with the President's belief that we ought to have
that information-gathering capacity with regard to critical
infrastructure within this department.
Mr. Gillmor. I wasn't strongly suggesting that it stay with
EPA; I was just trying to feel you out on where you were coming
on that.
Mr. Ridge. We think it would be better to put all this
within this--this assessment within the new department.
Mr. Gillmor. In title 3, the President proposes to transfer
certain R&D programs from DOE to the new Secretary. And mostly
those are the ones dealing with development of detectors or
sensors for nuclear, bio, and chemical agencies.
Now, most of the research is done by DOE's laboratories,
which are public and private entities under control of DOE. The
labs conduct such research, however, not just for DOD; they do
similar research under the work for other programs where the
CIA, FBI, State, and the Secret Service can also request their
own work.
Now, while it seems to make sense to have a single agency
coordinating and prioritizing all the research, I'm not sure
that the proposal does that since it only transfers the DOE
programs and doesn't touch the rest of them.So why just
transfer the DOE programs? Why not also transfer the work for
other programs at the labs? Is that an oversight, or is there a
reason for that?
Mr. Ridge. I think we focused, Congressman, on the programs
within the Department of Energy because of the very specific
focus they have at the national labs and the expertise they
have developed. But particularly, the Chem-Bio National
Security Program where they have as their mission the
development, the demonstration, and delivery of technologies
and systems that will help this country prepare for, prevent,
and respond to a terrorist attack. And they have been--this is
work that they have been doing for years. It deals with bio and
chem detectors, it deals with modeling capabilities to predict
the effects of a chemical-bio attack. And again, in
consultation with the Department of Energy, as we try to pull
into the new Department of Homeland Security those programs, if
not exclusively, then at least primarily deal with securing the
homeland, this was very appropriate.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Governor Ridge, for your testimony.
I have been listening carefully, and agree with your testimony
and with your answers to questions.
I would like to associate myself with the comments of our
Chairman about the urgency of the threat and the fact that it
is among us right now. And that prompts me to talk about the
urgency I believe there is, not just to pass this legislation,
but to implement certain changes which we could do this minute
and not even wait for the legislation. One of them is
information-sharing across the Federal Government and between
the Federal Government and local first responders.
As you know, Governor, H.R. 4598, a bill that Saxby
Chambliss and I introduced some months back, has now been
reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and also has the
unanimous support of the House Intelligence Committee, and is
ripe for action on the House floor. I would like to thank you
for your help in fashioning this legislation, and just mention
to my colleagues that this is a way to share information now,
stripping out sources and methods so that those without
security clearances can receive it. It would cover the FBI, the
CIA, and all those agencies not in this new department, and
would get their information down to first responders who
desperately need to understand better what our threats are. So,
thank you for your help with this. That's one thing we can do
now.
The other thing we can do now, I think, relates to
interoperability. When Saxby Chambliss and I visited your
excellent emergency facilities some weeks back, at your
invitation, we saw state-of-the-art technology that you have
been putting together. There is still an enormous amount of
work down the road, and we all agree about hooking in private
sector, cutting-edge technology into this new department. But
meanwhile, there exists now integrating devices that can bring
together the different frequencies and different handheld
communication devices in an emergency. This would create
interoperability, which we absolutely need for first responders
from different police and fire and EMT agencies to come
together at the scene of a terrorist attack in somebody's
hometown. As you point out, all terrorist attacks are local.
There is a device called the ACU-1000, which is built in
North Carolina, and which many communities are using. Its
problem is that it is too small to handle the requirements of
large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles County. Yesterday, in
front of this building I saw in a van a technology developed by
a large aerospace company that wraps this ACU-1000, a technical
term meaning adds to it, and can connect five or more vans to
cover the frequencies that an entire metropolitan area might
need to use in an emergency.
Example: L.A. County has 88 cities, 55 police departments,
33 fire departments. It could, they allege, cover L.A. County.
My question to you is, how do we get to these bridging
technologies--they may not be the perfect answer, but they sure
are better than where we are--now? How do we make things like
this happen right now, even before this department is up and
running? Because, as our Chairman points out, these terrorists
are among us and could attack us in 20 minutes from now.
Mr. Ridge. First of all, Congresswoman, I think your point
about bridging technologies and systems integration now, as we
develop even more robust technologies and better systems down
the road, is very appropriate, because I think it will take
us--once we determine what our mission is and how we are going
to achieve our goals, I think we can have the technology
overlay, but we still have to work out some of these--some of
these matters before we take advantage of the entrepreneurial
nature of this country and our extraordinary technology sector.
I would suggest that there are a couple of things that we
have done and we can do. One, our Office of Homeland Security
has been working with the President's Office of Science and
Technology Policy. And my recommendation would be that we take
a look at the technology application that you have just
discussed, make it available to this--to these groups, and have
them give us an assessment as to the impact on particularly
urban communication systems where there remains a huge gap.
Obviously, we need interoperable communications, we need a
bridging system now. Down the road, we hope to have a unified
system not only within urban America, but within the country.
The second thing I would recommend, and I say this with
enormous respect, the $3.5 billion first responder money is
sitting in the 2003 budget. So, as Congress sets its priorities
in dealing with the budget proposal in 2003, if we could make
the homeland security portion, or many of those portions,
available to local communities as quickly as possible, once
there is a stamp of approval, once there is an imprimatur on
pieces of equipment like this that it does the job it claims it
can do, then we'll be in a position to buy these technologies
immediately.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. My time is up.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to note--it is going to 10
seconds--that at our Conference on Technology and Terrorism
last week, Dr. Marburger was there from the Office of Science
and Technology Policy. He was talking in terms of this whole
effort coming on line in 2004.
I think this effort is on line this minute, and bridging
technologies, as you have just said, are the answer; and I
would hope you would encourage him to be thinking with a little
more urgency of the need to tap these various technologies in
our country to confront the various terrorists in our country
now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Governor Ridge.
Mr. Burr [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair will recognize himself at this time. Let me welcome
you and apologize--I was not here for opening statements--but
also say that I am supportive of the President's proposal.
There are a number of areas of the bioterrorism bill that we
took a tremendous amount of time in trying to integrate. Where
we knew there were strengths in agencies, we tried to beef up
those strengths; where there were weaknesses, we tried to
compensate, through the legislation, to make sure that the
tools and resources were there for that in fact to be a
success.
And I think that many of those areas, as we anticipated,
would be encompassed in the new homeland security agency; and I
think, in most cases, we are very supportive of that. My
questions are going to deal more with the areas where not 100
percent of the responsibility of that area that we saw, where
it might have been weak to start with, is shifting over and
whether we thought through exactly the consequences of stealing
half the responsibility and leaving the other half.
The new department is a security entity first and foremost.
Tasking it with the disaster mitigation and response and to a
certain extent research and development might distract from the
security responsibilities that homeland security has.
Do you have any reservations about the pieces that you pick
up that deal with research and development and mitigation of
disaster response?
Mr. Ridge. I believe the President's proposal tries to
encompass the broadest range of homeland security matters under
one agency, and that is from prevention and detection through
preparation and response. And it is for that reason that you
see the--this is a multitasked agency, and it covers the full
spectrum of activities that would be appropriately associated
with securing our homeland.
And I think, in time, the integration of these different
responsibilities--the establishment of a strategic plan dealing
with research and development clearly has implications for the
new analytical unit potentially, for the border aggregation
clearly, and for the preparedness and response. So I think you
can see that if you take a look at the different units, they
are not really stovepiped. At the end of time, there is really
a relationship among all of them.
Mr. Burr. We looked very closely at things like that, the
national medical response teams that we had. We tried to
explore why they weren't more effective, that they are very
crucial to our entity today; and I think through our efforts on
bioterrorism, we felt there was a need to create an assistant
secretary at HHS to sort of shepherd those areas. Now we sort
of shift those responsibilities.
I guess my question is, do you still think there are enough
areas at HHS that we need that assistant secretary there, or
can you envision the need, whether it is HHS or other agencies,
where you have pulled in jurisdiction and responsibilities, do
you need an assistant secretary there as a liaison for homeland
security?
Mr. Ridge. I know the committee was very concerned about
creating that capacity within Health and Human Services, and I
would leave it to your good judgment to determine whether or
not you would want to create another one to work as a liaison.
Clearly, given the dual nature of the infrastructure that both
a Department of Homeland Security and HHS would be using;
clearly, given the benefit of many of the research dollars and
the need for communication and coordination, I am going to
leave that to your best judgment as to whether or not you think
it would enhance that collaborative effort to create a similar
position now in HHS as we bring this position over to the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Burr. Clearly, there are areas--I think section 905 of
the President's proposal, and 906, deal with pharmaceutical
stockpiles and select agent registration. Select agent
registration was something that in the last administration was
by default handed over to CDC because we found we didn't have a
successful means to keep up with it.
I am a little bit concerned. We all believe there needs to
be a list that is kept, one that the appropriate people have
access to, one that we don't question its accuracy.
The difficulty that exists is that CDC seems to still be
responsible for allowing these agents out for the purposes of
research, but there is the problem of making sure that, in
fact, that information gets from CDC to Homeland Security
where, in fact, the registration of where that product has gone
would have to be.
Do you have any concerns about that?
Mr. Ridge. I think, for security reasons, the select agent
list must be--should be part of the Homeland Security function
and any regulations attendant to the preservation and
maintenance of that list. But CDC continues to have that public
health responsibility and would continue to do the research on
these pathogens and continue to oversee the work done, whether
it is done at CDC or elsewhere in conjunction with the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Burr. I truly do not raise it as a criticism, but there
is a link where we are almost relying on the system we had 5
years ago of somebody making a notification to another agency
when the decision is made to let one of the pathogens go out
for research purposes. And I know we were all faced with a
shocking reality when the anthrax scare came, and we tried to
track down how many places might have had anthrax under
research.
Mr. Ridge. And we weren't sure.
Mr. Burr. Title VII of the bill deals with the coordination
with non-Federal entities, the IG and the Secret Service. My
only concern in section 701, which requires the secretary to
direct and supervise grant programs of the Federal Government
for State and local emergency response providers. And it is not
a lack of confidence in Homeland Security to make those grants.
I guess the question that I would have, how much input will
the agencies that currently have that responsibility have,
since a lot of the grant, a lot of the research, a lot of the
programs that the grant money will be for might still be the
responsibility of the other agency.
Mr. Ridge. If I might, Congressman, give you a good
example, the folks at the local level generally would like to
go to one Federal agency to get emergency preparedness and
response grants. They also recognize that they take many forms.
There is a bioterrorism response initiative that HHS has. There
is an Office of Domestic Preparedness that actually has even
more dimensions, but that is in the Department of Justice. And
then, obviously, FEMA.
What I think is proposed under this legislation is, one,
that we have by statute continued the collaboration with Health
and Human Services so when these dollars go out they do go out
in collaboration with Health and Human Services as it relates
to the bioterrorism prevention and public health prevention.
Two, the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the Department
of Justice where it is envisioned that that entire operation
would become a more robust and more muscular agency that FEMA
becomes when they have responsibility for in excess of $3
billion under the President's 2003 budget. And then clearly
FEMA has been reaching out over the past several months working
with States and local communities trying to work with them to
set up a framework through which these multiple grants can be
issued. So FEMA has also undertaken as part of its longer term
goal the establishment of the kind of relationship they need
with the States and the local communities to help frame the
issuance of these grants.
The goal here is to buildup a national capacity of some
sort around the country. Obviously, it will not be done in a
year. Congresswoman Harman pointed out the need for
interoperability of communications. My sense, in talking to
FEMA and a lot of other people is, that may be the No. 1
priority. If you're going to save lives, it is predicated on
time. The best way you minimize time is better communication;
and unfortunately, we don't have integrated communications
systems in too many places in this country.
Having said that, FEMA is working with State and local
governments to develop these plans. And what we are, what the
President is hopeful of as it relates to the 2003 budget--and I
know I am going off just a bit, but I say this to members who
will be appropriating the dollars--is that the moneys that
would be issued, not just in 2003, but in future years as we
buildup a capacity to respond to terrorist activity, that we
build it up consistent with plans that begin at the local level
and then take it to the regional level and move up to the
State, that we begin to develop a capacity around mutual aid
packs, a capacity built on standards that are designed after
consultation within the departments and agencies that are also
designed based on threat assessments and vulnerabilities.
So we still have a lot of work to do. And the purpose of
the President's integration of all these agencies is to give
some strategic focus not only to the efforts of the men and
women that have been providing homeland security services for
this country for a long time, but also give strategic focus to
the dollars and technology and the kinds of equipment that we
provide to this country to prepare for a potential response to
a terrorist act.
Mr. Burr. Governor, thank you. My time has expired.
One more time I want to commend you personally for the job
that you have done. You were asked to step in at a--I can't
think of a more difficult time to take on a task that was then
undefined and not understood. You were asked to do it with a
limited group of people, and I think that you have done an
extraordinary job. My hope is that as we take up this
legislation and, hopefully, pass it in an expedited way that
you, like we, remember that we can do things of this magnitude
without growing bureaucracies that are bigger than the last
one.
And I know that the President's legislation chooses a
secretary and a deputy and five under secretaries and no more
than six assistant secretaries, but there is room for an
additional 10 assistant secretaries. My hope is you will always
think smaller from the standpoint of the internal structure up
here and, in fact, remember what I think you learned very early
on, that most of the intelligent folks and the best ideas
happen in the localities around the country that are ultimately
the ones that we need to communicate with in real time, so less
emphasis is spent up here and more around the country.
The Chair would recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Markey, for questions.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Governor Ridge, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Departments of Energy and Defense have historically had
jurisdiction over nuclear facilities whether they be civilian
or government. And they have had the responsibility for
constructing the design basis threat against which each of
these facilities has to be protected, and they also have
responsibility for conducting the force-on-force test against
those facilities.
Now, in the overriding--in the legislation you have sent up
it says that this new department will have primary
responsibility for infrastructure protection. And so the
question is, what does that mean in terms of the agency, yours
or the NRC or the Department of Energy or Defense that will
have primary responsibility over the security around nuclear
facilities once the legislation is passed?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, I believe that your question
highlights a characteristic of homeland security that can't be
underscored enough, and that is the continuing need for
intergovernmental and interdepartmental communication and
coordination. It is a point you make very effectively. DOD and
DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have multiple
responsibilities with regard to the security of our nuclear
facilities whether they be power plants or storage systems for
nuclear weapons. That will continue to be the case.
However, this new department, working particularly with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the design threat assessment
as it relates to the potential vulnerabilities that exist, will
play a very important role as we go about matching threats
against vulnerabilities and taking prescriptive actions.
Mr. Markey. So, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission 9 months after September 11 have refused to begin a
new design basis threat rulemaking, even though we know it
moved from nonsuicidal, nontechnically sophisticated handfuls
of terrorists that had to be protected against before September
11 to something which is suicidal, technically sophisticated,
heavily armed and large numbers.
Would, under the new system, the Office of Homeland
Security have responsibility for ordering the design basis
threat regulation to be upgraded, or would that still remain
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Who would have the
ultimate authority, the NRC or the Office of Homeland Security?
Mr. Ridge. Ultimately, Congressman, if the Department of
Homeland Security felt that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
hadn't moved either quickly enough or effectively enough vis-a-
vis the threat you are talking about, one would hope that the
new Cabinet Secretary, in conjunction with the chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can resolve that.
Clearly, the President has said that he seeks to retain as
part of the White House apparatus the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security that has been tasked with
coordinating that activity and resolving differences of
opinion. But if there is a difference of opinion finally, you
get one tie breaker, and that is the President of the United
States.
Mr. Markey. The tie breaker is the President. The tie
breaker is not whoever heads up the Office of Homeland
Security?
Mr. Ridge. I think the new Secretary of Homeland Security
is going to be empowered with enormous authority and
responsibility to deal with vulnerability assessments.
Mr. Markey. I guess all I am saying is, if you identify a
flaw in the security at Livermore or at Diablo Canyon and you
go to the NRC or the Department of Energy and you say, upgrade,
they say, no, we are not going to upgrade, we are not going to
go to a new system, you are saying that the head of the Office
of Homeland Security can't say, upgrade.
Then it goes to the President to resolve the dispute
between the two offices?
Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I think it is important that
we always play out the worst case scenario. And my judgment,
Congressman, is that if the vulnerability assessment is
significant, we won't have any difficulty getting the
cooperation.
But if you want to go to the worst case scenario----
Mr. Markey. Yes.
Mr. Ridge. [continuing] the matter would--since the assets
themselves--none of the national labs are part of the
infrastructure of the Department of Homeland Security.
You talked about having problems at--the national lab at
Livermore or Los Alamos does not have direct command and
control over those entities. The first responsibility is to
identify the vulnerability, convince them of the vulnerability
and get them to do something about the vulnerability. If there
remains a conflict, it would be resolved presumably within
the--by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
There is a coordinating function, and that function remains
within the White House.
Mr. Markey. That would be someone on the President's staff
that would resolve it?
Mr. Ridge. Assistant to the President.
Mr. Markey. That is the job to get then.
Mr. Ridge. It's a pretty good job. It is the one I have
right now. You are addressed with a great deal of authority.
Mr. Markey. When you----
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Markey. Could I have 1 more minute?
Mr. Greenwood. Unanimous consent, the gentleman is granted
an additional minute.
Mr. Markey. When you say, presumably the person on the
President staff will then break the tie between the Office of
Homeland Security and the NRC or the DOE, is that going to be
written into the statute?
Mr. Ridge. It is a function of the executive order signed
by the President of the United States creating the office on
October 8.
I am going to say the other leverage that you have on any
department or agency changing its direction or focus is also,
the Congress of the United States would have to be--could be a
potential partner in that enterprise as well. But if we are--as
we've said before, this is an enterprise within which we are
all engaged, and I guess I can imagine a worst case scenario,
and I guess we have to plan for it, but I think it is very
unlikely.
Mr. Markey. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being
here.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Governor, for coming here. This must be a very interesting time
in your life and certainly one of the most important issues
that this Congress will deal with.
I have a question having to deal with DOE's nuclear
emergency support teams, the NEST teams. I served on the
Intelligence Committee, and we had some involvement with this
issue in prior years.
Now, it is my understanding that the President's proposal
transfers the control of DOE's nuclear response teams to the
new Secretary in the event of an attack or emergency, and also
gives the new Secretary the authority to set standards for
DOE's group, as well as conduct training and exercises for
these teams. But as I understand it, these DOE teams also
always--almost always work in concert with DOD, and usually
conduct joint exercises with DOD, FBI, State and other
agencies, and that is because of their responsibility to deal
with more than just a nuclear issue.
Will the new Secretary coordinate the exercises and
training of all of these interagency components or just the
DOE, Department of Energy, portion?
Mr. Ridge. I believe it is envisioned from time to time
that we would want to deploy all of these agencies in a
realistic drill or exercise. So depending on the circumstances
and the nature of the drill, Congressman, it could very well
oversee an exercise involving all those agencies and serving in
a coordinating function.
Mr. Bass. Okay. That is good.
I also understand that DOE's radiological assistance teams,
which are spread out regionally throughout the country, are
currently authorized to respond to requests from State and
local officials for assistance and need not wait until the
Secretary of Energy formally calls them into action.
Will the President's proposal change that requiring action
by the new Secretary before these teams can be deployed for any
reason?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, in that change in the--I cannot
give you a specific answer to the change in the historical
relationship. I will get back to you on that. That is the way
they used to be deployed. I think there is a lot to be said for
maintaining that kind of a relationship, but I will have to get
back to you for a specific answer.
Mr. Bass. I appreciate that and I yield back to the
chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ridge, in your own home State of Pennsylvania, a
newspaper reporter for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review conducted
an investigation to determine how vulnerable chemical
facilities were to terrorists after September 11; and I don't
know if this article came to your attention, but it is pretty
shocking. According to that article, which was published on
April 7, the security was so lax at 30 sites that in broad
daylight a Trib reporter wearing a press pass and carrying a
camera could walk or drive right up to tanks, pipes and control
rooms considered key targets for terrorists. And I want to read
to you specifically what they found.
``Absent dilapidated or unfinished fence lines or
carelessly opened gates allowed access to 18 sites. Inside the
sites no one stopped the reporter from going wherever he
wanted, even into control rooms and up to tanks and train
switching and derailing levers. No security at the potentially
deadliest plants of the 123 plants nationwide that individually
could endanger more than a million people; two are in western
Pennsylvania. The reporter spent more than an hour walking
through each without encountering a guard or an employee.''
Now, I wrote to the President on this issue on September
26, 2001, asking him to use just $7 million out of the $40
billion of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
recovery and response to terrorist attacks to examine the
vulnerability of these facilities to attack. Congress required
these vulnerability assessments to be completed by this August,
yet apparently the administration has not even begun them.
I am also concerned the administration has failed to make
any proposal to address these significant risks. Does the
administration support Congress, requiring decisive action to
address these risks, and if so, why isn't it in your proposal?
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, your reference to that--the
critical infrastructure and the potentially devastating
consequences associated with the terrorist attack on chemical
facilities is something that the Office of Homeland Security
has been focused on and clearly will become a priority of the
new Department of Homeland Security. And I think, clearly, that
not only this President, but previous Presidents have called
on, and I believe the Congress of the United States has called
on, the private sector and others to do a--perform critical
infrastructure assessments and then take action to deal with
the vulnerabilities.
Obviously, the pace of the change within some sectors of
the economy and within some companies hasn't been what you or I
or most Americans would like.
At the end of the day, when you have a Department of
Homeland Security, Congressman, whose responsibility is to
match threats with vulnerabilities and to work with other
agencies within the Federal Government to harden these targets
that are owned by the private sector, I think that will
certainly accelerate the changes that are needed. And until
such time, we continue to--the administration continues to work
with all industry sectors to identify vulnerabilities and get
them committed to taking action.
I refer to a conversation that I had with some folks with
regard to these vulnerabilities across the board in various
sectors. And I think one of the ways, Congressman, that we can
make sure that those chemical facilities or some of these other
facilities in your neighborhood and my neighborhood, your State
or mine, everybody else's, is up to the standard that we seek
is to have our first responders in those communities visit and
work with those companies to make sure that the standards are
met, because these are the men and women who are going to have
to show up if these facilities are attacked.
Mr. Waxman. With all due respect, you just said we want
this new department to be sure to do this job, we want the
cooperation in the private sector to run these plants to be
sure they're doing the job, and then we want the first
responders to be doing the job. But you have been head of the
Office of Homeland Security, and one of the mandates from
Congress was to look at these vulnerabilities and do something
about them.
So does it strike you that maybe I am hearing you just
point your finger at everybody else, but not taking
responsibility for getting this done?
Mr. Ridge. Oh, no. I wouldn't want you to interpret it that
way. I suspect that there has been sufficient follow-up by
Congress, and I would assure you there has been sufficient
follow-up within the Office of Homeland Security.
As part of the President's directive to our office, we were
to--in the designing of a national strategy, we were to work
with both the public and the private sector to do a critical
infrastructure vulnerability assessment. That process is an
ongoing process. It is something that needed to be done for a
long, long time, and we are in the process of doing that, and
that will be part of the national strategy that we will present
to the President and to the Congress and to the public in the
next several weeks.
Mr. Waxman. Just one last short question. Was I incorrect
when I said this was required to have been completed by August,
but the administration has not even begun the assessment of the
risk at these facilities?
Mr. Ridge. The administration began that some time ago. It
has been a work in progress within the Office of Homeland
Security; and my recollection of the executive order creating
our office, there was no specific timetable. We created our
internal timetable and are trying to get most of it done before
we submit the strategy to the President, to the Congress and
the people sometime in July. But you can----
Mr. Waxman. What is your own internal deadline?
Mr. Ridge. We have said we are going to get the strategy to
the President for his eyes by the 1st of July, mid-July. We are
working on it.
Mr. Waxman. That is a strategy, but there is a
vulnerability.
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, the enormity of that task, we don't
shy away from it in any manner, shape or form. But this is a
process that I believe Congress has been and probably will be
working on years and years as well. We have taken advantage of
some of the work that Congress has done, but our own internal
work started several months ago. It will need a few more months
to be completed to give you the kind of specificity that I
think you are looking for.
But we are doing our job, and when Congress completes its
work and when the other agencies complete that work, I think we
are going to have a pretty good system of determining where the
vulnerabilities are and working together to come up with the
means to harden those targets and reduce the vulnerability.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Waxman. But assessments required by Congress are to be
completed by August 2002?
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair would note that the mandate from Congress to do the
vulnerability assessment of the chemical facilities was passed
in 1999, and it was the Clinton Administration that did nothing
subsequent to that.
The Chair thanks the Governor for your presence with us and
for your testimony and for your guidance.
Mr. Waxman. That is a little cheap, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair has the floor and the gentleman
may or may not be recognized in the future.
The Chair notes, Governor, that you are thanked for your
service many times a day for good reason because you have given
us such a sense of confidence.
But I would like to take the opportunity, as your friend,
to thank your wife, Michelle, to thank your daughter, Leslie,
and your son, Tommy. I know that after 10 years or so in the
Congress, 8 years as Governor of Pennsylvania, they were
probably and you were probably expecting to take off the mantle
of responsibility and hang it up in the home cabinet for
awhile. And I know it is only because of the dire circumstances
that we faced and your sense of duty to your country that you
put that mantle--and a large mantle it is--back on your broad
shoulders, and we thank you for that. And we want to thank your
family for the sacrifices they make every day in letting you do
this job. Thank you. Thank you very much.
The Chair then calls forward the second panel consisting of
the Honorable Claude Allen, Deputy Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services, as well as General John Gordon,
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Gentlemen, welcome. We thank you for being with us this
morning. Thank you for your forbearance. Let me begin by saying
that I believe you are aware that the committee is holding an
investigative hearing and, when doing so, has had the practice
of taking testimony under oath.
Do either of you have any objection of giving testimony
under oath?
Chair then advises, under the Rules of the House and the
rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by
counsel. Do either of you care to be advised by counsel?
Seeing negative responses, the Chair would ask that you
rise and raise your right hand, and I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you; you are under oath. And, Mr.
Allen, I believe we will begin with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAUDE A. ALLEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; AND JOHN A. GORDON,
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the proposed Department of Homeland Security and how it will
interface with the Department of Health and Human Services.
Secretary Thompson and I support strongly the initiative that
the President announced earlier this month and feel that this
is the best direction for the Nation to move in order to ensure
our homeland security.
The threat of terrorism has become a part of our daily
lives since September 11, and this new Department of Homeland
Security will enable us to make significant advances in
protecting the American public from terrorism. We are pleased
that the Congress is giving the President's proposal such
prompt and thorough review and attention. And Secretary
Thompson and I look forward to working with you to ensure the
passage of this important legislation.
The President's proposal will transfer several terrorism-
related activities that are housed currently within HHS to the
new Department of Homeland Security. Homeland security will
assume responsibility also for setting goals and providing
strategic direction for other relevant public health and
medical activities, but will rely upon HHS to implement and
operate them on a day-to-day basis. First, I want to talk with
you about the activities that will go to homeland security.
Those areas include the Select Agent registration enforcement
program, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public
Health Emergency Preparedness and the Strategic National
Stockpile.
Right now, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
regulates the transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and
toxins commonly referred to as ``Select Agents'' from one
registered facility to another. These agents, such as the
bacterium that caused anthrax, the bacterium that causes
Plague, and the viruses that causes Ebola are used widely in
the research laboratories across America. These Select Agents
are prime examples and candidates for use by would-be
bioterrorists, so when they are used in research, they must be
kept under constantly safe and secure conditions.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate and to
enforce regulations concerning the possession and use of Select
Agents as well as their transfer. While CDC has done its best
to manage the Select Agent program, CDC is a public health
agency and not a regulatory body. Therefore, we believe that
the new department is better suited to prevent Select Agents
from falling into the wrong hands.
HHS will be prepared to provide homeland security with
whatever scientific expertise and other technical expertise
they may need to manage the program. In fact, under the
administration bill, the Secretary of Homeland Security would
administer the Select Agents program in consultation with the
HHS Secretary, and HHS would continue to make key medical and
scientific decisions, such as which biological agents should be
included in the Select Agent list.
Let me talk about the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Health and Emergency Preparedness. The Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
also created the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Health Emergency Preparedness. The responsibilities of
this new office include the supervision of the Office of
Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System
and the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, as well as
related HHS emergency management functions. By having this
office within the Department of Homeland Security, we will have
a seamless integration of our national public health and
medical emergency management assets with the Nation's new
preparedness and response infrastructure.
Third, the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which
currently CDC manages: The stockpile consists of 12 ``push
packages'' of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and
equipment which are located strategically across the United
States, and additional lots of pharmaceuticals and caches of
medical materiel are maintained also by manufacturers under
special contractual arrangements.
The Secretary and I are proud of the job that CDC has done
in managing our Strategic National Stockpile, which was
evidenced in our ability to get a push package into New York
City on September 11. This fine work has set the stage for
smooth integration of the stockpile with our other national
emergency preparedness and response assets within Homeland
Security.
