Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
June 5, 2002
10:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building

1. Introduction

I would like to thank the members of this committee, and particularly Chairman Upton, for holding this hearing. Spectrum allocation decisions are timely and important issues, both for commercial interests and the Department of Defense.

The Executive branch, through NTIA and the FCC adopted a "win-win" approach to a very complex and intricate rulemaking proceeding. DoD believes that the final order and future decisions by NTIA with respect to governmental systems will ensure the protection of national security and public safety while opening the door to commercial deployment of UWB. They did not accept the alternative, which was to embrace unacceptable risk, with unknown consequences. Everyone involved should be proud that the nation's spectrum resources were, in this case at least, managed in a manner that safeguarded the national interest, particularly during a time when the country faces domestic and foreign threats while allowing for commercial innovation and technological advancement.

Let me say at the outset that it is critical that you understand how the Defense Department approached the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") Ultra Wideband ("UWB") proceeding earlier this year. The proceeding, which culminated in the FCC's ruling on February 14, 2002, did not come at an opportune time for our nation's military. Post September 11 and in the midst of Operation Enduring Freedom, the proceeding took considerable time and effort on the part of our nation's Defense Department. Nonetheless, DoD understood the importance of FCC priorities and DoD played an active role trying to reach consensus and we participated in all aspects of the proceeding.

Far from being an opponent of UWB development and deployment, the Department has been an early and ardent proponent of UWB technologies and plans to use UWB to advance the nation's defense systems. The Department also recognizes that it will benefit from the operational and cost improvements that will result from commercial deployment.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense John Stenbit, my boss, clearly stated in his letter of January 11, 2002 to Michael Gallagher of NTIA, "DoD supports UWB development. However, DoD seeks to ensure that such development will proceed in a manner consistent with core national security needs and objectives.DoD, in keeping with our national defense responsibilities, cannot accept any interference with its systems." In other words, DoD was not saying "no". DoD worked hard to develop approaches to permit commercial deployment of UWB technologies in a manner that would not pose risks to sensitive and vital defense and national security systems, such as the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS.) To do anything less would have been to abdicate our constitutional responsibility.

It is important to understand why the Defense Department takes spectrum allocation proceedings so seriously. Spectrum is the life's blood of the Department of Defense. Every ship at sea, every airplane conducting missions, every forward-deployed young man or woman-especially in hard to reach locations-depends on radios and spectrum to conduct missions and to return home safely. A Special Forces team leader operating in Afghanistan was recently quoted as saying that team members could do their jobs naked, in flip-flops, as long as they had the proper radios. Information has become our most effective weapon.

This will be even truer in the future, as DoD's ongoing transformation to a network-centric military will add new demands. A DoD spectrum requirements analysis, completed prior to September 11, 2001 (and therefore likely to be an underestimate) predicted DoD spectrum usage growth of more than 90 percent by 2005. Clearly, DoD's spectrum needs are increasing due to these new operational concepts, including more extensive use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, as well as evolving strategies that require joint, dispersed forces to have greater connectivity in the "last tactical mile." In addition, there will be new demands in the arena of homeland defense. These will likely include new spectrum related missions, such as military support for major events (such as was the case in the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City), protection of critical infrastructure and emergency response. It will also include use of new technologies.

Spectrum is one of our nation's most valuable natural resources. It is not uncommon for us to use land or real estate analogies to describe spectrum. We use terms like "beachfront property"--that's how valuable it is. The reason it is so valuable is that it enables so much of the technology that many people look to in order to solve many problems. The communications and information revolution has now resulted in technologies unimagined several years ago: tiny wireless phones, wireless LANs, Internet access from virtually anywhere in the world.

The same is true for military technology. Wireless technology is particularly important for our military forces because of their increasingly mobile and flexible nature. The ongoing revolution in military operations has made information the key component of warfare. Mass of force no longer has the power it once did because our tactics are more sophisticated, as are our warfighters and the equipment they carry. The revolution in personal communications that civilians have experienced is mirrored by a similar revolution in military communications. But these technologies are even more important to the military because of the lack of a wired alternative in many military operations. We can make a call or access the Internet on a landline, but the ship captain, bomber pilot or tank commander has no other option but wireless communications. And because of the way we fight, that information is more important than ever, both to the troops in the field and to the commanders-whether they are in theater or 12,000 miles away.

