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Full Committee on Energy and Commerce
February 6, 2002
12:30 Noon
345 Cannon House Office Building
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E
L A B O R A T I O N S
- Corporate
Disclosure: From Financial
Reporting to Comprehensive Disclosure
21st
century business enterprises are fast changing; involved in a complex network of
alliances, joint ventures, partnerships and other related entities; and derive
their value and growth primarily from intangible assets (patents, brands,
knowhow, unique organizational designs).
The
traditional accounting system, and its major product-the publicly-released
financial reports-essentially reflect past transactions (sales,
purchases, borrowing, etc.) only, and recognize physical and financial
assets (plant and equipment, securities), to the exclusion of most
intangible assets. Such
narrowly-based, backward-looking corporate reports are ill-suited to provide the
information needed by investors, creditors, and policymakers (e.g., for national
accounting measurements). Primarily
missing from current financial reports are:
1.
Networking activities
A
hallmark of the modern corporation is its involvement in a wide range of
corporate activities conducted through alliances, joint-ventures, partnerships,
and special purpose entities. For
example, pharmaceutical, biotech, and chemical companies are conducting much of
their R&D and marketing activities through alliances and joint ventures, as
do software developers, and special purpose entities are often used to shift and
optimize ownership and risk. There
are solid economic reasons for most of these networking activities, although
occasionally they are abused.
Most
of these wide ranging activities are either ignored or improperly reflected in
corporate financial reports, adversely affecting the information available to
investors and creditors, and creating incentives for misrepresentation and
fraud.
2.
Unexecuted Obligations
The
current, transaction-based accounting system practically ignores most unexecuted
obligations and contractual arrangements, despite the fact that they can create
major liabilities in the future.
Thus, for example, Enron's alleged obligations to cover SPE's losses
were not reflected in its financial reports.
More
broadly, firms' myriad unexecuted obligations to and contractual arrangements
with alliance partners, suppliers, and financial institutions (e.g., debt
securitzation) are deficiently reported, if at all.
This creates significant incentives to misrepresent the true obligations
profile of the company, and distorts the true economic situation of the
enterprise.
3.
Intangible Assets
In
today's economy, physical and financial assets are largely commodities (i.e.,
competitors have equal access to them, such as Merck and Pfizer's access to
the best lab equipment and information technology).
Value and growth, of both corporations and nations, is primarily derived
by unique intangible assets, such as patents, brands, and trademarks, as well as
unique organizational designs (e.g., supply chains) and knowledge management
systems.
The
current, industrial era-based accounting system regards most intangibles as
expenses, as if they were devoid of future benefits, thereby introducing serious
biases to corporate balance sheets and income statements.
It has been empirically shown that these reporting deficiencies cause
serious social harms, such as excessive cost of capital, large insider gains,
and manipulation of financial reports.
4.
Risk Exposure
The
traditional accounting system, focusing on assets/liabilities and the outcomes
of operations (income, cash flows) essentially ignores the risk exposure of
business enterprises.
The
fast growth of financial innovations in the last 20 years (derivative
instruments for hedging and speculation, debt and other assets' securitization,
employee stock options, etc.) expose companies and their shareholders to
considerable and difficult to quantify risks.
In the early 1990s, the SEC instituted various requirements for risk
disclosure in prospectuses and financial statements.
These, however, resulted in extensive yet largely meaningless boilerplate
statements enumerating every possible risk "under the sun," and insufficient
specific risk disclosures.
Particularly
missing are results of comprehensive risk-related stress-tests, informing
investors of the earnings and asset/liabilities consequences of expected changes
in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity (e.g., oil) prices, or
changes in the economic conditions of countries where the company has major
operations.
The
Solution:
Current
financial reports should be expanded to comprehensive disclosures,
portraying in addition to the consequences of past transactions (the current
system), a fair representation of the networking activities of the company, the
obligations undertaken (executed as well as unexecuted), and its risk profile.
Assets should include both tangible and intangibles.
This is, of course a major endeavor, but a possible one, if such a
comprehensive disclosure will be placed on the top of standard-setters (FASB,
SEC) agendas.
It
is important to emphasize, particularly in the current Enron-intensive climate,
that the major benefit of the proposed comprehensive disclosure system is to
improve resource allocation in the economy and enhance the integrity of capital
markets. The rooting of occasional
misrepresentation and fraud is an important, yet secondary objective.
II.
Auditing
The
auditing of public companies by external auditors is in many cases an "all in
the family" affair. Auditors are
in too many companies effectively appointed and reappointed by managers,
who also have a significant say in the audit fees.
Auditors' rotation is very low; quite frequently auditors serve the
same company 10-20 years, or more (much of the auditors' rotation, as is, is
due to frequent mergers and acquisitions by companies rather than to inadequate
service.) Cases in which auditing
personnel switch without a cooling off period to work for clients proliferate,
as are cases in which auditors engage in lucrative consulting with audit
clients. Such close arrangements
and relationships between auditors and auditees are manifestly inconsistent with
independent, effective and high quality auditing services.
Yet
another dimension of the "all in the family" is the fact that the
auditors' trade association-the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA)-is in charge of promulgating auditing standards (GAAS), on
which in turn, the audit report relies. This
uniform report is long on hedging (e.g., "the financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management") and short on information
relevant to investors and creditors. To
top it all, the industry oversight is performed by "peer reviews" conducted
by other auditing firms. It was
widely reported in the media that in the last two decades this peer review did
not publicly sanction a single "big five" accounting firm.
