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Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
July 9, 2002
09:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to
be here today to discuss several aspects of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The proposed legislation would bring many federal entities with homeland
security responsibilities into a Department of Homeland Security in an effort to
mobilize and focus assets and resources. Title
III of the proposed legislation would task the new department with developing
national policy for and coordinating the federal government's research and
development efforts for responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats. It would also
transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and
development programs and other activities, including those of the Department of
Energy (DOE).
In my testimony today, which
focuses on Title III of the proposed legislation, I will address (1) the need
for clarification of certain roles and responsibilities of the new department
and (2) our observations on transferring certain activities of DOE to the new
department. Our testimony is based
largely on our previous and ongoing work on national preparedness issues,
as well as a review of the proposed legislation.
In concept and if properly
implemented, this proposed legislation could lead to a more efficient, effective
and coordinated research effort that would provide technology to protect our
people, borders, and critical infrastructure.
However, the legislation does not address many issues that could impact
the Department of Homeland Security's potential effectiveness.
For example, while it is tasked with coordinating federal "civilian"
research, the new department will also need to coordinate with the Department of
Defense and the intelligence agencies that conduct research and development
efforts designed to detect and respond to weapons of mass destruction.
Further, the proposed legislation does not specify that a critical role
of the new department will be to establish collaborative relationships with
programs at all levels of government and to develop a strategic plan for
research and development to implement the national policy it is charged with
developing. In addition, the
proposed legislation is not clear on the role of the new department in setting
standards for the performance and interoperability of new technologies so that
users can be confident that the technologies they are purchasing will perform as
intended. Lacking this, the
Department of Homeland Security may not be able to efficiently and effectively
focus the research and development resources of the federal government to
address the most important terrorist threats.
Regarding
the transfer of certain activities of DOE to the new department, we believe that
some of the transfers proposed in the legislation are appropriate, such as
DOE's nuclear threat assessment program and the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML). However, we are
concerned that the transfer of certain DOE research and development activities
may complicate research currently being performed to accomplish multiple
purposes. For example, some
research programs, such as Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's advanced
scientific computing research program, have broad missions such as ensuring the
reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile that are not easily separated into
homeland security research and research for other purposes.
Furthermore, in some cases, such as the energy security and assurance
program activities at DOE, the legislation does not clearly indicate exactly
what research would be transferred.
Background
In response to global challenges the government faces in the
coming years, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security provides a
unique opportunity to create an extremely effective and performance-based
organization that can strengthen the nation's ability
to protect its borders and citizens against terrorism.
There is likely to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring
some of the homeland security functions, including reducing risk and improving
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of these consolidated agencies and
programs. Realistically, however,
in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces
will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take additional
resources to make it fully effective.
Recently,
we testified that Congress should consider several very specific criteria in its
evaluation of whether individual agencies or programs should be included or
excluded from the proposed department.
Those criteria include the following:
- Mission
Relevancy: Is homeland security a
major part of the agency or program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
- Similar
Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being considered for the
new department share primary goals and objectives with the
other agencies or programs being consolidated?
- Leverage
Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered for the new
department create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness of other
agencies and programs or the new department as a whole?
In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts?
- Gains
Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being considered for the
new department improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland security
missions through eliminating duplications and overlaps, closing gaps and aligning or merging
common roles and responsibilities?
- Integrated
Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or program being
considered for the new department contribute to or leverage the ability of
the new department to enhance the
sharing of critical information or otherwise improve the coordination of
missions and activities related to homeland security?
- Compatible
Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or program being
considered for the new department
effectively meld with the other entities that will be consolidated?
Field structures and approaches to achieving missions vary
considerably between agencies.
- Impact
on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing components to
the new department? What is the
impact on agencies with homeland security missions left out of the new
department?