As these wireless technologies have flourished, competition for the resource that enables them has skyrocketed. One only needs to look at the amount of money bid for spectrum in the most recent auctions to notice this, though not all auctions have been a success in terms of revenues. Over the past 10 years, DoD and other federal agencies have begun to relinquish 247 MHz of prime spectrum to industry. Every re-allocation of spectrum essential to military capability from DoD reduces flexibility, requires that replacement equipment be purchased or a work-around developed and erodes our realistic training. While we recognize that there are many competing needs for spectrum, including needs for commerce, important national defense needs must be a top priority.

The pressure on government spectrum will not end. Wireless technologies and other commercial uses of spectrum will continue to proliferate. UWB, like all other new technologies, is a mere stepping-stone to other technologies-we must arrive at a sound spectrum policy that allows our commercial interests to coexist with public interests. And, at the same time as commercial demands increase, so does DoD becomes increasingly spectrum constrained. It is our view that DoD will need access to additional spectrum allocations in order to meet our long-term goals of transforming to a network-centric military and to meet our obligation to protect our citizens, at home and abroad. To quote the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, "True transformation must include training and education, doctrine and organizations. As we transform our forces, we need to build capabilities that allow us to defend our interests in a wide array of situations. The key to that, in my view, are flexibility and adaptability."

Before I discuss the FCC's UWB proceeding, I'd like to share the Department of Defense's principles regarding spectrum in order to put the matter in proper context. I believe that it is useful for you to understand how the Defense Department approaches spectrum policy.

2. DoD Spectrum Principles

DoD spectrum policy is guided by certain core principles. DoD has been guided by these principles during our work with the NTIA and the FCC with regard to the UWB proceeding for the last year and it informs all of our spectrum policy. First, spectrum is a vital national resource. DoD understands that its needs must be balanced with other national needs. Therefore, it supports a US spectrum policy that balances military and economic security. DoD believes that the balance of authority between the President's spectrum manager, the NTIA, and the Federal Communications Commission, as implemented at a practical level, helps to achieve the appropriate balance. That balance must recognize that the Department of Defense must have sufficient spectrum to meet the nation's defense needs. This is a longstanding principal of national spectrum management and it should continue.

Second, spectrum is critical to DoD. It is a core enabler of what we do, and it is indispensable to national security. Therefore, we should not allow lack of sufficient spectrum to be a constraint on the US warfighter or on military capabilities. Senior DoD leadership recognizes that network-centric warfare and the military's ongoing transformation will depend on technology as a force multiplier and demands on bandwidth and access to spectrum will increase. This is true even without taking into account potential requirements of homeland defense. DoD spectrum needs should be driven by military requirements and capabilities, not spectrum allocations.

Third, DoD recognizes that it must be a good spectrum user. DoD must strive to be as efficient a spectrum user as it can be. Much of DoD's spectrum use is unique - unlike the commercial sector's drive for low cost, high revenue solutions, the DoD must put a premium on network and system reliability. DoD's core belief is that where lives are at stake, there is no margin for error - the "call" must get through. When an aircraft is guiding a precision weapon, or a commander is relaying life-saving information to troops on the ground, there cannot be "busy" signals. Some spectrum use that industry might label as "inefficient" is actually designed for anti-jam systems, low probability of intercept, and other "counter counter-measures." For the military, "efficient spectrum use" often translates into "guaranteed information delivery" and because of that, commercial standards that allow a certain percentage of built-in busy signals or dropped calls cannot be tolerated.

Fourth, DoD intends to continue investing in new, spectrum-efficient technologies. It will continue to seek to use technology to alleviate DoD's and the commercial sector's long-term needs for additional spectrum. DoD has been a major contributor to the birth of proven spectrum efficient technologies, including CDMA and software-defined radio, and, for that matter, those that show potential, such as ultra wideband technologies. Significant research is ongoing within DoD in search of efficient technologies. This research includes extensive work on such topics as adaptive spectrum usage, frequency and bandwidth agility, phased-array antenna configurations, interference mitigation techniques, congestion control technologies and numerous networking projects. In addition, DoD continually seeks to better manage its spectrum allocations.