The Secretary of Homeland Security will assume
responsibility for continued development, maintenance and
deployment of the National Stockpile, while the HHS Secretary
will continue to determine its contents. This arrangement will
ensure effective blending of our public health expertise with
the logistical and emergency management expertise of Homeland
Security.
With the strong integration and cooperation that exists
between HHS and Homeland Security, two functions of the new
department will be carried out by HHS unless otherwise directed
by the President. The first is Homeland Security's civilian
human health-related biological, biomedical and infectious
disease defense research and development work.
We recognize the expertise, successful track record and
unique capabilities of the National Institutes of Health and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Secretary
of Homeland Security, in consultation with the HHS Secretary,
shall have the authority to establish the research and
development program that will be implemented through HHS. This
means that Homeland Security will provide strategic direction
regarding the Nation's biological and biomedical countermeasure
research priorities.
Certain public health-related activities will also be
directed by Homeland Security and carried out through HHS. This
would include activities like enhancing the bioterrorism
preparedness of State and local governments and non-Federal
public and private health care facilities and providers. The
object of this provision is to continue the important role that
CDC plays, that the Health Resources and Service Administration
plays and other elements of HHS play in assisting States and
local governments and the hospitals and public health community
in preparing for and responding to large-scale public health
emergencies.
As with the research program, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with HHS Secretary, will have the
authority to establish the Nation's antiterrorism preparedness
and response program. But the implementation of the public
health components of that program will be carried out largely
through HHS.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, our Nation needs a
Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary and I strongly
support the President's proposal and look forward to doing
whatever is necessary to effect a smooth and swift transition
of responsibilities and operations. We believe that the
President's proposal strikes the right balance by playing to
the strength of HHS and recognizing this agency's core mission
that is the protection of the Nation's public health, while
capitalizing on the strategic and logistical strength of the
new Homeland Security. We will ensure that HHS fulfills its
obligation to the new department and provides that whatever
public health, medical and scientific expertise it may require.
At this time, I would be happy to answer any questions that
the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Claude A. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Claude A. Allen, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Health and Human Services
Thank you, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee for giving me
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the proposed
Department of Homeland Security. Secretary Thompson and I strongly
support the reorganization initiative that the President announced
earlier this month.
The threat of terrorism in its myriad forms has become an ever-
present part of our daily lives. The new Department will enable us to
make further significant advances in protecting the American people
from those who are bent upon inflicting death, destruction, and social
disorder to achieve their ideological ends. We are pleased that the
Congress is giving the President's proposal prompt and thorough
attention. Secretary Thompson and I look forward to working with this
and other Committees to ensure passage of the legislation for the new
Department.
The President's proposal deals with certain terrorism-related
activities that currently are the responsibility of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). Some of these HHS activities would be
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For other
relevant public health and medical activities, DHS would assume
responsibility for setting goals and providing strategic direction but
would rely upon HHS to implement and operate the activities on a day-
to-day basis.
I will discuss examples from each group of activities in turn.
examples of activities proposed for transfer from hhs to dhs
HHS functions conveyed to the new Department in the President's
proposal include:
<bullet> The Select Agent registration enforcement program;
<bullet> The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness; and
<bullet> The Strategic National Stockpile.
Select Agent Registration Program
Within HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
currently regulates the transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and
toxins--commonly referred to as ``Select Agents''--from one registered
facility to another. These agents are widely used in research
laboratories across America. Examples are the bacterium that causes
anthrax, the bacterium that causes Plague, and the virus that causes
Ebola, a lethal hemorrhagic fever. Select Agents are prime candidates
for use by would-be bioterrorists and thus, when used in research, must
be kept constantly under safe and secure conditions.
The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate and
enforce regulations concerning the possession and use of Select Agents,
as well as their transfer. While CDC has done its best to manage the
Select Agent program, CDC is a public health agency and not a
regulatory body. We believe that the new department, with its strong
multi-purpose security and regulatory infrastructure, will be well-
suited to prevent nefarious or other irresponsible uses of Select
Agents. HHS will be prepared to provide DHS with whatever scientific
expertise and other technical assistance it may seek to help it manage
the program. Under the Administration bill, the Secretary of Homeland
Security would administer the select agents program in consultation
with the HHS Secretary, and HHS would continue to make key medical and
scientific decisions, such as which biological agents should be
included in the select agents list.
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 created the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. The responsibilities of this
new office include the supervision of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System, the Metropolitan
Medical Response Systems, and related HHS emergency management
functions. This cluster of activities is a logical and proper candidate
for transfer to DHS--thereby enabling seamless integration of national
public health and medical emergency management assets with the Nation's
new preparedness and response infrastructure at DHS. The Public Health
Service Officers and other HHS employees who have faithfully performed
disaster relief work over the years have done a wonderful service for
our Nation. They are a credit to HHS as they surely will be to the new
Department.
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
CDC currently manages 12 ``push packages'' of pharmaceutical and
medical supplies and equipment strategically located around the United
States; additional lots of pharmaceuticals and caches of medical
materiel are maintained by manufacturers under special contractual
arrangements with CDC. You may recall that one of the push packages was
dispatched to New York City on September 11th and that elements of the
stockpile were used to respond to the anthrax attacks. The Secretary
and I strongly believe that CDC has done an exemplary job managing what
is now called the Strategic National Stockpile and this fine work has
set the stage for integration of the Stockpile with other national
emergency preparedness and response assets at DHS.
The President's proposal is designed to achieve this integration by
tapping the strengths of DHS and HHS in a precisely coordinated way.
Thus, the Secretary of Homeland Security will assume responsibility for
continued development, maintenance, and deployment of the Stockpile--
making it an integral part of the larger suite of federal response
assets managed by FEMA and other future DHS components--while the
Secretary of Health and Human Services will continue to determine its
contents. The arrangement will ensure effective blending of the public
health expertise of HHS with the logistical and emergency management
expertise of DHS.
dhs functions to be carried out through hhs
Certain specific program level details and administrative choices
are still being studied in order to ensure the most seamless
transition, and to give the greatest possible levels of efficiency and
effectiveness to our fight against the threat of biological warfare and
to protect the public health. However, the President's proposal clearly
designates the following two activity areas that the Secretary of
Homeland Security will carry out through the Department of Health and
Human Services:
1. Civilian Human Health-Related Biological, Biomedical and Infectious
Disease Defense Research and Development
The President's proposal provides that the new Department's
civilian human health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious
disease defense research and development work shall--unless the
President otherwise directs--be carried out through HHS. Under the
President's proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall
have the authority to establish the research and development program
that will be implemented through HHS. Thus, as the agency responsible
for assessing threats to the homeland, DHS, in consultation with the
HHS Secretary, will provide strategic direction regarding the Nation's
biological and biomedical countermeasure research priorities.
2. Certain Public Health-Related Activities
The President's proposal provides that the new Department shall--
unless otherwise directed by the President--carry out through HHS
certain public health related activities (such as programs to enhance
the bioterrorism preparedness of state and local governments and non-
federal public and private health care facilities and providers). The
object of this provision is to continue the important role that HHS
plays in assisting state and local governments and the hospital and
public health community in preparing for and responding to large scale
public health emergencies. As with the research program, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, will establish the Nation's anti-terrorism preparedness
and response program and priorities, but the implementation of the
public health components of that program will be carried out largely
through HHS.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, our Nation needs a
Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary and I strongly support
the President's proposal and look forward to doing whatever is
necessary to effect a smooth and swift transition of responsibilities
and operations. The Secretary and I believe that the President's
proposal strikes the right balance: it plays to the strengths of HHS
and recognizes this agency's core mission--the protection of our
Nation's public health--while capitalizing on the strategic and
logistical strengths of the new Department of Homeland Security. We
will ensure that HHS fulfills its obligations to the new Department and
provides it with whatever public health, medical, and scientific
expertise it may require.
At this time, I would be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
General Gordon you are recognized for your opening
statement
TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. GORDON
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, on behalf of
Secretary Abraham, we offer full support for the Homeland
Security Act. My remarks this morning will focus primarily on
what is Title V. We can go beyond that in the questions if you
like.
The President's proposal to organize the Department of
Homeland Security is really quite visionary and enjoys the full
support of the Secretary and I. It will significantly improve
the way the government responds to threats.
And the President's plan makes good sense. Centralizing the
responsibility for our response to weapons of mass destruction
can leverage resources currently spread across the government
and allow us to operate more effectively and more efficiently.
At the same time, leaving the nuclear response assets home-
based in DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration
will allow us to maintain their considerable expertise and make
them available for other potential responses.
We at NNSA are proud of the role we have had so far in the
fight against terrorism, especially WMD terrorism, and look
forward to working with the Congress and the administration to
make a smooth transition to this new department. NNSA has
really attracted over the years the world's premier nuclear
scientists, technicians, engineers and designers, and they
manage the national nuclear weapons program. These capabilities
and these assets and the training have been applied toward
Homeland Security and counterterrorism before 9/11, as well.
In short, we have the responsibility to operate and
maintain a strong technical capability to respond quickly to
discrete, specific nuclear and radiological emergencies. People
and equipment are trained and they're standing alert, along
with unique transportation assets, ready to respond now.
These capabilities were designed for short-term events, not
24-7-365 operations. With that said, they responded remarkably
well to 9/11 and to specific taskings following that, such as
the Salt Lake Olympics. And, importantly, we are seeking to
make them more responsive than they have been in the past by
moving assets forward and realigning them to coincide better
with the Federal districts.
There are seven organizations that make up this capability.
The first and most widely known is, in fact, the Nuclear
Emergency Support Team, NEST. They do the search, the
identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics, suspect
devices, technical operations to render them safe and packaging
for transport. We have an aerial measurement system with
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to provide a rapid response
to detect and measure radioactive material.
There's an Accident Response Group that provides scientific
and technical expertise to a U.S. nuclear accident or an
incident. The real-time assessments of the consequences of
potential radiation releases made by the Atmospherical Release
Advisory Capability. The Radiological Assistance Program was
established in the late 1950's and it comprises some 26 teams
across the United States that are DOE and NNSA first responders
to provide for the search, detection, and identification and
advice to State, local, tribal, industry and even private
citizens. They're actually called out about 24 times a year.
The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center really works with
the medical diagnostics and provides the basis for
understanding the radiological and physiological response to
radiation. And, finally, the Federal Government maintains an
extensive response capability for radiological response,
assessment and monitoring. This organization assures the hand-
off from crisis response to longer-term consequence management
and monitoring and that that hand-off is accomplished smoothly
and effectively.
Through these tailored and responsive teams, NNSA is able
to marshal highly trained, unique scientific and technical
expertise drawn across the NNSA nuclear weapons complex and the
DOE as a whole. More than 900 individuals are on call to
respond in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
Only about 70 of these are full-time.
The ability to call upon professionals from across the
complex brings the depth of the nuclear/radiological response
into this program and the full depth and breadth of the
weapon's complex expertise and staffing can be brought to bear.
Response teams are staffed with nuclear professionals who
undertake this work as additional duty. Day-to-day, these
individuals ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear
weapons stockpile, and with few exceptions, these individuals
work other full-time jobs at DOE and NNSA, but they are on call
as a response team when one is needed anywhere in the country.
In that sense, nuclear incident response teams are analogous
perhaps to the National Guard.
The capabilities of the program are maintained and improved
because of their cutting edge knowledge and because of their
intimate relationship. These are the people who design and work
on the weapons and the systems every day, and they are the ones
we also bring into the fight, to the problem, in an incident.
They have unique capabilities, but they are quite limited. Many
years of hands-on work in some cases, going back to the
Manhattan Project provides the knowledge and the insight and
the background to draw upon.
How will these teams work with the Department of Homeland
Security? We believe that they will work very much as they do
now. The team members will work at their regular jobs at DOE
and NNSA unless they're activated. Under the Atomic Energy Act,
the FBI is responsible to the United States for investigating
illegal activities involving nuclear materials, including
terrorist threats involving special nuclear materials.
Executive Order 12656 provides the authority for DOE to assist
in conducting, directing, and coordinating search and recovery
operations for materials, weapons or devices in assisting and
identifying and deactivating what we would call an improvised
nuclear device or Radiological Dispersal Device. The State
Department, Mr. Chairman, plays a similar role for overseas
international events and has the authority to reach back to our
teams for assistance. So when requested, NNSA-DOE response
teams are activated and deployed in support or resolution of
the crisis.
Under the bill to establish Homeland Security, the new
Secretary would coordinate responses to WMD incidents,
including nuclear or radiological functions. We do not
anticipate that the NNSA capabilities as a response to a
nuclear or radiological accident or incident will be
compromised in any way by this transfer of responsibility. What
Homeland Security can add in addition to a centralized response
to terrorism is a new and focused effort to set stronger
standards for the capabilities of our teams, to strengthen
training standards to ensure their inoperability, and to
conduct joint exercises. There would be a single agency
responsible for ensuring that we have the right assets
available by setting nationally understood requirements and
priorities.
In summary, DOE and NNSA nuclear radiological response
capabilities are critical in any domestic response to a nuclear
radiological incident. But they are also vital to the DOE and
to NNSA's capability to respond to an accident or incident
within the weapons complex or the nuclear energy sector. With
the teams organized essentially as they are now, subject to the
call of the Secretary of Homeland Security, they can continue
to function to support DOE and NNSA, the State Department and
Homeland Security professionally, effectively and in a cost-
efficient manner.
Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to turn to your questions.
[The prepared statement of John A. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John A. Gordon, Under Secretary of Energy and
Administrator for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here today to
discuss Title V of the Homeland Security Act as it applies to the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at the Department of
Energy (DOE).
The President's proposal to organize the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is at once visionary and down-to-earth. It will
significantly improve the way the government responds to threats
against the United States. Centralizing responsibility for our response
to weapons of mass destruction will leverage resources currently spread
across the government. The President's plan simply makes good sense. We
at NNSA are proud of our role in the fight against terrorism, and we
look forward to working with Congress and the Administration to make a
smooth transition to a new department.
The Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) develops and attracts the world's premiere
nuclear scientists, technicians, and nuclear weapon designers as a
result of over 50 years of managing the nation's nuclear weapons
program. Many of these capabilities and assets have been applied toward
homeland security and counter terrorism challenges long before 9/11, as
well as since then.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) is responsible, within the United States, for
investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear
materials, including terrorist threats involving the use of special
nuclear materials. Executive Order 12656 provides authority for DOE to
assist the FBI in conducting, directing, and coordinating search and
recovery operations for nuclear materials, weapons, or devices, and
assisting in identifying and deactivating an Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) or a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). Today's operations have
been updated to address the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). When requested DOE/NNSA response teams are activated
and deploy to support resolution of the WMD crisis.
Under the Bill to establish the Department of Homeland Security,
the new Secretary would coordinate responses to WMD incidents,
including nuclear and/or radiological support function. We do not
anticipate that the DOE/NNSA capabilities or response to a nuclear/
radiological accident or incident will be compromised in any way by
this transfer of responsibility.
Through tailored and responsive teams, DOE/NNSA is able to marshal
highly trained and unique scientific and technical expertise in support
of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). This expertise is made up of 70 full
time and 870 part time personal that draws from across the nuclear
weapons complex and is composed of 29 full time and 118 part time
Federal officials; 29 full time and 320 part time National Laboratory
staff; and, 11 full time and 450 part time contractor staff.
Although nearly 900 individuals are involved with the nuclear/
radiological incident response teams, through extensive matrixing and
leveraging of resources, the cost to the government is only equivalent
to 212 full time employees. This matrixing makes the response programs
stronger and keeps the costs very low. The response teams are staffed
with volunteers who, for the most part, work on ensuring the safety and
reliability of the Nation's nuclear stockpile day in and day out. These
professionals respond to staff a response team when called, much like a
volunteer firefighter, or a National Guard member.
Individuals from fifteen various DOE/NNSA sites/facilities or
National Laboratories across the nation are on call to respond in the
event of a nuclear/radiological incident or emergency. The ability to
call upon professionals from across the weapons complex brings depth to
the nuclear/radiological response programs. The full depth and breadth
of the weapons complex experience and staffing are brought to bear in
the event of a significant incident or an emergency.
The capabilities of the response programs are improved because of
the cutting edge knowledge of the stockpile stewardship program that
these scientists bring with them when they respond to a call. This
knowledge is gained over years of working with the stockpile
stewardship program on a daily basis and cannot be duplicated--neither
to replace the scientists on the response teams nor on the stockpile
stewardship program. These very unique scientific/technical resources
are extremely limited. Only the fundamental concepts of the stockpile
stewardship programs are taught in a university. Many years of hands on
work, in some cases going back to the Manhattan Project, provides
knowledge, insights and background to draw upon that are invaluable.
the nuclear/radiological incident response programs
As the steward of the nation's nuclear weapons program, DOE/NNSA
brings the knowledge and expertise of the world's leading nuclear
scientists, technicians, and nuclear weapon designers in response to a
significant nuclear/radiological incident or emergency. When the need
arises, DOE/NNSA is prepared to respond immediately anywhere in the
world with seven unique response capabilities.
The response capability most widely known of is the Nuclear
Emergency Support Team (NEST). The NEST program was initiated in 1974
as a means to provide technical assistance to the Lead Federal Agency
(LFA). NEST is our program for preparing and equipping specialized
response teams to deal with the technical aspects of nuclear or
radiological terrorism. NEST capabilities include search for and
identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of
suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render
safe procedures, and packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST
response team members are drawn from throughout the nation's nuclear
weapons complex. Response teams vary in size from a five person
technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of searchers
and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical
operations on a suspected nuclear device. NEST personnel and equipment
are ready to deploy worldwide at all times.
A Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team deploys as part of an FBI-led
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) or as part of a State
Department-led Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) is an incident
occurs overseas to provide nuclear scientific and technical advice to
the LFA.
If the location of a suspected nuclear or radiological device is
not known, search operations may be required. NEST search teams are
routinely configured to detect and locate a radiological source using a
variety of methods ranging from hand-carried to vehicle-mounted search
equipment. The basic building block for NEST search operations is the
Search Response Team (SRT). The Search Response Team is prepared to
deploy on either civilian or military aircraft. Upon arrival on-scene,
the Search Response Team can begin searching immediately or can equip
and train local responders, who are already familiar with the search
area.
When a device is located, the specific resolution is dependent upon
the political, technical, and tactical situation. The ultimate goal in
resolving a nuclear terrorism crisis is to keep the terrorist device
from producing a nuclear yield. This involves special explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) procedures conducted by highly-trained
technical personnel. DOE/NNSA Joint Technical Operations Teams have
been designated to work with military EOD teams during all phases of
the crisis response. This approach also draws upon the personnel and
equipment resources of the Accident Response Group (ARG).
The Accident Response Group (ARG) mission is to manage the
resolution of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear
weapons that are in DOE's custody at the time of the accident or
incident. ARG will also provide timely, worldwide support to the
Department of Defense in resolving accidents or significant incidents
involving nuclear weapons in DoD's custody. Scientists, engineers,
technicians, health physics and safety professionals from the National
Laboratories and production facilities make up the ARG team. These
skilled professionals from 30 different areas of technical expertise
are ready to respond immediately. ARG members deploy with highly
specialized, state-of-the-art equipment is used for monitoring,
assessing or removing nuclear weapons, components or debris. Once the
weapon leaves the site, the ARG mission is complete. Monitoring and
assessment activities would most likely continue using other DOE/NNSA
assets such as the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), the Atmospherical
Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), the Federal Radiological Monitoring
and Assessment Center (FRMAC), the Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS).
The Aerial Measuring System (AMS) aircraft carry radiation
detection systems, which provide real-time measurements of ground and
airborne contamination--even very low radiation levels. AMS can also
provide detailed aerial photographs and multi-spectral imagery and
analysis of an accident site. AMS provides a rapid response to
radiological emergencies with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
equipped to detect and measure radioactive material deposited on the
ground and to sample and track airborne radiation. The AMS uses a team
of DOE/NNSA scientists, technicians, pilots and ground support
personnel. Maps of the airborne and ground hazards are developed very
rapidly which enables the scientists to determine ground deposition of
radiological materials and project the radiation doses to which people
and the environment are exposed. This information gives the decision-
making officials, e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and state, local, or Tribal
emergency management officials, information they need to effectively
respond to the emergency. The AMS capability can also be used to locate
lost or stolen radiological materials.
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) role in an
emergency begins when a nuclear, chemical, or hazardous material is
released into the atmosphere. ARAC's main function is to provide near
real-time assessments of the consequences of actual or potential
radiation releases by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes to
provide emergency response officials with the vital immediate
information they need to rapidly evaluate airborne and ground
contamination projections and thus effectively protect people and the
environment. ARAC staff have vast databases available for a variety of
data, including: a worldwide library of potential accident sites such
as nuclear power plants and fuel-cycle facilities and a terrain
database covering most of the world at a resolution of one-half
kilometer.
Upon receiving a request for support, ARAC's specialists begin
downloading the most recent regional and site weather data for input
into the model calculations. On-scene emergency response officials
provide critical information such as the time and exact location of the
release and the type of accident or incident causing the emergency.
After ARAC team members have downloaded the regional weather
information and received site input, computer codes simulate the
release from the explosion, fire, vent or spill with dispersion models,
which show the spread of the material. These dispersion models take
into consideration the effects from the local terrain or topography and
complex meteorology. ARAC staff scientists prepare graphic contour
plots of the contamination overlaid on the local maps. These plots are
distributed to emergency response officials and also provided to DOE/
NNSA response teams such as: AMS, ARG, FRMAC, RAP, REAC/TS, and NEST.
In addition to accidental radiological releases, ARAC has assessed
natural disasters such as volcanic ash cloud and earthquake-induced
hazardous spills, manmade disasters such as the Kuwaiti oil fires, and
toxic chemical releases from a wide spectrum of accidents.
The Federal government maintains an extensive response capability
for radiological monitoring and assessment. In the unlikely event of a
major radiological incident, the full resources of the U.S. government
can support state, local and Tribal governments. The FBI, as the Lead
Federal Agency for domestic incidents, is responsible for leading and
coordinating all aspects of the Federal response. DOE/NNSA may respond
to a state or LFA request for assistance by deploying a RAP team. If
the situation requires more assistance than RAP can provide, DOE/NNSA
will alert or activate a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center (FRMAC). FRMAC activities include: coordinating Federal offsite
radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities;
maintaining technical liaison with state, local and Tribal governments;
maintaining a common set of all offsite radiological monitoring data;
and providing monitoring data and interpretations to the LFA, state,
local and Tribal governments. The main DOE/NNSA emergency response
assets that supplement and are integrated into FRMAC capabilities are:
RAP, ARAC, AMS, and REAC/TS. These assets are employed to detect and
monitor radiation, measure the concentration of radiation in the air
and on the ground, and to evaluate current weather conditions and
forecasts, which may affect the radiation impacts. Other Federal
agencies provide key professionals specializing in technical areas of
importance to the Federal monitoring assessment activities.
The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), established in the late
1950's, is composed of 26 teams spread across the United States, RAP is
often the first-responding DOE/NNSA resource in assessing an emergency
situation and advising decision-making officials. A RAP response is
tailored based on the scale of the event. Specific areas of expertise
include: assessment, area monitoring, and air sampling, exposure and
contamination control. RAP team members are trained in the hazards of
radiation and radioactive materials to provide initial assistance to
minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, and the
environment. Their equipment includes the most advanced radiation
detection and protection equipment available.
Since 1980, the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
(REAC/TS) has been a World Health Organization Collaboration Center for
Radiation Emergency Assistance. REAC/TS focuses on providing rapid
medical attention to people involved in radiation accidents and is a
resource to doctors around the world. DOE/NNSA's REAC/TS radiation
experts are on call 24 hours a day for consultation to give direct
medical and radiological advice to health care professionals at the
REAC/TS treatment facility or an accident site. If needed, additional
REAC/TS physicians and other team members can be deployed to the
accident scene. This highly trained and qualified team can provide
advice regarding assessment and treatment of contamination, conduct
radiation dose estimates, diagnose and provide prognosis of radiation-
induced injuries, conduct medical and radiological triage, perform
decontamination procedures and therapies for external and internal
contamination, and calculate internal radiation doses from medially
induced procedures.
REAC/TS is also the recognized center for training national and
foreign medical, nursing, paramedical, and health physics professionals
for the treatment of radiation exposure. As a World Heath Organization
Collaborating Center, REAC/TS is prepared to serve as a central point
for advice and possible medical care in cases of radiation injuries;
set up a network of available equipment and staff specializing in
radiopathology; develop medical emergency plans in the event of a
large-scale radiation accident; develop and carry out coordinated
studies on radiopathology; prepare radiation documents and guidelines;
and provide consultation or direct medical assistance to foreign
governments if an actual radiation accident occurs.
In summary, the DOE/NNSA nuclear/radiological response capabilities
are critical in any domestic response to a nuclear/radiological
incident, but they are also vital to the DOE and NNSA's ability to
respond to an accident or incident within the weapons complex or
nuclear energy sector. With the teams organized as they are now,
subject to the call of the Secretary of Homeland Security, they can
continue to function to support DOE and NNSA and Homeland Security in
an efficient, cost-effective manner.
The DOE/NNSA has more than 50 years of nuclear weapons experience
that continue to provide the nation with an extensive base for science
& technology, systems engineering, and manufacturing that has
application across a broad set of national security missions, including
homeland security and counter terrorism. Creation of a cabinet level
Homeland Security agency holds promise for dramatic acceleration of
improved capabilities against domestic threats. We in the DOE/NNSA are
committed to the success of this new Department, and will work to
facilitate it.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you for your testimony, General.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for inquiry. Let
me start with you, Secretary Allen.
In order to speed the development of priority
countermeasures, such as new vaccines and drugs, the Secretary
of HHS is going to have to expedite approvals under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Moreover, some research efforts
will be important both to counterterrorism and to advance
public health research generally. We need to make sure that
general research priorities are not diminished.
How will HHS assure proper priority and coordination on the
regulatory front with the new department?
Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, the question is a very important
one. It really goes to the heart of the mission of HHS, and in
terms of time in dealing with bioterrorism.
We don't believe the mission will change significantly at
all in that regard for the very mere fact that HHS right now
prioritizes the research, prioritizes how we are going to be
addressing the need for getting new products to market. So we
don't anticipate there will be much change at all, if any, in
regards to how the FDA will move in terms of getting products
approved for their use whether that be for a bioterrorism
response or whether it is for a general civilian response in
terms of the use.
And to give you a good example, Congress just passed and
the President has signed--as part of the bioterrorism
legislation was included the passage of legislation that
included the user fees for pharmaceutical products that would
go to market. We believe that that will continue to be a part
of that. But recognize that those products, those
pharmaceutical products, while they serve a general purpose,
using Cipro as an example--in terms of just an infection, they
were used specifically in response to the anthrax outbreak
which was a bioterrorism agent. So we don't anticipate there
will be a significant change in how we were.
The question we will have is that the department will need
to coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security as we
are looking at products that will be coming to market, that FDA
will need to approve and review for approval; and that is going
to be a function that will have to be conducted again at a very
senior level within the department. But FDA will continue to be
involved in that process, and we will just need to create a
liaison to work with Homeland Security to ensure the speed and
accuracy of getting that information between the departments
and getting the products to market.
Mr. Greenwood. The MDMS is being transferred from HHS to
the new department, but as I understand it, these teams often
have to be coordinated with other HHS elements, such as the
Public Health Service.
Will the separation of the MDMS from the Public Health
Service present problems in your opinion, and if not, how will
continued coordination be assured?
Mr. Allen. We don't anticipate it will create problems in
terms of the ultimate function of the MDMS system. While indeed
the legislation under section 502 transfers that function to
the new department, we do believe that as it currently exists
in HHS, it was transferred from under the Assistant Secretary
of Health to the Office of Public Health Preparedness, what
would be the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness, and there had to be coordination even within the
department of those assets and resources.
So we would anticipate that there would be an ongoing
coordination with, now, the Department of Homeland Security
that had already existed between HHS, VA, the Veterans'
Administration, FEMA, DOD and other agencies that were involved
in the MDMS system.
So we don't anticipate much change, but we would work
through agreements, working with the Department of Homeland
Security to ensure a smooth transition to ensure that those
responses continue.
Mr. Greenwood. Just a question or two to you, General
Gordon.
With respect to the NEST, the President's proposal leaves
these teams under DOE authority generally, except for emergency
situations when they would be under the new Secretary's
authority. In our discussions with those who make up these
teams at the labs, there is some sense of confusion as to the
exact dividing line.
Can you shed some additional light on that question, based
on your understanding of the administration's views?
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Chairman, now, today, if a team were to
deploy to a situation under Federal control--a nuclear
incident, a suspected weapon--that team would ``chop,'' in the
military term, would ``deploy'' under the control and command
of the lead Federal agency, which in most circumstances would
be the FBI.
Under this act, I think there is still a bit of a sorting
out to be done on exactly how that relationship between the
Secretary and the FBI works out. But the NEST teams will chop
to the lead Federal agency.
Mr. Greenwood. Sorting out requires some fine tuning of the
legislative language.
Mr. Gordon. I think it is just a decision. Whether it is
legislation or within the administration, I think it is a
decision.