Federally sponsored research
and development efforts, a key focus of the proposed legislation, enhance the
government's capability to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear terrorist threats by providing technologies that meet a range of crisis-
and consequence-management needs. Research
and development efforts for these technologies, however, can be risky, time
consuming, and costly. Such efforts
also may need to address requirements not available in off-the-shelf products. These factors limit private and public research and
development efforts for these technologies, necessitating federal government
involvement and collaboration.
Many
federal agencies and interagency working groups have recently deployed or are
conducting research on a variety of technologies to combat terrorism.
Recently deployed technologies include a prototype biological detection
system used at the Salt Lake City Olympics and a prototype chemical detection
system currently being used in Washington D.C.'s metro system that was
developed by DOE. Technologies
under development include new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals
being developed by the National Institutes of Health. In addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
in collaboration with other federal agencies, are conducting research on the
diagnosis and treatment of smallpox. Moreover,
the Food and Drug Administration is investigating a variety of biological agents
that could be used as terrorist weapons. Other
federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and intelligence community
are engaged in similar research and development activities, such as research on
technology to protect combatants from chemical and biological agents.
Roles and Responsibilities of the Proposed
Department of Homeland Security Need to be Clarified
Certain
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security in managing
research and development need to be clarified.
Under the proposed legislation, the Department of Homeland Security would
be tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating the federal
government's civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
However, while coordination is important, it will not be enough.
Federal agency coordination alone may not address the specific needs of
state and local governments, such as those of local police and fire departments
that will use this technology. In
our view, the proposed legislation should also specify that a role of the new
department will be to develop collaborative relationships with programs at all
levels of government-federal, state, and local-to ensure that users' needs
and research efforts are linked. We
also believe the legislation should be clarified to ensure that the new
department would be responsible for the development of a single national
research and development strategic plan. Such
a plan would help to ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive
duplication is minimized, and individual agency plans are consistent with the
overall goals. Moreover, the proposed legislation, as written, is unclear
about the new department's role in developing standards for the performance
and interoperability of new technologies to address terrorist threats.
We believe the development of these standards must be a priority of the
new department.
Shortfalls in Current
Research Coordinating Efforts
The
limitations of existing coordination and the critical need for a more
collaborative, unified research structure has been amply demonstrated in the
recent past. We have previously
reported that while agencies attempt to coordinate federal research and
development programs in a variety of ways, breakdowns occur, leading to research
gaps and duplication of effort.
Coordination is limited by compartmentalization of efforts because of the
sensitivity of the research and development programs, security classification of
research, and the absence of a single coordinating entity to ensure against
duplication. For example, the
Department of Defense's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was unaware
of U.S. Coast Guard's plans to develop methods to detect biological agents on
infected cruise ships and, therefore, was unable to share information on its
potentially related research to develop biological detection devices for
buildings.
Opportunities to Improve
Existing Legislative Proposal
Although
the proposed legislation states that the new department will be responsible for
developing national policy and coordinating research and development, it has a
number of limitations that could weaken its effectiveness. First, the legislation tasks the new department with
coordinating the federal government's "civilian efforts" only. We believe the new department will also need to coordinate
with the Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies that conduct
research and development efforts designed to detect and respond to weapons of
mass destruction. The proposed
transfer of some DOE research and development efforts to the Department of
Homeland Security also does not eliminate potential overlaps, gaps, and
opportunities for collaboration. Coordination
will still be required within and among the 23 DOE national laboratories.
For example, our 2001 report noted that two offices within Sandia
National Laboratory concurrently and separately worked on similar thermal
imagery projects for two different federal agencies, rather than consolidating
the requests and combining resources. In
addition, local police and fire departments and state and local governments
possess practical knowledge about their technological needs and relevant design
limitations that should be taken into account in federal efforts to provide new
equipment, such as protective gear and sensor systems.
To be most effective, the new department will have to develop
collaborative relationships with all these organizations to facilitate
technological improvements and encourage cooperative behavior.
The
existing proposal leaves a number of problems unaddressed as well.