Fifth, DoD commits to actively supporting US policies and interests in international organizations and multinational and bilateral negotiations for spectrum allocation and use. To do this, however, it is vital that the U.S. national processes recognize that in allocating spectrum according to the balance of needs among Department of Defense, commercial and other users, important national defense needs must be a top priority.

3. U.S. Spectrum Allocation Process

Every time a new technology arises the same interests must be balanced against each other: commercial interests versus national security and other public policy interests, such as aviation safety and law enforcements. We can only expect more of these regulatory balancing acts in the future, as more technologies are developed to share spectrum-or reuse it, as is the case of UWB. We must arrive at a sound spectrum policy.

There is an important point that national policy makers need to consider as we make spectrum allocation decisions. The current system places asymmetric risks on the national security and other federal incumbents. From DoD's position, if we lose spectrum or are forced to share and such sharing causes interference with vital systems, as a practical matter little can be done after the fact. Once an allocation has been made, it is difficult if not impossible to put the genie back in the bottle. As the Precursor Group, an industry analyst, says, "the FCC has never repealed authorization of a technology once granted."

DoD bears all of this risk -including the risk that our systems won't operate. The fact that vital systems might be interfered with raises concerns and uncertainties. The uncertainty caused by relocations pose serious issues for our long-term planning: will we be required to move, when will we get the money to move, will we need to retrain, will we retrain in time to be prepared to deploy in an emergency, will we need to change concepts of operations to account for degraded capabilities, will we be able to get host nation approvals to use the system in the new frequency band in all of the parts of the world we might need to do so, will our allies who bought interoperable systems now also be required to modify their existing equipment and, if so, will they pay their bill, will the new spectrum be free of interference?

We believe that the current spectrum management process creates imbalances and asymmetric risks and that these must be set straight through development and enforcement of a rational, long-term spectrum management policy that mirrors national priorities. DOD believes it is important to have a spectrum management system which recognizes that important defense needs for spectrum should be a top priority in allocation, that DOD needs long-term certainty and reliability of access to spectrum, and that, in those cases in which spectrum is reallocated from defense use to commercial use, DOD should not bear costs and risks (including financial risks) associated with the reallocation. However we implement our national spectrum policy, these national security priorities must be accommodated, in terms of how competing interests are balanced, before such a proceeding not during it.

4. FCC UWB Proceeding

I want to stress a few key points about the FCC's UWB proceeding. First, we commend FCC for making a very hard and complex decision and doing it by striking a reasoned balance. Second, we commend NTIA for their efforts and their process and role in this complex proceeding. As you know, NTIA, as the President's spectrum manager, has the authority to make decisions regarding government use of spectrum dependent systems. To the extent the FCC February decision impacts federal government use of spectrum, the Executive branch, through NTIA, had concurred.

Third, the FCC's proceeding posed new and significant issues. The proceeding proposed to approve the nonlicensed and uncoordinated emissions of ultrawide band signals into all Part 15 bands. NTIA and FCC had previously agreed that certain narrow band systems could emit at extremely low levels into certain federal government spectrum but not into so-called restricted bands, where commercial users are prohibited from intentionally emitting. Never before had the FCC and the NTIA authorized such unconstrained use of a horizontal slice of the entire spectrum including restricted bands. To the extent that NTIA has agreed to this limited use of "restricted band" spectrum in no way diminishes NTIA and DoD's understanding that "restricted bands" Are often the appropriate mechanism to protect spectrum used for essential national interests, including national security interests. Importantly, the proposed FCC rules set precedent that has the potential to eliminate protection of Government restricted bands. These are essential to national security, safety of life and economic security. In addition, the FCC was not proposing the imposition of any aggregation controls in the licensing process.

