1. CAPTAIN ORRIK'S RELEVANT EXPERIENCE IN U.S. NAVY AND IN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

2. OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS RESPONSE EVALUATIONS (OSREs) ARE PERFORMANCE BASED TACTICAL FORCE-ON-FORCE EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY NRC ON SITE AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TO ASSESS THEIR ARMED RESPONSE (OR COUNTER TERRORIST) CAPABILITY. FROM 1991 TO 2001, NRC HAS IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES AT 46% OF THE PLANTS.

3. CURRENTLY, ALL 65 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES ARE AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS.

4. NRC ORDERED SPECIFIC SECURITY UPGRADES ON FEBRUARY 25.

5. NRC ESTABLISHED OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE ON APRIL 7.

6. NEW, OR INTERIM, DESIGN BASIS THREAT NEEDED TO PROVIDE A COMMON YARDSTICK FOR INDUSTRY TO MAKE APPROPRIATE UPGRADES AND NRC TO ASSESS UPGRADED SECURITY

7. RESUMPTION OF NRC INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS (i.e.,. OSREs) NEEDED. INDUSTRY SELF-ASSESSMENT NOT APPROPRIATE POST SEPTEMBER 11.

TESTIMONY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss security at commercial power plants licensed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I will note my qualifications in these matters, recent relevant history of security at these nuclear power plants, and recent and still-needed actions by NRC.

I am a retired U.S. Navy Captain. I am qualified for, and have served in both Naval Surface Warfare and Naval Special Warfare. I had combat duty in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965 as a Naval Advisor to the South Vietnamese "Junk" and Riverine Forces. I have commanded a U.S. Navy Destroyer and, in1977 through 1981,as the Director of the Nuclear Weapons Division for the Naval Sea Systems Command, I was responsible for the Safety, Engineering and Security of tactical nuclear weapons and for the security of conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. I have been with NRC for 17 years, and have been team leader or program manager for the operational safeguards response evaluation (OSRE) program since its inception in 1991.

The OSRE is a performance based evaluation of the armed response capability at nuclear power plants. It uses table top time line drills and force-on-force exercises on site to test a plant's protection strategy and its execution by its armed response force. It is essentially the only test of a plant's anti-terrorist capability. However, plants were scheduled for an OSRE only once every eight years. Each OSRE was also scheduled from 6 to 10 months in advance, and each OSRE followed the same agenda and used the same NRC design basis threat, or less for the test. The utilities provided the adversary teams. NRC chose the targets for the exercises and advised the adversary team as to tactics. Eighty-one OSREs have been conducted to date. At 37 of them, the expert NRC team identified a significant weakness; significant being defined as the adversary team simulating sabotaging a target set, which would lead to core damage and in many cases, to a probable radioactive release. It is important to note that, even with adequate time for the plants to prepare and make themselves ready for the OSRE, that 46%still had a weakness in armed response. The happy side of this coin is at least twofold. First, as NRC identified weaknesses, the utilities corrected them. Second, I once asked a plant security director if he thought the OSRE was a learning experience. He replied, no, but that preparing for an OSRE was a big learning experience. That is reflected in a major improvement in the industry's armed response or counter-terrorism capability since 1991.

Currently, all 65 nuclear power plant sites are at a heightened state of readiness with regards to a terrorist attack as a result of NRC advisories. And, they are now doing further upgrades as specified by the NRC in the orders of February 25, 2002. Many of the upgrades are a direct result of special security assessments that the OSRE expert team was tasked to conduct at six plants' in December, 2001. Another significant action by the NRC was the establishment of the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response on April 7, 2002. This was strong agency recognition of the increased importance and visibility of counter-terrorist security at America's nuclear power plants.

In a parallel action, your Committee and the House of Representatives has approved legislation addressing the increased national concern about security at America's nuclear power plants. My understanding is that this legislation, among other things, would require NRC to adopt a new design basis threat that addresses the heightened security concerns raised in the aftermath of September 11. This highlights the need for quick NRC action to establish a new and more formidable design basis threat, interim or final.

The lack of anew/interim design basis threat is having a negative impact. Plant security directors all have the same plea; what is the new, or interim, design basis threat? They want to buy equipment, such as bullet resistant enclosures, but don't know what level of protection is going to be needed. They want to be ready to train their personnel, but against what threat? NRC cannot begin effective performance testing with the OSRE team without knowing what the yardstick is, so, until the design basis threat is established, we cannot effectively test the new upgraded security levels that NRC has ordered. Further, the new design basis threat is needed to establish just what level of capability the nation, and NRC, will require of the licensees, and what other capabilities will have to come from other sources, e.g, the federal government. Further, the capability "'mix" could be site-specific.

Resuming performance based testing of nuclear power plants' armed response capability is critical to assuring that nuclear power plants are adequately protected against the new levels of terrorist threat contemplated after September 11. Before September 11, NRC had agreed to a pilot program, called Safeguards Performance Assessments - or SPA - wherein the industry would self-evaluate their armed response capability. Self evaluation, post September 11, is a step in the wrong direction. Further, the industry's track record pre-September 11 does not support such an action. In the OSREs conducted to date, it can be assumed that each of the 81 plants had prepared and felt that they were ready to meet the challenge of OSRE force-on-force exercises. Thirty-seven, or 46% were not. That 46% holds true even for or the last two years of OSREs. The SPA pilot program should be canceled. Independent performance evaluations are needed to evaluate plants' strategy and ability to execute that strategy, to identify weaknesses and strengths, and to assure not only correction of weaknesses, but to assure that nuclear power plants reach and maintain the performance level that the nation, via NRC, demands of them.

The only major problem with the previous OSRE program was its frequency, once every 8 years. The SPA was proposing an evaluation every 3 years. NRC has the assets, knowledge, and experience to conduct OSREs every 3 years. It could be a important task for and contribution from the new Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. Resuming OSREs would be fulfilling NRC's fundamental responsibil1ity of protecting public health and safety. Allowing industry self-assessment would be an abrogation of NRC/governmental responsibility.

The SPA had another good element, that of requiring periodic training and exercising of the plants' armed response capability at various levels of complexity. That idea too should be incorporated into NRC rule-making for renewed, and more vigorous, performance assessment of nuclear power plants.