For example, while the proposed legislation is clear that the position of
Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures will be responsible for developing national policy for federal
research and development, there is no requirement for a strategic plan for
national research and development that could address coordination, reduce
potential duplication, and ensure that important issues are addressed.
In 2001, we recommended the creation of a unified strategy to reduce
duplication and leverage resources, and suggested that the plan be coordinated
with federal agencies performing research as well as with state and local
authorities.
The development of such a plan would help to ensure that research gaps are
filled, unproductive duplication is minimized, individual agency plans are
consistent with the overall goals, and a basis for assessing the success of the
research and development efforts.
Also,
while the legislation calls for the establishment of guidelines for state and
local governments to implement countermeasures for chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear terrorism threats, it is not clear to us what these
guidelines are to entail. In this
regard, we believe it will be important to develop standards for the performance
and interoperability of new technologies, something that the legislation does
not specifically address. For
example, we had discussions with officials from the Utah State Department of
Health who prepared for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games.
These officials said that local police and fire departments had been
approached by numerous vendors offering a variety of chemical and biological
detection technology for use during the Olympics. However, these state and local officials were unsure of the
best technology to purchase and could find no federal agency that would provide
guidance on the technologies. They
told us that if the science backing up the technology is poor or the data the
technology produces are faulty, the technology can do more harm than good.
Further,
the legislation would allow the new department to direct, fund, and conduct
research related to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other
emerging threats on its own. This
raises the potential for duplication of efforts, lack of efficiency, and an
increased need for coordination with other departments that would continue to
carry out relevant research. We are
concerned that the proposal could result in a duplication of capacity that
already exists in the current federal laboratories.
Transferring
Certain Activities of DOE to the Department of Homeland Security Raises Concerns
Under
Title III of the proposed legislation, a number of DOE programs and activities
would be transferred to the new department.
Some of these transfers seem appropriate.
However, in other cases we are concerned about the transfers because of
the potential impact on programs and activities that currently support missions
beyond homeland security. Finally,
in some cases, transfers proposed by the legislation are not laid out in enough
detail to permit an assessment. We
discuss each of these groups of transfers below.
Transfer
of Certain DOE Activities Seems Appropriate
Title III proposes to transfer
to the Department of Homeland Security certain DOE activities that seem
appropriate. Specifically,
Title III proposes to transfer the nuclear threat assessment program and
activities of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program in DOE's
international Materials, Protection, and Accountability Program (MPC&A).
The threat assessment program and activities, among other things,
assesses the credibility of communicated nuclear threats, analyzes reports of
illicit nuclear material trafficking, and provides technical support to law
enforcement agencies regarding nuclear material/weapons.
We would agree with officials of the Office of Nuclear Threat Assessment
and Detection who view the potential transfer to the Department of Homeland
Security positively. We base our
agreement on the fact that, according to officials from DOE, the transfer would
not have a negative impact on the rest of the MPC&A program because the
functions are separate and distinct. Further,
the transfer could tie the office in more closely with the other agencies they
work with, such as Customs.
Another program that we believe
could be appropriately transferred to the new department is the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML), located in New York City.
This government-operated laboratory operates under the Office of Science
and Technology in the Office of Environmental Management at DOE.
EML provides program management, technical assistance and data quality
assurance for measurements of radiation and radioactivity relating to
environmental restoration, global nuclear nonproliferation, and other priority
issues for DOE, as well as for other government, national and international
organizations. According to the
laboratory director, the laboratory is completely in favor of the transfer to
the proposed Department of Homeland Security and would fit in very well with it. We believe the transfer is appropriate because, unlike some
other transfers proposed under Title III, the entire laboratory would be
transferred. While it is a
multiprogram laboratory serving several elements of DOE as well as other
organizations, serving multiple clients could continue under a "work for
others" contracting arrangement whether the laboratory was housed within DOE
or the Department of Homeland Security.