Fourth, the stakes were extremely high for our national security. None of the systems at risk from UWB is more important than the federal government systems, including the GPS and other military systems that directly support U.S. troops and public safety officials. In fact, a recent Heritage Foundation homeland security task force report listed as its number two priority, designating GPS as a critical national infrastructure. But the Part 15 emissions originally proposed by the FCC to be allowed into all spectrum, including restricted bands, were inadequate for protection of most federal systems. UWB devices can disrupt GPS operations with emission levels well below the FCC's originally proposed limits, as well as by emission spikes that would exceed those proposed limits. As a result, the proposed rules could have, among other things:

Degraded the ability to use GPS to navigate and land military aircraft and commercial airliners, threatening the lives and safety of military personnel and the general public;
Degraded the operation of government airport radars, affecting flight safety;
Risked causing interference to ground distance-measuring systems that provide vital navigation information to military and commercial aircraft, as well as to rescue stations that host military and public safety operations;
Eroded our ability to train with precision guided munitions without which so much of our modern tactics would be impossible.

Disruption of these systems by UWB operations could undermine U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism and erode homeland defense. More to the point, disruption of these operations could directly lead to loss of life among U.S. forces and American citizens.

One other reason why the UWB proceeding proved so difficult was because the technology is so new that at the outset no hard science or empirical data existed. Some in the UWB industry said they believed that UWB devices, no matter how many in use, would never interfere with existing users such as GPS. Our view was that unconstrained, aggregated and non-licensed use of UWB devices, as originally proposed, posed a severe risk of interference to existing licensed systems and, therefore, must be governed by sensible technical parameters. Other government agencies believed that even more stringent limits were needed.

Unlike traditional wireless technologies which are restricted to a specific band of frequencies, UWB emits signal energy across an extremely wide range of spectrum bands. Thus, UWB would operate, on a non-licensed basis, across many different wireless bands, in which hundreds of government and commercial users are licensed to provide hundreds of vital and needed wireless services-including vital military, aviation safety and law enforcement systems. In theory, UWB offers "free spectrum" by thinly spreading its energy over many bands. If existing spectrum users are not adversely affected, what's the harm? Yet measurements taken by NTIA and the Department of Transportation-and associated government studies-have clearly shown that non-licensed use of this technology, without proper emission constraints, could cause interference to existing licensed radio services, including public safety and critical national security systems. For example, even thinly spread UWB energy interferes with very low power signals from distant sources, such as GPS satellites which are over 12,000 miles away. In such a case, prudence is dictated because no one knows for sure - and that is what the FCC, with NTIA concurrence, essentially said.

It is worth considering, What if the FCC had come up with a different outcome? Suppose the following: First, the FCC had decided to allow unconstrained, uncoordinated use of commercial UWB devices throughout the spectrum. Second, UWB industry successfully marketed such devices so that there was widespread deployment. Third, we accept the DoD view that such aggregated, widespread use of UWB devices below 3 GHz could interfere with and hamper GPS operations, in addition to other systems. In such a scenario, the following would have occurred as a direct result of the FCC ruling: money spent on the constellation of GPS satellites would be wasted; safety would be compromised in civil and military aviation which uses GPS for navigation, including in the critical approach phase; spectrum-dependent warfighting systems which depend on GPS would be unusable, degrading our readiness, mission effectiveness and capability, while wasting millions of taxpayer dollars; and the substantial civil investment in GPS would be wasted, including taxpayer dollars, and irreparable harm to US industry that depends on GPS.

Is that an outcome that is in our national interest? Did the proponents of unconstrained use of UWB prove with any scientific facts and to any reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt that this would not happen? Did they offer DoD and the nation any guarantees? Is any risk such as this worth taking?

Rather, our view and the FCC's ruling took a prudent approach. Allow a commercial industry to develop. In fact, let it thrive. Protect national security and vital systems by imposing moderate limitations that the majority of companies felt were acceptable. Then, see what happens.

In his remarks on February 14, 2001, FCC Chairman Powell stated that the rules announced that day were "fully coordinated with the U.S. Government." The Department agrees with NTIA Deputy Administrator Mike Gallagher's analysis that section 305 of the Communications Act of 1934 preserves the President's authority to authorize use of the radio spectrum for U.S. government owned and operated stations. We are confident that our colleagues at the Commission recognize the authorities and responsibilities of the President, authorities delegated to the NTIA as the Executive Branch spectrum manager, with regard to managing spectrum in a manner that protects Federal Government systems, as set forth in the May 15, 2002 letter.