The
Solution:
A substantive revamp of the auditing industry along the following lines.
-
Auditor
selection by shareholders. This
is a drastic change from the current procedure, where managers and board
members effectively select and reappoint auditors.
Shareholders, using a process similar to the frequently used "proxy
contest," will be asked to appoint auditors, based on competitive bids,
for a five-year term. Only such
an appointment will effectively sever managers-auditors link.
Some argue that this can be achieved by the board's audit
committee. But board members
are also selected by managers.
It's
easy to dismiss this proposal by saying that shareholders don't have the
required information to make auditor choices.
Such a condescending approach ("we know, but owners don't") is
flawed on its face. In
addition, Hewlett Packard (H-P), for example, will soon put to a shareholder
vote the largest acquisition ever in the high tech sector (Compaq).
If shareholders can be trusted to make such a complex decision, why
can't they be trusted to choose auditors.
Of course, the main choice will be made by the generally
well-informed institutional investors who are holding large blocks of
shares, in most companies.
-
Consulting
to audit clients. It's
attractive in the current climate to demand a complete ban on consulting to
audit clients. I prefer a
consulting cap of 25-30 percent of audit fees.
The reason: As an
educator, I can testify to the considerable difficulties accounting firms
encounter in attracting young, qualified personnel.
Put plainly-it's not very attractive to work for accounting
firms, particularly post-Enron. It
is, therefore, important to retain elements of challenge and excitement in
the accounting career. Consulting
provides such an element.
-
Jumping
ship. Engagement partners
(the people in charge of the audit) should not be allowed to switch
employment to clients, without a cooling-off period of a year, at least.
-
An
expanded audit report. The
current, information-challenged audit report should be replaced with an
open-ended document, where auditors report to shareholders and creditors on
various key subjects, in addition to the conformity of financial statements
with the company's financial position (the current report). Such key issues include the adequacy of corporate governance
systems and internal controls, unusual risks facing the company, and
questions and suggestions raised by auditors in the audit process, but left
unanswered by management. Of
course, if auditors will be selected by shareholders, additional tasks can
be placed on them (e.g., report on the consequences of mergers and
acquisitions).
-
Joint
accounting-auditing standard setting.
Accounting standards are set by the FASB, and auditing standards by
the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), affiliated with the auditors' trade
group-the AICPA. Since
financial reporting (accounting) and auditing issues are intertwined, it
makes sense to combine these activities in one standard-setting body.
Such a joint standard-setting process will have the added advantage
of detaching the setting of auditing standards from the industry.
-
A
need for oversight? The
peer review oversight of audit firms is currently much maligned. What should replace it?
Perhaps nothing. The
above mentioned proposals, if instituted, will create a vibrant, truly
competitive and independent auditing profession, that probably does not
require a formal oversight beyond the current SEC, courts, and shareholders
having a real power to remove auditors.
III.
Enforcement
Two
important elements are currently missing, in my opinion, from the
auditing-accounting enforcement systems: a quick-reaction investigatory body and
transparency.
-
¨
Quick-reaction investigation body.
This suggestion was raised by several commentators on the Enron case. The proposal is to establish an organization that will
promptly and thoroughly investigate corporate accounting/auditing failures,
and make the findings publicly available.
I strongly endorse this suggestion, and add several elements. Investigation cases should not be limited to "post
mortems," such as Enron. They
should start much earlier in the process and thereby retain the important preventative
element. For example, every
case of significant restatement of earnings (numbering in the hundreds each
year) should be investigated. Also,
employees, like Enron's Ms. Watkins, could ask for this body's
investigation.
I
propose that this investigative body be independent of the SEC, and funded
by a miniscule levy on stock trade. After
all, investors will be the main beneficiaries of this body.
An idea for funding: Total number of shares traded in the U.S. during
2000 was 718 billion shares. A
levy of 1 cent per 100 shares will raise $71 million a year, sufficient to
fund an active and efficient investigative body (the National Transportation
Safety Board's recent annual budget was $57million).
-
¨
Transparency. Much
of the examinations and investigations currently conducted with respect to
financial reporting and auditing issues is not open to the public.
Consequently, such investigations contribute little to learning and
deterrent in capital markets, in corporate boards and accounting firms. For example, most of the correspondence between the SEC and
public companies is closed to the public, as are securities litigation
settlements (over 90% of securities lawsuits).
I
propose to thoroughly review the SEC disclosure procedures, and increase
significantly the transparency of correspondence and investigatory material,
unless it is highly likely harmful to companies and their shareholders.
-
Not
directly related to accounting/auditing, but very important nevertheless is
a prompt reporting of insider trading.
Currently there is a lag of 20-25 days on average, between trade and
reporting to the SEC. There is
absolutely no justification for such a long delay. Insider (e.g., corporate officers and board members) trading
should be electronically reported to the SEC and made public no later than
the day following the trade. This
will alert investors and creditors in real time to important information
available to managers.
IV.
Postscript
The
analysis, proposals and suggestions outlined in this document are not just aimed
at preventing future Enrons and its audits.
More broadly and importantly, they are aimed at enhancing corporate
disclosure and the effectiveness of audits, which are necessary conditions for a
fast growing economy, well-functioning capital markets, and ethical and
equitable corporate behavior. The
pursue of these high level social goals, is the major purpose of the proposed
corporate reporting and auditing reforms.
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