My sense is it's not going to have any measurable effect on
the operation or the effectiveness of the teams. They are going
to work for someone who is in charge of the overall action.
Mr. Greenwood. Will this new bill require that the new
Secretary authorize any deployments of these teams, or
components of these teams, which I understand is not all that
uncommon? Or will the DOE Secretary or the regional commanders
of these teams remain authorized to deploy assets when deemed
necessary or upon request of State or local officials?
Mr. Gordon. We view these very much as dual-use assets in
that regard. If there's a national incident that requires the
team, the teams will provide it then. However, these are
individuals with qualities and capabilities that we need to be
able to deploy to an energy or national lab incident that we
can deploy ourselves. There are not a huge number of teams, but
certainly enough to handle more than one incident at a time.
Mr. Greenwood. My time has expired, but before I yield to
the ranking member, I would just ask that both Secretary Allen
and General Gordon commit to us that your staffs will work
diligently with us in the short, truncated period that we have
to get this legislation prepared for the House floor.
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely.
Mr. Allen. Absolutely.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Allen, I believe you were here throughout the
entire comments by the Governor and the questions. And I really
wanted to follow up a little bit about that. Besides myself, a
number of other members, I think, are just really trying to
inquire and really enter into a dialog into the changes of some
of these responsibilities from HHS to this new department.
Under this proposed governmental structure, what public
health responsibilities are left in HHS?
Mr. Allen. Actually, Congressman Deutsch, the vast majority
of the public health responses are left in HHS. It does not
dramatically impact the Public Health Service Act that exists
right now to focus on HHS' public health responsibilities. What
it does do is set some particular areas that will be dual use.
What is transferred from HHS under the proposal are, one,
the national pharmaceutical stockpile, which includes the
procurement, the maintenance, and deployment of the stockpile;
second, the transfer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, which includes the
National Disaster Medical System, includes the Metropolitan
Medical Response teams, includes our Disaster Medical
Assistance teams. Those assets which would also be part of our
Office of Emergency Preparedness will transfer. And then last,
the select agent regulations will transfer.
So the vast majority of the functions of HHS will continue
and will not be fully transferred over to the new department.
Mr. Deutsch. Could you specifically respond to, I guess one
of the questions I also asked Governor Ridge, regarding the
grant program, the billion dollar grant program for public
health preparedness established by Secretary Thompson and
authorized by the 2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act? How will that change in terms of the
proposals?
Mr. Allen. Under the proposals, the Department of Homeland
Security will have the responsibility for those State and local
programs; however, they will do that through contracting with
HHS to run those programs. Certainly, the Administration did
not want to disrupt what was accomplished in the public health,
the act, the bioterrorism act, to disrupt what has already been
taking place, and that is, is getting resources to State and
local communities. We will still be in essence the grant
managers in that sense actually working with State and local
governments. It's simply that the strategic decisionmaking will
be primarily the responsibility of the Department of Homeland
Security, and they will consult with and contract with
through--and through memorandums of understanding with the
Department in carrying out of those functions.
Mr. Deutsch. Now, our understanding is--my understanding as
well is that for budgeting purposes, these two infrastructures
that we are just describing cannot cost more than the single
one. How is that possible? And is that correct?
Mr. Allen. It's possible, because, for example, in terms of
what we are already doing, the functions will--the functions,
the personnel will remain at the Health Resources Services
Administration, which is working on the possible preparedness
issues, and will remain at the Center for Disease Control which
is working with State and local health departments in terms of
the functions there.
So, in essence, the money is going to be funded through the
Department of--the Department of Homeland Security, and they
will contract with HHS to carry out those functions.
Mr. Deutsch. In your testimony, you stated that HHS would
continue to decide what agents would be on the select agent
list. Could you cite the legislation or the provision for that?
Mr. Allen. Actually, under the legislation, the scientific
work that is being done, the medical expertise that is
necessary right now to determine what the select agents are
would be accomplished by working with the scientists who
currently exist at H HS. Under the section 502, it transfers--
subsection 5, it transfers the work of the Office of Assistant
Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, but also
transfers--and all their functions in the strategic and
national stockpile is also transferred.
With regards to the select agent rule, I have to find the
specific records.
Mr. Deutsch. You can provide that to us, if you can.
Mr. Allen. Sure. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. Deutsch. Again, I just see my time is running out, so
let me go through two other questions very quickly.
What percentage of public health service officers are
actually supposed to go over to the new agency?
Mr. Allen. We don't have a number of actual individuals. I
can give you the number of individuals who are supposed to
transfer over.
With regards to--if you will hold on for a second. Under
the select agent rule, for example, we will be transferring
seven FTEs. Those are the individuals who actually worked at
CDC who worked on the select agent transfer program. We also--
under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Preparedness, that would include approximately 116 staff and
detailees who are currently on board, including 87 individuals
who are at the Office of Emergency Preparedness. And for the
functions in terms of the national, the national pharmaceutical
stockpile would include currently about 28 individuals.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you.
Mr. Allen. And your cite for the select agent rule, I do
have that for you. It's under section 502. 302, I'm sorry.
Section 302, subsection 1. It says that the select agent
registration enforcement programs and activities of the
Department of Health and Human Services, including the
functions of the Secretary of HHS relating thereto, will
transfer over.
Mr. Whitfield. General Gordon, one of the laboratories in
their written testimony asked a very good question about how
NEST's effectiveness depends in large part on the continued R&D
and technology improvement efforts under way at DOE. If you
divide--if the NEST teams are divorced in some way from the R&D
component, whether by transfer of NEST or transfer of those R&D
components to Homeland Security, in your opinion, what would
the impact of that be? And does that concern you?
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Chairman, it's not our intent to break that
link at all. The labs have a huge capacity to do this R&D. It's
very important to us. And they are, of course, the ones who
provide the experts for NEST.
As we discussed in the statement, the NEST will continue to
operate and live as an organic unit within the National Nuclear
Security Administration and DOE, and be available as a national
asset, as the demand requires. We intend to keep them linked
tightly together.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. On these NEST teams, is it--many
people devote time voluntarily to this. Is that correct? Or----
Mr. Gordon. Of the 900 or so people that are identifiable
on the full range of nuclear incident response teams, which
goes beyond NEST, there is probably only about 70 full-time
employees. The others, I'm not sure I would call them
volunteers so much as additional duty. They accept this duty,
they accept this responsibility. They train to it and exercise
to it.
But the point being, from my perspective, Mr. Chairman, the
point being that's one of the reasons you just can't pick this
thing up lock, stock, and barrel, and move it elsewhere. Their
expertise, their currency is actually from the jobs they do day
to day.
Mr. Whitfield. You know, some people have described this
situation as following the National Guard model in which
equipment and supplies are centrally managed--in this case, by
the new Secretary--while the personnel remain under the general
authority of the respective departments--in this case DOE--
except when called to duty. Is that your understanding of the
approach embodied in this bill?
Mr. Gordon. I might use a different analogy but toward the
same end. Military service today, their responsibility is to
organize, train, and equip.
Mr. Whitfield. Right.
Mr. Gordon. And then they are then fought by a commander in
chief. I think that there is an analogy here pretty strong to
that point, that we would organize, train, and equip to
standards that I would hope that the new department would help
sharpen, help strengthen, and work the interoperability perhaps
better than we do today.
Mr. Whitfield. I was wondering if you would elaborate just
a little bit on these joint tactical operations teams.
Actually, what is their mission?
Mr. Gordon. What they would be doing is we would be
augmenting the individuals who were hands-on attempting to deal
with or dismantle a weapon. So, basically, in those instances,
Mr. Chairman, what we do is we bring in the technical expertise
that sits behind the bomb squad.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay.
Now, Secretary Allen, if we move some of the key functions
of the new Assistant HHS Secretary for Public Health
Preparedness--and maybe you all touched on this earlier. But if
we moved that to the new department, does that eliminate the
need for that assistant secretary entirely, or would there be
remaining functions, such as coordination, that would need to
be done?
Mr. Allen. Clearly, the need for coordination within the
Department of HHS of these activities will not be eliminated.
Whether that is the requirement of having an assistant
secretary level function, that is something that remains to be
addressed. Clearly, the department under Secretary Thompson
following 9/11, he created the Office of Public Health
Preparedness, and had a director of that office to coordinate
those functions. But it was certainly the wisdom of Congress to
create an office of an assistant secretary. So we would be
flexible to work with it, but there will need to have very
senior leadership coordinating the activities of the department
to work with Homeland Security to ensure the continuity of
those programs.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you very much. I see my time has
expired. We will recognize the gentleman from Michigan for 5
minutes.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Gordon, I think in your opening statement you
commented, or maybe it was in response to a question, about
Salt Lake City Olympics. Did you--or, not you. But were there
radiation detection devices at the Salt Lake Olympics?
Mr. Gordon. We didn't set up specifically. The emphasis on
the Salt Lake Olympics was more in the area of some biological
response, which I would prefer to discuss in a different
session.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. But in answer to my question, so there
wasn't any radiation detection devices at Salt Lake that you
know of?
Mr. Gordon. We did not set up specific portals.
Mr. Stupak. Right. My question is, do you know if there
were any radiation detection devices? I know you didn't set
them up, but were there?
Mr. Gordon. I just don't know the answer to your question.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Gordon. I will provide you a response.
[The following was received for the record:]
At the request of the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and in support of the Utah Olympic Public Safety
Command, the Department of Energy deployed the Nuclear/Radiological
Advisory Team (NRAT) and members of the Radiological Assistance Program
(RAP) team from Region 6 (Idaho) with portable radiation detection
equipment to the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The
equipment deployed included small pager-sized radiation detectors,
detectors carried in briefcases and backpacks, and vehicle-mounted
detectors. Identification units, which are used to identify the
specific type of radiological material, were also sent. No radiation
portal monitoring was conducted at any time.
Prior to the arrival of the athletes, NRAT and RAP conducted
radiological surveys around Salt Lake City and the high security areas.
Surveys of this type are useful in cataloging the radiological
signature of the surrounding areas, saving critical response time in
the event of an actual incident. During the survey process several
locations revealed an elevated radiation signature. In each instance,
the NRAT scientists deployed with identification units and determined
that the readings were due to natural background radiation, a normal
occurrence. Once the Olympics began, the radiological surveying stopped
and the teams assumed a response posture. There were no incidents
requiring the use of NRAT or RAP personnel or equipment during the
Olympics.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. But the only point I was driving at--it
wasn't a trick question--is my impression is that there were
radiation detection devices we used at Salt Lake City. In the
earlier panel with Governor Ridge here, we were talking a lot
about radiation detection devices. If they were set up and used
in Salt Lake City and if there is concerns we should have them
elsewhere in this country, why aren't we using them? That's all
I'm trying to get at.
Mr. Gordon. Again, I would really like to discuss this in a
different session.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Let me put it this way. When I was
asking--we were talking about it before, myself and Governor
Ridge, we talked about how Customs wanted these devices, and
then contractors gave them to DOE, and DOE has now gone to one
of the labs to try to get some standards and get some
development going, and we are already down the three levels.
And in response to the question, it was like, ``Well,
Congressman, that's sort of the way the Federal bureaucracy
works.'' I didn't get a warm, fuzzy feeling when I got that
answer.
I guess if we are going to do this new Homeland Security,
Department of Homeland Security, how are things going to be
different?
Mr. Gordon. I want to sign up to exactly what I think you
are getting at, sir. We had proposed and suggested at the
beginning that there be developed in effect a lead technical
agency that could bring together the disparate variety of
activities that are under way in this with some national
standards, with some national priorities that are set up for
where we are going. That is, in my understanding, what is to be
incorporated into this new department. Because what we have
now, even in our own areas for the Department of Energy and
NNSA, is some very specific capabilities that were put together
for some very specific and somewhat narrow uses. We have now
expanded those, I think, with considerable expertise and a
little bit of alacrity in response to 9/11. The pagers, the
sort of small radiation detection pagers that are used at
airports have been made available to the extent that we could
get them fast enough or cause them to be produced fast enough,
deployed in a number of locations with a number of different
forces.
I think there is a good effort across the board in where we
are using and deploying some systems, which I would be glad to
talk with you in a smaller group, but it is time to pull it
together in an aggressive program.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Again, maybe it would be appropriate in a
closed session, and, again, just a little bit. But I'm still
trying to get at if we create this new department how is it
going to be different? How are we going to have accountability,
responsibility, and make sure the job is getting done, and we
don't have finger-pointing after an incident? That's what I'm
driving at.
Mr. Gordon. We bring it together in one place with
individuals who are charged to look at it nationally----
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Gordon. [continuing] who are designed to set up what
are the priorities that you want us to spend our research
dollars and our production dollars on, and take that in an
aggressive step and just work right down a strategic plan.
Mr. Stupak. I'm sure, Mr. Chairman, when we get into the
radiation detection, I would suggest that might be a place we
want to go in closed session. I know I have some more
questions, but I am going to leave that issue right now and go
to another spot.
Well, let's take the NEST teams. I don't know of any
significant problems that have been evident by the way these
teams have been presently structured or how their command and
control has worked in the past. So if you move NEST teams over
to the new department, how is that going to improve them or
improve their functionality?
Mr. Gordon. I think the point, sir, is that they don't move
over; that they become part of the coordinated units that are
available to respond to a crisis upon the direction of the
Secretary.
Mr. Stupak. So the teams wouldn't move over to Homeland
Security?
Mr. Gordon. The teams do not move as a unit. They stay
where they are because--they need, in fact, to stay inside the
organization because they are not full-time personnel that
deploy. These are actually the experts that are working on our
stockpile stewardship program, working on our weapons, working
the intelligence side. So we bring them together, as the
Chairman had suggested, in a National Guard way or in a
military service way to respond to individual crisis.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. All right. I was under the impression,
and maybe wrongly so, that NEST teams are going to be moved to
Homeland Security.
Mr. Gordon. No, sir. They would be available under the
command of the Secretary of Energy upon call for national
issues. They also would be available to the Secretary or myself
for an DOE-NNSA incident where they had to respond. And we need
them to stay tied in to their current work, because they are
not full-time NEST employees, on the whole.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. They stay where they are, but additional
people can employ them, if need be.
Mr. Gordon. And that's effectively the way it is today. If
there were an incident this moment that involved a nuclear
weapons or terrorist attack, the FBI would be responsible for
commanding that incident, and we would deploy our forces to the
FBI for their use.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Thank you, Secretary Allen, thank you, General Gordon, for
your testimony, for responding to our questions, to your
pledges of cooperation as we work through this legislation.
Thank you again, and you are excused.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair then calls forward our third panel
for this hearing. We have Ms. Jan Heinrich, who is the Director
of Health Care and Public Health Issues at the U.S. General
Accounting Office; Dr. Harry C. Vantine, Program Leader,
Counterterrorism and Incident Response at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; Dr.--or Mr. David Nokes,
Director, Systems Assessment and Research Center, Sandia
National Laboratories; Dr. Donald D. Cobb, Associate Director
for Threat Reduction, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dr. Lew
Stringer, Medical Director, Division of Emergency Management,
the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public
Safety; and Mr. Edward P. Plaugher, Chief of the Arlington
County Fire Department, and also Executive Agent, Washington
Area, National Medical Response Team.
Lady and gentlemen, we welcome you, and thank you for
joining us this morning. And I would--you are aware that this
committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing
so, it is our practice to take testimony under oath. Do any of
you have any objections to giving your testimony under oath?
No? You are also, under the rules of this committee and the
House, entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you
wish to be represented by counsel this morning? Okay.
Is Dr. Stringer not here? Doctor, take your time and hurry
on up to the table.
Welcome, Dr. Stringer. As I indicated to the other
witnesses, sir, you are aware that this committee is holding an
investigative hearing, and you are aware that, pursuant to our
practices, we take testimony under oath. And I should ask you,
do you have any objection to giving your testimony under oath?
Mr. Stringer. No, sir.
Mr. Greenwood. Then for all of you, you are entitled under
the rules of the House and the committee to be represented by
counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? Okay.
In that case, if you would each stand, and all stand and raise
your right hands, I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Okay. You are all the under oath. And Ms.
Heinrich, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening
statement. Thank you for being with us.
TESTIMONY OF JANET HEINRICH, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; HARRY C.
VANTINE, PROGRAM LEADER, COUNTERTERRORISM AND INCIDENT
RESPONSE, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; K. DAVID
NOKES, DIRECTOR, SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH CENTER, SANDIA
NATIONAL LABORATORIES; DONALD D. COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR
THREAT REDUCTION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; LLEWELLYN W.
STRINGER, JR., MEDICAL DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND
PUBLIC SAFETY; AND EDWARD P. PLAUGHER, CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY
FIRE DEPARTMENT, EXECUTIVE AGENT, WASHINGTON AREA NATIONAL
MEDICAL RESPONSE TEAM
Ms. Heinrich. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the subsequent
anthrax incidents, there has been concern about the ability of
the Federal Government to prepare and coordinate an effective
public health response to such events. Our earlier work found
that more than 20 Federal departments and agencies carry some
responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness and response, and
that their efforts are fragmented.
Emergency response is further complicated by the need to
coordinate actions with agencies at the State and local level
where much of the response activity would occur. My remarks
will focus on the aspects of the proposal concerned with public
health preparedness and response, and the two primary changes
to the current system found in title 5 of the proposed bill.
First, the proposal would transfer certain emergency
preparedness and response programs, as we have already heard.
Second, it would transfer the control over but not the
operation of other public health preparedness assistance
programs, such as providing emergency preparedness planning
assistance to State and local governments from HHS to the new
department.
The consolidation of Federal agencies and resources for
medical response to an emergency as outlined in the proposed
legislation has the potential to improve efficiency and
accountability for these activities at the Federal level, as
well as the State and local levels. The programs to be
consolidated have already been identified for you. As Governor
Ridge has stated, issues of coordination will remain, however.
The proposed transfer of the Metropolitan Medical Response
System does not address the need for enhanced regional
communication and coordination, for example. The National
Disaster Medical System functions as a partnership among HHS,
the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs,
FEMA, State and local governments, and the private sector.
Thus, coordination across departments will still be required.
Similarly, the Strategic National Stockpile will involve
the VA for purchase and storage, and HHS, in regards to the
medical contents.
Although the proposed department has the potential to
improve emergency response functions, its success is contingent
on merging the perspectives of the various programs that would
be integrated under the proposal. We are concerned that the
lines of authority of the different parties in the event of
emergency still need to be clarified.
As an example, in the recent anthrax events, local
officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI
and public health officials handling suspicious specimens. The
FBI viewed the specimens as evidence in a criminal case, while
public health officials' first priority was contacting
physicians to ensure effective treatment was begun promptly.
The President's proposal to shift the authority, funding,
and priority-setting for all programs assisting State and local
agencies and public health emprgency Preparedness from HHS to
the new department raises concerns because of the dual purpose
nature of these activities. These programs include, as we have
heard, the CDC's bioterrorism and preparedness programs and the
HRSA Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. Functions
funded through these programs are central to investigations of
naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks and to regular
public health communications, as well as to identifying and
responding to a bioterrorism event. Just as with the West Nile
virus outbreak in New York City, which initially was feared to
be the result of bioterrorism, when an unusual case of disease
occurs, public health officials must investigate. Although the
origin of the disease may not be clear at the outset, the same
public health resources are needed, regardless of the source.
The recently enacted Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 recognized
that these dual purpose programs are needed in State and local
communities. Now States are beginning to plan to expand
laboratory capacity, enhance their ability to conduct
infectious disease surveillance and epidemiological
investigations, and develop plans for communicating with the
public. While under the proposal, the Secretary of Homeland
Security would be given control over these assistance programs,
their implementation would continue to be carried out by H HS.
The proposal also authorizes the President to direct that
these programs no longer be carried out in that manner without
addressing the circumstances under which such authority would
be exercised.
We are concerned that this approach may disrupt the synergy
that exists in these dual purpose programs. We are also
concerned that the separation of control over the programs from
their operations would lead to difficulty in balancing
priorities. Although the HHS programs are important for
homeland security, they are just as important to the day-to-day
needs of public health agencies and hospitals, such as
reporting on meningitis outbreaks and providing alerts to the
medical community on influenza. The current proposal does not
clearly provide a structure that ensures that both the goals of
homeland security and public health will be met.
In summary, many aspects of the proposal are in line with
our previous recommendations to consolidate programs,
coordinate functions, and provide a statutory basis for
leadership of homeland security. However, we do have concerns,
as we have noted.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I am
happy to respond to any questions you or other members may
have.
[The prepared statement of Janet Heinrich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care and Public
Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss the proposed creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has
been concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for
and coordinate an effective public health response to such events,
given the broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the
federal level. Our earlier work found, for example, that more than 20
federal departments and agencies carry some responsibility for
bioterrorism preparedness and response and that these efforts are
fragmented. <SUP>1</SUP> Emergency response is further complicated by
the need to coordinate actions with agencies at the state and local
level, where much of the response activity would occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research
and Preparedness Activities, GAO-01-915, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President's proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring
many of these federal entities with homeland security
responsibilities--including public health preparedness and response--
into one department, in an effort to mobilize and focus assets and
resources at all levels of government. The aspects of the proposal
concerned with public health preparedness and response would involve
two primary changes to the current system, which are found in Title V
of the proposed bill. First, the proposal would transfer certain
emergency preparedness and response programs from multiple agencies to
the new department. Second, it would transfer the control over, but not
the operation of, other public health preparedness assistance programs,
such as providing emergency preparedness planning assistance to state
and local governments, from the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to the new department. <SUP>2</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These changes are primarily covered by Sections 502 and 505,
respectively, in Title V of the President's proposed legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to assist the committee in its consideration of this
extensive reorganization of our government, my remarks today will focus
on Title V of the President's proposal and the implications of (1) the
proposed transfer of specific public health preparedness and response
programs currently housed in HHS into the new department and (2) the
proposed transfer of control over certain other public health
preparedness assistance programs from HHS to the new department. My
testimony today is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on
federal, state, and local preparedness in responding to bioterrorist
threats, <SUP>3</SUP> as well as a review of the proposed legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See ``Related GAO Products'' at the end of this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, we believe that the proposed reorganization has the
potential to repair the fragmentation we have noted in the coordination
of public health preparedness and response programs at the federal,
state, and local levels. As we have recommended, the proposal would
institutionalize the responsibility for homeland security in federal
statute. We expect that, in addition to improving overall coordination,
the transfer of programs from multiple agencies to the new department
could reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of
disaster. However, we have concerns about the proposed transfer of
control from HHS to the new department for public health assistance
programs that have both basic public health and homeland security
functions. These dual-purpose programs have important synergies that we
believe should be maintained. We are concerned that transferring
control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new
department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical
to basic public health responsibilities. We do not believe that the
President's proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland
security and the public health objectives would be accomplished.
background
Federal, state, and local government agencies have differing roles
with regard to public health emergency preparedness and response. The
federal government conducts a variety of activities, including
developing interagency response plans, increasing state and local
response capabilities, developing and deploying federal response teams,
increasing the availability of medical treatments, participating in and
sponsoring exercises, planning for victim aid, and providing support in
times of disaster and during special events such as the Olympic games.
One of its main functions is to provide support for the primary
responders at the state and local level, including emergency medical
service personnel, public health officials, doctors, and nurses. This
support is critical because the burden of response falls initially on
state and local emergency response agencies.
The President's proposal transfers control over many of the
programs that provide preparedness and response support for the state
and local governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Among
other changes, the proposed bill transfers HHS's Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness to the new
department. Included in this transfer is the Office of Emergency
Preparedness (OEP), which currently leads the National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS) <SUP>4</SUP> in conjunction with several other agencies
and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). <SUP>5</SUP> The
Strategic National Stockpile, <SUP>6</SUP> currently administered by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), would also be
transferred, although the Secretary of Health and Human Services would
still manage the stockpile and continue to determine its contents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In the event of an emergency, the National Disaster Medical
System has response teams that can provide support at the site of a
disaster. These include specialized teams for burn victims, mental
health teams, teams for incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction, and mortuary teams that can be deployed as needed. About
2,000 civilian hospitals have pledged resources that could be marshaled
in any domestic emergency under the system.
\5\ The Metropolitan Medical Response System is a program that
provides support for local community planning and response capabilities
for mass casualty and terrorist incidents in metropolitan areas.
\6\ The stockpile, previously called the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile, consists of two major components. The first component is the
12-Hour Push Packages, which contain pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and
medical supplies and can be delivered to any site in the United States
within 12 hours of a federal decision to deploy assets. The second
component is the Vendor Managed Inventory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the President's proposal, the new department would also be
responsible for all current HHS public health emergency preparedness
activities carried out to assist state and local governments or private
organizations to plan, prepare for, prevent, identify, and respond to
biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear events and public
health emergencies. Although not specifically named in the proposal,
this would include CDC's Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program
and the Health Resources and Services Administration's (HRSA)
Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. These programs provide
grants to states and cities to develop plans and build capacity for
communication, disease surveillance, epidemiology, hospital planning,
laboratory analysis, and other basic public health functions. Except as
directed by the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security would
carry out these activities through HHS under agreements to be
negotiated with the Secretary of HHS. Further, the Secretary of
Homeland Security would be authorized to set the priorities for these
preparedness and response activities.
reorganization has potential to improve coordination
The consolidation of federal assets and resources in the
President's proposed legislation has the potential to improve
coordination of public health preparedness and response activities at
the federal, state, and local levels. Our past work has detailed a lack
of coordination in the programs that house these activities, which are
currently dispersed across numerous federal agencies. In addition, we
have discussed the need for an institutionalized responsibility for
homeland security in federal statute. <SUP>7</SUP> The proposal
provides the potential to consolidate programs, thereby reducing the
number of points of contact with which state and local officials have
to contend, but coordination would still be required with multiple
agencies across departments. Many of the agencies involved in these
programs have differing perspectives and priorities, and the proposal
does not sufficiently clarify the lines of authority of different
parties in the event of an emergency, such as between the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and public health officials investigating
a suspected bioterrorist incident. Let me provide you more details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security:
Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-
627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have reported that many state and local officials have expressed
concerns about the coordination of federal public health preparedness
and response efforts. <SUP>8</SUP> Officials from state public health
agencies and state emergency management agencies have told us that
federal programs for improving state and local preparedness are not
carefully coordinated or well organized. For example, federal programs
managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department
of Justice (DOJ), and OEP and CDC all currently provide funds to assist
state and local governments. Each program conditions the receipt of
funds on the completion of a plan, but officials have told us that the
preparation of multiple, generally overlapping plans can be an
inefficient process. <SUP>9</SUP> In addition, state and local
officials told us that having so many federal entities involved in
preparedness and response has led to confusion, making it difficult for
them to identify available federal preparedness resources and
effectively partner with the federal government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research
and Preparedness Activities, GAO-01-915, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2001).
\9\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism:
Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed transfer of numerous federal response teams and assets
to the new department would enhance efficiency and accountability for
these activities. This would involve a number of separate federal
programs for emergency preparedness and response, including FEMA;
certain units of DOJ; and HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, including OEP and its NDMS and
MMRS programs, along with the Strategic National Stockpile. In our
previous work, we found that in spite of numerous efforts to improve
coordination of the separate federal programs, problems remained, and
we recommended consolidating the FEMA and DOJ programs to improve the
coordination. <SUP>10</SUP> The proposal places these programs under
the control of one person, the Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, who could potentially reduce overlap and
improve coordination. This change would make one individual accountable
for these programs and would provide a central source for federal
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 20, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed transfer of MMRS, a collection of local response
systems funded by HHS in metropolitan areas, has the potential to
enhance its communication and coordination. Officials from one state
told us that their state has MMRSs in multiple cities but there is no
mechanism in place to allow communication and coordination among them.
Although the proposed department has the potential to facilitate the
coordination of this program, this example highlights the need for
greater regional coordination, an issue on which the proposal is
silent.
Because the new department would not include all agencies having
public health responsibilities related to homeland security,
coordination across departments would still be required for some
programs. For example, NDMS functions as a partnership among HHS, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
FEMA, state and local governments, and the private sector. However, as
the DOD and VA programs are not included in the proposal, only some of
these federal organizations would be brought under the umbrella of the
Department of Homeland Security. Similarly, the Strategic National
Stockpile currently involves multiple agencies. It is administered by
CDC, which contracts with VA to purchase and store pharmaceutical and
medical supplies that could be used in the event of a terrorist
incident. Recently expanded and reorganized, the program will now
include management of the nation's inventory of smallpox vaccine. Under
the President's proposal, CDC's responsibilities for the stockpile
would be transferred to the new department, but VA and HHS involvement
would be retained, including continuing review by experts of the
contents of the stockpile to ensure that emerging threats, advanced
technologies, and new countermeasures are adequately considered.
Although the proposed department has the potential to improve
emergency response functions, its success is contingent on several
factors. In addition to facilitating coordination and maintaining key
relationships with other departments, these include merging the
perspectives of the various programs that would be integrated under the
proposal, and clarifying the lines of authority of different parties in
the event of an emergency. As an example, in the recent anthrax events,
local officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI
and the public health officials in handling suspicious specimens.
