 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration's Proposal
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Dr. Wayne J. Shotts
OPENING REMARKS
Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I am Wayne Shotts, the Associate Director for
Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). I am responsible for managing the work
being conducted at the Laboratory that pertains to homeland security. The
urgency of our efforts has increased dramatically in the wake of September 11.
The events of that day tragically make clear that the United States is not
immune to the scourge of terrorism, and they call for the nation's leaders and
technical community to take dramatic steps to improve homeland security. Enactment
of legislation to form a Department of Homeland Security-an idea supported by
the President and the Congress-will fundamentally change for the better the
nation's approach to preventing terrorist attacks on the United States,
reducing the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, and managing the aftermath
of any attack. The mission is complex and daunting in scope. One major challenge
for the new department will be effective integration of relevant activities,
which are currently dispersed among many government organizations. Another
challenge will be focusing the unsurpassed scientific and technical talent of
this nation to improve capabilities to deal effectively with threats, those most
critical today and as well as those emerging in the future. I
support formation of a Department of Homeland Security and I am here to comment
from a technical perspective on both the needs of the new department to pursue a
sustained research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) program and
the capabilities available to it to do so. Currently, RDT&E capabilities are
dispersed, but there is an important concentration of them-particularly
related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats-in the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its
laboratories and other sites. I will discuss relevant capabilities at LLNL and
some of the important programs and partnerships we have in place. They
illustrate LLNL's approach to developing and deploying technologies and
systems to strengthen homeland security and the success we are having in placing
the right tools in the hands of the right people. Effective
partnerships among the various sources of expertise and with the users of new
capabilities are required to make necessary improvements in homeland defense to
cope with today's dangers and prepare for the threats of tomorrow. Focus on
the most effective approaches to the highest priority issues is also required.
At LLNL, we are anxious to contribute to homeland security to the best of our
abilities and confident that we can help make the Department of Homeland
Security a success. LLNL'S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND SECURITY
Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory was established 50 years ago to pursue innovative
solutions to the nation's pressing needs to advance nuclear weapons science
and technology. Since then, the Laboratory has continually adapted to address
the evolving challenges of the day and anticipate future needs, keeping a
central focus on national security. As one of NNSA's three national
laboratories, LLNL is a principal participant in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The Laboratory is also engaged in vital
national programs to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and to provide for homeland security. These complementary
missions-stockpile stewardship and countering WMD threats-are integrally
connected in terms of their overarching goal of enhancing security, and the
research activities largely draw on the same base of scientific and technical
capabilities and expertise. Because
Livermore and our sister NNSA laboratories (Los Alamos and Sandia) have long
been working to develop technical capabilities to detect, counter, and mitigate
WMD proliferation and terrorism, we were able to respond rapidly and effectively
to the events of September 11 and its aftermath. Although those investments are
paying great dividends in the newly declared war on terrorism, substantial
sustained investment is needed to develop vastly improved warning and response
capabilities to protect the U.S. against these threats, now and in the future.
We are fully committed to this long-term national security endeavor and are well
positioned to provide RDT&E support to the Department of Homeland Security.
Lawrence
Livermore is contributing widely and effectively to the war against terrorism
with capabilities and partnerships and through RDT&E programs directly
relevant to the Department of Homeland Security's mission. The provided
examples illustrate three major points about the Laboratory:
The
Capability to Work Problems from End-To-End-BASIS as an Example
A
research and development program particularly focused on the area of WMD
terrorist threats is an integral part the legislative proposal for a Department
of Homeland Security for good reason-the nation faces a dire immediate threat
that unquestionably will grow more sophisticated over time. The nation's
vulnerabilities vary widely in their significance and their potential for being
ameliorated by new capabilities and/or changes in operations. What is needed is
a comprehensive perspective of the issues, a vision where one wants to go, and a
pragmatic approach to problem solving to put products in the field
expeditiously. At
LLNL, we take a systems approach to the overall problem and determine what
priority items can be dealt with expeditiously with existing equipment or modest
improvements in technology and where investments in longer-term research and
development will be necessary. In those areas where a new system based on
existing or emerging technologies can make a substantial difference, it is
important to work the problem comprehensively with the end user in mind. The
development of the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS) by
Livermore and Los Alamos exemplifies this approach and serves as model of how
the Department of Homeland Security could most rapidly and effectively take
technology from the conceptual stage through to actual deployment. The process
is more than R&D, it is RDT&E-research, development, testing, and
evaluation. In
late 1999 we were challenged by the Secretary of Energy to develop and field a
biological detection system in time for the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics. At the
time, there was no system suitable for civilian use for broad-scale biological
environmental detection and monitoring. Early detection and rapid response are
the keys to reducing the human health consequences of a biological agent attack.
