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Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration's Proposal
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Ambassador Linton Brooks
Introduction Thank you, Mr. Chairman for having me here
today. This is an important topic:
the establishment of a new Government Agency that will have sweeping
responsibilities. The new
Department of Homeland Security will enable us to more effectively respond to
today's threats, through a streamlined and dynamic institution that will
greatly enhance our ability to respond quickly, decisively, and where necessary,
before threats against our homeland materialize.
We are on the verge of making history.
It's critical that we get it right. The Department of Energy and the National
Nuclear Security Administration are fully committed to the homeland security
mission, and the successful establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security. We recognize that this
will require restructuring and relocation of critical assets now under the
stewardship of the NNSA. We are
prepared to support these shifts in responsibilities, and indeed, to do what is
necessary to make any transfer of responsibilities as smooth and painless as
possible. There is an enormous amount of experience and
expertise now residing in DOE/NNSA that will be vital to the success of the new
Department. Our Technology Research
and Engineering assets have been applied to homeland security problems long
before last September; since then, such contributions became even more focused
and accelerated. We've conducted the PROTECT subway
demonstration, which will help provide chemical protection to the U.S.
population. We deployed a prototype
biodetection capability at the winter Olympics.
We have greatly increased our work with the U.S. Customs and US Coast
Guard with radiation and nuclear technology - specific technical support that
will directly benefit the new Department. DOE/NNSA
is committed to ensuring that its assets can continue to provide enabling
science and technology to support homeland security and counter-terrorism
mission needs. There are a number of capabilities currently
residing in the Department of Energy that will support or be transferred to the
new Department. Today I want to focus on those relevant to Title III of the
legislation - those germane to technology research and development in support
of the Homeland Security mission. Before beginning that
discussion, let me briefly mention a few things that the Homeland Security Act
does not do. It will not
affect our ability to conduct our principal missions of stockpile stewardship,
nuclear nonproliferation, naval nuclear propulsion, and, just coming to NNSA,
emergency response. NNSA will
retain all of its programs and responsibilities that contribute to our ability
to assure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile. With respect to nuclear
nonproliferation, the Administration proposes to transfer the core of our
chemical-biological WMD work and certain nuclear programs related to the
domestic threat. This is largely
self-contained work and primarily supports domestic preparedness
programs. NNSA has unique assets and
capabilities, developed primarily from our work with nuclear weapons and with
nonproliferation, that have been applied to homeland security problems long
before last September. Some of these initiatives have
long timelines; Long before 9/11, DOE has led USG efforts to support "first
responders" with our chemical, biological, and nuclear research programs.
We've worked closely with the FBI and other agencies to ensure that
cutting edge detection and identification technologies are available to those
that would need them first. And we
began this work long before there was a recognized need to do so - we took the
initiative because we anticipated the requirement.
It is as good an example as any of why long-range research is so critical
to the security of this country. We have aggressively pursued
these efforts since last 9/11. But
it's time for a more focused organization and we are committed to that change and
to continuing to provide enabling science and technology in support of homeland
security and counterterrorism mission needs. Nonproliferation
and Verification Research and Development The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification
Research and Development Program conducts applied research, development,
testing, and evaluation of technologies that lead to prototype demonstrations
and resultant detection systems. As
such, the program strengthens the U.S. response to current and projected threats
to national security worldwide posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and the diversion of special nuclear material.
The R&D program provides operational organizations with innovative
systems and technologies to satisfy their nonproliferation and counter-terrorism
mission responsibilities. The
program's three main elements are:
Proliferation
Detection sponsors a high-risk research on detection technologies that can
support both nonproliferation and homeland security.
Those elements that can be disaggregated and identified as supporting
homeland security will be transferred to the new Department.
At a minimum, we will transfer our research and development to counter
nuclear smuggling. Where the
activity supports both the homeland security and non-proliferation functions, we
will examine arrangements as joint programs.
The Administration's proposed legislation gives the President the
necessary flexibility to provide for joint operation. Let me describe those functions that will be
transferred, after which I will return to the subject of long-term coordination. Major
Activities Identified for Transfer
Within,
the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program, the
Chemical and Biological National Security Program and the nuclear smuggling
detection activity fall squarely into the Homeland Security mission and thus
have been designated for transfer in their entirety.
Chemical
and Biological National Security Program
The
Chemical and Biological National Security
Program works to develop technologies and systems to improve the U.S.
capability to prepare for and respond to domestic chemical and biological
threats against civilian populations,
complementing DOD's focus on the battlefield and military installations.
As part of its primary nuclear science and technology mission, NNSA and
the National Laboratories have developed extensive capabilities in chemistry,
biology, and materials and engineering sciences that form the basis for the NNSA
chemical and biological national security program.
