Chairman Gillmor, Mr. Pallone and members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the 203,000
members of the National Association of Home Builders to testify on federal
brownfields legislation. My name is Gary Garczynski and I am the First Vice
President of the National Association of Home Builders. I am a home builder and
a land developer from Northern Virginia.
For the past four years, I have
been involved in developing NAHB's Smart Growth strategy and personally
working to bring together all stakeholders and interest groups for the common
goal of solving our growth concerns. As we have worked together, brownfields
redevelopment has emerged as one of the cornerstones of our efforts.
Importance of Brownfields and
Smart Growth
Brownfields are agricultural,
commercial or industrial properties that are impacted by contaminants, including
hazardous substances as defined under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and petroleum products. Historically,
developers have avoided these properties because of concerns relating to the
uncertain environmental liabilities at those properties under state and federal
environmental laws. Because of these liability concerns, brownfield properties
are typically passed over in favor of undeveloped "greenfields" sites
where potential contamination and the related liability did does not present
obstacles to development.
As you know, brownfields
redevelopment, if done correctly, presents a unique opportunity to marry
economic development with the principles of Smart Growth and environmental
protection. Brownfields redevelopment has the potential to slow the development
of open space and farmland by presenting property owners and developers with
access to brownfields sites located in desirable locations, with existing
infrastructure and affordable pricing. Additionally, brownfields redevelopment
is consistent with the notion of reestablishing our communities. Many
brownfields sites are located in urban areas or close-in suburbs within walking
distance or in close proximity to existing amenities such as transportation
systems, restaurants and shops. This proximity both fosters the sense of
community and satisfies the increasing needs of our population.
State Efforts to Address
Brownfields Redevelopment
During the past several years,
state legislatures, State environmental protection agencies and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have all proactively promoted
brownfields redevelopment through legislative and regulatory initiatives.
Currently at least 43 states have some form of brownfields legislation or
voluntary cleanup programs that actively encourage the remediation, reuse or
redevelopment of environmentally impaired property. Brownfields and Housing:
How Are State VCPs Encouraging Residential Development?, Bartsch and Dorfman,
Northeast-Midwest Institute, April, 2000. These State programs encourage
brownfields redevelopment through a combination of techniques including: (1)
credible financial incentives for investigating, remediating and reusing
contaminated properties; (2) flexible, yet certain remediation standards which
allow cleanups to reflect the actual risk posed by the contamination at a site;
and (3) transferable liability protection to all future property owners and
tenants once these remediation standards have been attained.
As one would expect, state
brownfields programs provide liability protection under state law only. The
question, then, becomes what protections exist under federal environmental
statutes for owners and tenants of brownfields sites after cleaning up the
property in compliance with state remediation standards? It is with respect to
this last question that federal brownfields legislation becomes essential.
The Need for Federal Brownfields
Legislation
Recognizing the need to create
incentives to develop brownfields properties, EPA has adopted a series of
brownfields policies and guidelines. These programs provide, among other things,
funding for brownfields assessment and remediation, job training, tax
incentives, and guidance on those circumstances where EPA may exercise
its discretion not to impose liability on a developer of a brownfields
site under federal environmental statutes.
Current federal law and EPA's
policies, in particular, do not provide and guidelines do not goliability
protection for developers or owners of contaminated property who remediate
property to state standards. Therefore , EPA may impose additional remediation
requirements at brownfields sites. Indeed, even where a developer has remediated
contamination at a brownfields site to the satisfaction of a State environmental
agency under a well established, well funded, stringent State brownfields
program, EPA retains its authority to independently require further remediation
under federal environmental statutes.
Federal environmental statutes
which require remediation of contaminated property [e.g., CERCLA; the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 et seq.
("RCRA") and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
("TSCA")] typically impose strict liability on those parties owning
contaminated property, even where those parties did not cause the contamination.
As a matter of practice, EPA rarely requires additional remediation of
brownfields properties under these federal authorities once a property has been
remediated to State cleanup standards. However, nothing prohibits EPA from doing
so. Therefore, the perceived threat of EPA intervention, rather than EPA
's actual enforcement activities to date, significantly inhibits
developers from attempting a brownfields site remediation. Simply, the
perception is the reality. Under current law, a developer has little incentive
to acquire a brownfields site and remediate it to the satisfaction of a State
environmental agency while EPA enforcement remains a distinct possibility.
