Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, I
am Ellen Engleman, Administrator of the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation.
I appreciate this opportunity to provide you an overview of the
Department's pipeline safety program and the progress we are making to improve
the protection of our national energy infrastructure.
As Secretary Mineta has emphasized, our
national transportation system plays a critical role in our Nation's
economic strength. Our oil and
gas pipelines are the backbone of the Nation's energy infrastructure -- these
pipelines provide resources for our national defense; to heat and cool our
homes; to generate the power for our business enterprises and to fuel an
unparalleled national transportation system.
As overseers of the nation's 2.1 million miles
of pipelines, we hold the people's trust to ensure that vital energy resources
will be delivered safely and securely. We
execute this mission through a number of statutory charges.
We are charged with setting standards for the design, construction,
testing, operation, maintenance and repair of pipelines.
We are charged with ensuring the qualification of personnel who perform
pipeline safety responsibilities. We
are charged with responding to emergencies when pipeline systems fail. And we are charged to enforce the law, when standards are not
followed. We take our job very
seriously and I assure you, we are on the job.
Further, we are not alone in executing our
mission. Through its wisdom,
Congress sought fit to provide us with authority to share oversight of these
tasks with state agencies, who through adoption and enforcement of our
regulations, are primarily responsible for overseeing intrastate pipeline
systems. It is a close working
partnership we depend on and value. We also work closely with our regulated community, to ensure
we understand the safety and security challenges they face and to ensure that
limited resources are maximized for greatest safety benefit.
However, make no mistake, if the law is broken, we will aggressively
enforce it.
This year, we identified the need for
significant additional resources to help RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) fulfill our
responsibilities, particularly the need for additional inspection and
enforcement. The President's
budget request for fiscal year 2003 reflects the importance the Administration
places on assuring the safety of pipelines.
Considering the expectation that pipeline mileage will continue to grow
at an unprecedented rate, we need to make clear to the American people and the
pipeline industries that the pipeline safety regulator is on the job and
equipped with adequate resources to do it properly.
Understanding what the job is, RSPA clearly
faces a number of challenges. Among
the most important of these challenges is the need to improve OPS's record and
responsiveness to outstanding mandates and recommendations.
Additionally, the agency is poised to address the challenge of leading
the way on research and development of innovative pipeline safety
technologies. And finally, in the
new security environment caused by the events of September 11, we must address
the challenge of ensuring the nation's pipeline infrastructure is secure as
well as safe. I will address each
of these challenges in turn.
RECORD
At the start of my tenure, there were 65
outstanding mandates and recommendations from Congress, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the General Accounting Office (GAO)and the
Department's Inspector General (IG). In
recent months we have made great progress in completing work on half of these
outstanding recommendations. In
January, we completed four important rulemakings on integrity management,
pipeline repair, accident reporting and corrosion control for hazardous liquid
pipelines. By the end of this
month, we believe that we will address nearly 50% of the remaining NTSB, IG,
and GAO recommendations in a meaningful way, as well as the remaining
Congressional mandates, and intend to have the slate clean within a year.
To accomplish this task, we have executed an aggressive plan involving
various actions, currently underway.
First, we are better defining pipeline safety
problems and evaluating the results of solutions we put in place through
regulatory and non-regulatory efforts. We
broadened our reporting requirements, to provide better quality data
and better control the accuracy of the data.
This action will allow us to make more informed decisions regarding
safety. Additionally, we improved
our distribution of information to state and local agencies who assist us in
safety oversight of pipeline operations.
Next, we continue to fill gaps in regulation
with updated requirements on integrity management, LNG facilities, breakout
tanks, pipeline repair standards, personnel qualifications and pipeline
corrosion control. Through the
integrity management program, especially, we are improving safety standards by
using systemic safety evaluation. This performance based approach will yield specific
improvements for application to individual and unique pipeline systems, and
will add value to the effect of the standards we have in place.
We also strengthened our enforcement efforts by
making better use of all of our tools, including fines.
We are improving the enforcement process by updating internal
procedures, providing increased enforcement training and expanding the use of
automation in case processing. We
also devoted more resources to enforcement in FY 2002, and as previously
mentioned, requested further increases for FY 03.
To date, we proposed over $9 million in civil penalties in the past
year and a half. We processed six
times the number of cases in 2001 over the prior year.
And now, as our large hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management
rule is in effect, RSPA is out enforcing it.
Which means OPS inspectors have been out conducting inspections,
reviewing about 70,000 miles or about half of the mileage covered by the first rule. Based on our inspections, we estimate that as much as 80,000
to 120,000 miles of pipelines will receive added protections from this first
phase of regulation.