Over the next three years, we and our colleagues at Los Alamos developed and
demonstrated a successful system to meet this challenge. BASIS was fielded at
Salt Lake City in February 2002 as part of the overall security strategy for the
Olympic Games where it performed exactly as designed. The goal-oriented approach
used in this program greatly contributed to its outstanding achievement. In
particular, BASIS benefited from:
Strong
Capabilities and Active Programs-Nuclear and Radiological Threats
As
one of NNSA's three national laboratories, LLNL is fully engaged in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program and has a very large science and technology base
supportive of work on nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nonproliferation
that can be leveraged to support homeland security. The Laboratory is home to
one of the nation's two research facilities for special nuclear materials. It
operates a remote test site and has a close working relationship with the Nevada
Test Site where work that requires even greater isolation is carried out.
Several activities that contribute to homeland security merit special mention: Nuclear Threat Assessment Program.
The NNSA's Nuclear Assessment Program was established in 1977 to provide a
national capability for correctly and expeditiously assessing the credibility of
communicated nuclear threats. Shortly after its inception, the Nuclear
Assessment Program became the central point of contact and action office within
the NNSA for assessing and monitoring illicit nuclear material trafficking
incidents worldwide. Selected elements of the program are routinely used
to provide NNSA technical support to the law enforcement, diplomatic and
intelligence communities. The major support activities include real-time
assessments of nuclear threats and black market transactions, participation in
FBI designated Special Events, and providing NNSA courses on nuclear crime at
various national and international training venues. Since the terrorist
attack on September 11, there has been dramatic increase in requests for our
services; we have assessed 25 nuclear threats, 90 illicit trafficking cases, and
51 other nuclear related incidents. The
operational capability consists of a small group of professionals who are
collectively knowledgeable in nuclear explosives design and fabrication, nuclear
reactor operations and safeguards, radioactive materials and hazards,
linguistics analysis, behavioral analysis and profiling, as well as terrorist
tactics and operations. The assessor teams are organized into specialty
teams and operate in secure facilities at the three participating NNSA
contractor sites. An Assessment Coordinating Center at LLNL directs
credibility assessment operations for the NNSA and provides a single point of
contact for federal crisis managers during emergency operations. Nuclear Incident Response. The Laboratory is a key
participant in the national nuclear incident response
groups, including the Joint Technical Operations Team (which deals with nuclear
terrorism or extortion threats), the Accident Response Group (which responds in
the event of an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons) and the Radiological
Assessment Program (which assists state and local agencies). Livermore maintains
a deployable response capability, called HOTSPOT, which can be transported to
any location by military aircraft to provide local radiological field support. Specifically,
the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) provides technical and operational
expertise to state and local agencies to mitigate the consequences of a
radiological incident or emergency. It uses DOE and national laboratory experts
with skills in assessing radiological and toxic contamination and the attendant
risks to human health. The Livermore RAP teams have primary responsibility for
California, Nevada, Hawaii, and the U.S. Pacific Rim territories. They are
called upon, on average, three to five times per year. In 2001, they responded
to three requests for assistance along with normal exercises and training.
Typically, RAP investigates containers suspected of housing radioactive
materials, seeks the location of lost industrial or medical radioactive sources,
and advises federal, state, and local authorities on the consequences of a
radioactive release or personnel contamination. RAP regularly drills with
similar teams from other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments
as well as private companies and organizations. To
deal with the latest emerging threats, LLNL now maintains a home team capability
to assist response workers at all levels. The home team is trained to recognize
and respond to nuclear terrorism. Included within this umbrella is the ability
to supply timely interpretation of signals from field instruments (the so-called
"nuclear triage" program being developed at NNSA headquarters). Search and Inspection Technologies.