According to the public health officials, FBI officials insisted on
first informing FBI managers of any test results, which delayed getting
test results to treating physicians. The public health officials viewed
contacting physicians as the first priority in order to ensure that
effective treatment could begin as quickly as possible.
new department's control of essential public health capacities raises
concern
The President's proposal to shift the responsibility for all
programs assisting state and local agencies in public health emergency
preparedness and response from HHS to the new department raises concern
because of the dual-purpose nature of these activities. These programs
include essential public health functions that, while important for
homeland security, are critical to basic public health core capacities.
<SUP>11</SUP> Therefore, we are concerned about the transfer of control
over the programs, including priority setting, that the proposal would
give to the new department. We recognize the need for coordination of
these activities with other homeland security functions, but the
President's proposal is not clear on how the public health and homeland
security objectives would be balanced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L.107-188) cited core public
health capacities that state and local governments need, including
effective public health surveillance and reporting mechanisms,
appropriate laboratory capacity, properly trained and equipped public
health and medical personnel, and communications networks that can
effectively disseminate relevant information in a timely and secure
manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the President's proposal, responsibility for programs with
dual homeland security and public health purposes would be transferred
to the new department. These include such current HHS assistance
programs as CDC's Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program and
HRSA's Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. Functions funded
through these programs are central to investigations of naturally
occurring infectious disease outbreaks and to regular public health
communications, as well as to identifying and responding to a
bioterrorist event. For example, CDC has used funds from these programs
to help state and local health agencies build an electronic
infrastructure for public health communications to improve the
collection and transmission of information related to both bioterrorist
incidents and other public health events. <SUP>12</SUP> Just as with
the West Nile virus outbreak in New York City, which initially was
feared to be the result of bioterrorism, <SUP>13</SUP> when an unusual
case of disease occurs public health officials must investigate to
determine whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally caused.
Although the origin of the disease may not be clear at the outset, the
same public health resources are needed to investigate, regardless of
the source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ These include the Health Alert Network (HAN), a nationwide
system that facilitates the distribution of health alerts,
dissemination of prevention guidelines and other information, distance
learning, national disease surveillance, and electronic laboratory
reporting, and Epi-X, a secure Web-based disease surveillance network
for federal, state, and local epidemiologists that provides tools for
searching, tracking, discussing, and reporting on diseases and is
therefore a key element in any disease investigation.
\13\ U.S. General Accounting Office, West Nile Virus Outbreak:
Lessons for Public Health Preparedness, GAO/HEHS-00-180 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 11, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States are planning to use funds from these assistance programs to
build the dual-purpose public health infrastructure and core capacities
that the recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 <SUP>14</SUP> stated are needed.
States plan to expand laboratory capacity, enhance their ability to
conduct infectious disease surveillance and epidemiological
investigations, improve communication among public health agencies, and
develop plans for communicating with the public. States also plan to
use these funds to hire and train additional staff in many of these
areas, including epidemiology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ P.L. 107-188.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our concern regarding these dual-purpose programs relates to the
structure provided for in the President's proposal. The Secretary of
Homeland Security would be given control over programs to be carried
out by another department. The proposal also authorizes the President
to direct that these programs no longer be carried out in this manner,
without addressing the circumstances under which such authority would
be exercised. We are concerned that this approach may disrupt the
synergy that exists in these dual-purpose programs. We are also
concerned that the separation of control over the programs from their
operations could lead to difficulty in balancing priorities. Although
the HHS programs are important for homeland security, they are just as
important to the day-to-day needs of public health agencies and
hospitals, such as reporting on disease outbreaks and providing alerts
to the medical community. The current proposal does not clearly provide
a structure that ensures that both the goals of homeland security and
public health will be met.
concluding observations
Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of response activities
are in line with our previous recommendations to consolidate programs,
coordinate functions, and provide a statutory basis for leadership of
homeland security. The transfer of the HHS medical response programs
has the potential to reduce overlap among programs and facilitate
response in times of disaster. However, we are concerned that the
proposal does not provide the clear delineation of roles and
responsibilities that we have stated is needed. We are also concerned
about the broad control the proposal grants to the new department for
public health preparedness programs. Although there is a need to
coordinate these activities with the other homeland security
preparedness and response programs that would be brought into the new
department, there is also a need to maintain the priorities for basic
public health capacities that are currently funded through these dual-
purpose programs. We do not believe that the President's proposal
adequately addresses how to accomplish both objectives.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee
may have at this time.
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-7118. Marcia Crosse, Greg Ferrante, Deborah Miller, and
Roseanne Price also made key contributions to this statement.
related gao products
Homeland Security
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving
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Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership
Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-
and Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November
7, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide
Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA's Role in Strengthening
Federal Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-
02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts.
GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Public Health
Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role
in Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November
15, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. GAO-
02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.
Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T.
Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-
915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and
Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999.
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.
GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation
Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington,
D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and
Public Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March
16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism
National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings.
GAO-02-687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the
Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local
Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.
Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations
for Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.
Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T.
Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations
for Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in
Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.:
October 17, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism
Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.:
September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's
Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington,
D.C.: May 9, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs
Further Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs
Further Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in
Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.:
March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-14.
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of
Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21,
2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are
Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are
Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: October 29,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and
Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,
1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.:
June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is
Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:
November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.:
October 2, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington,
D.C.: April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.:
December 1, 1997.
Disaster Assistance
Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington,
D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing
States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key
Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832.
Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.
Budget and Management
Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T.
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-
1084SP. Washington, D.C.: August 2001.
Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key Management
Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May
25, 2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High
Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington, D.C.:
August 29, 1997.
Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in
Federal Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.:
June 7, 1995.
Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles. GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-
95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.
Grant DesignGrant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility,
Accountability, and Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137.
Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998.
Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/
AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you very much.
Dr. Vantine, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF HARRY C. VANTINE
Mr. Vantine. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee, for asking me to speak before you today. It's a
pleasure to be here. My name is Harry Vantine. I head the
Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Our program at Livermore covers
the waterfront, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological.
Today, my remarks are going to concentrate on nuclear and
radiological, but I think similar remarks could be made for the
chem-bio program.
Let me start by saying that my overall reaction to this
legislation was that it is very broad, it's very inclusive. I
think that's a very good thing. It's clear to me that as we go
into the establishment of this Homeland Security Department, we
are going to learn by doing, we are going to have to be able to
change and adapt, and I think the legislation allows us to do
that.
What I would like to do is stress this morning some of the
elements that I think are really important in countering
terrorism. There are several elements that I see. One is that
we need a layered approach to counterterrorism. There is no one
silver bullet that is going to solve this problem. So, a
layered approach. I mean, we've got to look at beginning--we've
got to look at indications and warnings. We have got to try and
see the threats. We have got to protect the materials, the
nuclear materials that--or the weapons that might be diverted
for terrorist use. We need to have response teams that search,
that disable. We need to have consequence management teams. We
need to do the whole spectrum, and that's what I call a layered
approach. Any one of them won't work. It's a big problem. It's
a huge problem.
And so, you know, the second point I want to get to is
because it's such a large problem, how do we solve that? We are
going to need new and innovative approaches. And the way that--
coming from a technology laboratory like Livermore, the way I
see new technologies, new approaches being developed is through
R&D technology. I think we are going to have to rely very
heavily on R&D to find those new solutions.
Next, I would like to come to the issue of funding. When I
look at R&D funding in industries, if I look at
pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies, those type of industries,
it's not unusual in some of the pharmaceutical industries to
invest 20 percent of your revenues in R&D. We are going to have
to have a very aggressive investment strategy and new
approaches. Other companies invest 10 to 20 percent--10 to 15
percent. DOD is in that category. DOD invests in RDT&E
something like 10 percent. So I think that's another approach
going forward.
The fourth point I want to make is that I think we need
clear lines of authority in this department. One of the
drawbacks in the current system is that the current response
system is somewhat a response that's clues together from
different agencies. I think with this new department we have
the ability to have people really dedicated to this mission,
they know it's their job, and they're going to do it, and
they're going to know what they have to do. They have clear
authority.
The final general--the general attribute I think this
homeland security strategy needs is strategic planning. We
really have to do planning on big systems. We have to take a
big systems approach to how we do this. The planning has got to
be based on risk assessment to protect entire infrastructures.
At the laboratories, we've put together these big ideas in the
past, we've put together ideas such as model city protection,
the basis program for biological detection, protection system
for protecting metros, detection and tracking system for
looking at nuclear materials, a national test bid for cargo
inspection. These are the kind of ideas that we need,
overreaching ideas that really cover the waterfront.
Information synthesis, I think, is also an important area.
We are going to have to pull together the different
intelligence functions from the different agencies. I think the
new Office of Homeland--the Department of Homeland Security is
going to have to have access to the intelligence data, the raw
intelligence data it needs to process that information, to put
it together, and understand the threats.
And another program that's been brought over from the
existing programs is the nuclear assessment program. It's an
NNSA program that has actually run--operated all three of the
national weapons laboratories, headed by Livermore, though,
that--and these people have been real heroes since September
11, working hard to look and assess nuclear threats.
Let me say in summary that I really think we are going to
have to make a sustained investment in science and technology
to win the war on terrorism. It's an enormous task. It's a task
that the laboratories are eager to do, and with your help and
with your planning, we think we can do it.
[The prepared statement of Harry C. Vantine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harry C. Vantine, Program Leader for
Counterterrorism and Incident Response, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I lead the program in
Counterterrorism and Incident Response at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). However, the opinions that I present today
represent my views and not necessarily those of the Laboratory or the
National Nuclear Security Administration. Today I would like to focus
on nuclear and radiological response activities proposed for transfer
to the Department of Homeland Security. There are analogies for
chemical and biological response.
importance of the cbrni (chem/bio/radiological/nuclear/information)
mission
The threat of covert/terrorist delivery of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) is a concern of the utmost gravity. There are many
important government missions, but there is none more important than
the Homeland Security mission. Witnessing the changes in the past 20
years, the bio-technology revolution, the breakup of the Soviet Union,
the information explosion on the web, my conviction has only gotten
stronger that Homeland Security is an enduring national security
mission.
essential elements of a response strategy
What can we do to protect the U.S. against terrorist acquisition
and use of WMDs? As with every other aspect of the terrorism problem,
there is no silver bullet.
We see the following as essential elements.
<bullet> A layered strategy is required, addressing the various stages
on this threat.
<bullet> This strategy will rely heavily on R&D. Only new solutions
will offer adequate level of protection and be affordable.
<bullet> Adequate funding is needed. Industries, such as information
technologies, biotechnologies, and pharmaceuticals, invest
heavily in R&D: 10 to 15% of their budget. DOD has a similar
profile of RDT&E investment.
<bullet> Clear lines of authority. This will shorten the time to get
new capabilities to the field. Multi-group, multi-level
approvals and negotiations will be curtailed.
<bullet> Strategic planning. Planning, based on risk assessment, is
needed to protect entire infrastructures. Included in this
planning are ideas such as Model City Protection, Detection and
Tracking Systems, and the National Testbed for cargo
inspection.
nuclear incident response
The Nuclear Incident Response Program has a broad charter to train
for and respond to nuclear threats at the local, regional, and national
level. The program is multi-agency. In the DHS legislation, it appears
that there are three Under Secretaries who deal with various aspects of
nuclear counterterrorism: Sec.301 is Nuclear Countermeasures, Sec. 401
is Border and Transportation Security, and Sec 501 is Emergency
Preparedness and Response. The activities of there three need to be
closely tied together so that there is one coordinated operational
mission.
The advent of monitoring systems, first responder reach back
(``Triage''), expanded regional response (RAP or Radiation Assistance
Program) capability will require more robust communication systems and
a robust fusion cell manned by technical experts. We will need to
respond rapidly to assess the level of threat while waiting for the
arrival of advanced technical assets. To maximize this capability it is
critical that the proper equipment be with the first responders, who
need to be practiced in their interactions with the fusion cell. The
Nuclear Laboratories have the capability of making rapid and detailed
analyses if sufficient information is transmitted to them. Thus it is
critical that the equipment for the first response assets be carefully
screened to maximize its capability. At the same time the capability
and technical personnel at LLNL and LANL need to be expanded to provide
the proper coverage and response capability to any scenario which
occurs.
recommendations for nuclear incident response
1. Training should be realistic, with preparation and training aids
that challenge the responder. Results of training exercises
should be used to improve system response.
2. Training should mimic actual response operations. ``Practice like
you play.''
3. The operational architecture should include all levels of response
from the first responder, to the regional and national
responders.
4. A strategy to transition new technology into capable, prototype
operational systems is essential. Technology developers must be
included in the operational planning process.
5. Technical aspects of Nuclear Counter Terrorism should be managed by
the laboratories with technical capabilities in this area, i.e.
LLNL, LANL, SNL, and RSL. One laboratory should be in charge of
coordinating and managing these technical activities among all
the labs.
nuclear assessment program
The Department of Homeland Security will have responsibilities for
receiving and analyzing all source information in order to understand
the nature and scope of the terrorist threat to the American homeland.
This must involve access to both law enforcement and intelligence
information at the most sensitive levels if the Department is to be
successful in developing a strategic national plan for securing key
resources and critical infrastructures, as well as responding to
pending threats and attacks as they are detected. The terrorist threat
is dynamic and global in nature. Understanding it and anticipating its
countermoves will be an ongoing process that would benefit from
interaction with other existing government programs analyzing and
tracking a number of ``classic'' nuclear, chemical and biological
threats and proliferation concerns. Essential intelligence information
needed to support the Department's roles and missions must be quickly
obtained, distributed, and analyzed so that protective priorities can
be adjusted and/or warnings issued.
The Department faces major information analysis challenges. The
number and diversity of these suggest that it would be appropriate to
generously size and support the Department's strategic law enforcement
and intelligence analysis programs including the nuclear assessment
program. It will certainly require some ``fully cleared'' people,
direct intelligence oversight and specific infrastructure to comply
with DCID policies and guidance. New protocols for sharing and
integrating law enforcement information with intelligence data may have
to be developed. Furthermore, it seems highly likely that, sooner or
later, it will require some additional supporting communication
infrastructure.
information analysis
The rapid advances in computer and information technology have
enabled our society to generate massive amounts of data and
information, but frequently we end up drowning in this sea of data
because we lack the ability to select out the information or the
relationships between information that is relevant. It is possible to
develop computing tools and architectures that will enable us to
progress beyond information overload to credible insights that can be
used by decision-makers. The need for this ``Information-to-Insight
(I2I)'' capability spans many national security areas and most of the
Laboratory's programs. I2I will create a fundamental shift in the way
that we relate critical information. The impact will be especially
great for combating threats to our national security where anticipating
and characterizing specific threats based upon detailed data from many
varied sources are prerequisites for taking preventative action before
it is too late.
We envision addressing questions and problems that require the
ability to rapidly access massive amounts of data from disparate
sources in such a way that one can uncover the critical linkages and
insights hidden therein. Effectively linking the vast number of
disparate and complex data sources that government decision makers and
analysts must use to address U. S. national security issues is a major
R&D challenge. Because our goal is to provide timely insights, the
knowledge management system also needs to be able to constantly update
itself.
other specific recommendations
The new agency needs to have access to Restricted Data as defined
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This category of information has its
own unique requirements compared to National Security Information and
Law Enforcement Sensitive information. It would be reasonable to
include within Sec. 203 (Access to Information) that any Restricted
Data shared under that section is transmitted, retained, and
disseminated consistent with the authority of the Secretary of Energy
to protect Restricted Data. (This is similar to the approach taken for
both intelligence information and law enforcement sensitive
information.)
The new agency needs to have access to radioactive materials for
purposes of testing and evaluating equipment. This includes Special
Nuclear Materials (SNM) in various forms (e.g., oxides and metals) and
test objects that are in nuclear explosive-like configurations
containing SNM. The new department should be given the authority to
specify and order such sources from DOE, own the sources (transfer them
from DOE), and determine where the sources will be used. The new agency
should be required to conform to security requirements comparable to
those of the Department of Energy for these types and quantities of
material.
The new agency needs to have the authority to work with the
Director of Central Intelligence in setting priorities for intelligence
gathering activities that may be critical to the security of the United
States' homeland. In this way the new agency will not only be able to
assess gathered information, but influence the type and priorities of
information gathered by other agencies to make it more useful to the
homeland security mission.
scope of the problem
We must make a sustained investment in the science and technology
to win the war on terrorism. It is an enormous task.
In closing, let me assure you that we at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory have long been concerned about the terrorist WMD
threat. We have built on our historical nuclear weapons mission and
developed unique expertise, capabilities, and technologies to meet
these emerging threats. LLNL is already providing critical elements of
the nation's defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological
terrorism, many of which were called into action post-September 11. We
are committed to using our world-class scientific and technological
resources--people, equipment, and facilities--to meet the nation's
national security needs today and in the future.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Dr. Vantine.
Mr. Nokes for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF K. DAVID NOKES
Mr. Nokes. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for allowing me to----
Mr. Greenwood. I think your microphone is not on, sir.
There we go.
Mr. Nokes. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
David Nokes. I am Sandia's director for our Systems Assessment
and Research Center, and coordinator for our Homeland Security
and Combating Terrorism Activities. I would like to briefly
highlight some of the points I have made in my written
testimony today.
Sandia, as well as the other NNSA labs, were able to
respond to the events of September 11 very quickly, with good
technology. And the reason they did that is because of the
investments that have been made by the NNSA nuclear weapons
program, the Armed Control and Treaty Verification Programs,
and the sponsorship of many other government agencies to our
work or other's program. And that is the technology that has
been harvested by the Nation from the laboratories to address
the problems of homeland security.
Perhaps you were aware that the decontamination foam that
Sandia developed and licensed was used here on Capitol Hill to
decontaminate or help decontaminate the anthrax. That was work
that was done under our laboratory directed research and
development program several years ago. And there are many other
examples of work that was applicable directly to the events
immediately post 9/11.
Let me turn now to the challenging problems of chemical and
nuclear and biological detection and the weapons of mass
destruction. One of the specialties that we have are nuclear
sensors that rely on spectral analysis. That's important
because those sensors reduce the nuisance alarms, the false
alarms, and have an excellent record of detecting malevolent
nuclear devices. We believe that there are sensor technologies
that we have that are ready now for commercialization that
could be transferred to industry and could be produced in
quantities at this time.
We have also developed portable chemical and biological
sensors, sensors that detect biotoxins, chemical agents, and
recently we prototyped a system that would detect anthrax and
identify anthrax in about a 5-minute timeframe. These are also
in prototype stage, but they could join the suite of sensors
that's available to first responders.
An area that we have developed almost unique technology is
in the system of tools that are used to dismantle and disable
explosive devices, and these are devices that could be used as
the foundation for a weapon of mass destruction. Sandia's tools
have been deployed widely. We run schools and we have trained
over 750 first responders in the use of these high-tech tools
that are useful in dismantling explosive devices. We are a full
participant in the emergency response, the NEST teams of the
Department of Energy. At Sandia, we have about 90 folks who are
members of the response teams, in addition to the normal job.
These are additional duties that they have elected to take on.
They have been the very core of our design activities, and
that's why they are useful as they go out and try to assess and
render safe the various nuclear incidents.
We think it's going to be important for the Office of
Homeland Security--the Department of Homeland Security to have
a full portfolio of research activities, and it has to serve
two parts. One is, we must provide the technology that's in
hand to solve the current and emergent problems. And that's a
transfer into industry so they can make these technologies
available to the folks who need them.
Second, an equally important part is a longer range vision
of what we can do in research and development to make great
security affordable and sustainable, because otherwise you will
end up with a system that is unsustainable and unaffordable,
and that's a challenge for the new department to establish that
research agenda.
I think that there is some bureaucratic problems that might
harm the way the laboratories can be constructively engaged in
the problems of the Office of--or the Department of Homeland
Security. One that would be useful, if the NNSA were explicitly
given the mission of developing technologies around homeland
security, that would allow them to bring the force of the
laboratories together, and it would be very useful if the
Department of Homeland Security were able to task the
laboratories directly as the agencies within the Department of
Energy do. That would eliminate much of the bureaucratic
problems that we have working with the government agencies.
On behalf of the folks at Sandia, I applaud your efforts. I
think this is going to be a very important step in actual
national and homeland security. I thank you, and I would be
happy to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of K. David Nokes follows:]
Prepared Statement of K. David Nokes, Sandia National Laboratories
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the Administration's proposal to
create a Department of Homeland Security, and specifically, the
radiological, chemical, and biological response activities that may be
of value to the new department. I am David Nokes, Director of Sandia
National Laboratorie' Systems Assessment and Research Center. I have
more than forty years experience in the nuclear weapons program, and
currently head Sandia's activities that support our nation's
intelligence community as well as the laboratory's activities in
homeland security and the war against terrorism. I will shortly assume
responsibility for all of Sandia's arms control, threat assessment,
security technology, nonproliferation, and international cooperative
programs as Vice President of Sandia's National Security and Arms
Control Division.
Sandia National Laboratories is managed and operated for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of the Lockheed
Martin Corporation. Sandia's unique role in the nation's nuclear
weapons program is the design, development, qualification, and
certification of nearly all of the nonnuclear subsystems of nuclear
warheads. We perform substantial work in programs closely related to
nuclear weapons, including intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty
verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory,
Sandia also conducts research and development for other national
security agencies when our special capabilities can make significant
contributions.
At Sandia National Laboratories, we perform scientific and
engineering work with a mission in mind--never solely for its own sake.
Even the fundamental scientific work that we do (and we do a great deal
of it) is strategic for the mission needs of our sponsors. Sandia's
management philosophy has always stressed the ultimate linkage of
research to application. When someone refers to Sandia as ``the
nation's premier engineering laboratory,'' that statement does not tell
the whole story: We are a science and engineering laboratory with a
focus on developing technical solutions to the most challenging
problems that threaten peace and freedom.
My statement will describe Sandia National Laboratories'
contributions and capabilities in homeland security and discuss our
technologies for radiological, chemical, and biological sensing. I will
also describe our role in nuclear incident response and comment on the
proposed relationship of that function to the Department of Homeland
Security. Finally, I will offer suggestions for how the new department
can efficiently access and manage the scientific and technology
development resources it will require to support its mission.
sandia's contributions to homeland security and the war against
terrorism
Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories
responded to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound
resolve on both a personal and professional level. As a result of our
own strategic planning and the foresight of sponsors to invest
resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to
immediately address some urgent needs.
For example, by September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented
the K9 rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs to
enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video and
audio to their handlers. This relatively low-tech but timely adaptation
was possible because of previous work we had done for the National
Institute of Justice on instrumenting K9 units for SWAT situations.
You may perhaps be aware that a formulation developed by Sandia
chemists was one of the processes used to help eliminate anthrax in the
Hart, Dirksen, and Ford buildings on Capitol Hill and at contaminated
sites in New York and in the Postal Service. Sandia had developed the
non-toxic formulation as a foam several years ago and licensed it to
two firms for industrial production in 2000. The formulation
neutralizes both chemical and biological agents in minutes.
An array of devices invented by explosives experts at Sandia have
proved to be effective for safely disarming several types of terrorist
bombs. For the past several years, our experts have conducted training
for police bomb squads around the country in the techniques for using
these devices for safe bomb disablement. The shoe bombs that Richard
Reid allegedly tried to detonate onboard a trans-Atlantic flight from
Paris to Miami were surgically disabled with an advanced bomb-squad
tool originally developed at Sandia. That device, which we licensed to
industry, has become the primary tool used by bomb squads nationwide to
remotely disable handmade terrorist bombs while preserving them for
forensic analysis.
Sandia is a partner with Argonne National Laboratory in the PROTECT
program (Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism), jointly funded by DOE and the
Department of Justice. PROTECT's goal is to demonstrate systems to
protect against chemical attacks in public facilities, such as subways
and airports. For more than a year, a Sandia-designed chemical detector
test bed has been operating in the Washington D.C. Metro. The system
can rapidly detect the presence of a chemical agent and transmit
readings to an emergency management information system. We successfully
completed a demonstration of the PROTECT system at a single station on
the Washington Metro. The program has since been funded to accelerate
deployment in multiple Metro stations. DOE has also been requested to
implement a PROTECT system for the Metropolitan Boston Transit
Authority.
Another major worry for homeland security is the potential for acts
of sabotage against municipal water supplies. In cooperation with the
American Water Works Association Research Foundation and the
Environmental Protection Agency, Sandia developed a security risk
assessment methodology for city water utilities. This tool has been
employed to evaluate security and mitigate risks at several large water
utilities. We have used similar methodologies to evaluate risks for
other critical infrastructures such as nuclear power-generation plants,
chemical storage sites, and dams.
These and other contributions to homeland security and the war
against terror are possible because of strategic planning we had
conducted years ago and early investment in the capabilities that were
needed to respond to emerging threats. The outstanding technology base
supported by NNSA for its core missions is the primary source of this
capability. We also made strategic decisions to invest laboratory-
directed research and development funds (LDRD) in the very things that
we knew were urgent needs: items to the Afghanistan theater, the
decontamination foam, the sensors we have deployed, and special-purpose
robotics that we have developed. In recent months, requests for
Sandia's services from federal agencies other than DOE for work in
emerging areas of need have increased. Approximately twenty-eight
percent of our total laboratory operating budget is now provided by
federal agencies other than DOE.
sandia capabilities for homeland security
Sandia National Laboratories and the other nuclear weapon
laboratories constitute a broad, multidisciplinary technology base in
nearly all the physical sciences and engineering disciplines. We seek
to leverage those capabilities to support other national security needs
germane to our missions, including homeland security, when our
capabilities can make significant contributions.
Nuclear Sensing
A terrorist with a nuclear weapon and the knowledge and skill to
use it, will use it if he is not stopped. The Department of Homeland
Security will be responsible for preventing an attack on the United
States by a terrorist with a nuclear weapon of mass destruction (WMD).
The Department must prepare for this type of attack by reducing the
vulnerability of the United States to nuclear terrorism through
detection, identification, and interdiction of the nuclear materials
that could be used in such an attack.
Nuclear weapons that could be used by a terrorist organization can
be divided into three categories:
<bullet> A stolen or purchased functional nuclear warhead. Such a
device has a high level of sophistication and the probability
that it would detonate is high. The damage it would cause would
be great, with large-scale loss of life, environmental
devastation, and economic ruin.
<bullet> A weapon indigenously crafted, by a terrorist organization,
from stolen or purchased plutonium or uranium. This device
would have a moderate level of sophistication and a lower
probability that it would detonate. However, if it did
detonate, the damage could be great, perhaps similar to that
caused by a stolen or purchased weapon.
<bullet> A radiation dispersal device (RDD) often referred to as a
``dirty bomb.'' This is not a nuclear weapon, but consists of
radioactive material (of any type) packaged with conventional
explosives. It is designed simply to disperse radioactive
material over a target area. The level of sophistication may be
very low, but the probability that it would work is high,
although the results desired by the perpetrator may be
difficult to achieve. The actual damage a weapon of this type
would cause is relatively small, compared to a nuclear
detonation; however, it would result in radioactive
contamination and could cause public panic and fear.
A nuclear bomb is a product of science and technology, and it is
this same technology that must be used to protect against its use by
terrorists. Scientists and engineers at the nation's nuclear weapon
laboratories understand nuclear weapons--how they work, how to build
them, what they can do. More importantly for homeland security, they
know how to detect them, what characteristics to look for, how to sense
their emissions, how to interpret what the sensors detect, and how to
disable them.
Sandia National Laboratories has more than fifty years of
experience in the nuclear weapons arena and an extensive knowledge of
nuclear weapon science and technology. In addition to our mission of
nuclear weapons stewardship, we have long been committed to
safeguarding the nuclear weapons stockpile and actively supporting
nonproliferation. The terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics
focused our awareness on our nation's vulnerability to terrorist
attacks abroad and, in particular, on the need to protect our stored
nuclear weapons. This led to our work in access delay and denial at
weapons storage sites and improving the security of weapon storage
vaults. More recently, we have turned our physical protection expertise
to protection and control of nuclear materials in Russia and the former
Soviet Union.
If a terrorist intends to detonate a nuclear or radiological device
in the United States, then he must deliver that device to his target.
The device will emit radiation that can be detected with a radiation
sensor. If his nuclear device was acquired or built outside the United
States and smuggled into the country, we must find it before it enters
or as it crosses into the country. If it originates in the United
States, then we must detect it when it is being transported to the
target site.
There are many different types of radiation detectors. The one that
usually comes to mind is the Geiger counter, a simple device that can
detect the presence or absence of some types of radiation. But it can't
tell you very much about what type of material is emitting the
radiation. Because there are many naturally occurring, medical, and
industrial radioactive materials, knowing what type of material is
emitting the radiation is crucial in order to avoid false and nuisance
alarms and to zero-in on only those objects that pose a threat. For
this purpose you need a spectral sensor.
Sandia National Laboratories produces radiation sensors for a
variety of government customers. One of our specialties is spectral
sensor systems that provide automatic radioactive material
identification using special algorithms developed by Sandia. These
systems detect and analyze nuclear materials quickly, in real time, in
indoor or outdoor environments, and with a high degree of precision
that provides a high level of confidence. We have produced a wide
variety of sensor systems, from very large, fixed installations to
small, rugged, portable battery-powered units.