Evaluation of the Gillmor June
13th Draft, the Democratic Discussion Draft and S.350
Petroleum Contaminated Sites Must
Be Accorded the Same Protection as Other Sites
To encourage builders and
developers to redevelop petroleum-contaminated sites, it is imperative that
prospective purchasers, who successfully complete a state clean-up/brownfields
program, are protected from RCRA liability and enforcement authority. The
Gillmor Discussion Draft has recognized and acknowledged that petroleum
contamination is a concern for developers. Under Section 129 of the Gillmor
Discussion Draft, in addition to CERCLA enforcement protection, the draft
provides additional liability protection under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) and
7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(A)(1(B) and 6973.
Neither S.350 nor the Democratic
Discussion Draft provides this protection. Section 129(b)(1)(A) of S.350
and the Democratic Discussion Draft provides that the president may not use the
authorities under sections 106(a) or 107(a) of CERCLA against any person
conducting or completing a response action regarding a specific release in
compliance with a State brownfields program. This section represents the
cornerstone of S.350's and the Democratic Discussion Draft's attempt to
restrict EPA's enforcement authority where a brownfields property is
remediated under a State brownfields program.
However, Section 129(b)(1)(A)
restricts EPA's enforcement authority under CERCLA alone. CERCLA expressly
applies to remediation of a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a), 9607(a). Hazardous substances, as
defined under CERCLA, expressly exempts petroleum pro ducts, including crude oil
or any fraction thereof, natural gas and natural gas liquids. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14). Therefore, S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft do not
provide any enforcement protections regarding petroleum-contaminated sites.
The absence of any enforcement
protections for petroleum contaminated sites represents an extremely significant
limitation to S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft. The General Accounting
Office estimates that there are approximately 450,000 brownfields sites
nationwide. Out of these sites, EPA estimates that 100,000 to 200,000 sites
contain abandoned underground storage tanks or are impacted by petroleum leaks. EPA
USTfields Initiative,
www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/index.html
. EPA has recognized the importance of petroleum
contaminated brownfield sites along with the current barriers that prevent EPA
from effectively addressing these petroleum contaminated sites. S.350 and the
Democratic Discussion Draft attempt to solve this problem by devoting a portion
of federal grants funding to assist in the clean-up of these sites, however only
the Gillmor Discussion Draft matches the grant funding with needed enforcement
and liability protections for developers and other prospective purchasers who
attempt remediate petroleum contaminated sites. PIn addition, petroleum
contaminated sites are obvious targets for redevelopment because of their prime
locations and the well-known and cost-effective remediation technologies
available for petroleum contamination.
As a matter of policy and logic,
there is no apparent basis for treating hazardous substance contamination under
CERCLA more favorably than petroleum contamination. On the contrary, since there
are numerous petroleum contaminated sites and these sites present attractive
development opportunities, federal brownfields legislation should provide at
least the same liability protections for petroleum contaminated sites as for
sites contaminated with CERCLA hazardous substances.
Additional Liability Protection
for Prospective Purchasers who Purchase Petroleum Sites
The Gillmor June 13th Discussion
Draft provides additional liability protection to "prospective
purchasers" under RCRA Section 7002(a)(1)(B) and 7003, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(A)(1(B) and 6973, and RCRA's provisions relating to a release of
petroleum from underground storage tanks, 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h). Whereas
S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft provide prospective purchasers with
liability protection under CERCLA alone, the Gillmor Discussion Draft has the
foresight to provide an additional level of protection for the purchasers of
petroleum-contaminated sites. Simply, the Gillmor Draft provides a greater
incentive for developers to tackle petroleum sites.
Extension of Enforcement
Limitations to Future Owners and Tenants
As I mentioned previously, any
brownfields legislation must provide for the transfer of enforcement protections
and liability protections from current owners to future owners, leaseholders, or
tenants of these properties. Existing state programs, EPA enforcement policy,
and previous federal brownfields legislative proposals all have tied the
enforcement and liability protections directly to the property, or the
contamination itself, rather than the current owner or remediator. In fact,
several EPA CERCLA enforcement policies promulgated over the past decade
consistently hold that owners of contaminated properties who did not cause or
contribute to a release of a hazardous substance, or who purchased contaminated
property after the contamination was released, are not subject to EPA
enforcement action under sections 106 or 107 of CERCLA. I am pleased the Gillmor
Discussion Draft continues this common-sense practice.