There is a pressing need for technologies to improve the screening of
passengers, baggage, and cargo. Candidate technologies, in various stages of
development at Livermore, include computed
tomography (CT), x-ray scanning, gamma-ray imaging, neutron interrogation, and
ultrasonic and thermal imaging. These efforts build on projects and expertise in
the Stockpile Stewardship Program to develop improved sensors for
non-destructive evaluation of the condition of weapons and weapon components in
the stockpile. NNSA has assigned LLNL the responsibility to establish a national
test bed for the inspection of cargo containers (discussed further below). Two
Laboratory-developed search technologies demonstrated their applicability to
counterterrorism response when they were deployed to the World Trade Center. The
first, a micropower radar, can "see" many feet into concrete rubble and
could be a valuable tool for search and rescue operations. The other, a remote
monitoring instrument that uses hyperspectral data to detect and identify trace
gas emissions, was flown over Ground Zero to characterize hazardous gases
emanating from the rubble. Sensor Networks. Livermore
has developed a concept for correlated sensor networks for detecting and
tracking ground-delivered nuclear devices or nuclear materials, the Detection
and Tracking System (DTS). A novel algorithm integrates data from the various
sensors, together with information from other sources (e.g., an intelligent
traffic system) to identify sources of concern, track their movement through the
road network, and guide responders in intercepting the suspect vehicle. Since
September 11, DTS development was accelerated and a prototype system was
demonstrated in an urban environment. We are preparing for further, larger
scaled demonstrations of this system with added capabilities. Strong
Capabilities and Active Programs-Biological and Chemical Threats
Bioscience
research at the Laboratory traces its root to 1963, when a program was
established to study how radiation and chemicals interact to produce adverse
consequences to humans. Research activities at LLNL and LANL led to a focus on
DNA and technology development that led to DOE's decision to launch its Human
Genome Initiative in 1987. Both laboratories are part of DOE's Joint Genome
Institute, which includes Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and is located
in nearby Walnut Creek, California, and have contributed to deciphering the
human genetic code. We are applying our expertise in genomics to counter the
threat of bioterrorism. In addition, in support of Livermore's national
security and other programs, the Laboratory also has outstanding capabilities in
chemistry and materials science. Biological Agent Detectors.
The biodefense capabilities that have been deployed in the wake of September 11
have, at their core, advances in biological detection instrumentation developed
at Livermore. We have made technology breakthroughs in biodetection
instrumentation, pioneering the miniaturization and ruggedization of both flow
cytometry and DNA identification devices. Our miniature thermal cycler unit
makes possible DNA amplification via polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and
identification in minutes rather than the hours and days previously required.
Livermore's miniaturized PCR technology has been licensed to private industry
and forms the basis of today's most advanced commercial biodetection
instruments (e.g., Cepheid's Smart Cycler, Environmental Technology Group's
handheld biodetector). Cepheid Smart Cyclers are the
heart of the field laboratory of the Biological
Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), developed jointly by Livermore
and Los Alamos and previously discussed. In developing BASIS, the two
laboratories worked closely with the many law enforcement, emergency response,
and public health agencies that would be involved in dealing with a bioterrorism
event to develop appropriate sample handling (chain of custody), communications,
and response protocols. DNA Signatures. Biodetectors
depend on unique antibodies or DNA sequences to identify and characterize
biological pathogens. Livermore is developing gold-standard DNA
signatures of top-priority threat pathogens (anthrax, plague, etc.) and are
working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to validate
these signatures and distribute them to public health agencies nationwide. We
are also working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CDC, Department of
Defense, and U.S. intelligence agencies to develop detailed biological
"fingerprints" and data to support forensic analysis of any act of
biological terrorism. Chemical Analysis for Forensic Attribution.
Timely and complete analysis of suspect chemicals can answer important questions
related to nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Our Forensic
Science Center has assembled a unique capability for detecting and
characterizing ultratrace levels of virtually any compound in any sample matrix.
Expertise and instrumentation are available for complete chemical and isotopic
analysis of nuclear materials, inorganic materials, organic materials (e.g.,
chemical warfare agents, illegal drugs), and biological materials (e.g., toxins,
DNA). The Forensic Science Center also develops advanced laboratory and field
capabilities for ultratrace analysis, including a portable (55-pound) gas
chromatograph/mass spectrometer, field kits for thin-layer chromatography, and
novel sample collectors using solid-phase microextraction. The
Forensic Science Center has begun the rigorous testing required to become the
second U.S. laboratory certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Under the terms of the CWC, all samples collected from
inspected facilities must be analyzed at two OPCW-designated laboratories. The
U.S. Congress mandates that all U.S. samples be tested in the U.S. Currently,
the U.S. has only one designated laboratory, the Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Forensic Analytical Center. Livermore
will provide the second required facility. Strong
Capabilities and Active Programs-Underpinning Capabilities and Facilities
Several
special capabilities at Livermore merit special mention because they provide
broad yet critical support to homeland security: our International Assessments
Program, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the
Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), high-performance
computations, and the Computer Incident Advisory Capability. Intelligence Analysis and Threat Assessment.