Sandia's Radiation Assessment Identification and Detection (RAID)
System was originally conceived, built, and tested before the tragic
events of September 11, 2001. However, it meets the post-9/11 need to
help safeguard our nation from nuclear terrorism. This system is
designed to detect and identify radioactive materials transported
through portals at passenger and package terminals at international
ports of entry. RAID uses a commercial sodium iodide scintillation
spectrometer and associated electronics, along with Sandia-developed
analysis algorithms, to detect and identify radioactive materials
passing within several meters of the sensor. A video image of the
detection event scene is displayed on a base-station computer. The
system automatically and continuously updates and recalibrates for
background phenomena and can identify a radioactive source even if the
source is shielded.
Based on our experience with RAID and other more advanced nuclear
sensing systems, we believe the state of development of our nuclear
sensors is such that the technology could be quickly transferred to
commercial producers and widely and rapidly deployed at a cost of less
than $50,000 per unit. These deployed systems would have a very high
probability of detecting a smuggled nuclear weapon or an RDD if
properly deployed. Nuclear sensing systems could be placed at ports of
entry, around likely targets, or even scattered throughout a city to
scan people, packages, and vehicles. Since these sensors are passive
devices, they don't emit a signal and, consequently, are very difficult
to detect. In other words, a terrorist can't use a radar detector to
determine if one of these sensors is present. Unbeknownst to a
terrorist, an alarm from one of these sensors could alert law
enforcement personnel to the presence or movement of a weapon that
employs radioactive material.
Of course, challenges exist in transitioning any technology from
the laboratory to mass-produced industrial products. However, as we
have demonstrated many times with technologies that we have transferred
to industry in the past, Sandia works closely with industrial partners
to work through the design challenges associated with manufacturing
engineering and commercialization.
Another important tool in the war against nuclear terrorism is the
Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. Its
purpose is to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism
through cooperative efforts with foreign governments to strengthen
their overall capability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of
nuclear material across their borders. Here too, the nation's nuclear
weapons laboratories have brought to bear their technical expertise in
nuclear physics and engineering. Short-term, the Second Line of Defense
program has adapted commercially available radiation detection
equipment, security systems, and communications equipment to work
comprehensively with Russian Customs and other foreign agencies to stop
nuclear smuggling now. It is effective in detecting both weapons
material and radiological dispersal devices.
Long-term, the Second Line of Defense program will deploy radiation
detection equipment optimized for border use, integrate it with local,
regional, and national-level communication systems geared for quick
response, and cooperatively train foreign officials in use of the
systems. Long-term sustainability is planned into every level of the
program to ensure continued training and equipment maintenance.
Chemical and Biological Agent Sensing
Sandia is developing a variety of technical solutions to counter
the threat posed by chemical and biological agents. This activity is
supported by the DOE Chemical/Biological Nonproliferation Program
(CBNP) and includes threat and response analysis, environmental sensing
and monitoring, facility protection and biosecurity, advance chem/bio-
terror warning systems, reagent design, and decontamination technology.
Sandia has developed a portable bio-sensor to put into the hands of
first responders. Configured to detect toxins such as ricin and
botulinum, the device uses micro-fabricated ``chips'' as a miniature
chemical analysis lab to isolate and identify biological agents. This
system has been demonstrated to also reliably and rapidly detect a
variety of chemical weapon agents in realistic situations where
obscurants to mask the signature are present. The system is being
modified to analyze viruses and bacteria. We have identified commercial
partners to produce and market the unit.
A prototype handheld detector under development at Sandia can
identify anthrax in less than five minutes. The instrument analyzes
fatty acid esters vaporized from the cell walls of bacteria and
compares them with cataloged signatures indicative of anthrax or other
pathogens. This technique has been used to identify pathogens at the
genus level and often at the species level. Identifying the bacillus in
minutes, rather than the hours currently necessary, is a crucial step
toward developing bio-attack warning systems and defenses such as foam
dispersal systems in public facilities similar to the PROTECT system
that is being deployed in the Washington Metro and other locations. We
have applied for a patent on this detector and expect to license the
technology to industry for commercial development and manufacture.
Sandia's Laboratory-Directed Research and Development program supported
this work.
Sandia is engaged in an accelerated development effort for a
standoff biological weapons detection system to provide advance warning
of a biological weapon threat. The system will employ ultraviolet
laser-induced fluorescence to scan for and to discriminate clouds of
biological agents over a broad field of view. Prototypes of this system
have been demonstrated on various mobile and fixed platforms and have
demonstrated excellent standoff range and sensitivity. Under NNSA
sponsorship, we are moving toward the demonstration phase of the system
development in the next several months.
Explosives Detection
Today, a commercially produced, walk-through portal for detecting
trace amounts of explosive compounds on a person is available for
purchase and installation at airports and other public facilities. The
technology for this device was developed, prototyped, and demonstrated
by Sandia National Laboratories over a period of several years and
licensed to Barringer Instruments of Warren, New Jersey, for
commercialization and manufacture. The instrument is so sensitive that
microscopic quantities of explosive compounds are detected in a few
seconds.
Using similar technology, we have developed and successfully tested
a prototype vehicle portal that detects minute amounts of common
explosives in cars and trucks. Detecting explosives in vehicles is a
major concern at airports, military bases, government facilities, and
border crossings. The system uses Sandia's patented sample collection
and preconcentrator technology that has previously been licensed to
Barringer for use in screening airline passengers. The same technology
has been incorporated into Sandia's line of ``Hound <SUP>TM</SUP>''
portable and hand-held sensors, capable of detecting parts-per-trillion
explosives and other compounds. These devices can be of great value to
customs and border agents at ports of entry.
Bomb Disablement Technology and Training
As first responders, American firefighters, police, and emergency
personnel will be called upon to be America's first line of defense
against terrorist attacks. These men and women must be prepared for the
full range of terrorist threats, from improvised explosive devices to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. It will be the responsibility of the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure their preparedness by providing them with
the training and tools they need to do their jobs.
Sandia National Laboratories began holding advanced bomb-
disablement technology workshops for bomb squad technicians in 1994.
Since then, Sandia has transferred advanced bomb-disablement technology
to more than 750 workshop participants through Operation America and
its predecessors, Operation Riverside and Operation Albuquerque.
Operation America is a series of ongoing regional workshops hosted by a
local police department in the state where the event is held and
supported by regional FBI offices. Participants come from bomb squads,
police and fire departments, and emergency response organizations
throughout the United States, including most of our major metropolitan
cities and the U.S. Capitol Police. They also come from other
government agencies, all branches of the U.S. military, and,
internationally, from our allies in some of the world's terrorism
hotspots. Participants come to learn applied explosives technology and
advanced bomb-disablement logic, tools, and techniques. Technical
classroom presentations, live-range demonstrations, hands-on training,
and special high-risk scenarios give them the knowledge and technology
they need to respond to terrorist threats involving explosives.
Most of the bomb-disablement technologies demonstrated in Operation
America were developed by Sandia National Laboratories as part of the
DOE Laboratory-Directed Research and Development program and our work
for other federal agencies. These tools include the Percussion-Actuated
Nonelectric (PAN) Disrupter used to dismantle suspected explosive
devices and preserve forensic evidence. The device was used at the
Unabomber's cabin in Montana and was available at the 1996 Summer and
2002 Winter Olympic Games. More recently, Massachusetts State Police,
with the assistance of the FBI, used the Sandia-developed PAN Disrupter
to disable the alleged shoe bombs removed from an American Airlines
flight from Paris to Miami.
The PAN disrupter, as well as other advanced disablement tools
developed by Sandia, are currently in use by local bomb squads and
could be used against terrorist threats such as radiological dispersal
devices (RDDs) and other weapons of mass destruction. Most of these
bomb-disablement tools are relatively simple to assemble in the field,
can be used safely from a distance, and are affordable, and they are
currently in use throughout the bomb-disablement community. These tools
disrupt and ``render-safe'' explosive packages without initiating the
explosives or destroying forensic evidence.
Once Sandia has researched, developed, and tested a bomb-
disablement tool, it begins the process of transferring the technology
to the first-responders community, putting the technology in the hands
of the men and women who need it. Operation America sponsors include
Sandia National Laboratories, the National Institute of Justice, and
DOE.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
National security and the quality of life in the United States rely
on the continuous, reliable operation of a complex set of
interdependent infrastructures consisting of electric power, oil and
gas, transportation, water, communications, banking and finance,
emergency services, law enforcement, government continuity,
agriculture, health services, and others. Today, they are heavily
dependent on one another and becoming more so. Disruptions in any one
of them could jeopardize the continued operation of the entire
infrastructure system. Many of these systems are known to be vulnerable
to physical and cyber threats and to failures induced by system
complexity.
In the past, the nation's critical infrastructures operated fairly
independently. Today, however, they are increasingly linked, automated,
and interdependent. What previously would have been an isolated
failure, today could cascade into a widespread, crippling, multi-
infrastructure disruption. As the documented cases of attacks on vital
portions of the nation's infrastructure grow, there is a sense of
urgency within industry and government to understand the
vulnerabilities.
The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC)--which would be transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security under the Administration's bill--is a comprehensive capability
to assess the nation's system of infrastructures and their
interdependencies. NISAC's partners are Sandia National Laboratories
and Los Alamos National Laboratory, both of which possess extensive
supercomputer resources and software expertise. NISAC will provide
reliable decision support analysis for policy makers, government
leaders, and infrastructure operators. It will perform modeling,
simulation, and analysis of the nation's infrastructures, with emphasis
on the interdependencies.
Sandia pioneered probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for
evaluating the risks associated with high-consequence systems such as
nuclear weapons and nuclear power generation plants. We apply this tool
to risk assessments for critical infrastructures such as dams, water
utilities, chemical plants, and power plants. Combined with our
expertise in security systems for nuclear facilities, we have helped
utilities and industrial associations create security assessment
methodologies that can guide owners and operators through the
assessment process to determine vulnerabilities and identify mitigation
options. Methodologies have been developed for water utilities,
chemical storage facilities, dams, power plants, and electrical power
transmission systems.
Cyber Sciences
Computer systems and networks are attractive targets of attack by
terrorists, foreign governments, or high-tech criminals. Government
functions, commerce, and the military increasingly rely on cyber
networks in their operations. Computerized supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems often control the operations of critical
infrastructures such as power utilities and distribution networks and
municipal water supplies.
Sandia has significant activities in the technologies intended to
protect cyber and network resources and the information that resides on
such systems. Programs that assess the vulnerabilities associated with
these systems are in place for our own resources as well as for those
at other federal government agencies. Sandia operates a SCADA
laboratory to study such cyber control systems and to determine
effective protection strategies. We conduct red-teaming to challenge
cyber and information systems and identify and remove vulnerabilities.
Our objectives are to enhance the robustness of cyber systems and
critical information systems and develop solutions for survivability
and response options for systems under attack. Our understanding of the
issues associated with computer and network vulnerabilities is enhanced
by the microelectronic design and fabrication capability resident at
Sandia as well as the state-of-the-art work performed as part of NNSA's
Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) campaign.
nuclear incident response
The President's bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security
defines a Nuclear Incident Response Team that includes entities of the
Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency that
perform nuclear and/or radiological emergency support functions
(Section 504).
NNSA plays a vital support role in combating acts of nuclear
terrorism through its Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST
provides the FBI and other federal and state agencies with technical
assistance in response to terrorist use or threat of use of a nuclear
or radiological device in the United States. NEST also supports the
Department of State in a similar role for incidents overseas. Another
NNSA team, the Accident Response Group (ARG), has the different mission
of providing technical support in response to accidents involving U.S.
nuclear weapons while they are either in the custody of DOE or the
military services. The ARG and NEST teams draw from the same pool of
experts at the NNSA laboratories, all of whom are volunteers.
NEST maintains a fast-response capability for a radiological
emergency involving dispersal of radioactive debris--for example, from
the detonation of a so-called ``dirty bomb'' or radiological dispersal
device (RDD). The NNSA's Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides
initial responders who can be on the scene in a matter of hours. Their
support role is to characterize the radiological environment, provide
technical advice to the FBI, FEMA, and other emergency response
agencies, and to assist with decontamination and material recovery.
NNSA is in the process of enhancing the Radiological Assistance Program
to perform radiological weapons detection and device characterization
missions on a regional basis consistent with the FEMA response regions.
The Joint Technical Operations Teams (JTOTs) are major operational
elements of NEST that directly assist military units and crisis
response operations. These teams are trained and equipped to support
render-safe operations and advise on stabilization, packaging, and
disposition procedures.
In addition to the NEST and ARG capabilities, NNSA maintains
Consequence Management Teams that are available to provide assistance
to federal and state agencies that require radiological emergency
assistance after an event has occurred. The teams are trained and
equipped to support incident assessment, monitoring and sampling
activities, laboratory analysis, and health and safety support to
incident responders.
Sandia National Laboratories contributes approximately ninety team
members to the various elements of NEST, ARG, RAP, and Consequence
Management. Sandia's role focuses largely on RAP incident response,
device characterization, render-safe techniques, assessment and
prediction of consequences from radiological incidents and accidents,
and methods for containment of radiological materials. Sandia is the
only NNSA laboratory that maintains the capability for containment of
particulates that would be released in an RDD explosion.
The President's bill would place the Nuclear Incident Response Team
under the author-ity and control of the Secretary of Homeland Security
during an actual or threatened terrorist attack or other emergency.
During such a time, it would operate as an organizational unit of the
Department of Homeland Security. At all other times, DOE/NNSA would be
responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and exercising
authority and control over NEST, ARG, and the Consequence Management
Teams. This arrangement is not ideal, but it makes sense in this case
because the volunteer NEST and ARG experts are integrated with the
nuclear design activities of the DOE/NNSA laboratories. It would not be
possible, for example, to transfer the NEST/ARG functions to the
Homeland Security Department on a permanent basis because the personnel
who constitute those teams are full-time weapon scientists, engineers,
and technicians.
Consequently, it will be important to establish and exercise a
clearly understood process for deploying the Nuclear Incident Response
Team elements to avoid interagency conflicts over roles and
authorities. The process should be designed to minimize the layers of
federal offices involved in both management and deployment.
science and technology development for homeland security missions
The national laboratories of the NNSA are widely regarded as the
premier science and technology laboratories in the federal government.
These institutions have a long history of excellence in research and
development in nuclear weapons and other national security
applications. They are uniquely able to deploy multidisciplinary teams
on complex problems in a way that integrates science, engineering, and
design with product.
In a world where threats are increasingly insidious--with worrisome
developments in chemical and biological weapons, cyber warfare, and
proliferation--it is important that the NNSA laboratories be major
contributors in the national effort to address these threats. These
national laboratories can provide enormous value to homeland security
challenges. They are also the logical entities to perform technology
evaluation on the many products and proposals that will inevitably be
advocated to the Department of Homeland Security from countless
vendors.
Unfortunately, established bureaucratic structures and regulations
that insulate agencies from one another will stand in the way of
effective utilization of the NNSA laboratories for homeland security
unless legislative action is taken to remove the barriers. As a first
step, it would be helpful to explicitly authorize NNSA to carry out
research and development for homeland security by adding that activity
to the NNSA's authorized missions listed at Title 42, Section 2121 of
the United States Code. Next, the Homeland Security Act should give the
Department of Homeland Security the power to task the NNSA laboratories
directly, just as the Science, Energy, Environmental, and other non-
NNSA offices of DOE are able to do. That authority would eliminate the
bureaucratic red tape and additional costs associated with the Work-
for-Others (WFO) process that inhibits access and utilization of the
laboratories by non-DOE sponsors.
It will be important for the Homeland Security Department to have
the authority to determine for itself how and where to make its
research and development investments to support its mission goals.
There will be some laboratories and institutions that will seek to be
designated as homeland security laboratories or as centers of
excellence for this or that homeland security mission area. The
Department will need to look beyond labels to demonstrated capabilities
and a track record of deliverables. Its research and development
program should encourage a competition of ideas among many performers,
including industrial firms, universities, and federal laboratories, and
then fund the development of the best ideas based on considerations of
technical merit and not on who the performer is. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) uses such an approach, and it may be
an effective model for the Homeland Security Department to emulate.
Under the President's bill, the research and development program
for the entire Department would be directed by the Under Secretary for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures.
Certainly that official will have formidable R&D challenges, but he or
she must also be cognizant of the science and technology needs for the
other mission areas of homeland security, including information
analysis and infrastructure protection, borders and transportation
security, and emergency preparedness and response. As an alternative,
it may be useful to consider a chief scientist position reporting to
the Secretary with authority for coordinating and directing the
Department's overall research and development program. Each Under
Secretary may benefit from a dedicated R&D element focused on the
challenges peculiar to his mission.
summary and conclusion
Sandia National Laboratories and the other NNSA laboratories
constitute a broad, multidisciplinary technology base in nearly all the
physical sciences and engineering disciplines. We are eager to leverage
those capabilities to support the science and technology needs of the
Department of Homeland Security when our capabilities can make
significant contributions.
Sandia possesses strong competencies in nuclear, chemical, and
biological sensors and engineered systems suitable for transfer to
industry and deployment in homeland security applications. We have been
proactive in supporting our nation's first responders and addressing
the challenges of infrastructure protection. We have a track record of
anticipating emerging homeland security threats and investing in
technology development to counter them through our Laboratory-Directed
Research and Development program and sponsor-directed programs. We are
one of the premier laboratories for working with industry to transition
laboratory technologies into deployable commercial applications.
Bureaucratic and regulatory roadblocks exist that limit access to
the DOE/NNSA national laboratories by other federal agencies, and those
obstacles should be removed by the homeland security legislation in
order to facilitate direct access to those resources. The Homeland
Security Department needs the authority to manage a research and
development program that encourages competition of ideas among many
performers--including industrial firms, universities, and federal
laboratories--and then fund the development of the best ideas based on
technical merit and applicability to mission needs.
On behalf of the dedicated and talented people who constitute
Sandia National Laboratories, I want to emphasize our commitment to
strengthening United States security and combating the threat to our
homeland from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is our
highest goal to be a national laboratory that delivers technology
solutions to the most challenging problems that threaten peace and
freedom.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you may have.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Nokes.
Dr. Cobb for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF DON COBB
Mr. Cobb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. It is a pleasure for me to be here and talk about a
very important part of the establishment of the new Department
of Homeland Security, namely, the part that's associated with
the ability to respond to threats of weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism against our own country.
My name is Don Cobb. I'm the Associate Director for Threat
Reduction at Los Alamos. I have about 30 years experience in
dealing with various kinds of threats, working in arms control,
nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. Over that period of
time I have had experience in developing technologies, from
radiation technologies to satellite-based technologies.
Los Alamos, about one quarter of the laboratory, something
over 20 percent of the laboratory, is involved in these kind of
threat reduction activities across the board. As you know, Los
Alamos is operated by the University of California for the
Department of Energy; has been for the last 60 years. So we are
uniquely, along with our brethren at the other labs, operated
for the country to do major missions that are broad S&T-based,
like the homeland security issue is today.
What I want to do is confine my remarks to the Nuclear
Emergency Research Team and try to elucidate some of the issues
that I think are most important in the setting up of this new
department to preserve the capability and hopefully enhance our
nuclear response capabilities.
First, let me say Los Alamos is involved in virtually every
aspect of nuclear emergency response, from threat analysis,
analyzing all source information to understand what the threat
is, to fielding detection diagnostics, radiation sensors, and
so forth, to neutralizing the threat, to making recommendations
how to--how to safe the device, whatever it may be. This is a
shared responsibility that I have primarily with the other two
NNSA laboratories.
The main point that I want to make, and I think General
Gordon made it earlier, is--made it for me, is that the NEST
tech base is not something that you can isolate as a piece and
transfer it to the new department. It does not stand alone.
It's the synergy of that tech base with the nuclear weapons and
threat reduction program at the laboratories.
For example, to give you the idea, there are over 100
people at Los Alamos that work at the Nuclear Emergency Support
Team. Only about seven of these are full-time people. The rest
of them are nuclear weapon designers, they're nuclear weapon
engineers, they're people who do radiological detection
development for sensors and systems. And it's those skills, and
also the specialized facilities that we have where you can
actually make measurements and utilize nuclear materials, that
make this a unique support capability. We need to keep that
synergy in the transition.
Let me talk to three specific issues that I think are
important to us that will matter but that can be resolved, I
think--or, perhaps not through legislation, but through just
negotiating the right roles and responsibilities between the
existing DOE, the laboratories, and the new Department of
Homeland Security.
First, about command and control relating to NEST. It has
to be clear, when NEST is under the authority of the new
Department of Homeland Security, under what conditions it
remains under the authority of the DOE. For example, under a
heightened threat condition, we may be deploying people or
looking at threats as part of our NEST responsibilities; we
will call people in to work on that. Under that condition, we
need to understand whether we are reporting to the DOE or
whether we are reporting to the Department of Homeland
Security.
Similarly, the RAP program, the Radiation Assistance
Program, has similar kinds of response to maybe State and local
responders. We need to understand whether they continue to do
that under the DOE.
So the roles and responsibilities, and to clarify under
what conditions these various responsibilities will occur
between the departments has to be worked out. And then we need
to jointly do exercises and drills and practices so we can
understand how this actually plays together in case and when
these assets are needed and they are called upon. So that's
one. The command and control structure needs to be clarified.
The second one has also been previously mentioned, but I
want to raise it again because it is very important. The R&D
that generates the technology that goes into the NEST programs
quite often comes from other programs, not necessarily directly
through the NEST program. It relies on and leverages other
investments that are being made in parallel that develop
related technology. Heretofore the DOE has accepted that
responsibility and understands that kind of relationship.
If the NEST R&D is rolled over to the Department of
Homeland Security as part of a total R&D package, it will sever
some of that leveraging, and it would have to be done very
carefully. I would argue in favor of keeping the R&D and the
technology integration as part of the NEST package and keep
that as part of the current DOE structure.
Then the third one I want to mention is legal issues. We
currently, working for the University of California, have clear
indemnification and liability protection for our people and our
institution in participating and supporting NEST activities.
That's because of our M&O contractual relationship that's
spelled out very clearly. If we move that over to the
Department of Homeland Security, again, we would have to
examine all those legal issues again, and at least they would
have to be redone, preserved in another way.
So my final comment is we currently work--when we are
called out, we have a DOE lead person in the field who leads
our NEST teams. That lead person for the DOE interacts with the
lead Federal agency. It might be the FBI, depending on what
kind of incident it is. So there is a clear mechanism for doing
this. The Department of Homeland Security could easily be the--
could be the lead Federal agency in certain emergency
situations, and we'd still have our DOE NEST team responding in
similar fashion. If we do that, if that's the nature of the
relationship that's set up, then I think all of the issues that
I've raised here are pretty straightforward in terms of being
able to handle them. If we don't, it's going to be much more
complicated.
So thank you. And I would be happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Don Cobb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Don Cobb, Associate Director, Threat Reduction,
Los Alamos National Laboratory
introduction
Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, for
inviting me here today to discuss the important issue of the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security and what its proposed role will
be in terms of dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear emergency response activities.
I am Don Cobb, Associate Director for Threat Reduction at the
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's Los
Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos is one of the three NNSA
laboratories responsible for maintaining the nation's nuclear
stockpile. At Los Alamos, I am responsible for all programs directed at
reducing threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. I
personally have more than 30 years experience working to reduce these
threats.
Today, I would like to discuss with you the emergency response
activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory, focusing on our
involvement and work with nuclear emergency response efforts, primarily
the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). In
addition to NEST, I also will discuss Los Alamos' efforts in responding
to biological threats and incidents, in particular the Biological
Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS). Responding to the
biological threat is an area in which our national capability is not as
mature as the capabilities that we have in dealing with the nuclear
threat.
nuclear emergency support team (nest)
Los Alamos plays an important role within the area of nuclear
emergency response. The largest and the most well-known team in this
area is the DOE-managed NEST team. NEST was created in 1975 in response
to concerns over nuclear terrorism activity. Its effectiveness is due
to well-established interagency relationships including significant
Department of Defense and FBI collaboration. NEST is focused on
responding to a threatened act involving radiological or nuclear
materials or devices. Among the range of potential terrorist threats
involving weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear response
infrastructure and capabilities are the most mature and capable of
addressing the threat. NEST includes the capabilities to search for,
diagnose, and disable an improvised nuclear device.
NEST depends on a team of highly dedicated individuals at the
national laboratories and facilities throughout the DOE-complex who
volunteer their expertise to this program. Los Alamos' NEST and related
activities are funded at approximately $10 million in fiscal year 2002.
More than 100 Los Alamos scientists and engineers are involved in
various aspects of the NEST program. Nearly all are involved in other
parts of the Laboratory's research in nuclear weapons or threat
reduction. Many of the employees who work part-time on NEST are
involved with more than one team within the NEST program.
It is important to note that NEST is more than a group of
scientists who stand at the ready with pagers on their belts, waiting
to be contacted to respond to a crisis. NEST team members at the DOE
and NNSA laboratories, including Los Alamos, are involved in a wide
range of related activities including research and development into
diagnostic tools, disablement techniques, and computer simulations and
modeling; working with the intelligence and law enforcement communities
on the analysis of threats and the development of analytical tools;
training of employees from other government agencies in environments
that allow hands-on work with the actual nuclear materials that they
might encounter in the field; and providing subject-matter experts when
required. Los Alamos has the lead within NEST for development of
nuclear diagnostic tools to help determine the nature of the suspected
threat device and for maintenance of what is called the ``home team,''
a group of experts parallel to those that would be deployed in the
field who can provide analysis, advice and technical support.
Los Alamos is involved to varying degrees in all aspects of the
national NEST program. The activities of the national team, and Los
Alamos' role, are as follows:
<bullet> Search activities--Los Alamos is primarily involved in
research and evaluation of detectors used for search.
<bullet> Joint Tactical Operations Team (JTOT)--JTOT is a partnering of
DOE and DoD expertise that provides advice or direct assistance
to render safe a suspect malevolent employment of a nuclear
device by terrorists or others and to perform a nuclear safety
assessment for the eventual safe disposition of the device. Los
Alamos plays a major role in the JTOT mission and is involved
in maintaining management oversight, render-safe capability,
diagnostics capability, emergency response home team
capability, a watchbill (a group of experts who are on call 24
hours a day, seven days a week, year-round), communications
support and deployable equipment, and contingency planning.
<bullet> Accident Response Group (ARG)--ARG is responsible for dealing
with incidents involving a U.S. weapon, commonly referred to as
a ``Broken Arrow.'' Los Alamos has experts on the ARG roster
who may be called upon if their particular set of knowledge is
necessary to deal with the given situation.
<bullet> Disposition--These assets support both the JTOT and the ARG
team, making decisions about the ultimate disassembly and
disposition of a device after it has been made safe to move and
ship to a remote location.
<bullet> Consequence Management--Following an incident, this team is
involved in the immediate monitoring of any potential
radiological dispersal and in monitoring and forecasting that
can advise responders on issues of evacuation and treatment.
<bullet> Attribution--This area involves drawing upon capabilities from
the U.S. weapons testing program to analyze samples and draw
forensic inferences about a threat device.
<bullet> Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)--Related to but separate
from NEST, DOE and Los Alamos maintain response plans and
resources to provide radiological assistance to other federal
agencies; state local, and tribal governments; and private
groups requesting such assistance in the event of a real or
potential radiological emergency. The Los Alamos RAP
organization provides trained personnel and equipment to
evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation of
actual or perceived radiological hazards or risks to workers,
the public, and the environment. This Los Alamos capability
supports associated activities throughout RAP Region Four:
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico.
biological emergency response
The biological science and medical communities responded to the
challenge posed by the fall 2001 anthrax attacks. Los Alamos has been
involved in responding to the attacks from the beginning, providing DNA
forensics expertise to assist federal law enforcement agencies in the
anthrax investigation. Our bioscience experts played an advisory role
in the decontamination of the Senate Hart Office Building after the
attacks, providing a strategy and advice for decontaminating the
building so it could be restored to its regular function.
Although more work and attention is needed in terms of biological
emergency response, significant progress has been made through research
efforts, many of which reside in DOE NNSA's Chemical and Biological
National Security Program (CBNP). For instance, Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory have been involved in research and
development of bio-detection systems as part of CBNP. One such system
to detect a biowarfare attack was demonstrated by Los Alamos and
Livermore at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. The system, called
the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), provides
public health officials with early warning of a potential bioterrorist
attack.
emergency response issues
The following issues related to transferring emergency response
authority and responsibility to DHS should be addressed.
<bullet> NEST command and control--It must be clear when NEST is under
the authority of DHS and when it is under the authority of DOE.
For example, continuous monitoring and surveillance looking for
threats could be under either department. Once authorities
under various options are clear, it will be important to
establish joint training to exercise the various options.
