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Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
May 1, 2001
1:00 PM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality:
Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the proposed Electricity Emergency Act of 2001. I know
that Chairman Barton has worked hard to find legislative measures that will help
the western states deal with the electricity crisis they are now facing. While I
will comment on many of the measures currently in the bill, I must first discuss
a very important measure that is not in the bill.
Effective price
mitigation
Unless there are
dramatic improvements in supply, weather, or demand responsiveness, we are
likely to see shortages of electric generating capacity this summer with a
continuation, and probably an escalation, of out of control prices in the West.
To stem the likely economic dislocation, I believe Congress should enact
effective price mitigation for the Western Interconnection now. We need a time
out in this dysfunctional electricity market.
Under normal
circumstances, I would not recommend that market price issues be addressed
through legislation. I believe that it is the Commission's responsibility to
adopt effective price mitigation when necessary. The Commission has ample
authority to do so under the Federal Power Act's just and reasonable standard,
and acting under that standard is the more appropriate course. But circumstances
are dire as the West faces the second summer of an electricity emergency and the
Commission has failed to impose effective price mitigation. The Commission's
recent order, on which I dissented, imposes price mitigation only when reserves
drop below 7%. Yet there is evidence that sellers exercise market power in all
hours to drive up prices. Thus, with summer fast approaching, I have no choice
but to recommend that Congress act. Without more forceful and comprehensive
price mitigation, I fear for the health of the western economy as high prices
ripple through the region over the next few months.
Ideally, effective
price mitigation must apply to the entire Western Interconnection, during all
hours, must have an end point, and should be based on costs. In my prior
testimony, I described a generator specific cap that would be based on variable
costs plus a reasonable profit. There may be other ways to craft effective price
mitigation that will restore just and reasonable prices in the Western
Interconnection. I would recommend immediate Congressional action in this area.
Demand
responsiveness
Section 101
(Demand Management Agreements Clearinghouse) and section 102 (Price Mitigation
in Western Market through Demand Management Incentives) provide measures that
will help improve demand responsiveness in electricity markets. Demand
responsiveness is a critical feature that is largely absent from electricity
markets. Without the ability of customers to respond to price, there is
virtually no limit on the price that suppliers can fetch in shortage conditions.
Consumers see the exorbitant bill only after the fact. This does not make for a
well functioning market.
The demand
responsiveness provisions of the bill move in the right direction and I support
them. I support the market based approaches in the bill and observe that the
Commission may be able to use the private sector for organizing a clearinghouse
for agreements, subject to Commission oversight. I would recommend, however,
that the Commission be allowed to make a recommendation to extend the provisions
of section 102 beyond the proposed October 1, 2002 termination date, as is
allowed for in section 101.
Transmission issues
Section 103
(Transmission Constraints Study), section 104 (Path 15 Transmission Expansion),
section 105 (Tribal Energy Office), section 106 (Federal Transmission
Corridors), and section 108 (Sale of Transmission Assets to the State of
California) of the bill address important transmission issues. Identifying
transmission constraints and developing a plan for relieving them, identifying
transmission corridors across Federal land, and finally relieving the long
standing constraint on California's notorious Path 15 are all positive
developments and I support them. I must observe, however, that those provisions
are unlikely to have much impact on the market over the next several months.
I would add two
observations. First, constraints should be relieved in the least cost manner.
Constraints may be relieved by adding generation, adding transmission, or
increasing demand responsiveness. I recommend that Congress require that
constraints be relieved in the least cost manner.
And second, I
strongly believe that the major impediment to the addition of new transmission
facilities is the inability to site them. To address this problem, I recommend
empowering the Commission to site new transmission facilities. The transmission
grid is the critical superhighway for electricity commerce, but it is becoming
congested due to the increased demands of a strong economy and to new uses for
which it was not designed. Transmission expansion has not kept pace with these
changes in the interstate electricity marketplace. The Commission has no
authority to site electric transmission facilities that are necessary for
interstate commerce. Existing law leaves siting to state authorities. This
contrasts sharply with section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, which authorizes the
Commission to site and grant eminent domain for the construction of interstate
gas pipeline facilities. Exercising that authority, the Commission balances
local concerns with the need for new pipeline capacity to support evolving
markets. We have certificated 10,000 miles of new pipeline capacity over the
last six years. No comparable expansion of the electric grid has occurred.
I recommend
legislation that would transfer siting authority to the Commission or at least
establish the FERC as a backstop when state authorities fail to decide on
proposed expansions within a specified period of time. Such authority would make
it more likely that transmission facilities necessary to reliably support
emerging regional interstate markets would be sited and constructed. A strong
argument can be made that the certification of facilities necessary for
interstate commerce to thrive should be carried out by a federal agency.
Section 108 of the
bill would subject to FERC jurisdiction any transmission facilities that are
acquired by the State of California. I support the principle underlying this
recommendation but see no reason to limit its application to California only.
Congress should place all interstate transmission under one set of open access
rules. That means subjecting the transmission facilities of all municipal
electric agencies and rural cooperatives, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and
the Power Marketing Administrations to the Commission's open access rules.
In addition, all
transmission, whether it underlies an unbundled wholesale, unbundled retail, or
bundled retail transaction, should be subject to one set of fair and
non-discriminatory interstate rules administered by the Commission. This will
give market participants confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
interstate delivery system, and will facilitate robust trade by eliminating the
current balkanized state by state rules on what is essentially an interstate
delivery system.