One of the most critical, yet difficult, elements of homeland security and
counterterrorism is gaining insight into the capabilities, intentions, and plans
of persons, groups, or states hostile to the U.S. Our International Assessments
Program (Z Division) is one of the strongest capabilities in the country for
analysis and research related to foreign nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction, including early-stage foreign technology development and
acquisition, patterns of cooperation, and foreign cyber threats. Such
intelligence analyses serve as the foundation for homeland defense against WMD
threats. Intelligence provides an essential input to threat analyses that, in
turn, provide the basis for defining functional requirements for technical
homeland security systems. Furthermore, intelligence can provide "indications
and warning" of an imminent attack, thus guiding further deployment of
defensive assets. Thus there is a critical need for both long-term, in-depth
intelligence analysis and timely, responsive indications and warning. Z
Division regularly provides analysis products to our intelligence, defense and
policy-making customers. Our assessments of foreign
weapons programs and activities provide important input to policy makers and
diplomats as they develop strategies for U.S. responses to events affecting
national security. The capabilities in Z Division also support our
Nuclear Threat Assessment Program (previously discussed), which analyzes nuclear
terrorist threats and smuggling incidents. In
addition to filling a critical niche by providing all-source intelligence
analyses of foreign nation-state programs to acquire WMD, we develop data
analysis tools and data integration methods to aid intelligence collection and
assessment and avoid the pitfalls of information stovepiping. Some of these
tools are currently being evaluated by our analysts as well as end-users across
the Intelligence Community, while many others are under intense development and
will be applied to the counter-terrorism problem. In the aftermath of September
11, we provided intelligence analysts and assessments as well as
information-operations tools and expert personnel to the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Atmospheric Modeling for Consequence
Management.
The National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), located and operated
at the Laboratory, is a national emergency response service for real-time
assessment of incidents involving nuclear, chemical, biological, or natural
hazardous material. NARAC can map the probable atmospheric spread of
contamination in time for an emergency manager to decide whether protective
actions are necessary. NARAC is on call to respond to real incidents and can
also be used to evaluate specific scenarios for emergency response planning,
such as optimizing the siting of bioaerosol samplers or determining evacuation
routes. Since
it was established in 1979, NARAC has responded to more than 70 alerts,
accidents, and disasters and has supported more than 800 exercises. In addition
to accidental radiological releases (e.g., Chernobyl, 1986; Three Mile Island,
1979), NARAC has assessed natural and manmade disasters (Mt. Pinatubo volcanic
ash cloud, 1991; Kuwaiti oil fires, 1991). NARAC has also provided assessments
to state and local responders to toxic chemical accidents (e.g., Richmond
sulfuric acid cloud, 1993; Sacramento River Spill, 1991). State and local
agencies can request NARAC support for actual releases or planning by contacting
DOE's Office of Emergency Response or the NARAC program office at Livermore. The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS).
Developed continually updated by LLNL,
Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) is a versatile and
powerful modeling system for analyzing, end-to-end, a proliferator's WMD
production processes and for assessing interdiction options and their
corresponding consequences. CAPS is as easy to use as a Web browser, with its
powerful and complex science (spectral analysis, toxic release modeling, etc.)
invisible to the user. CAPS is widely accepted by the military's mission
planners and is the Department of Defense's preferred counterproliferation
planning tool. High-Performance Computing.