<bullet> NEST research and development and technology integration--
Heretofore, DOE has fulfilled the responsibility for NEST R&D
and technology integration. It is important to determine
whether this responsibility will continue in DOE or be
transferred to DHS. This is the underpinning for the continued
and improved effectiveness of NEST. Similarly, the ability to
respond to future biological threats depends on synergy with
the biological and health sciences.
<bullet> NEST legal issues--Legal issues related to liability and
indemnification for those that respond to emergency incidents
need to be sorted out and resolved. Individuals and contracting
entities responding to these incidents at the direction of the
federal government need clear legal protections.
<bullet> Biological Emergency Support Team (BEST)--The establishment of
a national BEST, perhaps modeled after NEST, should be
considered. Just as NEST relies on nuclear weapons and threat
reduction experts, a BEST will need to maintain close contact
with the biological and medical sciences communities.
conclusion
At Los Alamos, we will continue to work with DOE NNSA and the other
national laboratories to support the nation's ability to respond to
emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction. We will work with
the new DHS to ensure the continued effective function of these
emergency response capabilities.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Dr. Cobb.
Dr. Stringer, for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF LLEWELLYN W. STRINGER, JR.
Mr. Stringer. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me here today. I was here in October talking
about how emergency responders at local, State, and Federal
Governments were affected and what we needed. Well, I'm back
again today. I'm going to talk about how the homeland----
Mr. Greenwood. You did such a good job in October, we
wanted a repeat performance.
Mr. Stringer. Thank you, sir.
I'm going to talk about how this could affect local and
State governments, and how it could affect the national medical
response system and OEP.
In talking to my local, Federal and State cohorts, I really
think we could put all of this together and call it the need
for interoperability on a day-to-day basis.
It's part of my job with the State looking at grants, how
do we apply for them, trying to get the local and States to
understand the stakeholders, what we are going to need to do to
get them, and then all the many pots of money that are sort of
dangled at us at the State level for locals and State from CDC,
OEP, FEMA and many more. They all have different rules. They
all have different time tables, they all have different things
that we have got to try to understand and then explain to
others in the State to be successful in getting the grant and
using it. That's a real problem.
In North Carolina, we are trying to develop a single
unified terrorist plan, bringing the local and the State
entities together to develop strategies for equipping,
planning, training and exercising, so we have one plan,
wherever it may be in the State, whatever city it may be in.
This is very important. The planners in emergency management
need one standard set of grant guidelines provided by one
unified department for all WMD grants.
I want to compliment the Department of Health and Human
Services for the recent bio-state grant program. That was
something that was--we could live with and it was really
enjoyable to work with, believe it or not. I would recommend
that other agencies copy this.
We need funding assigned for program management and
equipment maintenance allowances. Most State agencies, local
emergency management, and public health agencies are bare-
boned. We have limited funds for planning and managing our
daily activities, much less new initiatives. I would suggest
that 10 to 20 percent of the grant funding be assigned for
program management and equipment maintenance. Unfortunately,
Federal programs have provided funds for training, planning,
and purchasing, but it stops there. If the Department of
Homeland Security doesn't follow through with a program that
assists the locals and the States with this managing and
planning, I'm afraid several years from now it will be like the
old civil defense disaster package hospitals, sitting somewhere
rotting, unable to be used.
Unfortunately, terrorism is not going to go away, and we
need to have continued support to organize a program and to
manage it. We need grants that are awarded at 100 percent, not
matching funds. I've heard rumors that FEMA's 2003 grants for
WMD are going to be on a 75/25 basis. I can tell you that in
North Carolina, and I suspect many other States, we can't
support this. We are having troubles on a day-to-day basis.
For the National Disaster Medical System and the Public
Health Service Office of Emergency Preparedness, it's finally
been recognized by Congress in the bioterrorist bill, and I
really want to thank you all for that support. It really was
greatly needed.
Until recently, NDMS has had little funding, has inadequate
staffing and accountability and minimum recognition from DHHS
on a regular basis. In years past, some snidely referred to
NDMS as the No Damned Medical System. This is no longer true,
sir. NDMS responds to help local and State governments when
they are overwhelmed with many crises, natural and man-made.
Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, air crashes, animal events,
the recent avian influenza, and terrorism. The network of
volunteers who step up to the plate and become part-time
employees of the U.S. Public Health Service in a crisis has
really been helpful.
I have a problem right now, an example with the Federal
Team, a WMD issue, which is my team, which is the National
Medical Response Team-East, housed in North Carolina, just
received one-sixth of our operating budget for 2001/2002. It--
to actually get the money appropriated by Congress, I had to
get assistance from my Congressman to get HHS to turn the money
loose. We were borrowing the money from a non-profit
organization to support a Federal team for basic operating
expenses. Eight months into the Federal fiscal year, I
considered canceling planned training activities because we
just could not afford to continue supporting a counterterrorist
type team. And if it's not important after 9/11, when will it
be?
In closing, you have got to have support for planning and
training and maintenance. We need to consider natural and man-
made disasters that overwhelm a State or local government. We
need not to reinvent a wheel. The FEMA's Federal response plan
has been around a while, and it's taken a good while for
everybody, including the Federal Government, to fully
understand it. It's got a counterterrorist or a terrorist annex
since PDD 39 came about, and I believe everybody started going
along with it now. Now, if we start something totally new and
try to reinvent a wheel, it's going to be another 3 or 4 years
at best before it's understood, and we will again have the same
problem on a day-to-day basis with interoperability not
present; and then in a crisis, whether it be by electronic or
face-to-face, we will have a problem.
This needs to be fixed. And I want to thank you for paying
attention to it.
[The prepared statement of Llewellyn W. Stringer, Jr.
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Llewellyn W. Stringer, Jr., Medical Director,
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, Department of Crime
Prevention and Public Safety
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me here today to discuss the issue of the establishment of a Department
of Homeland Security. I am Dr. Lew Stringer, Medical Director of the
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, Department of Crime
Prevention and Public Safety. I have a long history of emergency
management experience that ranges from services as a local EMS Medical
Director for 28 years, Director of the Special Operations Response
Team-a disaster organization in North Carolina and involvement with the
National Disaster Medical System through the Office of Emergency
Preparedness, USPHS since 1990. In October, 2001 I spoke to this
committee on WMD issues as it affected the local, state and federal
response community.
I am back today to address the issue of how a single homeland
security department could affect local and state governments and the
Office of Emergency Preparedness/ National Disaster Medical System.
During the preparation of my statement and in discussions with my
local, state and federal cohorts, this focus become the issues of
``interoperability''.
I have focused on chemical, biological and radiological response
activities, as I know them to be, and have chosen 3 areas of focus: 1.
Grants and funding; 2. Preparedness and planning at all levels; and 3.
Response efforts.
In my position in North Carolina, I have been involved for several
years in the ``Grant Process'' which includes: applying for grants,
explaining the grant requirements to state and local stake-holders, and
trying to manage the many different ``pots of money'' dangled in front
of my state by CDC, FEMA, OJP, DHHS and others. (They) all have
different requirements, different time tables, different folks to meet
with, and different ways to figure out how to be successful. In North
Carolina, we are striving to develop a SINGLE, UNIFIED terrorist plan
that must bring all the varied state and local agencies together by
developing, planning, equipping, training, and exercising strategies
into a single unified plan.
Planners in emergency management need a standard set of guidelines,
provided by one unified department, for all WMD grants. I want to
compliment the DHHS on the presentation of requirements for the recent
Bioterrorism state grants--others may wish to adopt their guidelines.
We need funding assigned for program management and equipment
maintenance allowances. MOST state agencies--local emergency management
and public health agencies--are ``bare boned''. We have limited funds
to plan or manage our day-to-day activities; much less manage new
entities. I would suggest that 10-20 % of the grant funding be assigned
for program management and equipment maintenance. Unfortunately,
federal programs have provided money for terrorist planning/training
and purchase of equipment but have stops there. Otherwise, Homeland
Security planning will follow the same path as the old Civil Defense
Packaged Disaster Hospital Program--nonfunctional, and useless--if
needed in several years. Unfortunately, the need for terrorist
preparedness will not go away and support for preparedness must be on
going.
We need grants awarded at 100% and not require matched funding. I
have heard rumors that the 2003 FEMA Domestic Preparedness grants will
be at awarded at matching 75/25%. I can tell you that in North
Carolina, and I suspect many other states, we can not afford that type
of ``support''.
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the Public Health
Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) have recently been officially
recognized by Congress in the Bioterrorism bill signed on June 12th. I
want to thank you on this committee for your efforts. Until recently,
NDSM had little funding, inadequate staffing and accountability, and
minimal recognition from DHHS. Some snidely referred to NDMS as No Damn
Medical System. This is no longer the case. NDMS responds to help state
and local governments when the locals become overwhelmed by natural or
man-made disasters--hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, air crashes,
animal events such as the avian influenza outbreak and terrorist
events. The network of volunteer personnel who become temporary
employees of the USPHS and respond has been gratifying, especially
since September 11.
Let me give you an example of my funding distribution problems:
My Federal WMD team, Nation Medical Response Team-East, housed in
North Carolina, has just now received the first \1/6\ of our operating
budget for 2001-2002. To actually get the money, appropriated by
Congress for OEP, I had to request assistance from my Congressman to
get the DHHS moving. My Federal team had to use the monies of a non-
profit organization, Special Operations Response Team's emergency
contingently funds, for a federal team's basic operating expenses.
Eight months into the federal physical year, I considered canceling
planned training because of the lack of released funding. Since 9/11
certainly, this type of team has never been more needed.
Now that you (Congress) have officially recognized OEP/NDMS and
created an Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness, who will
direct OEP/NDMS, I am hopeful that such funding distribution issues
will be resolved. Moving Public Health Preparedness, OEP and NDMS into
the Department of Homeland Security should improve these funding
distribution issues.
I suspect that others, involved in response, are also looking
forward to 100% coordination of efforts--for planning, funding and
direction from individuals who are tasked by Congress and our
President--to be 100% sure that services are 100% ready to make secure
our homeland.
We, in state government, need be confident in knowing that a
coordinated, unified Federal response to natural or man-made disasters
will continue under the Department of Homeland Security. The ground
work was begun years ago by FEMA with what is called the Federal
Response Plan, (FRP). Federal departments, offices and other Federal
entities come under, or are responsible for various emergency support
functions, when the Stafford Act is declared. As you know, the Federal
Response Plan has a Terrorist Annex since PDD 39, which further defines
the functions of crisis and consequence management roles. This plan is
fairly well understood by states and is followed by federal, state and
local governments.
If the primary consequence offices and agencies, as well as some of
the law enforcement entities, are moved from the departments where they
now function and are placed under the steadfast management of the
Department of Homeland Security, this should improve efficiency,
simplify the annual budget process, and reduce redundancies and
interagency competition.
A downside for a Department of Homeland Security could be a failure
of a service formally provided by the old agency plan not to be honored
under the new department plan. For example, when OEP requests from DHHS
the temporary assignment of USPHS Commissioned Corp personnel, will
that request be honored by DHHS when OEP is no longer under DHHS?
It is critical that in the new department, there must be a
prominent health care focus. Many of the critical services needed in
man-made or natural disaster are health care issues. There needs to be
an adequate physician presence-not just a health care administrative
presence ``to guide the Secretary in health care issues at all levels
of department operation.
In closing, I would like to speak about the critical need for
communication ``interoperability'', which has become a ``buss word'' in
Washington and in the state governments. In any emergency, first
responders need to be able to communicate with other first responders,
i.e. fire with medical, ambulance with police, and all with other
agencies who become involved. Mutual aid and the federal response
compounds the communication problem by brings more folks who need to
talk with each other together. Communications issues have been
mentioned in every disaster after-action report I have seen for years.
These communication issues involve cost for locals. This will be a huge
planning and funding issue that the Department of Homeland Security
must address.
I sincerely hope the new Department of Homeland Security will
resolve or, at best, improve many ``interoperability'' issues existing
today. The task will be daunting. In these difficult times, the aim
should be to make all of us successful.
Mr. Greenwood. We thank you, Dr. Stringer, for your
testimony again.
Mr. Plaugher.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD P. PLAUGHER
Mr. Plaugher. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. I am Edward Plaugher, chief of the Arlington
County Fire Department in Virginia. I appear today on behalf of
the Washington, DC Area National Medical Response Team, of
which I am its executive agent.
I would like to begin by thanking the committee for having
me here today. Issues related to terrorism and related
preparedness efforts have taken on a new meaning in our Nation.
Our region has been engaged for the previous 5 years prior to
the events of September 11 in educating Federal policymakers as
to the role of fire and emergency services in mitigating acts
of terrorism. The men and women of my fire department were
joined by thousands of others from the Washington, DC and New
York metropolitan areas in demonstrating that role last fall. I
believe we owe it to them and to the public safety good to move
forward as quickly as possible in fashioning the most rational
and workable national terrorism preparedness policy as soon as
possible. The public safety and the memory of 343 fallen
firefighter colleagues in New York City demand no less.
Since its inception, the Office of Emergency Preparedness,
U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human
Services, has provided an invaluable contribution to the first
responder community within our Nation. Creating and supporting
the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, DMATs, the Metropolitan
Medical Response System, and the National Medical Response
Teams, has provided not only financial support, but leadership
and direction in the most critical aspects of disaster
response, that is, the aspect of emergency medical care. It
goes without saying that without this program, our Nation would
not be as prepared as we are today to deal with both man-made
and natural disasters.
Long-range relation ships have been developed, and they are
vital to the success of the program. As we found on September
11, it is the upfront work that pays dividends during the
emergency event.
In addition, the last 6 years has seen the development of
both public and local assets under the direction of OEP. These
local assets, the Metropolitan Medical Response System, are
designed to deal with the consequence of weapons of mass
destruction incidents. Each NMRS has an order to get OEP
funding that's been required to develop these very critical
pre-incident relationships, bringing to the table disciplines
who routinely do not work together, but during a disaster or
terrorist event must not only work together, but they must do
so in a seamless manner. Sacrificing any part of this long-term
relationship building and seamless response to medical
emergency management must not be allowed to vanish.
Hence, my position on moving OEP to the new Department of
Homeland Security is somewhat tied to building upon a well-laid
foundation and not allowing this foundation to erode.
I have seen the vast matrix of Federal programs, that is,
the good, the bad, and the ugly. Direct relationship-building
and financial support for local asset-building has produced
outstanding results for emergency medical preparedness. OEP's
and NMRS' system has provided this focus and is good.
I have also seen the Department of Defense via the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 provide training and exercises
but fail to develop lasting relationships within a community or
a city. That is bad. And it continues to miss the mark now as a
Department of Justice program.
The ugly that I am referring to is the State and local
assistance program currently under way at the Department of
Justice. Even though well intended by Congress and meaningful
in amounts, over $100 million a year since Federal fiscal 1999,
almost none of the support has reached the first responder
community. Utilizing the States as a funding mechanism has not,
and I believe will not, work as intended. As the police chief,
my colleague in Arlington County, Edward Flynn, relates,
terrorism is a global act with local response.
Back to the concept of transferring OEP to homeland
defense. If the transition of the relationship-building
cornerstone crumbles, the transition is a giant step backwards.
Local response is built on managing a wide array of assets,
which is best accomplished in an atmosphere of trust.
On the other hand, if more direct assistance is provided to
local first responders with the State in the loop to provide
uniformity between States and within States but not as a
controlling element or as a barrier to assistance, then
homeland defense and OEP could benefit from a single
departmental alignment.
Again, I want to thank the committee for giving me this
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Edward P. Plaugher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward P. Plaugher, Fire Chief, Arlington County,
Virginia
Good Morning/afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
I am Edward Plaugher, Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department. I
appear today on behalf of the Washington, D.C. area National Medial
Response Team (NMRT).
I would like to begin by thanking the Committee for having me
today. Issues related to terrorism and related preparedness efforts
have taken on new meaning in our nation. Our region was engaged for
five years prior to the events of last September in educating federal
policy makers as to the role of the fire and emergency services in
mitigating acts of terrorism. The men and women of my fire department
were joined by thousands of others from the Washington, DC, and New
York metropolitan areas in demonstrating that role last fall. I believe
we owe it to them and to the public safety to move forward as quickly
as possible in fashioning the most rational and workable national
terrorism preparedness policy as is possible. The public safety and the
memory of 343 fallen firefighters in New York demand no less.
Since its inception, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, U.S.
Public Health, Department of Health and Human Services has provided an
invaluable contribution to the first responder community within our
nation. Creating and supporting the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
(DMATS) and the National Medical Response Teams (NMRTs) has provided
not only the financial support but the leadership and direction in the
most critical aspect of disaster response emergency medical care. It
goes without saying that without this program our nation would not be
as prepared as we are to deal with both man-made and natural disasters.
Long range relationships have been developed and are vital to the
success of the program. As we found on September 11th it is the up
front work that pays dividends during an emergency event.
In addition the last six years has seen the development of public
and local assets under the direction of OEP. These local assets, the
Metropolitan Medical Response Systems are designed to deal with the
consequences of weapons of mass destruction incidents. Each MMRS has,
in order to get OED funding, been required to develop these very
critical pre-incident relationships. Bringing to the table discipline
who routinely to not work together but during a disaster of
``terrorist'' event must not only work together but must do so in a
seamless manner. Sacrificing any part of this long-term relationship
building and seamless response to medical emergency management must not
be allowed to vanish. Hence my position on moving OEP to the new
department of Homeland Security is somewhat tied to building upon a
well-laid foundation and not allowing this foundation to erode. I have
seen with the vast matrix of federal programs ``the good, the bad and
the ugly''. Direct relationship building and direct financial support
for local relationship building has produced outstanding results for
national medical preparedness without this the ability of the first
responder community is greatly diminished. I have also seen the
Department of Defense via the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of
1996'' provide training exercise and expertise but fail to develop
lasting relationships within a community or city. That is bad and it
continues to miss the mark now as a Department of Justice program. The
ugly I am referring to is the State & local assistance program
currently under way in the Department of Justice. Even though well
intended by Congress and meaningful in amounts, over 100 million a
year, almost none of the support has reached the first responder
community. Utilizing the states as the funding mechanism has not, and I
believe will not, work as intended. As the police chief in Arlington
County, Edward Flynn relates ``Terrorism is a global act with local
response''.
Back to the concept of transferring OEP to Homeland Defense; if in
the transition the relationship building cornerstone crumbles, the
transition is a giant step backwards. Local response is built on
managing a wide array of assets, which is best accomplished in an
atmosphere of trust. On the other hand, if more direct assistance is
provided to local first responders, with states in the loop to provide
uniformity between states and within states, but not as a controlling
element or as a barrier to assistance, then Homeland Defense and OEP
could benefit with a departmental alignment.
I want to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to
testify and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And, for
your information, that is not a national alert; that is an
indication that we have a series of votes on the floor. For the
benefit of the members of the committee, what we will try to do
is in the next 15 minutes allow each of the three of us to ask
questions, and then we will be able to excuse this panel; and
then we will take a brief recess until the next panel comes up.
And let me ask a question, and I would ask, starting with
Mr. Plaugher and going to my left, with the exception of Ms.
Heinrich, because I have another question for her, this
question:
How ready do you think the labs and NDMS teams are today,
and the other Federal response assets are, to respond to a true
radiological or nuclear incident such as a dirty bomb? Are we
sufficiently prepared and adequately organized to handle the
threat now? And will the new proposal help improve such
preparedness? So if somebody detonated a dirty bomb in
Arlington, Virginia tomorrow morning and you had dead bodies
and you had people wounded and you had people potentially
exposed to radiological materials, how ready are we today, Mr.
Plaugher, and how do you see that improving with this
legislation?
Mr. Plaugher. I think we are very far off the mark as far
as for preparedness for a dirty bomb. I think we have focused
most of our energy on chemical, and we are now starting to
focus on biological. We have yet to begin the preparedness of
the nuclear program, and it's just been a matter of assets and
resources. We had to start somewhere. I personally chose to
focus on chemical attack because of the incident in Tokyo,
Japan, and the similarities between our system and their system
and what we thought was the likelihood of event.
We have also done a great deal of preparedness for
conventional weaponry. So if it's dirty bomb with conventional
weaponry, we will have some resources and capability to manage
that piece of it. But as far as for the other levels of
preparedness, we still have a long way to go.
Mr. Greenwood. Does this bill help us get there?
Mr. Plaugher. I think this bill will provide us with more
focus, which I think is much needed. Coalescing these long-term
relation ships, I've heard wonderful testimony today about the
NEST teams and about their ability. I do have a relationship
with a NEST team in the area, the one out of Andrews Air Force
Base.
So there is some capacity and some response capability.
But, remember, I'm in the 4-minute business. I've got to make
changes in the first 4 to 10 minutes of that incident scene, so
I need that equipment and training and capability there
immediately.
We just received recently some new radiological monitoring
from the Commonwealth of Virginia. So, I mean, we are working
in that direction, but we still have a ways to go.
Mr. Greenwood. Briefly, Dr. Stringer.
Mr. Stringer. From a local and State standpoint, we've got
a long way to go. As far as the NMRTA is concerned, I think
being under the Homeland Security will allow some
interopability and get to know the folks better, and I think
that should help us in any type of response, bringing in
Federal assets to assist a local government.
Mr. Greenwood. Dr. Cobb.
Mr. Cobb. Two quick comments. One, NEST has been focused
since its inception on prior information, and also focused more
on the higher-end threat, namely, a stolen or improvised
nuclear device. That's one point.
The second point is that while it's recognized that the
bolt-out-of-the-blue could happen, and we are moving in that
direction, something called the Triage program, I think
discussing that capability would be better in a different
environment.
Mr. Greenwood. Very well.
Mr. Nokes?
Mr. Nokes. Let's see. One answer is the Operation America
that Sandia conducted in Portsmouth, Virginia last month, where
we had about 100 first responders, including many from the
Washington, DC area, teaching them advanced bomb dismantlement
techniques. So if the device had not exploded, perhaps the
folks who had that training would have an advantage trying to
render it safe. If it had already detonated, the effects are
variable. They go from almost nothing to very tragic. And so it
depends a lot on what the effects were. But, as Don said, the
labs have been practicing for the very serious end of that
experience, a nuclear weapon, and mostly radiation devices are
within that envelope of practice.
Mr. Greenwood. Dr. Vantine.
Mr. Vantine. Mr. Chairman, if an RDD went off in Arlington
yesterday, we've already failed. I think the new department can
help in two ways: It can help regulate the materials at the
source, and it can help detect the materials before this event
ever happens.
Mr. Greenwood. Ms. Heinrich, very quickly. Do you think we
need better coordination between bio, the HHS and this new
department in order to be prepared for this kind of an event?
Ms. Heinrich. I think that the proposal for the most part
is broadly stated, and I think that we have to have
clarification on, as we have heard here before, the roles and
responsibilities. It's not always clear what the control
command relationships are. So, I think we need more
information.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm going to just
ask one question, and yield to my colleague from Colorado just
not to have to keep you around for about another 45 minutes.
Chief, you seem quite satisfied with your relationships
with HHS and FEMA. Except for the possibility of getting more
money, is there any reason to move these emergency response
activities into a new department?
Mr. Plaugher. Well, one of the things that the fire
services has said repeatedly to Congress is that we need a
national strategy, we need a national focus. And the coalescing
of that--and that is all of its subparts--into a single agency
has tremendous benefit to first responders in the development
of a national strategy. I'd just ask, as this goes forward,
that you allow the first responders to have some opportunities
for dialog and input into that national strategy. I mean, we
are the folks that are going to be there, we are the folks that
are going to have to manage the incidents.
So I think it does have some solid purpose and benefit,
because we have seen the absence of a national strategy because
of the splintered approach to date from the Federal agencies.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you. I'd yield to Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much for yielding.
Mr. Plaugher, let me just comment on what you are saying,
because I had a meeting in my district, which is Denver, with
the local first responders and the representatives of the
State, and they even have a difficult time figuring out who
should be giving them directions between the State and the
local first responders, much less coordination in urban areas
like my district between all the counties that are involved.
And I think you are right, there needs to be some kind of
directions, so long as it's not, you know, just another
bureaucratic layer. I really appreciate what you are saying.
I just have a couple quick questions for Mr. Nokes and Drs.
Cobb and Vantine about the labs. First of all, how will the new
Department of Homeland Security make the deployment of the
technologies that the labs are developing easier to deploy in
the field?
Mr. Vantine. I think what happens is that when DHS starts
funding the program and putting it together, they are going to
work the whole issue of the systems issue. And so when the
technology goes to field, it's going to be already coordinated
with local response, regional response, and national response.
It's going to be an integrative package. It's going to be
vetted at the national laboratories to make sure that it works.
It's going to have the best technology. So it will be a package
that we put out in the field rather than pieces.
Ms. DeGette. And you think under the current structure of
the Department of Homeland--or, of what's happening now, it's
just in pieces? It's not coordinated?
Mr. Vantine. I think right now we rely on largesse of other
programs. They do R&D in their areas, we take that and try to
apply it to this problem, but we don't have the resources to
put the technology that we really need on the problem.
Ms. DeGette. So you envision that what this department
would do, then, would be to take that technology and bring it
all together?
Mr. Vantine. Exactly. That's exactly right.
Ms. DeGette. The other two, any additions?
Mr. Nokes. I would make one comment, and that is, right
now, as you well know, no one owns the problem and so everybody
has a piece of it, and so we have a very tactical fragmented
approach of applying technology to the issues. And I would hope
that the new department is able to pull together the
requirements across the--what are now different agencies and
put together a coherent program, so you have good security that
is uniform across the country and that would be the best thing.
Ms. DeGette. We haven't achieved that yet, have we?
Mr. Nokes. No.
Mr. Cobb. Just a quick answer, over the past several months
we have been working with NNSA anticipating the possibility
that they'd be the lead Federal agency, or they'd have a major
role in integrating the technologies. I think much of that is
being transferred to the new department, that concept. We now
have a lead Federal agency to develop the R&D, so that focus
will help.
Ms. DeGette. Has this coordination that you all think is so
essential, and so do I, and is that part of a specific proposal
that you have seen or is that just your hope for what the new
agency would show?
Mr. Cobb. There has been discussion, but I don't think it
is in the framework of a specific proposal. Obviously, the
legislation is very broad so the details still have to be
worked.
Ms. DeGette. Right, and I think that is all of our issues
here today. And without, you know--without asking you specific
details of how this would work, do you expect you will be
consulted on how this coordination can be implemented in a
plan?
Mr. Vantine. I guess I would answer that I think we are in
a negotiation stage right now as to how that is going to work.
We are trying to talk to Congress and to the different agencies
in trying to put together the package of how it is going to
work. As you have issues with it, I think we have issues with
it too. We don't see the details and I think they will be
worked out over time.
Ms. DeGette. That is always true when you're talking about
a big bureaucracy, the devil is in the details.
Mr. Nokes. I think, one more comment, as I look at the
legislation, I see that science and technology is in the
infrastructure under the Secretary's office, and the other
Under Secretaries don't appear to have a science or technology
advocate. So I think you might want to have a chief scientist,
or somebody at the top that looks down at all of the technology
requirements and makes resource allocation and priority
judgments.
Ms. DeGette. That was very helpful and now we have to go
vote.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and the
Chair thanks each of our witnesses for lending your expertise
to this most vital effort and thank you again. You are excused.
The Chair would note that we do have series of votes and the
committee will recess until 1:35 and then we will bring forward
the fourth panel.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Greenwood. The committee will come to order, and we
thank our witnesses, and they are Mr. Philip Anderson, Senior
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Dr. Ronald Atlas, President-elect of the American Society for
Microbiology and Dr. Tara O'Toole, Director of the Center for
Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University and
thank each of you for being with us this morning and for your
forbearance in waiting for us. You are aware that this is an
investigative hearing and that when holding an investigative
hearing, it is the practice of this committee to take testimony
under oath. Do any of you have objection to giving your
testimony under oath? The Chair would also then advise you that
pursuant to the rules of this committee and the House, you are
entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you require or
ask to be represented by counsel. In that case if each of you
would stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. You are under oath, and Mr.
Anderson we will start with you, and you're recognized for 5
minutes to give your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF PHILIP ANDERSON, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; RONALD M. ATLAS,
PRESIDENT-ELECT, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY; AND TARA
O'TOOLE, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STUDIES,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Anderson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. It is an honor to be with you today to provide
my views on vulnerabilities and response capability at the
Federal, State and local levels for consideration in addressing
the President's proposal to establish a Department of Homeland
Security. The slide behind me depicts an area of contamination
in the District of Columbia resulting from a detonation of a
radiological dispersion device, an RDD, a dirty bomb, detonated
on the National Capital Mall area in the area of the Air and
Space Museum.
CSIS conducted in-depth research and developed this
realistic cross-jurisdictional crisis scenario with the purpose
of helping to frame the planning requirement for the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, led crisis
planning effort by identifying some of the key issues and
friction points that needed to be addressed. The exercise
portrayed the complexity associated with command control and
communications between Federal, State and local government and
the private sector and the general public.