In this regard, we believe that NTIA should not treat authorization of all DoD UWB device uses in the same way as nonlicensed commercial devices. Under current NTIA Manual provisions, we are required to and do provide NTIA - and all other Federal agencies - the details of our planned UWB device use and seek NTIA authorization to so operate. We intend to continue this practice. Certain DoD present and future uses of UWB will require operation at power levels greater than those allowed for the general public to perform specific missions. DoD will operate many fewer UWB devices than the public. DoD UWB devices will be operated mainly on DoD installations and training areas under the control of the Executive branch. In the case of EMI, the UWB device can easily be located and turned off by local spectrum or command personnel. No such controls exist for UWB devices mass-marketed to the public.

We do agree with NTIA that government use of commercial off-the-shelf UWB devices authorized by the FCC in the FCC proceeding should be encouraged. When possible, we want to use such systems - in part because such use may make these systems more affordable. We support NTIA's intention to update the applicable sections of the NTIA Manual to so make clear. However, we must be free to operate high power UWB - in accordance with criteria appropriate for limited use government systems in order to fulfill military missions. Some of the military missions for which we expect to use UWB include: sniper detection/location; buried weapon cache detection; unexploded ordnance detection; and tunnel complex detection. Without these devices, we would have to send our troops directly in to harm's way in very risky missions. Other uses include, runway void detection; all weather precision formation flying; ship docking radar; and precision radar altimeters for ultra-small UAVs. Without these systems the associated functions would either be impossible or much more dangerous. The NTIA, as the President's spectrum manager, must continue to have the discretion to individually authorize DoD UWB systems at specific locations for specific times and with specific technical characteristics. DoD intends to continue to coordinate the uses of such devices to ensure protection operation of all critical federal government systems and to seek to maximize the efficient use of spectrum.

5. Result of FCC UWB Proceeding

If the goal of the UWB spectrum allocation proceeding was to meet the twin goals of (a) protecting vital national security systems from harmful interference while (b) allowing an innovative new technology to develop, then it would seem by initial indications that the FCC accomplished that goal.

DoD primarily was concerned about interference to GPS. GPS is now used by the military in almost every phase of operations. It is used in precision-guided munitions; airplanes use it for navigation; and special operations units operating in Afghanistan use it for coordination with airborne platforms and allied troops. These functions are also performed within the United States, as well. Today's military is designed to "train like they fight." This means that they use the same equipment, the same tactics and even the same frequencies in training that they will use in overseas operations to the greatest extent possible. This goal of making our training as realistic as possible is intended to prepare our troops for combat as best we can, so that when they get there casualties are minimized.

Allowing degradation to systems our troops use in the field would reduce the effectiveness of their training and increase the risk of casualties. The net effect is to cause harm to our national security. UWB operates at such a low power level, that a few UWB devices will not cause interference with critical DoD equipment. However, it is the aggregate effect of the proliferation of such devices that has the potential to cause interference. This effect is often referred to as "raising the noise level" and it occurs when the aggregate effect of many, many UWB devices raises the level of ambient noise. Correcting for this would be very difficult and expensive in systems that are currently deployed because they are engineered for the existing ambient noise level and not the heightened noise level caused by the aggregated effects of UWB devices. This aggregate effect is difficult to predict and, therefore, a "go slow" approach is the preferred way to deal with it.

The R&O contains several emission masks for the various types of envisioned UWB devices. This allows a tailored approach for each individual type of mass-marketed UWB device. The technical criteria indicated by the masks cover DoD's inputs on the draft R&O. The UWB discussion has always been "how low is low enough?" We are dealing with a new technology and feel the masks are a good compromise between allowing the technology into the spectrum on an nonlicensed basis and the need to protect vital current - and future federal and civil spectrum dependent services that have a good chance to be in the same operating area. In all cases, the 960 - 1610 MHz part of the emission mask is the most stringent, since that spectrum supports many safety-of-life radio systems - air traffic control, GPS, and others.