Some Proposed Transfers Give
Reasons For Concern
Title
III proposes transferring the parts of DOE's nonproliferation and verification
research and development program that conduct research on systems to improve the
nation's capability to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological
attacks. The legislation also
proposes transferring a portion of the program's proliferation detection
research. This includes work on
developing sensors to help the Coast Guard monitor container shipping at ports
of entry. These proposed transfers
raise concerns because much of the program's research supports both homeland
security and international nonproliferation programs.
These programs have broad missions that are not easily separated into
homeland security research and research for other purposes and the proposed
legislation is not clear how these missions would continue to be accomplished.
Furthermore, we are concerned that the legislation does not clearly
indicate whether only the programmatic management and funding would move or also
the scientists carrying out the research. Moving
the scientists may not be prudent. This
is because the research is currently conducted by multiprogram laboratories that
employ scientists skilled in many disciplines who serve many different missions
and whose research benefits from their interactions with colleagues within the
laboratory.
In
addition, we believe transferring control of some scientists within the DOE
national laboratories to the Department of Homeland Security could complicate an
already dysfunctional DOE organizational structure by blurring lines of
authority and accountability. DOE
carries out its diverse missions through a network of multilayered field offices
that oversee activities at the national laboratories and other DOE facilities
widely dispersed throughout the country. The
structure inherited by DOE and the different program cultures and management
styles within that structure have confounded DOE's efforts to develop a more
effective organization. Transferring
control of scientists within the national laboratories could complicate the
accomplishment of homeland security missions and DOE's other missions by
adding additional lines of authority and accountability between the laboratory
scientists, DOE, and the Department of Homeland Security.
One alternative would be for the new department to contract with DOE's
national laboratories to conduct the research under "work for others"
contracts. This would allow for
direct contact between the Department of Homeland Security and the laboratories
conducting the research without creating a new bureaucracy.
Many federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and intelligence
agencies currently use this contracting arrangement with the national
laboratories.
We have similar concerns about
transferring two other activities to the new department:
- The advanced scientific
computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory are developing supercomputer hardware and software infrastructure
aimed at enabling laboratory and university researchers to solve the most
challenging scientific problems at a level of accuracy and detail never
before achieved. Research
conducted under the program include; designing materials atom-by-atom,
revealing the functions of proteins, understanding and controlling plasma
turbulence, designing new particle accelerators and modeling global climate
change. This program is an
integral part of DOE's efforts to ensure that the nuclear weapons
stockpile is safe and secure. This
program may be difficult to separate into homeland security research and
research for other purposes.
- The Life Sciences Division
within the DOE Office of Science's Biological and Environmental Research
Program manages a diverse portfolio of research to develop fundamental
biological information and to advance technology in support of DOE's
missions in biology, medicine, and the environment.
For example, it is determining the whole genome sequences of a
variety of infectious bacteria, including anthrax strains-a first step
toward developing tests that can be used to rapidly identify their presence
in the environment.
In both of these instances, the
programs serve multiple missions. These dual-purpose programs have important synergies that we
believe should be maintained. We
are concerned that transferring control over these programs to the new
department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to other
DOE missions, such as the reliability of our nuclear weapons.
We do not believe that the proposed legislation is sufficiently clear on
how both the homeland security and these other missions would be accomplished.
Transfer of Some Activities
Is Unclear
The details of two other
transfers proposed in the legislation are unclear.
First, Title III would transfer the intelligence program activities at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These
intelligence activities are related to the overall program carried out by
DOE's Office of Intelligence. The
Office of Intelligence gathers information related to DOE's missions--energy,
nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, basic science, radiological research and
environmental cleanup. To support
this overall intelligence program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, like
other weapons laboratories, conducts intelligence activities.
At Lawrence Livermore, the "Z" division conducts these activities and
has special intelligence expertise related to tracking the nuclear capabilities
of countries other than Russia and China. Importantly,
the "Z" division receives funding from other DOE programs and/or offices as
well as funding from other federal agencies (Department of Defense, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.).