The exercise participants included mid to upper level
decisionmakers and regional planners from the District of
Columbia and other local jurisdictions as well as
representatives from FEMA and the FBI. The results of this
research effort and the scenario were also presented to the
senior leadership of the New York City Police Department. The
scenario that was employed involved an explosive dispersal
device laced with radioactive Cesium 137. The scenario included
expected casualty rates, critical infrastructure damage
assessments, and effects across critical key infrastructure.
The addition of a radiological event pushed the recovery
portion of the scenario well beyond the scope of the exercise,
but it did generate additional thought with respect to future
planning. It's important to note that nowhere else in America
do the people charged with addressing emergency response and
recovery face a more daunting challenge than in the District of
Columbia. Nonetheless, the presence of radioactivity was an
issue that the participants were clearly not prepared to deal
with. This would seem to indicate that the greater Washington
region could be prepared for unconventional terrorist attacks
involving materials that have the potential of contaminating
large areas.
In the absence of well-developed plans and given the
complex multi-layer jurisdictions within the greater Washington
area, the actions of the Federal, State and local governments
could combine to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of
emergency preparedness and response, particularly for
unconventional attacks. If you were to ask most Americans to
describe their greatest terrorism fears, chances are that they
would suggest cataclysmic scenarios involving weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear biological or chemical devices.
These views have been reinforced by the media and by the
administration's recent spate of gloomy warnings. However, at
present, there are significant financial and technical
obstacles to terrorists obtaining and deploying effective
weapons of mass destruction. There is, however, another
category of attack that deserves at least equal attention from
government, the private sector and public alike. Not just the
high consequence, but very low probability weapons of mass
destruction-type attacks or attacks on the opposite end of the
spectrum involving a much higher probability, perhaps, a lone
shooter or suicide bomber, but yet another category involving
attacks that fall somewhere in the middle.
In retrospect, this mid-level space is where September 11
belonged and it is the space in which future terrorists will
likely operate. Terrorist attack scenarios in this category
typically involve unconventional tactics or weapons that
include dirty bombs like that in the scenario we developed.
From the terrorist perspective they assume widespread death and
destruction is an unattainable goal. So they seek long-term
disruption similar to that realized by the September 11
attacks.
Other examples include a well-coordinated attack involving
multiple near simultaneous suicide bombings nationwide or
targeting unsecured highly visible, nonnuclear aspects of
energy infrastructure, very soft targets like oil refineries,
petroleum or liquid natural gas terminals or perhaps tanker
trunks. These types of unconventional attacks are achievable
now and indeed well developed plans along these lines are
probably already on the shelf.
Most importantly, although they represent real
possibilities, their impact in many cases is far more
psychological than real, real in terms of loss of life and
injury. Facing up to these threats must not mean giving into
fear. Even as a Nation develops defensive technologies from
radiation and chemical and biological sensors to bomb sniffing
devices, citizens must be equipped with the tools to protect
themselves psychologically. An intensive program to create
public awareness can help avert the panic and paralysis attacks
like these aim to inspire. With the arrest last week of
Abdullah al Muhajir, Jose Padilla, the would-be dirty bomber,
the importance of educating our first responders and the public
in general about the new dangers we face is more apparent than
ever.
The response clean-up and recovery effort that would be
required following a radiological attack for example,
synchronized decisions at the Federal, State and local levels,
as well as in the private sector must be fully thought through
and incorporated in the comprehensive contingency plans. It is
also important that long-term economic recovery plans be
developed considering the implications of unconventional attack
scenarios. The means to develop greater public awareness and
acceptance of risks should be considered. As such scenarios
that can be employed in table-top exercises and simulations
should be designed and incorporated into the development and
testing of plans to address the possibility of unconventional
attacks.
While we would all like to believe that the dirty bomb
scenario represents a remote possibility, the evidence points
to the contrary. How real a possibility that a terrible event
like this could happen remains to be seen, but it is clear that
adequate preparation for unconventional attack is essential.
Addressing all the possible terrorist attacks is a daunting
challenge, but it is important to keep in mind that from a
terrorist perspective, the challenges are far greater. To kill
large numbers of Americans and destroy significant portions of
critical infrastructure is extremely difficult. The terrorist
must depend on psychological impact to achieve his objectives,
disrupting the economy, breaking our spirit and reducing our
confidence in our government.
By focusing on the most likely threats, increasing
situational awareness and empowering first responders in the
public with the knowledge they need, we weaken the terrorist
arsenal as we strengthen our own.
Mr. Chairman, over the long term, considering this new and
very dangerous environment, the President's proposal must be
acted upon to ensure unity of effort and clear lines of
authority, responsibility and accountability at every level to
effectively address the enormous complexity of securing the
homeland. The road ahead remains fraught with challenges yet to
be addressed, and we at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies are ready and willing to help. Organizing
effectively to ensure the security of American homeland is
essential to the safety of our country's citizens and to our
prosperity as a Nation. We appreciate the committee's
leadership on this issue and we look forward to helping in any
way we can. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Philip Anderson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip Anderson, Senior Fellow and Director,
Homeland Security Initiative, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
i. introduction.
Good morning Mr. Chairman--Members of the Committee. It's an honor
to be with you today, to present my views on ``Creating the Department
of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration's Proposal .
. . focusing on chemical, biological, and radiological response
activities proposed for transfer to the Department of Homeland
Security.'' Let me begin by saying that the statement I am about to
give represents my views and in no way should be taken as the
institutional view of CSIS. Before beginning though, let me provide you
with some background on the work we are doing at CSIS.
CSIS has completed a number of homeland security projects both
prior to--and since the tragic events of September 11. In January 2001,
CSIS released a report on the results of an eighteen-month study,
Homeland Defense: A Strategic Approach. In June 2001, CSIS co-directed
Dark Winter, a high-level simulation of a smallpox attack originating
in Oklahoma City. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, CSIS
convened an internal task force on terrorism, the results of which were
published in To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against
Terrorism. In March 2002, CSIS completed extensive research on the
impact of a ``dirty bomb'' detonated on the National Capitol Mall. This
in-depth research led to the development of a crisis-planning scenario
which served as the basis for the Council of Governments led ``Greater
Washington Crisis Planning Workshop'' which was held on March 21, 2002.
The results of this research effort and the scenario were also
presented to the senior leadership of the New York City Police
Department on May 1, 2002.
Currently CSIS is completing a White Paper on the challenges
associated with the creation of a Department of Homeland Security that
will provide actionable recommendations for decision makers for
consideration in this critically important debate. CSIS is also working
on a simulation exercise, patterned after our Dark Winter effort, to
focus on the vulnerability of U.S. energy infrastructure. Rather than
consequence management, this simulation exercise will focus on the less
understood--and explored--scenarios in which policymakers must decide
on whether and how to act in the case of a credible threat against
critical energy infrastructure.
ii. overview.
With the President's proposal to establish a Department of Homeland
Security, there seems to be a renewed sense of urgency in Washington.
When considering the number of threats we face from terrorists intent
on doing us harm, this would certainly seem appropriate. The Nation is
at war--a war that is occurring in many ways beyond the public's view.
There can be no greater public recognition of this fact than the
President's proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security.
I was asked to address response capability at the federal, state
and local levels for consideration in addressing the President's
proposal. In this new and very dangerous environment, it appears that
if enacted, the President's proposal would greatly simplify management
processes and unify the efforts of the 46 federal agencies that, to
varying degrees, have responsibility for Homeland Security. In
addition, the President's proposal would seem to represent an effective
starting point to ensuring the means to effective communication and
coordination between the federal, state and local governments to ensure
unity of effort and clear lines of authority, responsibility and most
importantly, accountability.
iii. the challenges.
CSIS conducted in-depth research and developed a realistic crisis
scenario to address a plausible--large--cross-jurisdictional crisis in
Washington, DC. The overall purpose was to help frame the planning
requirement for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
(COG) led crisis-planning effort by identifying some of the key issues
and friction points to be addressed. The exercise portrayed the
complexity associated with command, control and communications between
federal, state and local government and the private sector/general
public. CSIS facilitated discussions focused on how to resolve lines of
communication, authority, and responsibility in an unconventional
crisis environment.
The exercise was designed to present participants with a large-
scale terrorist attack on downtown Washington, D.C. in order to
facilitate discussion and identify questions to be addressed by a
coordinated response plan. The exercise participants included mid to
upper level decision-makers and regional planners from the COG task
force working groups as well as from the District of Columbia and other
local governments and from relevant agencies of the federal government
to include FEMA and the FBI.
The participant's role was to assimilate the events unfolding and
operate within their own committee framework to discuss and determine
the actions/recommendations they would take forward to superiors in
addressing the regional response to mitigate near term and long-term
risks. The exercise was not designed to be a decision driven war game
where actions/decisions were analyzed or critiqued against some ideal
or textbook solution.
The comprehensive scenario that was employed involved an explosive
dispersal device laced with radioactive Cesium 137. The scenario
included expected casualty rates, critical infrastructure damage
assessments, and effects across key critical infrastructure. The
addition of a radiological event pushed the recovery portion of the
scenario well beyond the scope of the exercise, but did generate
additional thought with respect to future planning. The scenario was
presented in three segments with the following questions providing the
framework for discussion: What are the key decisions that have to be
made? Who will make those decisions? What additional information do you
need? Where do you propose to get this information? What are the
critical interdependencies? Who will be the authoritative voice for the
public? How will you communicate risk to the public?
During the first segment, the participants were not made aware of
the radiation associated with the scenario and appeared to be
comfortable with near-term response procedures for dealing with a
conventional explosion and the resulting crisis. Overall, emergency
response procedures and coordination requirements were familiar at this
level, due in part to the events of September 11.
The necessity of having coordinated response procedures in place
became clearer during the second segment of the scenario that provided
the participants with the news that the bomb was in fact a ``dirty
bomb''' that contained Cesium-137. The presence of radioactivity was an
issue that the participants were clearly not prepared to deal with.
Issues that the participants felt were critical to address at this
stage were whether to shelter in place or evacuate the city, the
requirement for the President to declare Martial Law, the possibility
that METRO might be forced to shut down due to contamination, the role
of the media, the presence of radiation, emergency personnel
augmentation, and protective gear requirements.
The long-term implications of a radiological attack became
increasingly clear and overwhelming as the third segment was
introduced. The scenario presented participants with reports of
deserted D.C. streets and hotels, workers refusing to return to work,
and parents refusing to send their children back to schools that had
conducted field trips to D.C. on the day of the attack. These reports
were indicative of the deep, long-lasting psychological impact that a
radiological attack could have. The public has an inherent fear of
radiation, even though there is almost no danger of dying from exposure
to this type of isotope--only the potential for long-term health
implications in the form of increased cancer and cataract rates. The
participants felt that issues associated with long term economic impact
and recovery were critical to address in advance of this type of
attack.
It is important to note that nowhere else in America do the people
charged with addressing emergency response and recovery face a more
daunting challenge than in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, the presence
of radioactivity was an issue that the participants were clearly not
prepared to deal with. This would seem to indicate that the greater
Washington region could be unprepared for unconventional terrorist
attacks involving materials that have the potential of contaminating
large areas. In the absence of well developed plans--and given the
complex, multi-layered jurisdictions within the greater Washington
region--the actions of the federal, local and state governments could
combine to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency
preparedness and response, particularly for unconventional attacks.
iv. general recommendations.
At the heart of any effort to establish a Department of Homeland
Security is the requirement to address the likely threats. However,
defining likely threats in this new environment is problematic in that
they will likely derive from multiple sources with different objectives
and various means to do us harm. Defining the threat is risky but
absolutely necessary for developing plans to organize and allocate
resources to address the myriad vulnerabilities that exist.
Later this summer, the White House Office of Homeland Security has
said it will unveil a comprehensive national strategy to secure the
United States from future terrorist attacks. Governor Ridge has
emphasized that the strategy will be guided by a risk management
philosophy, ``focusing our resources where they will do the most good
to achieve maximum protection of lives and property.'' A risk
management approach is essential--but defining the threat, identifying
critical vulnerabilities, and developing effective capabilities to
address them are a daunting challenge.
With the arrest last week of Abdullah al Muhajir, the would-be
``dirty bomber,'' the importance of educating our first responders and
the public in general about the new dangers we face is more apparent
than ever. If you asked most Americans to describe their greatest
terrorism fears, chances are they would suggest cataclysmic scenarios
involving weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, biological, or chemical
devices. These views have been reinforced by the media and by the
administration's recent spate of gloomy warnings. However, there are
significant financial and technical obstacles to obtaining and
deploying effective weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But since the
consequences of a successful terrorist attack using such weapons would
be devastating the government is correct to focus significant resources
toward preventing these gruesome possibilities. There is, however,
another category of attack that deserves at least equal attention from
government, the private sector and the public alike: not just high
consequence but very low probability WMD attacks or the less severe
consequence but much higher probability suicide bomber attacks, but
those attacks that fall in the middle. In retrospect, this mid-level
space is where September 11 belonged, and it is the space in which
future terrorists will likely operate.
Terrorist attack scenarios in this category are typically
unconventional and include ``dirty bombs'' like the one described
herein which employed conventional explosives laced with radioactive
Cesium-137--which can easily be found in industry, hospitals and
medical labs. Or terrorists could develop a well-coordinated attack
involving multiple near-simultaneous suicide bombings nationwide. They
could also target unsecured, highly visible, non-nuclear aspects of
energy infrastructure--``soft'' targets like oil refineries, petroleum
or liquid natural gas terminals. These types of unconventional attacks
are achievable now; indeed well developed plans along these lines are
probably already on the shelf. But although they represent real
possibilities, their impact in many cases is far more psychological
than real--in terms of injury and loss of life. Facing up to these
threats must not mean giving in to fear. Even as the nation develops
defensive technologies--from radiation and chemical and biological
sensors to bomb sniffing devices, citizens must be equipped with the
tools to protect themselves psychologically. An intensive program to
create public awareness can help avert the panic and paralysis attacks
like these aim to inspire.
The response, clean up, and recovery effort that would be required
following a radiological attack for example--that synchronize decisions
at the federal, state, and local levels as well as in the private
sector--must be fully thought through and incorporated into
comprehensive contingency plans. It is also important that long-term
economic recovery plans be developed considering the implications of
unconventional attack scenarios. The means to develop greater public
awareness and acceptance of risks should be considered. As such,
scenarios that can be employed in tabletop exercises and simulations
should be designed and incorporated into the development and testing of
plans to address the possibility of unconventional attacks. While we
would all like to believe that the scenario described herein represents
a remote possibility, the evidence points to the contrary. How real the
possibility that a terrible event like this could happen remains to be
seen but it is clear that adequate preparation for unconventional
attack is essential.
Addressing all the possible terrorist attack scenarios is a
daunting challenge, but it is important to keep in mind that from the
terrorist perspective, the challenges are far greater. To kill large
numbers of Americans and destroy significant portions of critical
infrastructure is extremely difficult. The terrorist must depend on
psychological impact to achieve his objectives--disrupting the economy,
breaking our spirit, and reducing our confidence in our government. By
focusing on the most likely threats, increasing situational awareness
and empowering first responders and the public with the knowledge they
need, we weaken the terrorist arsenal as we strengthen our own.
v. conclusion
Mr. Chairman, over the long term, considering this new and very
dangerous environment, the President's proposal must be acted upon to
ensure unity of effort and clear lines of authority, responsibility and
most importantly, accountability at every level to effectively address
the enormous complexity of securing the homeland.
Mr. Chairman, the road ahead remains fraught with challenges yet to
be addressed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies is
ready and willing to help. Organizing effectively to secure the
American Homeland is essential to the safety of our country's citizens
and to our prosperity as a nation. We appreciate the Committee's
leadership on this issue, and we look forward to helping in any way we
can.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Anderson.
Dr. Atlas for 5 minutes. You need to push the button on
your microphone, sir.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD M. ATLAS
Mr. Atlas. Chairman Greenwood, members of the subcommittee,
we would like to thank you for inviting the American Society
for Microbiology to testify on issues related to the
administration's proposal to create the Department of Homeland
Security. The ASM has submitted a written statement which I
will briefly summarize. The ASM, which has particular expertise
in biomedical research and public health protection, supports
the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security that
would have oversight, coordination and leadership functions for
biodefense activities. We agree that the Department of Homeland
Security should be established to serve the important function
of integrating threat analysis and vulnerability assessments
and to identify strategic priorities for preventative and
protective steps that can be taken by other Federal agencies.
We believe that the Department of Homeland Security would
be able to work with the Department of Health and Human
Services and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases to pursue highly managed rapid paced and even
classified research and development projects, which are needed
to defend against the threat of biological weapons. ASM thinks
that having a strong science and technology component within
the Department of Homeland Security is essential and would help
provide critical linkage among the numerous mission agencies
charged with science development.
By having a strong science component, the Department of
Homeland Security would be able to play a vital role in
coordinating, reviewing and evaluating scientific and technical
programs relating to human animal and plant life. We need to
recognize, however, that biodefense research is part of the
continuum of the breadth of biomedical research aimed at
protecting the Nation aimed at infectious diseases. This field
is different than many other areas because of its duality and
the high degree of overlap with the public health and
biomedical research activities of the Nation.
We do not want to create a duplicative system. Rather, we
want a seamless, integrated and highly coordinated biodefense
response system. Therefore, ASM believes that it is critical
that a scientific health organization, namely HHS, continue to
prioritize and conduct Federal research relating to civilian
human-related, biological, biomedical and infectious diseases.
We feel it is important to distinguish between policy and
planning guidance, which would be well served by the Department
of Homeland Security and the responsibility and/or authority
for the direction, control and conduct of scientific research,
which should remain within HHS.
HHS and the National Institutes of Health are best
qualified to establish biomedical research and development
programs and to prioritize scientific opportunities and
research. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases bring to bear all aspects of biomedical research and
full capability of science to achieve scientific advances and
biodefense. The ability to build on the body of scientific
knowledge underpins the capability of the United States to
combat bioterrorism.
Because it is difficult to distinguish an introduced
infectious disease from a naturally occurring one, the
strategies to protect against either event in terms of new
scientific and technical approaches are the same. Since 9/11,
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has
rapidly accelerated work to protect the Nation against the
threat of bioterrorism. This acceleration has occurred across
the spectrum of scientific activities from basic research in
microbial biology to the development of vaccines and
therapeutics to research related to diagnostic system.
We fear that the proposal to transfer responsibility for
biodefense research to the Department of Homeland Security
could create unpredictability and loss of momentum for these
research programs, would very likely divert money from research
and would not be the optimum way to obtain the integrated work
of the best scientific minds. It is clearly not the aim of the
administration's proposal. We, therefore, feel that the HHS, in
consultation and coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security, should retain primary responsibility for accelerated
biodefense research and development programs.
ASM also would leave primary responsibility for planning
for such emergencies for the Centers of Disease Control and
prevention. We do not want to create a separate public health
system for biodefense. A public health emergency arising from
biological causes public health authorities must determine the
nature of the organism, distinguish between a bioterrorism
attack and a natural event, and respond rapidly to the health
threat.
Regarding the select agent registration program, the
administration bill would transfer this and the enforcement
programs of HHS to the new department. HHS currently has the
scientific and institutional knowledge and expertise relating
to dangerous biological agents, biosafety and biosecurity to
administer the program, and ASM continues to believe that the
CDC should be responsible for the select agent registration
program, which is key to the development of the Nation's
biodefense capability.
Further, the administration bill does not appear to
transfer the select agent registration and enforcement programs
newly assigned to the Department of Agriculture. ASM believes
that coordination and the registration programs for agriculture
and human agents is critical as was recognized in H.R. 3448.
The proper administration of the select agent program must
balance public concern for safety with the need to not unduly
encumber legitimate research and diagnostic testing. We need an
integrated program that adds protection against misuse of
microbial resources.
Therefore, ASM is recommending that an interagency group
with the involvement of scientific societies address the
advisability of removing the select agent program from HHS
authority. Finally, ASM's full testimony touches upon a number
of other specific issues. These issues include management and
oversight of the National Pharmaceutical stockpile and response
to infectious disease outbreaks, be they natural or intentional
and provisions relating to research programs and activities of
the USDA and DOE.
Each of these specific areas merits careful review by this
committee. In closing, I want to reaffirm ASM's commitment to
working with the administration and the Congress to achieve the
most effective and most efficient system in the world for
research control and response to the threat posed by biological
agents.
[The prepared statement of Ronald M. Atlas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald M. Atlas, President Elect, American
Society for Microbiology
introduction
The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) is pleased to testify
before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing on creating the Department of Homeland Security:
Consideration of the Administration's Proposal with a focus on
chemical, biological and radiological response activities proposed for
transfer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The ASM is the
largest life science society with over 40,000 members and its principal
goal is the study and advancement of scientific knowledge of
microbiology for the benefit of human welfare.
The ASM has worked with the Administration, the Congress and
federal agencies on measures to protect against biological weapons and
bioterrorism. Most recently, ASM provided expert advice on provisions
to expand the Biological Weapons Statute in the USA Patriot Act and on
Title II of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, which expands controls on certain dangerous
biological agents and toxins. ASM members are involved in research and
public health initiatives aimed at eradicating the scourge of
infectious diseases, which daily end the lives of thousands of
Americans and tens of thousands around the world. Infectious diseases
remain the major cause of death in the world for those under the age of
45 and particularly for children. They are the third leading cause of
death in the United States.
The ASM considers it critical that the proposed DHS build upon
existing science and technology programs that hold promise in the
defense against bioterrorism and in the effort against deadly
infectious diseases. We would like to focus our comments on issues that
Congress should consider on how best to achieve this goal.
the role of the department of homeland security
1. Role of science and technology in Homeland Security is Critical
The terrorist events of September 11 and the anthrax biocrimes
reveal the need and complexity of homeland defense. The ASM, therefore,
supports oversight, coordination and leadership for biodefense
activities in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Given that
science and technology will play a vital role in the biodefense of the
nation, the ASM believes it is essential to establish a strong science
and technology function in the DHS. This science component will provide
the necessary linkage between the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the numerous mission agencies charged with science and technology
development.
2. The Department of Homeland Security has an important role to play in
defending the nation against biological threats.
The DHS will have an important role in developing the nation's
defenses against, and responses to, biological threats. The role of DHS
should be to integrate threat analysis and vulnerability assessments
and to identify priorities for preventive and protective steps to be
taken by other federal agencies to protect the American public. The DHS
can coordinate, review, and evaluate scientific and technical programs
related to human, animal, and plant life. The DHS will be a proper
governmental vehicle to coordinate and to integrate the expanded roles
of mission agencies in bioterrorism related research. The important
role of the United States Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) should be recognized and strengthened
and it should interface with the proposed DHS.
It will be important to define the boundaries between DHS and the
mission agency with major responsibility for protecting the nation's
health, HHS. An appropriate coordination office or position should be
established within DHS. One approach, for example, would be for DHS to
establish a position or appoint a person with the appropriate
scientific background who would report to both the DHS Secretary and
the HHS Secretary. That person would also work with the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Institute of Allergies and
Infectious Diseases to ensure integration of threat and vulnerability
analysis about bioterrorism. The goal, of course, would be mutually
agreed upon research priorities that address threatening biological
agents.
Other mechanisms and/or functions may be needed for HHS and DHS to
serve the vital role of coordinating the pursuit of an integrated
research and development agenda for counter-terrorism, including highly
directed, high risk, fast-paced, classified projects, and to manage
between research results and applications to develop and evaluate
specific technologies and for procurement. For example, NIH/NIAID has
already accelerated basic and clinical research related to bioterrorism
to focus on ``Category A'' agents considered by CDC to pose the highest
threat. Last fall, the NIAID conducted a study to show that existing
stocks of smallpox vaccine could be diluted at least 5-fold to provide
immediate protection in case of a smallpox attack. NIAID also
accelerated screening of antiviral compounds for activity against
smallpox and related viruses and accelerated development of a ``new
generation'' bioengineered anthrax vaccine and a promising Ebola virus
vaccine. It has launched seven new fiscal year 2002 initiatives to
expedite biodefense research.
3. ASM recommends that HHS continue to be responsible for the
prioritization, direction, and conduct of federal research
efforts related to civilian, human, health-related biological,
biomedical, and infectious diseases.
Pathogenic microbes pose a threat to national security whether they
occur naturally or are released in a bioterrorism attack. Biodefense
research is part of the continuum of biomedical research aimed at
protecting the nation and the world against infectious diseases. The
capability to develop countermeasures and interventions is directly
related to information generated by biomedical research on pathogenic
microbes and the host response to these microbes. Therefore, it is
critical that federal research efforts related to civilian human
health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious diseases should
be prioritized and conducted by, and at the direction of, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
It is important to distinguish between oversight functions such as
policy and planning guidance and coordination, which would be served by
the DHS and the responsibility and authority for the direction, control
and conduct of scientific research. ASM recommends that HHS, a public
health and biomedical research agency of unparalleled success, should
continue to be responsible for the conduct and direction of scientific
research.
The Administration's Bill recognizes the necessity that HHS conduct
the research and development programs related to infectious diseases.
Section 303(a)(1) of the Bill provides that the Secretary of DHS shall
carry out responsibilities related to civilian human health-related
biological, biomedical, and infectious diseases through HHS and the
Public Health Service ``under agreements with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, and may transfer funds to him in connection with
such agreements.'' Section 301(2) of the Administration's Bill,
however, gives DHS primary authority and responsibility for the conduct
of national scientific research including ``directing, funding, and
conducting research and development'' related to biological threats.
Additionally, at Section 303(a)(2), the Bill provides that DHS, in
consultation with HHS, ``shall have authority to establish the research
and development program, including the setting of priorities.'' The ASM
believes that the proposed restructuring of program authorities in the
Administration's bill will create unpredictability for research
programs, will divert monies from research and will not be the best
approach to achieving the goal of civilian biodefense, which requires
the involvement of the best scientific minds and the support of
excellent science based on merit review.
The HHS, the federal agency with the major mission for protecting
the public health, is best qualified to establish biomedical research
and development programs, identify scientific opportunities and the
research approaches for ensuring that biodefense needs are met in the
best way possible. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) is best able to bring together all aspects of
biomedical research and the full capability of science to ensure
breakthroughs and advances of high quality for biodefense. The ability
to build on the body of scientific knowledge underpins the capability
of the United States to combat bioterrorism. For example, the national
response mounted by NIH/NIAID to AIDS demonstrates the capability of
science to respond to a threat. The response was based on years of
accumulated scientific knowledge and biomedical research that had been
well supported by Congress. The response to bioterrorism will require
the same long-term dedication of financial resources and scientific
talent.
The NIAID, working with the DHS, has the knowledge about scientific
capabilities to respond to threats and vulnerabilities related to the
biological sciences. It can identify the science and infrastructure
relevant to the most pressing issues and take advantage of the most
highly leveraged opportunities for research that can contribute to
counter-terrorism solutions. Because it is difficult to distinguish an
introduced infectious disease from a naturally occurring one, the
strategies to protect against either event in terms of new scientific
and technical approaches, including surveillance, prevention and
response, are the same. There will be dual benefits for public health
in that investment in research to develop new therapeutics, vaccines,
antivirals, genomics, diagnostics, sensitive detection devices and
innovative surveillance approaches for biological agents will carry
over to public health breakthroughs for all infectious diseases.
The nation has already seen the ability of HHS to respond to
bioterrorism. In the months since September 11, 2001, the NIAID has
rapidly accelerated work to protect the nation against the threat of
bioterrorism. This acceleration has occurred across the spectrum of
scientific activities from basic research in microbial biology to the
development of vaccines and therapeutics to research related to
diagnostic systems. It is critical that this work continue to develop
rapidly and efficiently without delay, disruption or loss of momentum.
A scientific health agency, HHS, rather than the nonscientific,
nonpublic health DHS should have the principal authority for developing
and prioritizing scientific and health related programs. Essentially,
therefore, the ASM suggests reversing the responsibilities identified
in Section 303(a)(2) of the Administration's Bill. HHS, in consultation
and coordination with DHS, should retain responsibility for accelerated
research and development programs, including prioritizing such projects
the public health system for biodefense
The ASM is also concerned that the nation not create a separate
public health system for biodefense. Therefore, the ASM would leave
primary responsibility for planning for public health emergencies
arising from biological causes with the HHS and Center for Disease
Control. At the earliest possible moment after the outbreak of a
contagion, it is critical to determine the nature of the organism and
to distinguish between a bioterrorism attack and a natural event. Then,
public authorities must respond rapidly and appropriately to the health
threat that either one would present. The ASM believes CDC should be
charged with these tasks.
Section 505(a)(2) of the Administration's Bill requires DHS to
carry out these functions under agreement with HHS. Again, the ASM
believes the important and appropriate role for DHS is to coordinate
planning and development of programs and to lend technical assistance
to the responsible agency. It is entirely appropriate for HHS to
coordinate and consult with DHS. As with the direction and control of
research, however, the primary duty and authority should remain with
the scientific agency with the existing knowledge, experience, and
expertise to fulfill the critical mission. A scientific person within
the DHS with the appropriate public health background and reporting to
both the DHS Secretary and HHS Secretary could work closely with the
CDC Director to achieve mutually agreed upon public health priorities
for bioterrorism preparedness and response.
administration and enforcement of the program for registration for
possession and use of select agents
Agriculture, the food supply, and the environment are potential
targets of bioterrorism along with humans. It is important, therefore,
to integrate and coordinate programs related to human, animal, and
plant agents. Section 302(a) of the Administration Bill transfers to
DHS the select agent registration and enforcement programs of HHS.