In the area of qualification, we are addressing
the need to improve qualifications for both operators and regulators alike.
We are particularly interested in improving the ability of operators to
diagnose and treat safety problems. Additionally,
our operator qualification rule is in effect, and we are in the field auditing
its implementation, including the use of examination methods beyond the
observation of on-the-job performance. RSPA
and State agencies trained together for auditing implementation of the rule,
and currently are in the process of thoroughly reviewing all operators'
training programs.
Also, as outside force damage is the primary
cause of pipeline failures, we are focusing efforts on damage prevention.
We are working in conjunction with the Common Ground Alliance (CGA), a
national, non-profit damage prevention organization that evolved from the
initial one-call framework established by Congress in the TEA 21 Surface
Transportation Reauthorization Act. And
I am pleased to report that national efforts in this area are bearing fruit. Damages to pipelines associated with new construction are
coming down - while construction of new housing is up 57 percent in the last
ten years, and damages to pipelines resulting from excavation are down 30
percent.
Finally, RSPA is creating a nationally uniform
oversight program that makes better use of the State resources available to
us. In September 2001, GAO closed
two recommendations concerning our use of State agencies in the areas of
inspection and enforcement. This
was accomplished through RSPA's efforts to develop new guidelines for State
participation in interstate pipeline oversight; by involving States in the
development of integrity management programs; and by holding frequent
conference calls with the States to seek input on our national security
initiatives.
As you can see, we are serious about cleaning
up our record. To date, we are
very proud of our results in these areas.
However, these actions represent the beginning of our efforts; I am
determined to further improve our record within 12 months.
Our plan to address the remaining recommendations involve a number of
RSPA actions, including: the
completion of rulemakings on integrity management, which will address
approximately one-third of the remaining recommendations; additional training
for Federal and State inspectors in advanced testing, monitoring, management
systems and processes; building on our expanded interstate agent program with
our State partners; implementing information and management systems to support
State/Federal cooperative oversight efforts; and increased enforcement.
Additionally, through our joint actions with
the CGA on damage prevention, education and outreach, we should satisfy about
another third of the outstanding recommendations.
These actions include the development of a public education standard to
guide operators' evaluation of public information; promotion of additional
"best practices" for preventing third party damage; development of a
database on excavation activities; and review of State requirements for
one-call programs. In this
effort, it is critical to share responsibility for pipeline safety and
protection of underground facilities with other utilities and local officials.
We need to encourage communication among the various stakeholders and
foster alliances in order to focus on this goal and identify specific
practices amongst the stakeholders to reduce damage. We must also continue to
broaden public awareness of safe excavation practices.
Simply put, protection of pipelines from third party damage is a shared
responsibility.
RESEARCH
Our next primary challenge is fulfilling a
leadership role in research and development of innovative pipeline safety
technologies. At RSPA we see a
need for technological breakthroughs in the development and use of innovative
technologies to provide true safety advances.
Based on our success with previous collaborative efforts, such as
one-call, we recognized that we could facilitate a role in this area.
Taking the initiative, RSPA developed a comprehensive research and
development plan, or a multi-year "blueprint" or technology map, if you
will. This action was done in
cooperation with DOE, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the
Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service, as well as a
broad-based group of State and industry stakeholders. As part of this plan, we established four areas of focus:
Damage Prevention and Leak Detection; Enhanced Operations, Controls and
Monitoring; Improved Materials; and Mapping and Information Integration.
Based on this plan, we intend to have 80 percent of the R & D
identified in the plan, complete within three years or less.
I want to be clear, that we are focused on near-term technology results
that will be useful and competitively ready for the marketplace in a short
time frame.
Additionally, through the President's budget
request for 2003, we are asking to consolidate pipeline safety research
activities previously undertaken by DOE, within RSPA to reduce duplicative
efforts among federal agencies. Within
this consolidated approach, we will promote clear accountability for safety
outcomes and ensure integration of activities among the public and private
sector.
In sum, through our R&D efforts, we will
place greater emphasis on integrity management tools and practices for
distribution companies; we will consider practical options for improved leak
detection; we will continue development of techniques, particularly direct
assessment, for evaluating pipelines that cannot be inspected with current
in-line inspection techniques; and we will pursue development of improved
techniques for real-time monitoring of pipelines, including use of satellites,
acoustics and unmanned aerial vehicles.
SECURITY
We are also addressing security issues for
pipelines through our Office of Pipeline Safety.