With supercomputers acquired as part of
NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program and additional
institutional investments in massively parallel computers, Livermore is an
international leader in high-performance computing. Many groundbreaking
applications are being developed. An example directly relevant to homeland
security is our computational biology work directed at genomics-the
development and use of bioinformatics tools and databases. We
have developed computational tools to automatically identify regions of
bacterial and viral pathogen genomes that have a high probability of being
unique to that genome. We can now process any draft or finished pathogen genome
in a few hours and confidently detect all regions that are not "matched" in
any other known sequenced genome. This capability has been tested on numerous
bacterial and viral pathogens both at LLNL and with collaborators such as the
Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases, and the Department of Agriculture. We are currently using
this unique computational capability to satisfy pathogen detection needs of
these and other federal and state agencies. Building
on the approach we are taking, we will attempt to tackle more complex problems
such as automatically determining all protein signature targets in a genome and
determining the "pathomics" of virulence across all pathogens (i.e., the
molecular mechanisms of virulence itself). The computational needs to address
these problems will require use of cutting-edge supercomputer resources such as
those at LLNL. Computer Incident Response.
LLNL is home to DOE's Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), which was
formed in 1989. We assist any DOE facility
that experiences a computer security incident with analysis, response, and
restoration of operations. CIAC serves as DOE's watch and warning center,
notifying the complex of vulnerabilities that are being exploited, specifying
countermeasures to apply, and providing a picture of the attack profile. The
center also develops science and technology solutions in support of computer
network defense and products such as SafePatch, which earned its developers a
Government Technology Leadership Award. CIAC's list of clients has
grown to encompass other government agencies, and there have been several
incidents where the team worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Strong
Ties to Research Partners and the User Community
One
key attribute of LLNL is the Laboratory's proximity to important
assets-potential major partners in RDT&E and commercialization as well as
key customers for homeland security. The San Francisco Bay Area is home to three
international airports, two seaports, an FBI field office, Customs and INS
headquarters, Silicon Valley, area biotechnology firms and health-care
providers, mass transit and rail systems, and high-visibility targets (e.g.,
Golden Gate Bridge). In addition, as part of University of California, LLNL has
close ties with the many UC campuses in the area (Berkeley, San Francisco,
Davis, and Santa Cruz) as well as Stanford University (and associated medical
schools). We are also right next to Sandia-California. Almost every aspect of
the homeland security equation is just minutes away from Livermore. Many
of our various research partners are cited throughout my testimony. An often
overlooked-yet important-aspect of a successful research and development
program is understanding the users' needs. Additional examples of our
connections and work with the user community follow. Expert Personnel Assisting in Homeland Security.
Livermore scientists serve on various task forces, committees, and advisory
groups dealing with aspects of homeland security and counterterrorism. For
example, a Livermore expert on x-ray imaging is
a member of the National Academy of Science Committee on Assessment of
Technology Deployed to Improve Commercial Aviation Security. Other Laboratory
scientists serve as technical advisors to the U.S. Customs Service, the National
Guard, and the Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, and as members or
advisors to various Defense Science Board task forces addressing homeland
defense. Still others are assisting the California Highway Patrol and the
California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) with training related to
weapons of mass destruction and serving as members of the California Council on
Science and Technology, which is providing technical advice to the OES's State
Strategic Committee on Terrorism. Forensic Science Support to Law Enforcement.
Over the years, Livermore's Forensic Science Center (previously discussed) has
responded to many requests from law enforcement for assistance in forensic
analysis of unique samples. Since September 11 and the subsequent anthrax scare,
hundreds of samples of concern have been analyzed for local and federal law
enforcement and government officials. Previously, the Center has been brought in
to analyze Supernote counterfeit bills, methamphetamine samples, biotoxins,
suspect chemical-warfare specimens, and nuclear contraband. It has characterized
explosive traces from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber case,
and the Fremont serial bomber; performed forensic sleuthing related to the
Riverside "mystery fumes" case; analyzed samples for the Glendale "Angel
of Death" case; and analyzed Capitol Hill offices as requested following
anthrax decontamination. Locally, the Center assisted Livermore police by
rapidly identifying a vapor that sickened response personnel at the scene of a
suicide; once the chemical was identified (malathion), law enforcement agencies
were able to take appropriate personnel-protection measures and complete their
investigation. LINC for Improved Emergency Preparedness. Through
the LINC program (Local Integration of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory
Center with Cities), we are currently working with local agencies in the Seattle
area. A LINC pilot project is testing and evaluating the effectiveness of an
approach to emergency preparedness that offers the potential for dramatic
improvements. Sponsored by NNSA's Chemical and Biological National Security
Program, LINC integrates capabilities at LLNL's NARAC (previously discussed)
with local emergency management and response centers. Ultimately, LINC's goal
is to provide continuous operation of an integrated, nationalwide system that
aids emergency preparedness and response at all levels of government. A National Test Bed for Standards, Test, and
Evaluation. One
key function of the Department of Homeland Security will be the setting of
standards for technical homeland security systems. To set such standards will
require practical, technical judgment, with consideration of the threats that
the technology is intended to address, a concept of operations for its use, and
the infrastructure necessary to use it effectively. This process must involve
the Intelligence Community, end users in federal, state and local government,
and technical experts. Candidate technologies must undergo objective testing and
evaluation to determine how well they satisfy the standards, as input to
acquisition decisions by those with operational responsibilities. NNSA
has assigned LLNL the responsibility to establish a national test bed for the
inspection of cargo containers for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons and materials. To meet this responsibility, we have initiated
threat analyses to establish the range of threat scenarios that such inspection
systems should address. We have also begun a research program, based on
calculations and experiments, to characterize the relevant "observables" for
successful detection. We have engaged federal, state and local organizations
with operational responsibilities in this area to factor in their practical,
operational constraints. We have set up a test facility where exemplar
containers are loaded with surrogate materials, as well as typical cargo, so
that commercial equipment and research prototypes can be tested in meaningful
scenarios. We believe that this methodology should be extended to other
terrorist scenarios of concern. Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of Critical
Facilities.