However, it does not transfer the select agent registration and
enforcement programs of the Department of Agriculture to the DHS.
Subtitle C of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act of 2002 mandated coordination of activities of HHS and the
Secretary of Agriculture regarding ``overlap agents''--that is, agents
that appear on the separate lists prepared by HHS and Agriculture.
Without doubt, such coordination must occur. Bioterrorism research and
surveillance extends and applies to infectious disease and select agent
research. The ASM believes that integration of the select agent
registration program inevitably will assist in the creation of an
efficient registration process thereby expediting registration.
The proper administration of the select agent program is key to the
development of the nation's biodefense capability and response and must
balance the concerns for public safety with the need to not unduly
encumber legitimate scientific research and laboratory diagnostic
testing. The ASM continues to believe that HHS has the scientific and
institutional knowledge and expertise related to dangerous biological
agents, biosafety, and biosecurity in microbiological and biomedical
laboratories and that it is best qualified to achieve the goal of
protecting the public health and safety without interfering with
research, and clinical and diagnostic laboratory medicine. Transferring
this program to DHS raises many questions with regard to the
administration of this program which must be carefully considered by
Congress, which recently enacted new legislation and additional
requirements for select agents. The ASM, therefore, requests that a
review be done by an interagency group with the involvement of
scientific societies to assess the advisability of removing the select
agent program from HHS authority.
each transfer of a scienific fundtion should be specifically reviewed
Some additional specific measures in the Administration Bill
require further consideration and comment by the ASM. The ASM continues
to study the Administration Bill to evaluate the best approach to
achieving expedited research that advances the defense against
bioterrorism but does not dilute the continuing, critical battle
against naturally occurring infectious diseases. The ASM suggests
expeditious review of the appropriateness of each transfer of a
facility or responsibility related to biological organisms from an
existing agency. Similarly, the proposed transfers within the USDA
should be carefully reviewed, in particular the justification should be
considered for transferring Plum Island which addresses animal diseases
but not incorporating the equivalent functional unit that addresses
plant diseases.
For example, as noted above, the defense against bioterrorism must
be fully integrated into the nation's public health system that is led
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Currently, CDC would
use the national pharmaceutical stockpile in response to infectious
disease outbreaks--both natural and intentional. Sections 501(3)(B) and
502(6) would transfer the Strategic National Stockpile to DHS. Such
transfer should be reviewed carefully during further consideration of
the Bill. HHS should be responsible for developing the materials in the
stockpile. Therefore, it seems appropriate for HHS to continue
management of the stockpile. The ASM, however, understands the
coordination and oversight function envisioned for DHS, and the final
resolution of the management of the stockpile ultimately must depend
upon the resolution of the scope and role of DHS responsibilities and
activities. At this time, we also recommend that there be an external
review of the CDC to ensure optimal preparedness for public health
emergences and bioterrorism and to ensure appropriate integration with
existing programs.
conclusion
We appreciate the opportunity to present this testimony. The ASM is
committed to working with Congress and the Administration to achieve
the most efficient and effective system in the world for research,
control, and response to the threat posed by biological agents.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Dr. Atlas.
Dr. O'Toole for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF TARA O'TOOLE
Ms. O'Toole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a physician and
a public health professional by training, so I am going to
restrict my remarks to those aspects of the proposed new agency
related to bioterrorism activities. First, I would like to say
that I support the President's call for a new agency dedicated
to homeland security. We are also extremely admiring of the
President's and the administration's initiatives on
bioterrorism, particularly over the past year. I think that the
R&D initiative situated in NIH as well as the funds now going
to State and local health departments for public health
preparedness reflect the President's recognition of the
importance of the bioterrorism threat as well as the unique
nature of this threat and the necessary response.
That said, however, I think the proposed reorganization as
it pertains to bioterrorism functions raises several serious
issues, and I would like to suggest some of them to you today.
As I look at the proposed new agency, it appears to be a tiny
island of bioscience, public health and medical functions
around bioterrorism concerns within a very large ocean of more
traditional national security and law enforcement functions.
This worries me.
First of all, my understanding is that the rationale for
consolidating many of these other border security type
functions into a single agency is to improve coordination,
cooperation and collaboration amongst similar functions and to
get them all under one roof. In the case of bioterrorism
programs, however, we would not be consolidating public health
and bioscience research functions, we would be splitting them
out to a new agency. This raises the specter of either, as Dr.
Atlas suggested, having to create redundant parallel programs
in homeland security in order to have enough leadership to
figure out what to do in these areas and do it properly, or
leaving one of the other agencies, either HHS or homeland
security with insufficient robustness and expertise to carry
out these important and difficult tasks.
The second problem that is raised by the proposed
reorganization is the question of talent. The Hart-Rudman
report talked quite eloquently about the crisis of competence
that the Federal Government is facing, and it noted that in
particular, we have failed to attract people with science and
technology backgrounds into the Federal service. This is a
problem we should confront now. Whoever belongs to this new
agency, I think the Congress would do the country a great
service if you could figure out ways to attracting young
people, particularly with scientific backgrounds into Federal
service.
I don't see that in the new bill as of yet. I would like to
list five things that I think are essential elements of any
department, whatever we name it, or whatever it is that has to
lead the Nation's biodefense and biopreparedness efforts. First
of all, as I said, they must have adequate expertise and
personnel. I believe the crisis of competence is already
afflicting the Federal agencies. And whether or not
bioterrorism programs move to homeland security, we must, we
must hire many new, I would say, at least 100 professionals to
deal with bioterrorism programs in CDC, HHS or homeland
security. This is for the medical and public health parts of
bioterrorism.
Second, one of the critical aspects of success in
bioterrorism prevention and preparedness is liaison with local
authorities. The core of bioterrorism response is going to
reside in hospitals, in clinics and in State health agencies.
The Federal Government has to enable those entities to work
properly. I am concerned that the programs already underway,
particularly the public health preparedness programs initiated
by the administration in February, are going to be disrupted
with this move or even the threat of this move. These programs
are getting started. The money is on the ground in the States.
Whatever we do, however we do it, we should ensure that
that progress is not thwarted. We will also, if we create a
homeland security agency as the home for bioterrorism
preparedness programs, be creating a two-stop shopping problem
for local authorities. They will go to CDC for traditional
infectious disease help and guidance. They will go to homeland
security, should we move the bioterrorism programs there. I
understand we are going to try to have tight coordination
between those agencies, but again, we seem to be splitting
rather than consolidating functions. That could be a real
problem for local agencies which have limited resources to
interact with the Federal Government.
Third, I am worried about sustained support. However we
configure bioterrorism programs, we are going to have to put
resources into these programs for many years to come. If we
move bioterrorism preparedness programs into homeland security,
we may lose the opportunity to build dual use programs, that is
bioterrorism response capabilities and systems that serve
routine organizational purposes in the medical and public
health field. That is not necessarily the case, but again,
moving it to a new agency threatens to create parallel systems
rather than one integrated system.
Fourth, we have to have a robust biodefense research and
development program. The President recognized this by granting
NIH the greatest budget increase in history in the past year.
We ought not to build this program from scratch, but we are
starting from very far back in the field. NIH does not now do
production and development of technologies. No one in the
government does it well. However we go forward with biodefense
R&D, we must engage the universities and the private sector in
this enterprise. That is where the real talent in bioscience
research lies in this country, not in the government.
The government, aside from NIH, actually has very few
bioscientists who are expert in R&D. So the new agency, whoever
it is, has got to be able to engage industry and the university
researchers and biodefense R&D.
Finally, I think that it is critically important that
bioterrorism and biodefense be seen as a top national security
priority. Coming from the Hopkins Center for Biodefense
Strategies, I am, as you might imagine, deeply worried about
this threat. I believe that this threat will grow considerably
in the next few years because the power and the diversity of
biological weapons is linked to advances in the life sciences
and these advances which will have great booms for human kind
are moving very, very quickly. That said, should we decide to
leave bioterrorism preparedness programs in HHS, we must make
sure that those programs don't get left behind and left out of
the national security policies planning and strategies. It has
taken several years to get national security experts to
recognize that it is essential to have public health and
medical people at the table making decisions about these
issues, and we should not lose that progress in the new move to
the new agency should we decide to go in that direction. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Tara O'Toole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tara O'Toole, Director, Center for Civilian
Biodefense Strategies, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Chairman, my name is Tara O'Toole. I am a physician and public
health professional by training, the Director of the Johns Hopkins
Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, and a faculty member of the
Bloomberg School of Public Health. From 1993-97 I served as Assistant
Secretary of Energy for Environment Safety and Health, and prior to
that was a senior analyst at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment. It is a privilege to come before you today to discuss the
implications of President Bush's proposed bill to create a Department
of Homeland Security. I shall confine my remarks to those aspects of
the bill which deal with bioterrorism preparedness and biodefense
activities.
I strongly support the formation of a federal department of
Homeland Security as outlined by the U.S. National Commission on
National Security in the 21st Century (the ``Hart-Rudman report''). It
makes great sense, as President Bush has advocated, to consolidate some
of the many departments and agencies that share similar functions
pertaining to border security, customs procedures, etc. in order to
achieve greater collaborative power, efficiency and accountability.
There are some potential advantages to be gained from placing
bioterrorism preparedness and biodefense research and development
activities in a new federal agency. The activities dealing with the
biodefense mission are profoundly important to the nation's security
and deserve the attention and support the new agency is likely to
command in the coming years. If biodefense activities do not reside in
the Homeland Defense Department, there is some peril that these crucial
functions will be neglected. It is also important that the operational
public health and medical biodefense functions are integrated with
national security objectives and that biodefense experts be full
participants in national security policymaking and strategic planning.
I do, however, have serious concerns about the implications of
moving bioterrorism preparedness programs and biodefense activities
into the new agency, at least in the form presently envisioned.
A bioterrorist attack would be unlike any other type of terrorist
assault. This would not be a ``lights and sirens'' event with
firefighters, police and emergency rescue teams rushing to the scene of
attack. We will know we have been attacked with a biological weapon
when victims become ill and report to doctors' offices and emergency
rooms. The ``first responders'' to bioterrorism will be physicians and
public health professionals from state and local health agencies. The
center of action will be hospitals, clinics and laboratories.
Bioterrorism response activities--which will involve actions needed to
treat the sick and perhaps stem the spread of contagious disease--are
quite different from the emergency response to other types of
catastrophic terrorism or to natural disasters.
Allowing for the inevitable transition period of confusion and
adjustment, it is likely that the new agency will be more successful in
instilling work habits of cooperation and collaboration to the extent
that the agency's mission is coherent and tightly interconnected. It is
not clear to me how or whether simply combining highly diverse
functions from dozens of existing agencies under a single department
results in better coordination or operational accountability. The
description of the new department seems to envision an agency that is
largely dedicated to security functions--border protection and control,
vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructures, etc. The
bioterrorism related programs and the scientific research and
development aspects of the proposed department seem strikingly
different from everything else the agency would handle.
President Bush exercised admirable leadership this winter when he
greatly increased funding for bioterrorism preparedness programs in
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and initiated a
significant investment in bioterrorism research and development to be
administered through the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
anthrax attacks of 2001 revealed that considerable improvement is
needed in the nation's ability to respond to such attacks. In the past
six months, notable progress has been made by the DHHS Office of Public
Health Preparedness (OPHP). The OPHP has set sound goals for upgrading
local medical and public health response capabilities, and the
``critical benchmarks'' it has demanded state health authorities
achieve will provide clear indications of progress. We should consider
disassembling and transferring this successful effort to the new
department only after careful deliberation of what might be lost in the
process. A recent poll reports that most Americans would seek and trust
the advice of CDC during a public health emergency. It is unclear if
such public confidence would transfer to the new department.
Part of the rationale behind the formation of a Homeland Security
agency, as I understand it, is to combine similar functions--such as
border control, customs services and immigration policy, etc.--within a
single department, thereby enhancing program focus, fostering
cooperation and collaboration and improving operational effectiveness.
Yet moving bioterrorism programs from the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to the proposed new agency will likely impede all
these goals. Instead of consolidating similar programs, the proposed
agency would split bioterrorism preparedness programs from the related
but more encompassing mission of public health protection which is
DHHS' main objective.
Rather than producing organizational coherence the proposed move
would require that parallel capacities be created in both DHHS and the
new agency. Homeland Security could not hope to lead the development of
an effective bioterrorism response capability unless it were staffed
with health officials and scientists having considerable expertise and
experience in infectious disease, epidemic control, laboratory
diagnosis, etc. Again, the country would be forced to create parallel
workforces: one in Homeland Security for bioterrorism preparedness and
another in DHHS for ``normal'' public health functions.
Moving bioterrorism programs to Homeland Security would disturb the
existing relationships between DHHS bioterrorism programs and the state
and local public health departments and health care facilities which
are the central core of bioterrorism response. This is an especially
important consideration right now, when the federal grants to state
health departments are just hitting the streets and programs to upgrade
response capacities at the city, county and state level are getting
started. Changing the federal partner for these path-breaking grants
will almost inevitably slow progress in this critical arena.
Moving bioterrorism preparedness and response activities out of
DHHS may also sacrifice opportunities to construct dual use programs.
Ideally, one would design bioterrorism response systems that also serve
routine organizational purposes. There is a real danger that by
sequestering bioterrorism programs in Homeland Security, they will be
treated as ``emergency use only'' functions or seen as such, reducing
the efficiency of preparedness efforts, and quite possibly compromise
response effectiveness.
Bioterrorism is, arguably, the type of terrorism with which the
country is least familiar and for which the United States is least well
prepared. A bioterrorist attack could be calamitous, killing many
thousands of people in the initial assault. The consequences would be
sustained and the crisis could continue for weeks or months, especially
if the weapon used were a contagious disease. The economic and social
disruption would be significant--as was seen in the aftermath of the
2001 anthrax attacks when only 22 people were infected with a disease
treatable with antibiotics. According to the Defense Science Board, we
currently have countermeasures of some effectiveness (vaccines, drugs)
for only 13 of the 50 pathogens most likely to be used as bioweapons.
In addition, the institutions and infrastructures which would be at the
core of bioterrorism response--health care organizations and the public
health system--are financially frail, highly stressed, and have almost
no capacity to contend with a sudden surge in demand for care.
These factors make it imperative that we make significant headway
quickly in our capacity to manage bioterrorist threats. If one looks at
the description of the proposed department, bioterrorism-related
activities appear to be a tiny island of bioscience, medical and public
health functions within a gigantic ocean of security and border control
operations. I am skeptical that such an odd coupling can be made to
work, particularly in the short term when there is such need for rapid
progress.
I am especially worried about the fate of science and technology
within the proposed department. Although there is clearly value in
linking national security needs to research and development priorities,
it is a very tall order to ask a single agency to develop national
security strategy and implement operations on the scale envisioned for
Homeland Security AND create a sophisticated scientific research and
development capability over a broad range of disciplines and
technologies.
Furthermore, we should have no illusions that creating a viable
biodefense R&D capability is merely a matter of transferring or
consolidating existing capabilities and programs. Regardless of how
biodefense R&D programs are structured, the US government will have to
build its capacity in these areas far beyond our present state. This
nation has tremendous talent in bioscience and biotechnology--but the
majority of talent lives in universities and the private sector, not in
government. Any successful biodefense strategy must find ways to engage
top scientists and young scientists in these sectors. Creating a robust
biodefense R&D capability should be a top national security priority
however we eventually design the architecture of biosecurity functions.
Bioterrorism must be considered a special category of terrorist
threat. The potential power of bioweapons is easy to lose sight of in
the aftermath of the thankfully limited anthrax attacks of 2001. But it
is important to keep in mind that bioterrorism occupies a special
category of terrorist threat that deserves careful scrutiny. The Hart-
Rudman Commission noted in its first volume of analysis that
``. . . the most serious threat to our security may consist of
unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups
using genetically engineered pathogens.'' [US Commission on
National Security/21st Century, Sept. 15, 1999]
As we design programs to prevent and respond to bioterrorist
attacks we must proceed carefully, especially so since these weapons
are largely unfamiliar to policy experts. However we decide to proceed
in organizing federal bioterrorism activities, the nation's ability to
respond to mass casualty situations and to effectively contain spread
of contagious disease remains a grave concern. We must use our
prodigious talent in bioscience to create the vaccines and therapies
needed to respond to the bioweapons of today and of the future. We
cannot afford a pause or loss of momentum in accomplishing these tasks.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Dr. O'Toole.
The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for inquiry. Dr.
Atlas, in your testimony on page 3 you said the role of DHS
should be to interrogate threat analysis and vulnerability
assessments and to identify priorities, and I underscore
priorities for preventative and protective steps to be taken by
other Federal agencies to protect the American public. DHS can
coordinate, review and evaluate scientific and technical
programs relating to human animal and plant life. It seems to
me you support some role for the new Secretary with respect to
public health R&D and preparedness grants, including in some
instances having the Secretary set the priority for such
activities. Can you explain the distinction you are proposing
and some alternative models such as dual reporting?
Mr. Atlas. Yes, in a couple of ways. We see a very
important strategic role for the new Secretary. The new
Secretary will bring more of the intelligence community of the
overall government perception of threat to human health and
services for incorporation into the Nation's R&D plan. We could
well imagine that the Assistant Secretary that has been
discussed by your subcommittee today having a dual reporting
responsibility, and I know that is normally very difficult, but
we are dealing with such a complex issue with such duality,
such overlap that we think that perhaps such a unique solution
of having an individual with the health background that we need
being able to assist both the Secretary of HHS and the
Secretary of DHS in this area.
Mr. Greenwood. Let me ask a question of Dr. O'Toole. I
understand that you support the increased flexibility in the
administration's proposal for personnel-related decisions. You
talked about the need to bring young scientifically trained
people in the government, and to do it as quickly as possible.
Why is it necessary, in your opinion, for there to be this
civil service rule flexibility for this new agency?
Ms. O'Toole. Well, I think it wouldn't be necessary if we
were allowed to hire several thousand new FTEs into the Federal
Government. But absent that, in order to get a new skill mix
into the government, it has been my experience that it was
necessary to be able to move people in and out in ways that
were not permitted by the civil service regulations.
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Anderson, what additional measures to
coordinate the Federal, State and local response to a nuclear
attack have been implemented subsequent to the Air and Space
Museum exercise?
Mr. Anderson. In following conversations I have had with
local first responders, public safety, public health folks,
there seems to be a great deal of momentum. I am not convinced
that we are anywhere near close to being able to solve this
problem and address it effectively. But at least the situation
awareness exists that didn't exist previously, and I think that
is going to lead to effective processes and procedures and
hopefully equipment procurement, and all of the coordination
that has to occur between the 17 surrounding jurisdictions in
order to effectively deal with this.
Mr. Greenwood. Did this exercise exclusively look at the
consequences to the post explosion, or did you look at
questions at all as to the access to the Cesium, for instance?
Mr. Anderson. We developed the back end of this thing
completely. We selected Cesium as the radioactive material,
simply because it is readily available and there's enough of it
missing or unaccounted, for according to the NRC, that it's
reasonable to believe that it could have fallen into terrorists
hands right here in this country.
Mr. Greenwood. What are the sources of it?
Mr. Anderson. Medical research, cancer research, cancer
treatment. It has industrial applications with various types of
diagnostic equipment. It is out there in large amounts. It
would take a pound and-a-half to do what the slide depicted.
And that was a DOD model that just plugged in 1,043 curies of
Cesium 137, or a pound and a half and 4,000 of TNT. We
absolutely believe--well, when we began, we thought it was a
very remote possibility.
We only selected a dirty bomb because we were looking for a
cross-jurisdictional crisis that would help in their planning
effort. When we finished the research--and again it included
all the back-end stuff like where are you going to get the
materials and where are you going to get a school bus and all
the rest. We absolutely believe this a real possibility. How
real remains to be seen, but real enough that we need to think
it through in terms of how we are going to respond.
Mr. Greenwood. My time has expired. The gentleman from
Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. O'Toole,
obviously you listened to Mr. Anderson's testimony in terms of
the threat of biological and chemical, which is not something
that he discounts, but is describing as very far away. Would
you characterize those the same way he did?
Ms. O'Toole. No.
Mr. Deutsch. Do you want to elaborate on that?
Ms. O'Toole. I think it is quite possible there could be a
large bioterrorism attack in this country. It is very easy to
do. The materials are at least as available as those necessary
for a dirty bomb, although I agree with Mr. Anderson that a
dirty bomb is also quite feasible. It's also possible that
several small or a medium-sized biological attacks could be
levied upon the United States and we would have a very
difficult time figuring out what was going on and how to
respond to it. As we saw with the anthrax attacks, which is
only 22 cases, it doesn't take thousands and thousands of
people being killed in order to cause disruption and economic
loss.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me follow up with the issue at hand which
is our responsibility in terms of the proposal of the
Department of Homeland Security. You have expressed grave
doubts about this new department that it will have the capacity
to address bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreaks. How
would you envision if you were writing the legislation, how
would you structure the public health research and response
system?
Ms. O'Toole. Well, as I said, first of all, I would hire
more people into the system with appropriate expertise. I think
that we need to build a much more operational Federal public
health capacity that is able to go into the field, figure out
the epidemiology.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me make my question clearer. The people on
the appropriation side, we are the subcommittee that
authorizes, but will be involved at a direct level in terms of
actually structuring. The issue that we have talked about this
whole day so far is how much is HHS doing now in basically
biologicals with the component--and, you know, I have spent
some time at CDC and talked to them and they seem to have an
incredible, sophisticated, well-run operation now, but the
concept is to take that out of HHS and CDC and bring it into
homeland security.
So the issue in front of us is there seems to be some
that's coming out and some that's staying in. I mean, would
your advice be keep it in one place, whether it is HHS or bring
everything over to homeland security, or Dr. Atlas suggested--I
will be honest with you. I heard what you said. I don't think
it is possible. The whole point of doing this is you have two
people responsible and no one is going to be responsible as
creative as you want to be. So I think--and Dr. Atlas, I would
be happy for you to respond. But Dr. O'Toole, you can just
respond specifically about that issue.
Ms. O'Toole. If I had a magic wand in hand, I would keep it
in HHS and make it more robust. I would, however build in
mechanisms to both coordinate activities between HHS and
homeland security as well as to ensure that bioterrorism gets
appropriate notice and someone is accountable for bioterrorism
and HHS. I think the bioterrorism functions are basically
medical and public health functions. It's going to be really
hard to transplant them into this new security agency. It's
possible maybe 10 years from now, it will be highly desirable.
But in the near term, as I said, we run the risk of disrupting
our capabilities in this area with this transplant.
Mr. Deutsch. Would that mean there is no advantages of
thinking about the sort of public health response from a
terrorism basis or just a naturally occurring event basis. Do
you gain anything about that in sort of the discovery process
or treatment process or prevention process?
Ms. O'Toole. No. What you would gain is focus and attention
directed toward bioterrorism. It would clearly be a national
security priority, and it would be funded that way. And the
people dealing with bioterrorism would be part of the national
security inner circle. Public health is not now at the Federal
or State level on the hot water circuit. That presumably would
change to some extent. But again, I think you would lose a lot
of functional capacity, at least in the near term with the
move.
Mr. Deutsch. This is obviously a decision that Congress is
making over the next several months, and I think your
perspective--and all three of your perspectives are unique in
terms of the panels we have had up to this point. Hopefully--I
know our staffs are interacting with you. But clearly, the
direction of everyone up to you and the direction that most of
us are at least coming from, and I think we still have open
minds and this is what this whole process is about is that we
are really talking about taking it away or setting up a two
tiered system. And again having some experience no where in the
orders of magnitude your experience with this and I know you're
being sincere with your belief and based on your background, I
think it's something we need to take very seriously.
If you could just work with us because all of us are trying
to get to the same goal, but the opinions you are expressing
really are a minority opinion which might be the correct
opinion but I think if I could encourage you to interact with
our staffs and with members directly because you know, I think
we have the ability to influence it and shape it the correct
way.
And as strongly as you can be--this is not politically
driven, it's not anything driven. It's just trying to come to
the best outcome. And I hear exactly what you're saying. Dr.
Atlas, if I could give you the opportunity to respond.
Mr. Atlas. I suggested what may be even more complicated,
one individual, an individual who could serve that coordinating
function, that integration between two secretaries. Like Dr.
O'Toole and the testimony clearly indicated that HHS should
retain the authority over the biomedical research and the
public health response, but clearly, there is this new function
of homeland security. There is a real need for it. It brings
other assets of the government to bear and it is somehow
linking those that we are, I think, debating as we are going
back on this, and I do see the possibility that appropriate
high level individual who can walk back and forth between the
two with great freedom would be a valuable asset in homeland
defense.
Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Chairman, if I could just, for 15 seconds,
kind of follow up with my last comment. But having spent some
time at CDC I think, Dr. O'Toole, what you are specifically
talking about where there are people there who basically made
their career there and they seem to be able to attract the best
and brightest within their little world of doing this
biological. And I agree with you completely, this is really an
individual basis. I mean, you need some incredibly bright--the
brightest of the brightest people in the world looking at this
to understand it. And if we are going to create a culture where
we are not going to be able to attract and keep those people,
it is going to be a failure. There is going on within HHS. Is
there is at least, from a laymen's perspective, there is a
culture that has been able to attract the brightest of the
bright, even if the salary structure is not as good as it could
be, and even if we can do a lot more. But we have got some
people there who really are the best of the best, and I guess
my real concern, which I hear you saying a little bit is, if we
move this over to a new agency without any history, without any
culture without any understanding how--you just can't move the
whole function and move it over.
Ms. O'Toole. Could I clarify just a minute, Mr. Chairman. I
think you can move it but you better prepare that ground. I
also think that you have to significantly revamp the CDC
operation and bring a lot more people than had been coming into
CDC in to do bioterrorism work in the near future. Either way,
I think that the bioterrorism functions deserve a lot of
attention and consideration. But what you don't want to do is
break the operations that are now beginning to work out of HHS.
They are young. They are like new chutes. If you transplant
them too early into hostile soil, it's not going to work.
Mr. Greenwood. Chair thanks the gentleman. The gentlelady
from Colorado is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. O'Toole, I really
empathize with what you're saying, and I think part of the
problem we have since the details of this proposal aren't
completely fleshed out, it is hard for us to exactly see what
would happen. But here's something that I kind of wanted to
throw back at you, and if the gentlemen would like to answer
it, that would be great, too.
The problem with biological and also chemical warfare is
that it really cuts across many agencies and many disciplines
and the GAO's testimony today talked about--really highlighted
the types of problems when you're dealing with competing
authorities among different agencies. With the recent anthrax
events that you referred to, for example, local officials were
complaining that the FBI and the public health officials had
competing priorities about handling specimens, and this proved
problematic because the FBI was briefing FBI officials, and
local health departments didn't know what was going on and
first responders.
I saw some of this in a town hall meeting--wasn't a town
hall meeting, but a meeting with first responders talking about
anthrax in Denver and the Postal Service employees in Denver
got into a big argument with the State and with the FBI local
offices there because the Postal Service couldn't get the FBI
to test questionable specimens, and the Post Office didn't know
what to do with them.
And I hear what you're saying, but I wonder, does the
solution of hiring more people really help resolve issues of
how do you prioritize and how do you deal with these
interdisciplinary issues, and maybe you have some idea and I
would like to hear it, because I think it would help all of us.
Ms. O'Toole. Hiring more people doesn't solve all problems.
But I think some of the problems you mentioned would be at
least alleviated to some extent if we had more realistic
exercises so the people got used to working together and they
had a better sense of what the protocols would be in an actual
crisis. That was part of the problem in the anthrax response.
It was sheer confusion. It was also lack of expertise. You had
person A saying A and person B saying something else.
So getting our acts together actually is going to be a real
challenge, no matter where the bioterrorism functions lie
within the Federal bureaucracy. So hiring people is not a one-
size-fits-all solution, but if you had more people, you could
run more exercises and train more people. I think it would
help.
Ms. DeGette. How would you deal with the interdisciplinary
issues that are such a problem right now?
Ms. O'Toole. The interdisciplinary issues are always going
to be there.
Ms. DeGette. If you have one per--if you had a correctly
structured agency where one person was in charge of saying
here's the protocol for who's notified.
Ms. O'Toole. You can do that no matter how you structure
the organization. The problem is anticipating that we're going
to have to be dealing with the Post Office, okay. There is an
infinite number of scenarios that one can imagine for these
nontraditional attacks and we need to create organizations that
are expert enough and inventive enough and nimble enough to
respond appropriately to things we never imagined before.
Now all of the literature and all of the experience of
emergency disaster personnel and scholarship shows that
planning is the one thing that seems to help get people ready
for the next unexpected disaster, not because you put together
plans that you use, not because you generate protocols that you
snap into place, but because people know each other and they
work better, particularly when they have to invent th |