RSPA oversees the safety and security of the nation's 2.1 million miles
of pipelines. The security of our
pipeline system is of strategic importance due to the large volumes of
materials transported by pipeline and their critical importance to the
National economy as well as defense. The
events of September 11 provided us a unique understanding of the state
of security preparedness within the pipeline industry -- and we discovered
there is work to be done. To
ensure that pipelines are secure to the maximum extent possible, we are now
taking a number of measures. Additionally,
we are cooperating with the new Transportation Security Administration, to
ensure we provide a unified approach to meeting transportation security
challenges.
Initially, on September 11th, we responded immediately to security concerns
for our Nation's pipeline systems by making over 1,000 telephone calls
jointly with our State partners to pipeline operators, to assess the security
at pipeline facilities and to monitor events.
In recent months, we streamlined this communication process, in
coordination with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and incorporated it into our daily operations for distribution
of security information and threat warnings.
Along with improving our communications capabilities, we are securing our own
information systems. One action
on securing information concerns the National Pipeline Mapping System,
accessed by a website. To reduce
the opportunity for misuse, we limited accessibility to the website by
installing a password protection system. We are also processing security clearances for key federal,
state and industry security personnel, and conducting conference calls every
two to three weeks with all the pipeline safety agencies to review recent
developments, toward the goal of providing a seamless Federal and State
oversight program of pipeline security.
Realizing that we cannot address the security challenge alone, we
called on the pipeline industries to work with us in further assessing
vulnerabilities, identifying ways to improve protections for pipeline
facilities, and developing plans to improve response and recovery
preparedness. Based on this
outreach effort, we encouraged the development of consensus standards for
security practices. We
participated in the development of these standards, and we included DOE and
state pipeline safety agencies in this process. We are now incorporating these security practices into a
pipeline contingency plan, and are tiered to correspond with the Office of
Homeland Security's threat warning levels.
We are also at the stage of implementing a coordinated set of protocols
for our inspectors to use during inspections of pipeline facilities to ensure
operators are putting security practices into place at critical facilities.
Additional RSPA efforts are focused on
improvements to public and private sector planning for response and recovery.
The primary needs in this area include improved communications with
local authorities and identification of methods/resources necessary to
expedite the return to service of a pipeline, in the event of an attack.
With regard to recovery, this involves identifying critical spare part
inventories for rapid restoration of pipeline service, and establishing
relationships among the operators to share their resources.
The benefits of such actions will not be limited to terrorist
incidents, but will also accrue in the event of natural disasters or pipeline
accidents. Additionally, we
formed a work group with DOE to assess the role of Federal-level emergency
authorities in the rapid restoration of service.
In sum, the experience we gained from the events of September convinced us of
the need for an integrated role for safety, system integrity and security to
maintain a reliable national pipeline system.
The consequences of a major pipeline failure, whether intentional or
unintentional are potentially the same -- that is loss of life, injury,
property loss, environmental damage and disruption of critical fuel supplies.
I am pleased to inform you that OPS security activities are integrated
fully within our safety operations.
CONCLUSION
RSPA is committed to addressing the many
challenges before us and we have a vision of how to accomplish our goals.
We have a plan to address the outstanding mandates and recommendations,
and we are cleaning up our record. We
are strengthening our regulatory structure through a systemic, comprehensive
approach to safety evaluation; and aggressively enforcing our requirements.
We are taking a leadership role in advancing technology for pipeline
safety. And in coordination with
the Transportation Security Administration, State agencies and the pipeline
industries, we are addressing pipeline security issues.
Overall, all of these efforts will provide greater accountability for
safety outcomes, which can result in greater public confidence in the safety
of America's pipeline systems.
However, our efforts alone are not enough to
raise the public's confidence in the pipeline safety program -- we need
reauthorization of the program. Commercial
and residential energy demands are growing; urban centers are expanding and
moving closer to rural pipelines; and our national defense demands a reliable
energy supply -- yet, citizen concerns over pipeline safety have resulted in
delays of new construction or rehabilitation of existing pipelines.
This does not serve the public's interest -- and we must act.
American citizens need to know we are upholding their trust.
They need to know we are doing everything possible to ensure the safety
and security of pipeline systems, and they need to know we are authorized and
provided the resources necessary to accomplish our job.
Toward this goal, we are very pleased that Congress is renewing its
efforts on this front, and we offer our assistance in any way possible to
complete your work.
Again, I wish to thank the Subcommittee for
this opportunity to share an overview of the pipeline safety program and our
vision of how to accomplish pipeline safety, research and security efforts.
I would be happy to answer any questions.