Under the Gillmor Discussion
Draft, the EPA is limited from bringing an enforcement action at a brownfields
site where a release is being remediated under a state clean up program. Tying
the enforcement limitations directly to the release at a brownfields site
affords future owners, leaseholders and tenants the much needed peace-of-mind
when contemplating the acquisition or rental of a former brownfields site.
To the contrary, the enforcement
limitations provided by Section 129(b)(1)(A) of S.350 and the Democratic
Discussion Draft apply only to a person who "is conducting or has completed
a response action regarding the specific release" under a State brownfields
program. Read literally, this language potentially excludes from S.350's and
the Democratic Discussion Draft's enforcement protections both current
developers of a brownfields site as well as future owners and/or tenants of that
site. Two examples illustrate this problem.
First, assume a property owner
seeks to sell contaminated property and agrees with the proposed buyer/developer
that the property owner will complete the required remediation under State law
prior to closing. In this circumstance, the developer will not be a person
"conducting" or "completing" the required response action
and would fall outside the protections of Section 129(b)(1)(A).
Second, assume that the proposed
developer, not the property owner, conducts and completes the response action.
Subsequently, the developer sells the property to another developer who leases
the property to a tenant. Again, neither the second developer nor the tenant
fall within the language of Section 129(b)(1)(A) because they did not
"conduct" or "complete" the response action. For these
reasons the provisions of S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft should be
amended to expressly apply to all parties who participate in the response action
and all future owners or tenants of that property.
The federal enforcement
protections under Section 129 of S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft
seriously undermine existing EPA policy by identifying only those parties who
participated in the clean up as being eligible for enforcement protections.
Federal Brownfields Legislation
Must Provide Finality
NAHB fully recognizes the
importance of EPA's enforcement role in ensuring protection of public health
and the environment. NAHB also recognizes and supports the fundamental
presumption of state primacy under all three of the bills presented here today.
Existing state brownfields programs must be the primary authority to investigate
site contamination, establish clean-up standards sufficient to protect public
health and the environment, and determine when those clean-up standards have
been achieved. For any federal legislative proposal to be successful, it must
strike a balance between two important objectives: maintaining EPA's
enforcement role and ensuring finality to prospective purchasers that have
successfully completed a state brownfields program.
Fundamentally, federal
brownfields legislation must ensure that for those sites where (a) EPA is not
currently requiring remediation under federal environmental statutes, and (b)
remediation has been completed to the satisfaction of a State environmental
agency, EPA will, as a matter of law, not seek further remediation under federal
statutes except under defined circumstances. This framework provides the essence
of needed federal brownfields legislation: creating the requisite certainty to
developers of brownfields property, removing the perception of EPA overfiling,
and providing finality in the form of statutory liability liability and federal
enforcement protections. At the same time, this framework necessarily must
retain appropriate enforcement authority for EPA, a so-called federal
"safety net," under clearly defined circumstances.
The Gillmor Discussion Draft
provides an appropriate level of certainty by prohibiting enforcement under
CERCLA Section 106, 107, or 113, 42 U.S.C. 9606, 9607, or 9613, and RCRA
Sections 7002(a)(1)(B) and 7003, 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B) or 6973. Importantly,
the Gillmor Discussion Draft, in addition to including protections for Superfund
contaminants, once again has recognized the critical necessity of providing
enforcement protection for petroleum-contaminated sites. In sum, the Gillmor
Discussion Draft couples the limitations on federal enforcement with the limited
reopeners in Section 129(b)(1)(B) to provide an effective balance between
finality and the federal "safety net."
To the contrary, S.350 and the
Democratic Discussion Draft lack the certainty and finality necessary to
overcome the perception of EPA intervention that currently inhibits brownfields
development. Clearly, intent of Section 129(b)(1)(A) of S.350 and the
Democratic Discussion Draft is to provide a certain measure of finality for
persons remediating hazardous substance contamination in compliance with State
brownfields programs. However, by limiting EPA's enforcement authorities under
CERCLA, without similar limitations on EPA enforcement authorities under RCRA,
S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft only partially accomplish this goal.
Simply stated, by limiting
Section 129(b)(1)(A) to CERCLA, a person remediating hazardous substance
contamination under a State brownfields program will be subject to potential
federal intervention under RCRA for the exact same hazardous substances.