Through our participation in DOE's Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Program,
we have made systematic assessments of the threat environment, cyber
architecture, physical and operational security, policies and procedures,
interdependencies, impact analysis, risk characterization, and possible
mitigation measures for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, eleven
electric and gas infrastructures, and several independent service operators (ISOs),
including the California ISO during the electrical energy crisis. We have also
analyzed the vulnerability of buildings, dams, and other structures to
catastrophic damage from earthquakes and explosive events. Projects have
included evaluation of the earthquake vulnerability of major bridge structures
(including the Golden Gate and San Francisco-Oakland Bay bridges), the
structural integrity of nuclear material shipping containers for a variety of
impact scenarios, and the likely damage resulting from the explosion of natural
gas storage tanks in a suburban environment. More
generally, LLNL has applied risk and decision theoretic methodologies to a wide
range of hazardous endeavors, both internal to the Laboratory and for the public
sector, and we can be considered a major scientific contributor to the
discipline of risk assessment and risk management. We have developed
methodologies for and conducted risk assessments of nuclear power generation,
nuclear explosive operations, information systems, transportation systems and
hazardous material protection (called vulnerability analyses) to identify and
enhance safety, safeguards and security. In addition, LLNL has assisted other
federal agencies in the application of risk management. Engineering a Novel Truck-Stopping Device. In October 2001, the Governor of California contacted Livermore requesting assistance to develop a means of stopping tanker trucks, to keep hijacked trucks from becoming motorized missiles. The objective was to make it possible to stop these large trucks using equipment readily available to peace officers, namely their vehicles and their weapons. A retired Livermore engineer and consultant teamed with Laboratory engineers, technicians, and heavy equipment operators to develop a simple mechanical device to accomplish this. It can be readily attached to the back of a tanker truck. When bumped from the rear by the patrol vehicle, the device would cause the trailer braking system to lose air pressure automatically locking the trailer brakes. A prototype was demonstrated in Oakland in late November 2001, and testing at high speeds was conducted at the Nevada Test Site in February and March 2002. We are currently developing a portable remote-controlled system and working with the California Highway Patrol and a major California trucking company on implementing a field trial program. CLOSING
REMARKS
In
its efforts to combat terrorism and ensure homeland security, the nation can
build on an attribute that has made the United States the world leader that it
is-the remarkable capability of the American people to focus extraordinary
energy on achieving important objectives in a time of need. Establishing a
Department of Homeland Security can fundamentally change for the better the
nation's approach to preventing terrorist attacks on the United States,
reducing the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, and managing the aftermath
of any attack. As
the Administration and many leaders in Congress have already stated, to succeed
the new department will need to pursue a sustained RDT&E
program-particularly related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
threats-that is prioritized to meet prudently established objectives. These
threats are significant and will grow more sophisticated over time. At
Livermore, we are fully committed to this long-term national security endeavor
to improve homeland security and are well positioned to provide effective RDT&E
support to the department. LLNL brings to the Department of Homeland Security
relevant existing mission responsibilities and programs, experience working with
a wide range of research partners and users, and a track record of taking
technologies from concept to prototype development and deployment.
|
|||||||||||
|