According to officials at DOE Headquarters and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, only about $5 million of the division's $30-50 million
budget comes from DOE's Office of Intelligence. These officials said the transfer would most likely affect
only the $5 million that DOE's Office of Intelligence directly provides to the
laboratory, but this is not clear in the proposed legislation.
As with other DOE programs discussed in this testimony, the staff that
carry out these activities are contractor employees and it is not clear how they
would be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
Moreover, DOE headquarters and other laboratories also have a role in
intelligence, and the legislation does not propose to transfer any of their
intelligence functions. Another area of Title III where
the details are unclear is the transfer of "energy security and assurance
program activities." These
activities are carried out by the Office of Energy Assurance, which was created
in November 2001 to work with state and local government and industry to
strengthen the security of the United States through the application of science
and technology to improve the reliability and security of the national energy
infrastructure. The national energy
infrastructure includes (1) physical and cyber assets of the nation's electric
power, oil, and natural gas infrastructures; (2) interdependencies among
physical and cyber energy infrastructure assets; (3) national energy
infrastructure's interdependencies with all other critical national
infrastructures. At the time this
testimony was being prepared, DOE and the Office of Homeland Security were
trying to define the scope of the proposed transfer.
***
Mr.
Chairman, this completes my prepared statement.
I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the
Committee may have at this time.
Contact and Acknowledgements
For further information about
this testimony, please contact Gary Jones at (202) 512-3841.
Gene Aloise, Seto J. Bagdoyen, Ryan T. Coles, Darryl W. Dutton, Kathleen
H. Ebert, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Cynthia Norris and Keith Rhodes also made key
contributions to this testimony.
Related
GAO Products
Homeland Security
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and
Partnership Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and
Partnership Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-900T. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2002
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and
Partnership Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve
Coordination but May Complicate Priority Setting.
GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has
Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success.
GAO-02-886T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve
Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting.
GAO-02-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are
Underway but Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability
for Achieving National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and
Partnership Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in
Addressing Short- and Long-Term National Needs.
GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can
Guide Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA's Role in
Strengthening Federal Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management
Approach.
GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the
Nation's Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Public Health
Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention's Role in Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness
Programs.
GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness.
GAO-02-141T. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness.
GAO-02-129T. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness
Activities.
GAO-01-915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk
Assessment and Inventory Management Are Needed.
GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health
Preparedness.
GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and
Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework.
GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological
Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
1999.
Combating Terrorism
National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal
Buildings.
GAO-02-687T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State,
Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in
the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness.
GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a
National Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness.
GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in
a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness.
GAO-02-547T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness.
GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify
Expectations for Medical Readiness. GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.
Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process.
GAO-02-181T. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2001.
Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify
Expectations for Medical Readiness. GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing
Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness.
GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management.
GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a
President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness.
GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical
Supplies Needs Further Improvement. GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to
Improve the Federal Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical
Supplies Needs Further Improvement. GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism
Leadership and National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress
in Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide
Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.
GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate
Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical
Supplies Are Poorly Managed. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical
Supplies Are Poorly Managed. GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of
Chemical and Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and
Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks.
GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of
Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs.
GAO/NSIAD-99-160. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response
Teams Is Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal
Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency
Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response
Teams Is Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending
to Combat Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency.
GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
Domestic Preparedness Program.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting
Issues.
GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can
Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide
Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination.
GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.
Disaster Assistance
Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster
Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures.
GAO-01-837. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in
Preparing States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of
Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges.
GAO-01-832. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.
Budget and Management
Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges.
GAO-02-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies.
GAO-01-1084SP. Washington, D.C.: August 2001.
Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key
Management Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2001.
Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges
and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.
Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address
Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap.
GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 1997.
Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential
Duplication in Federal Missions and Approaches.
GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 1995.
Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles.
GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.
Grant Design
Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility,
Accountability, and Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998.
Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal
Resources Go Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.
Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability
Provisions.
GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
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