As an example, assume that a site is contaminated with benzene in soil and
groundwater and that a developer remediates that contamination to the
satisfaction of a State environmental agency. Section 129(b)(1)(A) provides
a developer with certain protections from CERCLA enforcement. The developer does
not, however, receive any protections against a third party law suit under RCRA
Section 7002(a)(1)(B) or an EPA enforcement action under RCRA Section 7003.
For this reason, providing a
limitation on EPA's CERCLA enforcement authority alone does not resolve the
concerns regarding EPA intervention that gave rise to Section 129(b)(1)(A)
of S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft.
Federal Brownfields Legislation
Must Not Include Reopener Provisions With Insufficient Standards
As set forth above, federal
brownfields legislation must provide not only certainty and finality for site
developers and owners, but also an appropriate federal
"safety net" authorizing EPA to exercise its enforcement
authorities under federal environmental statutes in clearly defined
circumstances. These provisions, sometimes referred to as reopeners, are
contained in Section 129(b)(1)(B) of S.350 and the Democratic Discussion
Draft. The specific reopener provided for in Section 129(b)(1)(B)(iv) of
S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft is overly broad and as a result
threatens to significantly undermine the finality and certainty that S.350 and
the Democratic Discussion Draft correctly seek to achieve.
Specifically,
Section 129(b)(1)(B)(iv) of S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft
provides that EPA may bring an enforcement action if:
The Administrator, after
consultation with the State, determines that information, that on the earlier
of the date on which cleanup was approved or completed, was not known by the
State, as recorded in documents prepared or relied on in selecting or
conducting the cleanup, has been discovered regarding the contamination or
conditions at a facility such that the contamination or conditions at the
facility present a threat requiring further remediation to protect public
health, welfare or the environment. Consultation with the State shall not
limit the ability of the Administrator to make this determination.
There are two fundamental
problems with this provision. First, information known to the State "on the
earlier of the date on which cleanup was approved or completed" forms the
baseline for determining whether "new" information has been discovered
subsequently. In many instances, a State environmental agency approves a cleanup
plan and the remediator thereafter continues to generate data during the course
of designing and implementing the approved cleanup. Pursuant to
Section 129(b)(1)(B)(iv), any and all data generated during remedial
design and remedial action will be newly discovered and potentially subject the
remediator to EPA enforcement.
Second, and more significantly,
the mere existence of any new "information" such that the
contamination or conditions present any threat is a standard without boundaries.
Several examples illustrate this point. First, assume a report issued by an
organization, whether or not peer reviewed, alleges that a particular
contaminant at a site poses a marginally greater risk than previously thought.
In that circumstance, the "information" reopener contained in Section
129(b)(1)(B)(iv) potentially applies notwithstanding the validity of the report
or whether the risk remains with the range documented as part of the State
approved cleanup. Second, any migration of contaminants within a site, which is
a normal occurrence, would potentially be subject to this same reopener.
Finally, any fluctuation in sampling results, within the same order of magnitude
(even expected seasonal fluctuations) could potentially subject a particular
site to a reopener.
In sum, there is no standard
contained within Section 129(b)(1)(B)(iv) that constrains the quality,
reliability, authority or environmental significance of the new information. As
such, this reopener is potentially so broad as to eliminate the very protections
S. 350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft seek to create.
As an alternative, Section
129(b)(1)(B)(iv) of the Gillmor Draft reads:
(iv) the Administrator, after
consultation with the State, determines that contamination or conditions,
that on the later of the date on which cleanup was approved or
completed, were present at the site but were not known by the State, as
recorded in documents prepared or relied on in selecting or conducting the
cleanup, have been discovered that present a threat requiring further
remediation to protect public health or welfare or the environment and the
State will not take the necessary response action.
By replacing
"information" with "contamination and conditions," the
Gillmor draft eliminates the potential for the mere existence of any new
"information" to subject a particular site to a reopener.
"Contamination and conditions" is a concrete standard by which EPA and
the developer can quantify the level of threat at a site and whether that threat
warrants the exercise of EPA's enforcement power.
Additional Weakening Provisions
in the Democratic Discussion Draft
The Democratic Discussion Draft
contains several additional provisions that render the federal enforcement
protections contained in Section 129 virtually meaningless.