We have conducted research on the biological foundations necessary to
establish signatures of biological threat agents and develop assays certified by
the Centers for Disease Control for those agents, which are applied to develop
detectors. NNSA has conducted demonstration projects of prototype detector capabilities in partnership with other agencies to support their operational missions, such as the systems I just mentioned that have been developed and applied for the Olympics and the Washington Metro, to illustrate possible system approaches for population protection. We are now working to expand the number of signatures and assays of biological agents that we can detect with increased sensitivity, and to improve public health response through the CDC. The next generation of bio-detectors will detect a much wider range of agents, which will enable public health agencies to more rapidly treat affected people. Homeland
Security Nuclear Smuggling Activities The nuclear smuggling component
of our proliferation detection program also squarely fits within homeland
security and will be transferred. NNSA
and the National Laboratories have unique insight into nuclear proliferation
activities - the facilities and infrastructure, as well as the observable
signatures of nuclear weapon development activity.
We also have the capability to develop technical solutions for the U.S.
government to detect and characterize such proliferation activities in their
early stages. NNSA has worked
closely with homeland security agencies, including U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast
Guard, and the Departments of Transportation and Justice to apply this technical
base to detection of nuclear weapons and materials at U.S. borders.
With these agencies, we have previously conducted demonstrations of
radiation detection methods at international border crossings, including a port,
a rail yard, and airport personnel and baggage handling facilities.
With many of these agencies becoming part of the new Department, it is a
good fit for the R&D applications to counter nuclear smuggling to be
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Nuclear Threat Assessment and Trafficking in
Nuclear Materials In
addition to the transfer of research and development, Title III of the proposed
legislation provides for the transfer of the Department of Energy's Nuclear
Assessment Program to the new Department of Homeland Security.
This program provides a national capability to assess accurately and
swiftly the credibility of communicated threats of nuclear terrorism.
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) leads this unique
effort. Since September 1978, the
Nuclear Assessment Program has been used to assess the credibility of over 60
nuclear extortion threats, 25 nuclear reactor threats, 20 non‑nuclear
extortion threats and approximately 650 cases involving the reported or
attempted illicit sale of nuclear materials. When
activated, DOE-based threat credibility assessment teams perform comprehensive
technical, operational and behavioral assessments of communicated nuclear
threats at the start of an actual or perceived emergency. Since communicated
nuclear threats are a serious violation of federal law, the FBI is the lead
federal agency. Since the
Program's inception in 1977, the Nuclear Assessment Program has developed
close and working relationships with its counter-terrorism counterparts in
Customs, State, FBI, DIA, CIA, and others in the nonproliferation community. The
Program also provides expert technical support to law enforcement and others for
Special Event Preparedness, on-scene technical support, and national and
international training. Since 9/11 the Nuclear
Assessment Program has performed approximately 70 assessments involving
communicated nuclear threats, reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear
materials, and special analysis reports for law enforcement and intelligence
components. This national asset
provided immeasurable support to all government agencies tasked with separating
critical from non-critical information in the aftermath of 9/11. Observations
With the transfer of these programmatic
responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security, it will be critically
important that the new Department assume the leadership to maintain the
technical base at the National Laboratories.
Upon this foundation is built our future technical capability. The
multidisciplinary scientific environment of a national laboratory is ideally
suited to pursue high risk, long-term research, in spite of the need to focus on
short-term requirements for homeland security.
It is the ability to pursue such research that makes our national
laboratories a national treasure - and a unique asset with unmatched
capabilities. Only through such
investment will the scientific and technical capability exist to meet the needs
for innovative solutions to future homeland security problems.
With respect to the remainder
of the proliferation detection program, no matter how the responsibilities are
finally apportioned, the research will be of value to both departments.
For that reason, it is critical that we work together closely.
By so doing, our nonproliferation and homeland security efforts will
continue to benefit from the unparalleled capabilities of the National
Laboratories. I support fully the concept of
locating the new Department's main research facility at Lawrence Livermore,
with satellite centers of excellence located at other national laboratories.
It will create a campus-like environment where scientists will be
dedicated, full-time, to thinking about homeland security, and it will allow for
direct interaction with the expertise that resides at the other DOE labs as well
as other labs throughout the federal government.
It's good for DOE and it's good for the Department of Homeland
Security. Conclusion
I want to reiterate in no
uncertain terms: The National
Nuclear Security Administration supports fully the transfer of the programs
noted in Section 302(2) of the bill under discussion.
The details of what would be included in the legislative package were
worked out directly with my office. These
programs are a natural fit for the Department of Homeland Security, whose
primary mission is the critical task of protecting the United States from
catastrophic terrorism. DOE/NNSA
will also work to ensure that its assets can continue to contribute enabling
science and technology in support of DHS mission needs. Obviously, that is a goal that
I am pleased to support wholeheartedly. I
believe that the Administration's proposed legislation represents a major step
toward its realization. Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may have.
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