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Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
March 14, 2002
10:00 AM
2322 Rayburn House Office Building
Good morning Mr.
Chairman and members of the Committee. My
name is Joe Dilg. I am the Managing
Partner of Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. Vinson
& Elkins, founded in 1917, is now an international law firm of approximately
850 lawyers. My partner Ron Astin
is with me to assist in answering the Committee's questions.
From 1991 until
December 2001, I served as the Vinson & Elkins partner primarily responsible
for coordinating the firm's relationship with Enron.
In this role, I coordinated much of the legal work performed by Vinson
& Elkins for Enron through all of our offices.
Although Mr. Astin and I each personally worked on many Enron matters, we
were directly involved in only part of Vinson & Elkins' work for Enron.
This statement, as
well as the testimony that Mr. Astin and I will provide, is based solely upon
our individual personal knowledge and best recollection of the events.
We cannot purport to know and thus be able to speak to all of the
knowledge and information possessed by all lawyers at our firm.
Since Enron's
bankruptcy, there have been reports and statements that inaccurately describe
the role Vinson & Elkins played and the advice we gave.
We look forward to responding to questions as fully as possible because
we are confident a full exploration of the facts will show that our firm fully
met its professional obligations.
First, let me say
that the lawyers of Vinson & Elkins are greatly saddened by the financial
collapse of Enron. Many outstanding
and decent people who worked at Enron and their families have been greatly
harmed. Likewise, many Enron
investors have unfortunately lost a great deal of money.
Many cities like Houston will be harmed by the loss of the very
significant business and civic contributions of Enron and its employees.
Our work for Enron
consisted of a large number of specific projects for which we were selected by
Enron's legal department. In the
Enron bankruptcy filings, Enron listed more than 400 law firms as having
represented Enron. Enron was a
significant client for a number of major law firms.
Enron's legal
affairs were directed by a highly sophisticated in-house legal department
consisting of approximately 250 attorneys.
Enron recruited and employed experienced, highly capable, and well
qualified attorneys, many of whom had previously practiced in large law firms.
Pursuant to Enron
corporate policy, Vinson & Elkins and other outside attorneys were employed
by and directed to interface with Enron's legal department, not Enron's
executives.
Despite our sadness
over the collapse of Enron, we remain proud to have served as Enron's counsel
in many matters. Our representation
of Enron provided interesting and challenging legal work on highly visible
matters, and it was a pleasure to work with their very able in-house counsel.
In representing Enron, our lawyers worked closely with many of the
world's leading investment banking firms, commercial banks, and law firms.
We provided Enron with quality legal services, and we fully met our
professional and ethical obligations in rendering those services.
Much of the
Committee's attention and the media's coverage of the relationship between
Enron and Vinson & Elkins has focused on a preliminary review conducted by
Vinson & Elkins into allegations made by an Enron Vice President, Ms.
Sherron Watkins, in a letter and supplemental materials delivered to Mr. Kenneth
Lay in August of 2001. We are
pleased to have an opportunity to discuss that matter.
Ms. Watkins raised
serious issues. Contrary to some
public reports and the implication of some previous statements made in hearings
conducted by this Committee, Vinson & Elkins did not advise Enron that there
were no problems. Our written report pointed out significant issues, including
the credit problem in the Raptor vehicles, the aggressiveness of the accounting,
conflicts of interest, litigation risks, and the risk of credibility-harming
media attention.
The report did
conclude that no further investigation was necessary because the appropriate
senior level officers of Enron were fully aware of the primary concerns Ms.
Watkins wanted Mr. Lay to address -- and had in fact already addressed them. Mr. Fastow had resigned from his position with the LJM
partnerships, eliminating the conflict of interest problems raised by Ms.
Watkins and earlier by Mr. McMahon. Prior to the delivery of our final written
report, the Company terminated the Raptor entities which were the primary focus
of Ms. Watkins' concerns. The
Company reported in its earnings release for the third quarter of 2001 a loss of
more than $500 million attributable to the termination.
The bankruptcy of
Enron in December of 2001, approximately six weeks after we delivered our
written report, has been the subject of numerous published analyses which have
made clear that Enron faced very significant business challenges.
Enron had made major and highly publicized investments in the broadband,
water, international infrastructure, and retail electric businesses, all of
which had resulted in significant illiquid capital investments and large losses
for the company. The price of
Enron's common stock had already declined approximately 60 percent from August
2000 to August 2001, when Mr. Skilling's resignation created even more
uncertainty about the company. At
the same time, Enron's online trading through Enron Online and the related
dependency on trade credit from its counter-parties was experiencing explosive
growth.
In hindsight, there
appears to be a consensus that these events, coupled with impending maturities
of a significant amount of debt and the turmoil in the financial markets created
by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, placed Enron in an extremely
vulnerable position in the fall of 2001. No
one can deny, however, that the adverse publicity associated with the related
party transactions and the accounting errors related to the November restatement
announcements contributed to the loss of confidence Enron experienced in energy
trading and financial markets. This
confidence was critical to the continued success of Enron's trading
operations, which accounted for a significant portion of Enron's business.
With regard to the
related party transactions, it is important to consider the role of legal
counsel. If a transaction is not illegal and it has been approved by
the appropriate levels of a corporation's management, lawyers, whether
corporate counsel or with an outside firm, may appropriately provide the
requisite legal advice and opinions about legal issues relevant to the
transactions. In doing so, lawyers
are not approving the business judgment of their clients.
Likewise, lawyers are not responsible for the accounting treatment of the
transactions.
In conclusion, I want
to make it very clear that we are confident that Vinson & Elkins fully met
its professional responsibilities in connection with our representation of
Enron. We are pleased to assist in
the Committee's deliberations and are happy to answer your questions, within
the constraints of our professional responsibilities to our clients.
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