First, the Democratic Discussion
Draft includes, as an additional reopener under Section 129(b)(1)(B) that allows
EPA to reopen a site that has completed a state approved clean up if:
the cleanup of the site under the response
action plan of the State program no longer protects human health or the
environment, as determined by the Administrator or the State, because of a
change or a proposed change in the use of the site.
This reopener is overly broad and
unnecessarily undermines the finality of state-approved response actions. For
example, the reopener applies to any "change or proposed change in
the use of the Site." Pursuant to this sweeping language, even a change (or
for that matter a proposed change) from one industrial use to another would
authorize EPA to reconsider the state-approved response action. Moreover, this
reopener is unnecessary because S. 350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft
already contain a reopener where changed conditions exist.
To the extent, however, that a
specific reopener for change conditions in land use is deemed necessary, the
reopener should be drafted to ensure that it applies only to significant
changes in land use, such as a change from non-residential to residential uses.
Significant changes in land use are those which fundamentally alter the exposure
assumptions upon which the State approved the response action.
The Gilmore Discussion Draft addresses site use
changes in precisely this manner. Specifically, in section 202(c)(3), a
prospective purchaser loses its defense to liability only while the change in
site use is "inconsistent" with the terms of the state-approved
response action.
Second, the Democratic Discussion
Draft creates a litany of standards that a state program must satisfy in order
to become a " qualified" state program for the purposes receiving
federal enforcement protection under Section 129 of the legislation. The
conditions that this legislation would impose on states are nothing more than a
thinly veiled attempt to grant EPA review of existing state programs.
Furthermore, these conditions undermine the presumption of state primacy that
the Democratic Discussion Draft pretends to support.
Finally, Title IV of the
Democratic Discussion Draft creates an Advisory Commission on the Concentration
and Impact of Brownfield Sites on Minority and Economically Disadvantaged
Neighborhoods. While the impetus for the creation of this commission is
honorable, the provision contained in Section 401(c) is a direct assault on
state authority and on EPA's authority. This subsection allows for the
revocation of the federal enforcement protections granted under 129(b)(1)(A) if
the commission finds that minorities and economically disadvantaged
neighborhoods are not allowed "meaningful" public participation in the
state clean up program. This provision gives appointees, who may not have the
requisite expertise and knowledge, unprecedented control and review of state
programs and short-circuits the ability of EPA to exercise its authority under
129(b)(1)(B) of the legislation. Furthermore, the level of technical expertise
required for appointment to this commission in the fields of; health science,
risk assessment, and engineering required for appointment to this commission is
undefined. Our concern is the creation of this federal commission would result
in this commission passing judgement on state voluntary clean-up programs with
no direct knowledge of these programs. makes no mention of an expertise in the
administration of state clean up programs.
Conclusion
For four years, I have personally
sought to marry the principles of Smart Growth with a wide variety of interest
groups, governments, developers, site owners, community groups and
environmentalists to reach common ground. A cornerstone of that effort is
brownfields redevelopment. However, as attractive as brownfields development
appears, any effort that strangles private sector participation will prove to be
an exercise in futility. Federal brownfields legislation must ensure that
builders and developers receive liability protections as a means to provide
incentives for the development of these sites. Furthermore, builders and
developers must be assured that EPA will not take an enforcement action unless a
clear and limited set of circumstances warrants federal action. Without these
incentives and protections, builders and developers will remain skeptical of
acquiring and remediating brownfield sites.
It is my firm belief that the
Gillmor June 13th Discussion Draft provides builders and developers with the
necessary incentives to tackle these sites while ensuring the federal
"safety net." While S.350 and the Democratic Discussion Draft provide
certain important elements toward that end, these bills will not encourage the
development community to redevelop brownfield sites. The exclusion of meaningful
liability protection for prospective purchasers under RCRA, the exclusion of
federal enforcement protections for petroleum contaminated sites remediated
under a state program, the failure to provide protection to future owners and
tenants, and the standardless reopeners do not strike an appropriate balance
between providing certainty, finality and liability protection to brownfields
developers. I encourage the members of this subcommittee to join with Chairman
Gillmor and move forward on enacting his meaningful, workable, brownfields
proposal.
Again, I am grateful for this
opportunity to appear before you on this important issue. I look forward to
working with all members of the subcommittee. Thank you.