Western-wide RTO
Section 306 of
the bill would require all entities in the WSCC to participate in a single RTO
if at least ten of the fourteen governors within the WSCC agree. I would
interpret this provision as a strong Congressional endorsement of a Western
Interconnection RTO. I wholeheartedly agree with that goal. The Western
Interconnection functions as a single market. I firmly believe that large RTOs
consistent with FERC's vision in Order No. 2000 are absolutely essential for the
smooth functioning of electricity markets. RTOs will eliminate the conflicting
incentives vertically integrated firms still have in providing access. RTOs will
streamline interconnection standards and help get new generation into the
market. A single RTO for the West will help ensure access to the western power
market, improve transmission pricing, regional planning, congestion management,
and produce consistent market rules across the West. We know for a fact that
resources will trade into the market that is most favorable to them. Trade
should be based on true economics, not the idiosyncracies of differing market
rules across the region.
To realize these
many potential benefits, RTOs must be truly regional in scope - - large and well
shaped. Markets are regional in scope - - this has been well demonstrated
recently as prices over the entire West rose and fell with events in California.
Thus, we need an RTO that covers the entire West.
I would add two
caveats to my support for this provision. First, the FERC should have the
express authority to require a single RTO for the West whether or not it is
requested by ten governors. Establishing the needed institutions for just and
reasonable terms and conditions for interstate wholesale markets is a federal
responsibility.
And second, I
recommend that the Congress clarify existing law to authorize the Commission to
require the formation of RTOs and to shape their configuration in all states,
not just those in the West. I continue to believe strongly that the development
of well structured Regional Transmission Organizations is a necessary platform
on which to build efficient electricity markets. The full benefits of RTOs to
the marketplace will not be realized, however, if they do not form in a timely
manner, if they are not truly independent of merchant interests, or if they are
not shaped to capture market efficiencies and reliability benefits.
Emergency power
sales
Section 107
prohibits orders requiring emergency sales of electricity or natural gas unless
payment is guaranteed. This is a reasonable provision and I support it. I agree
that sellers should be paid for their product. But I must emphasize the obvious:
payment should be for prices that are just and reasonable.
PURPA contracts
Section 205 of
the bill provides for the ability of a PURPA QF to sell its output to a third
party if the utility purchaser is unable to meet the payment terms of the power
purchase agreement. This is a reasonable provision and I support it.
Federal assistance
available during electric emergencies
Although section
201 (Emergency Conservation Awareness), section 202 (Preparation for Electricity
Blackouts), section 203 (Conservation at Federal Facilities), and section 204
(Daylight Savings Time) of the bill do not appear to directly implicate FERC
authority, they appear to be reasonable proposals that I would endorse.
Hydroelectric power
license conditions
Section 301
would require the Commission to promulgate a standard license article,
applicable and available to all FERC licensed facilities. The article would
permit any licensee to suspend, for up to two years, any or all of its minimum
flow requirements. The licensee's authority to invoke the article would be
triggered by an emergency declaration by the Governor of the State in which the
licensee's facilities are located.
I am concerned with
the breadth of this provision. Although the section does provide for a
consultation period, in which relevant resource agencies could express their
concerns, the licensee could suspend any minimum flow regimes previously
required by the Commission. Many of these minimum flow provisions are critical
tools in balancing power generation and resource protection.
The Federal Power
Act provides that the responsibility for determining the proper balance between
the development of hydro power and environmental protection rests with FERC. The
Commission recently encouraged Commission licensees in the West to examine their
projects for the purpose of identifying any efficiency modifications that could
result in increased generation, while identifying any environmental impacts that
could occur. This approach will allow FERC to expedite consideration and
approval of proposals to increase generation in emergency situations, while
respecting environmental considerations.
Additional
Recommendations
I made
recommendations for Federal legislation in some of the earlier sections of this
testimony. The following additional recommendations for legislation will ensure
that the nation reaps the benefits of well-functioning electricity markets.
We need mandatory
reliability standards. Vibrant markets must be based upon a reliable trading
platform. Yet, under existing law there are no legally enforceable reliability
standards. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) does an
excellent job preserving reliability, but compliance with its rules is
voluntary. A voluntary system is likely to break down in a competitive
electricity industry.
I strongly recommend
federal legislation that would lead to the promulgation of mandatory reliability
standards. A private standards organization (perhaps a restructured NERC) with
an independent board of directors would promulgate mandatory reliability
standards applicable to all market participants. These rules would be reviewed
by the Commission to ensure that they are not unduly discriminatory. The
mandatory rules would then be applied by RTOs, the entities that will be
responsible for maintaining short-term reliability in the marketplace. Mandatory
reliability rules are critical to evolving competitive markets, and I urge
Congress to enact legislation to accomplish this objective.
And second, I
recommend legislation that would give the Commission the direct authority to
mitigate market power in electricity markets. It should be clear by now that,
despite our efforts, market power still exists in the electricity industry. The
FERC, with its broad interstate view, must have adequate authority to ensure
that market power does not squelch the very competition we are attempting to
facilitate. However, the Commission now has only indirect conditioning authority
to remedy market power. This is clearly inadequate. Therefore, I recommend
legislation that would give the Commission the direct authority to remedy market
power in wholesale markets, and also to do so in retail markets if asked by a
state commission that lacks adequate authority.
Conclusion
I stand ready to assist
the Subcommittee in any way, and I thank you for this opportunity to testify.
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