To allow unrestrained deployment of UWB devices could mean opening Pandora's box: once it is opened it is impossible to close and mitigating the negative effect is very difficult and expensive. There are no geographical limits on where the public might use non-licensed UWB devices or under what circumstances. For example, there isn't any reason why a mass-marketed UWB device couldn't be used in or around Reagan National Airport. The potential harm is that widespread commercial use might raise the overall noise level in localized areas to the point where RF reception by licensed services is degraded. We have practical experience with current narrowband Part 15 devices causing interference to licensed users: tactical VHF frequencies near 50 MHz are degraded at some bases due to nearby cordless phone use. This is a clear example of raising the noise floor through aggregate use-no single cordless phone can do this but together they can interfere with critical military and civil systems.

The American public would not, nor should they, tolerate such a mishandling of our spectrum resources. We, therefore, adopted sensible policies as well as technical criteria for public UWB devices that will protect the sanctity of military equipment. Nearly 90% of all federal and civil RF devices operate below 3.1 GHz - it is the most crowded part of the spectrum. Forcing UWB - initially - above 3.1 GHz is part of the Administration's overall strategy to strike a balance between the need to jump-start this technology, but in a responsible manner. One company, Kohler, currently uses UWB technology near 6 GHz, so the technical barriers must be less than envisioned for UWB use above 3.1 GHz. Building and clear path attenuation above 3.1 GHz is greater than below 3.1 GHz. Operating mass-marketed UWB devices above 3.1 GHz provides more isolation between UWB and licensed systems. Therefore, the FCC's decision that allowed for widespread deployment of UWB devices above 3.1 GHz - and out of GPS bands -was not too conservative but rather prudent and logical.

UWB technology brings great possibilities for expanding use of the spectrum because theoretically it can reuse spectrum already employed for other purposes. However, if it turns out that UWB interferes with existing users it will end up costing us far more than it saves us. We would either have to stop the use of UWB technology or move the existing systems to another band of spectrum. Both of these solutions are highly problematic and expensive. It is much better to go more slowly in the initial phases and ensure that we have a regulatory regime in place that allows for development of a new technology while maintaining the viability of the existing technologies.

6. Impact of FCC Ruling

It is too early to know the ultimate impact of the FCC ruling. Only after enough UWB devices are commercially deployed, can the real empirical evidence be gathered and measured to determine whether UWB devices at certain levels cause harmful interferences to federal and commercial systems. But statements by various parties immediately prior to or following the FCC's ruling leads to the conclusion that the FCC and NTIA got it right.

Several UWB proponents issued statements prior to the FCC ruling stating that they believed that a vigorous commercial industry could develop if UWB devices were restricted to intentional emissions above 3.1 GHz. Time Domain, a UWB proponent, issued a public statement on February 14, the day of the FCC ruling, stating that, "The FCC action enables Time Domain to deliver its patented UWB technology to the company's development partners for integration into certain products and applications, including wireless broadband links and precision radar products." Martin Rofheart, chief executive officer of another UWB firm, XtremeSpectrum, Inc., said the FCC's decision was "great for the industry and good for us."

In other words, the commercial vendors do not need to operate below 3.1 GHz in order to market UWB devices commercially. And a Washington Post article last week noted that since the FCC UWB ruling, "competition is growing" and cited a Precursor Group analyst who expressed his view of UWB-"we believe that this will be a serious threat to Blue Tooth and 802.11b."

The UWB industry needs a chance to develop the technology and prove its business case. We have seen many examples where promised technology failed to succeed in the market, even when provided with the required spectrum and policy incentives. We, other federal spectrum users, NTIA and the FCC, need time to learn how to address UWB interference. We need time to gather real world data on interference incidents - or lack of them. We need to see how the coordination process works out. We also need time to do more testing and analysis. The Department has concerns that 6 - 12 months may not be sufficient to obtain the necessary information to make further policy or technical standards.

7. Conclusion

Printer Friendly

Comment On This Page

The FCC's UWB Proceeding: An Examination of the Government's Spectrum Management Process

4. FCC UWB Proceeding

6. Impact of FCC Ruling

7. Conclusion